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JANUARY, 1916 —————— APRIL, 1916

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Edited by HAROLD COX

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The Edinburgh Review

JANUARY, 1916 No. 455

THE UNITY OF FRANCE

1. **La Patrie en Danger.** Par GUSTAVE HERVÉ. Paris: Bibliothèque des Ouvrages Documentaires. 1915.
2. **L'Âme Française et la Guerre: L'Union Sacrée.** Par MAURICE BARRÈS. Paris: Émile-Paul Frères. 1915.
3. **Contre les Barbares (1914–1915).** Par PAUL MARGUERITTE. Paris: E. Flammarion. 1915.
4. **Péguy.** Par ANDRÉ SUARÈS. Paris: Émile-Paul Frères. 1915.
5. **Enquête sur la Jeunesse: La Revue hebdomadaire.** Paris: Librairie Plon. 1912.
6. **Paris pendant la Guerre.** Par FERNAND LAUDET. Paris: Perrin et Cie. 1915.

WE are all of one mind in admiring, and often with an admiration bordering upon amazement, the magnificent temper in which the heroic French nation has faced its stupendous hour of trial. But there is a danger that the nature of the national fortitude should be misapprehended in this country, and as a fact much has been hastily said on this subject in the English press which is not founded on a close study of recent history. From every point of view it is unjust and unseemly to proclaim our surprise at the heroism of the French, and to assume that the calm of the population, and its confidence, and its unity, are due to a

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sudden miracle supernaturally brought about by the act of mobilisation in August 1914. To assert this, and to talk, as too many English publicists have done, of a New France, created at the moment of the declaration of war on purpose to resist the advances of Germany, is not merely, in our opinion, to state a matter of history incorrectly, but it is to do a grave injustice to the intelligent evolution of French sentiment. The France which is now so gallantly fighting with us and with the rest of the Allies to prevent the triumph of Teutonic evil is simply the France which has long been in preparation for a life-struggle with the powers of darkness.

Those who detested France and had every spiritual and material reason for depreciating her values continued to repeat, with nauseous iteration, that she was in full decadence, and that her race was eaten out to the core by the white ants of social disorder. The disputes of radicals and moderates, of socialists and reactionaries, of anti-militarists and clericals, were pointed to with glee as the evidences of ethical chaos in a bewildered people, and events like the Caillaux trial and its result saddened the best friends of France as much as they were exulted over in Berlin. What has not been understood has been the superficial character of these symptoms. The pretended levity of Paris was all on the surface, and even there, if the exotic elements were eliminated and the action of the parasitic population removed, there was little for a formalist to condemn or even reprove. What in the charming gaiety of the French might seem, in face of the most painful contingencies of the moment, to be frivolous, was thrown like a gauze veil over the harsher lines of life. This complaint of the levity of France is one of the poorest excuses which dulness can make for its own want of amiability. No one has put the matter more vividly than Voltaire when he says : ' Il me semble que la vertu, l'étude et la gaieté sont ' trois sœurs qu'il ne faut point séparer.' For our own part, so far from reproaching France with her frivolity, we should be inclined to regret the increasing seriousness of the national countenance, which of late years has seemed less and less ready to break out into those ripples of laughter which have always fascinated the nations. Yet, if France has of late laughed less, her smile has on occasion been more beautiful than ever.

There is more reason in the objection that has of recent years been brought against the French people for an apparent want of internal harmony and evenness in its treatment of political and social aims. In the ardent struggles of French thought during the last two decades, it has, indeed, been sometimes difficult to trace that continuity of purpose which should be the aim of public life. The constant disturbances, the angry wranglings, the battles royal between Labour and the Army, the Church and the Republic—these have often, we admit, been depressing to those of us who have loved France best. It is very difficult for eyes that watch, however benevolently, another nation from a distance, to avoid misapprehension of developments which are unfamiliar in their kind. But reflection will persuade us that even the social agitations which have so often bewildered us in recent French politics were founded on generous instincts. They were conducted in the interest, often no doubt in the mistaken and even the perverted interest, of equity and justice. They were exasperating in their form, and they led to deplorable episodes, but in their essence they were not ignoble. At the basis even of their irregularities, it was always possible to trace a zeal for first principles and the universal rights of man, no less than for the emancipation of intelligence and for the progress of civilisation. Even the crisis of Dreyfusism, which saddened and bewildered the rest of the world, and in some of its features presented an aspect of unrelieved distress, even this melancholy affair revealed marvellous examples of high civic courage. It is not too much to say that after all these years it is the intrepidity of the combatants, far more than their confused and squalid struggle, which remains vivid to us when we look back on the dismal swamp of Dreyfusism.

We do well, therefore, to protest against this talk of a New France, risen, like a phœnix out of the funeral pyre of the old, for the instant purpose of combating the arrogance of Prussia. The France of to-day is splendid, but her effort is not miraculous ; it has long been prepared for by the elements of her ancient and continuous civilisation. Those who watched the nation closely before the outbreak of this war have no cause for surprise, though much for gratulation and thankfulness, in the evolution of national character ; it is welcome, but it is no more than we expected. For fifteen years past,

it has been impossible for an unprejudiced and perspicacious observer to fail to see that France has been gathering her moral forces together, simplifying her political attitude, preparing without haste for concerted action. The superficial agitations in the social life of the country have been vastly exaggerated and seriously misunderstood by foreign observers. It is evident that in Germany, with the brutal superficiality of a race equally hostile and unimaginative, they were seized upon with alacrity and grotesquely overestimated. It seems important to meet the calumnies of foes and the bewilderment of friends by a statement of the unbroken essential tradition of France.

The importance of cultivating an intellectual and moral unity in the thought of France was insisted upon by Renan on his entrance into the French Academy so long ago as thirty-six years. In his beautiful 'Discours de Réception' (April 3, 1879) Renan said to the Academicians 'Où est 'donc votre unité, Messieurs? Elle est dans l'amour de 'la vérité.' He dwelt, in language which has singularly the accent of to-day, upon the radical error of Teutonism. His words deserve to be recalled to memory, so strikingly do they foreshadow the moral stigma which events have fastened upon Germany. Renan said, while entreating the Academicians to support and to unify the ancient and beautiful culture of their own race:

'Vous vous inquiétez peu d'entendre annoncer pompeusement l'avènement de ce qu'on appelle une autre *Kultur*, qui sera pauvre du talent. Vous vous défiez d'une *Kultur* qui ne rend l'homme ni plus aimable ni meilleur. Je crains fort que des races, bien sérieuses sans doute, puisqu'elles nous reprochent notre légèreté, n'éprouvent quelque mécompte dans l'espérance qu'elles ont de gagner la faveur du monde par de tout autres procédés que ceux qui ont réussi jusqu'ici. Une science pédantesque en sa solitude, une haute société sans éclat, une noblesse sans esprit, des gentilhommes sans politesse, ne détrôneront pas, je crois, de sitôt, le souvenir de cette vieille société française, si brillante, si polie, si jalouse de plaire.'

Nothing could be more pointed, while the reproach is pressed in the great writer's best style of prelatical irony, and the only objection to it is that the arrow is too delicate to pierce the thick hide of the Boches. But here we have a Frenchman of genius, so long ago as 1879, coming forward

as what M. Paul Margueritte, in a fine phrase, calls ' le champion ' de l'Esprit contre la Bestialité armée.' It was a reminder to France that she had not lost the attention of the world, and could only lose it if, by frittering away her genius in internal dissensions, she forgot to preserve the tradition of her intellectual and moral greatness. Renan urged the France of his day, the France of thirty-six years ago, not to be intimidated by the truculence of her eastern rival, not to endeavour to compete with her mechanical and material culture, but to cling to all that was refined, sympathetic, and inspiring in the unbroken tradition of the ancient genius of France.

Those who have watched a little closely the movement of affairs in France cannot but have observed the increasing tendency towards energy of action among young men. There has been a steady development in this direction. The French, whose life had tended to run in very conventional channels of practical movement, have enlarged their borders in every direction that leads to individual activity. The cultivation of games, which took a strong upward line from the year 1900 onwards, has proceeded so rapidly and so uniformly that when the war broke out last year there was scarcely a country village which did not possess its clubs of football and tennis. Cricket has continued to be a mystery not to be penetrated by the Gallic mind, but the other physical exercises—and with the addition of much more horse-riding and fencing than are customary at present in this country—have extended their influence over the mind as well as the body of young France to a degree which must not be underrated. Games played with energy and spirit extend the sentiment of responsibility, and it is obvious that in this sphere they have had a directly beneficial effect upon French character, the defect of young France at the close of the nineteenth century having evidently been its inability, or lack of opportunity, to assert initiative in conduct. One of the earliest advocates of football remarked, with a pleasing naiveté, ' Les fautes commises se paient directe- ' ment, soit par une chute, soit par la perte de la partie ou de ' l'assaut engagé. Il en va de même dans la pratique des affaires : ' une erreur d'exécution entraîne pour son auteur un préjudice ' direct.' It is not too much to say that the liberty of action which young Frenchmen have insisted upon since the opening

of the present century has had an extraordinary effect on their ability to form a rapid and firm decision.

In our opinion it was the crisis of 1911 which enabled the French to take advantage of all the reviving energy of their race and tradition. The country had arrived at a point when all depended upon a shock to its nervous system. Agadir came, and it pulled the whole youth of France together in a sudden splendid unity of purpose. The writer of these lines asks to be forgiven if he refreshes his memory by turning to notes which he made at that moment. From a Paris, somnolent in the gloom of August, and inhabited apparently only by a population of Germans and Americans, from Paris slumbering in a haze of cosmopolitan indifference and representative of nothing at all, he came to a beautiful house in the heart of Burgundy, a hospitable house of great antiquity, shadowed, as by a rock in Palestine, by the bulk of a famous basilica. Here was France indeed, without the least admixture of the tourist or the restaurant, the brasserie transferred from Berlin or the bar that pretended to be in New York. Here were gathered, in various generations, a group of people representing, in contrast and in harmony, the sentiments of French intelligence. If I may complete my indiscretion, I will name, as those who led the delightful revels, two men whose influence on younger minds has asserted itself through the length and breadth of France, my admirable friends, M. Paul Desjardins and the resuscitator of the medieval 'Tristram and Iseult,' M. Joseph Bédier.

There was something theatrical in the suddenness with which, in the midst of our enchanted talks under the spreading branches of another 'Tree of Taine,' there fell upon the studious company there assembled news of the German aggression in Morocco. Suddenly the unfamiliar name of Agadir appeared before us, a sinister inscription written right across the north-eastern sky. For a little while, it will be remembered, war seemed imminent, at all events it seemed so to us in that burning silence. And now, it was of the deepest interest to me to feel the pulse, as it were, of the Frenchmen round me, elderly, middle-aged and young, and so to judge of their temper. With held breath, questioning and listening, I seemed privileged to apply my ear to the actual auscultation of a fragment of the heart of France. In the echoes of talk which I took down

at that moment, I find the key-note of ' calmness ' prominent. A certain idealism which lies a little below the surface of every thinking Frenchman was brought up to light by the shock, and lay there ready to meet without undue agitation whatever the next weeks or days might bring forth. There was no boasting ; that was particularly notable to one who could remember the shouts of ' À Berlin ! ' in 1870. There was anxious but not undignified inquiry put to the solitary Englishman, ' Will England be with us ? ' to which in his ignorance he could only reply ' I hope so and I think so.'

Very vivid in my memory is a walk on one afternoon of that week of suspense, a walk taken in the Cuyp-like golden atmosphere of the illimitable stubble-fields of the Yonne, in going, without an aim, in returning, with the vast church, like a ship at sea, towering on the horizon for a goal. My companion, one of the wisest of men, spoke gravely, almost fatalistically, of the immediate future. He mourned the nonchalance and negligence of the official class, the bureaucracy of France, so little alive to the great movements of the age. He lamented the passion for cities, the *polimania*, which drained the country districts of their richest blood. But his own faith was staunch and well-grounded ; he was persuaded that the crisis would awaken a universality of patriotism, a flood in which all the social scum would disappear, as before a stream of wholesome waters. And he said, with a stoic reserve, ' If we are doomed ' to disappear before the barbarian, we can at least die with ' dignity, fighting to the last, and—surely, surely !—without ' the disgrace of internal dissension and private reproach.' As we came near to our home, and the western light flashed in the windows of our great abbey-church, which might have been the symbol of the unshaken State, the diapason of our talk closed full on the notion of Union,—France drawn together in the battle for existence along a serried line of consistent defence.

That particular cloud, as everyone knows, evaporated and left the sky of Europe comparatively clear. But the lesson of Agadir was not forgotten. It made itself felt in many ways throughout the year 1912, when a change in the general tone of the press could scarcely fail to be observed. One very curious phenomenon was the reaction against the excess of intellectualism, which, it is now easy to see, had been a main

cause working towards the division of French thought into warring camps. It was now that a leader of the old school exclaimed ' La réaction est très forte, plus forte que je n'aurais ' cru, contre Auguste Comte, Taine et Renan,' and this because those eminent oracles of a preceding generation had underrated the value of composite energy, and had encouraged too unstintedly the freedom of individual enterprise. Very remarkably there began to assert itself among the intelligent youth of France a new kind of abnegation, which prompted them to resign what had seemed their most valued privilege, the right to pursue abstract speculation to its utmost limits. It was now that M. Maurice Barrès dared to exclaim ' La raison, ' quelle pauvre petite chose à la surface de nous-mêmes,' and that a prophet still less expected, M. Paul Bourget, found it possible to declare that ' L'intellectualisme, c'est la forme la ' plus dangereuse de l'individualisme.' It was at this time in the summer of 1912, that the ' Enquête sur la Jeunesse ' of the *Revue Hebdomadaire* revealed so remarkable a consensus of opinion that duty, without distinction of party, must be the watchword of all that was youthful and vigorous in the effort of France.

A year later than the Agadir incident, one of the soundest and wisest minds of the elder generation, one which had for more than one generation been brought singularly close to the consciences of the young, summed up the evidences which he saw before him of the condition of France. I quote these eloquent words of M. Emile Faguet (in July 1912), because their existence refutes, as well as any document could, the fallacy of a New France, arisen without previous warning, at the shock of August 1914. He wrote :

' Il ressort que la génération qui suit—d'assez loin—celle des hommes de mon âge [M. Faguet was born in 1847] est énergique, sainement passionnée, curieuse, chercheuse, inventeuse et éprise d'action ; qu'elle *va de l'avant* sans étourderie, ni témérité, mais avec un très bel élan d'espérance et de foi ; qu'elle ne dissimule ni les dangers qui nous menacent, ni les défauts nationaux, ces autres dangers, ni la grandeur de la tâche qu'elle a devant elle ou plutôt à laquelle elle a déjà mis la main ; mais qu'elle n'est qu'excitée par ces dangers et ces difficultés et que, sans le chercher avec un dilettantisme puéril, elle *accepte* de tout son cœur de vivre dangereusement.'

We believe that the opinion expressed in these eloquent words was eminently just, and we insist upon this in defiance

of much that in the intervening months occurred to sadden and perplex the lovers of France. We are convinced that, in direct contradiction to the squalid evidences of things said and done, and of much dirty linen washed in public by the newspapers, there was a wide and essential resuscitation of intelligence, activity, and probity throughout all classes of French society, and that it was this which made preparation for the wonderful manifestation in the face of the enemy. What was, however, emphatically lacking in this advance of national energy was precisely unity. It must frankly be acknowledged that over the surface of the energy of France there was lacking this enamel of a definite common purpose. This absence of national unison was particularly formidable in matters of religion and of labour.

No doubt, in looking back over the past four or five years, the most menacing phenomenon in French social life has been the apparent triumph of anti-militarism. This had become a leading principle in that system of 'solidarité ouvrière' from which so much future prosperity was expected. There had grown up a strange tradition that to suppress the army was to suppress the greatest of the enemies of the human race, international war. This found expression in axioms which a few months have proved ridiculous, but which were accepted with solemnity and approval. It is hardly conceivable that so recently as 1912 a leader of labour in France could enunciate, with the loud approbation of his audience, the formula 'Puisque les gens qui s'égorgent sont des soldats, pour qu'on 'ne s'égorge plus, il faut qu'il n'y ait plus de soldats!' The socialist dream of a universal strike against war was developed in the revolutionary newspaper, 'La Guerre Sociale,' by M. Gustave Hervé, who, with the courage of a fanatic, was ready to affront derision, imprisonment, and even the menace of death in support of his views. According to the large school of labour of which M. Hervé was the mouthpiece, the only practical method of preventing war was to intimidate governments, and force them to settle their quarrels peaceably, by declaring a general strike and insurrection immediately upon any threat of hostilities. When it became evident to the rulers of France that it was necessary, if the existence of the country was to be maintained, to be prepared to resist the redoubtable enemy on the Eastern frontier, the attitude

of 'la solidarité ouvrière' on this question of a war-strike became the most perturbing of problems.

If the working classes of France had carried out their scheme —and it is perhaps little remembered that it was not until the 29th of July 1914, in connexion with the proposed mass meeting of the Confédération Générale du Travail, that the syndicalist leaders abandoned their plan for a huge revolutionary strike—it is as certain as anything can be that France would have been helpless against the attack of the invader. Fortunately, the brain which had formulated the scheme was the first to be convinced of its futility. M. Gustave Hervé, of whom many hard things have been said, is before all else a sincere and reasonable man; even in his violence he pauses to consider his logical position; and he has the real intellectual courage which admits its own mistakes. The anti-militarist movement, of such exceeding peril to the heart of France, began about 1906, and M. Hervé put himself at the head of it. 'Plutôt l'insurrection que la guerre' was voted almost unanimously at a great meeting in Nancy, and the Germans, hard by, rubbed their hands silently in exultation. Ingenious arrangements were proposed and accepted by the French labour leaders for rapid action to paralyse the mobilisation of the army if France were to deliver an ultimatum to a foreign power.

It is not conceivable that any large number of French artizans would have lent themselves in serious earnest to so treacherous and contemptible a manœuvre. But there was great danger in the state of mind revealed by the mere academic discussion of such a scheme. It was quite enough to disturb the consciences and weaken the energies of tens of thousands of workmen. Fortunately, it was the fiery candour of M. Gustave Hervé himself which provided an antidote for the poison which he had distributed. Of course, the whole efficiency of the general strike project depended upon its being loyally carried out by the socialists of other nations. The French proletariat was to shake hands with German labour over the vainly-raging guns and helmets of a couple of paralysed War Offices. But M. Hervé, with a subtlety which his feverish temper would hardly have led us to expect, was watching the attitude and weighing the words of the German 'comrades' at the international con-

gresses. In 1912 he became privately convinced of their absolute hypocrisy, and in spite of all their assurances of confraternity he perceived that they meant to betray the cause of socialism at the last moment in the interests of their master's imperial policy. He perceived that their dream was to impose on the conquered nations of the rest of Europe the peculiar socialistic theories of Germany. We may reflect, with what philosophy we can, on the revelations which reach us from every point of the degree to which the individual conscience of the German citizen has allowed itself to grow honeycombed with perfidy.

A highly theatrical incident was the murder of Jaurès, on the 31st of July. He was killed by a crazy fanatic at the very moment when he had returned from a visit to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom he had gone to entreat him to beg Russia to make a last effort at conciliation in order to avoid the horror of a great war. He argued that it was better to break off the alliance with Russia than to engage France in such a struggle. The position of Jaurès at the head of the socialists of the country gave a peculiar significance to this stupid crime, and for a moment the universal question was, would his supporters revenge his death by some violently unpatriotic act ? But France was too sober, too perspicacious, for such folly. It became apparent at once that the death of Jaurès would change in no degree the political unison of parties. The ' Guerre Sociale ' expressed the universal opinion when it said next morning, ' Jaurès has failed to ' secure peace ; it is for us at least to secure the country ' from invasion.' That night mobilisation began all over the face of France, and not a socialist or syndicalist voice was raised to interrupt it. Next day, in spite of his years and his infirmities, M. Gustave Hervé, the arch-antimilitarist, put his own services unreservedly at the disposal of the country in an eloquent open letter to the Minister of War.

What sealed the peace of parties at this thrilling moment, and testified to the greatness of the national sentiment, was the attitude of the body which had stood at the opposite extreme of the political line, and had fought with ceaseless energy against the inroads of socialism. On the 1st of August, M. Maurice Barrès, the president of the League of Patriots, wrote a letter to Mademoiselle Jaurès, in which he spoke of

the murder of her father the night before as having cemented all French hearts in union. His words will be remembered in history, for their echoes were far-reaching: 'L'union est déjà 'faite de tous les Français;' this is the 'union sacrée' which has reigned ever since, and has created in France that magnificent fund of fortitude and steady hope which makes her the wonder and envy of the world. The principle of unity was gained, and it is therefore of lesser importance to note that the original enthusiasm was too brilliant not to be a little tarnished by time. Already in October 1914 the strain was making itself felt about the clerical question. The Ligue des Patriotes fretted under the yoke which bound it to its profane neighbours. Already M. Maurice Barrès could not resist the temptation to announce that if France was to be victorious it must be under the banner of St. Vincent de Paul, of St. Louis, of Pascal. Already M. Gustave Hervé recalled the merits of Voltaire, of Diderot, of Kléber, of Desaix; and murmured his horror of an 'envahissement 'catholique.' It was the old, old story, and much to be deplored; but these differences were on the surface, and it was too late for there to be any fear that they could disturb the depths of the holy union of Frenchmen. The transient affectation of anti-militarism had faded away like a wisp of vapour in the glare of national peril.

All this was not a new revelation. It was the inevitable result of the long training which the French spirit had undergone, and in particular of the awakening of the national conscience which followed the crisis of 1911. If it be not thought too extravagant, I would venture to suggest, as in some degree an inspiring cause, the growing admiration which attended the memory of that noble woman, Eugénie de Guérin, who, for half a century after her death in 1848, was scarcely known in France, but whose memory, since the opening of the twentieth century, has been more and more widely cultivated. The influence of such a character as hers, when it is found to contain the mysterious quality of arresting the attention of posterity, is capable of being far more extensive than we readily imagine. Eugénie de Guérin, whose life was the most monotonous and secluded, the most humble and self-abnegating which can be conceived, has nevertheless by sheer force of character and appropriateness to the occasion,

become a sort of intellectual and moral Jeanne d'Arc to the latest generation in France. They find in her exactly the qualities which adorn and protect the virility of the French nation to-day. Her courage, her faith, her reverence, her intensity of love for the fatherland, her passion for domesticity, and her sense of the dignity of a rural round of duties, point her out as a guardian saint of France. No one has with a more tender generosity insisted upon the sublimity of those whom the world despises, and upon the genuine confraternity of souls.

There may seem to be something fantastic in passing from the shadowy figure of Eugénie de Guérin to the solid and violent presence of Charles Péguy, but no one who examines the signs of the times will be shocked at the transition. Every great national crisis produces, or should produce, a symbol or legend which sums up the sentiment of the circumstances. A man who has walked on a level with his compeers, exciting the affection of some, the hatred of others, and the complete indifference of the vast majority, suddenly becomes, for no very apparent reason, the centre of an almost superstitious attention. He is what gamblers call a luck-piece ; his existence seems to be bound up with the universal weal ; nay, even his death may be the sign of his redoubled importance. Such a mascot France has discovered in the person of Péguy, who was killed during the battle of the Ourcq, at the village of Plessis-l'Evêque, near Meaux, on the 5th of September 1914. To a far greater extent than the loss of any other man of intellect or art, the death of Péguy has affected the spirit of France. A legend has grown up around his name, a legend which illuminates it like the *skin-lika* in Bulwer's famous story, accompanying the human form and transfiguring it with a supernatural luminosity. It is necessary that we should try to discover why Péguy has become a part of the Unity of France.

He was of peasant race, and his forebears were vine-growers in the Beauce. But they fell into great poverty, and while his grandmother, who could neither read nor write, earned a few pence by taking a farmer's cows to grass, his mother lived by mending old chairs and hiring them out to worshippers in the cathedral of Orleans. ' Personne mieux que Péguy n'a ' pratiqué la pauvreté,' says his biographer ; but he was not

content to endure its disadvantages. Early he showed remarkable aptitude for study, and his career in the École Normale was so brilliant, that he seemed destined for the chair of a professor. But, when he was seven years old, while his mother was mending her chairs in the cathedral, the boy was already dreaming of Jeanne d'Arc, and secretly in his heart he never ceased to nourish the romantic ambition of fighting for France, not with a bayonet, for he was an anti-militarist socialist, but with his brain and his will. He 'took 'to writing,' as we say, not, I think, because he had a very strong vocation, but because this was the simplest way in which a young man without material advantages could indent his character and his conscience upon contemporary opinion. From an obscure and unimpressive journalist, and a poet who rarely did justice to his own emotion, Péguy has become one of the heroes of French tradition, and the centre of a legend. It is worth while to investigate the reason.

In 1896, when he was five-and-twenty years of age, he published his first book, 'Le mystère de la charité de Jeanne d'Arc.' He used to say that he should go on writing about Jeanne d'Arc if he lived to be a hundred. In this first volume, which attracted but a limited attention, but is now revived or discovered in a somewhat unthinking enthusiasm, Péguy exhibits a personal sentiment which is widely characteristic of France to-day, but is with great difficulty comprehended by an English mind. He was what we should call a complete sceptic, that is to say he had no belief in any of the traditions or dogmas of revealed religion. As he grew older, he became more of a believer, but always an heretical one. He protested that heresy was the life-blood of religion, and that faith died in the arms of orthodoxy. He was a secular mystic, and there was only one point upon which he coincided with the rest of the religious world, but this happened to be of the very essence of Gallic faith. He believed, without a shadow of incredulity, in the divine mission of France as the elder daughter of God and sublime mother of the nations, and in the indissoluble unity of Frenchmen. His design was to carry out in the twentieth century the sacred labour of Jeanne d'Arc.

In February 1900 Péguy began to publish, in a very modest way, a sort of periodical miscellany, called 'Les Cahiers de 'la Quinzaine.' In this magazine he printed not merely his

own lucubrations but those of others with whom he found himself in more or less close sympathy. One among these friends was destined to immediate celebrity—M. Romain Rolland, whose 'Jean Christophe' began to appear in the 'Cahiers.' By a curious revolution of the kaleidoscope, while one of these friends has become the symbol of patriotism, the other, tormented by the oddities of individualism, has lost the confidence of all Frenchmen, and is fain to live in exile. The contrast is remarkable; while M. Rolland, distracted by the ingenuities of a too-subtle imagination, has lost his hold on reality, Péguy owes his transcendent fame to the fact that, more decidedly than perhaps any other man, he determined to go straight for general political truth, without the smallest concession to *amour-propre*, and understood that, in the hugest contingencies, 'but one thing is needful.'

Monsieur André Suarès, who strikes one as more ardent than judicious, claims for Péguy that he is 'the Carlyle of 'France, infinitely better than the other, more true, more 'free and more human.' These parallels are sometimes unlucky, and one wonders with which of the writings of the English (or Scotch) Carlyle M. Suarès is familiar. Carlyle is at present suffering in this country from a general, and it must be said a deserved, unpopularity due in great measure to his total inability to see the trend of German *Kultur*. He recommends, with lamentation and invective at our blindness in not accepting it, a tendency which has at last been revealed to us in all its abominable brutality. Carlyle's writings have become unpalatable to us, because we find them running counter to our sober experience, and outrageous to our national conscience. But in the case of Péguy, it is precisely the fact that the events of the war have proved him to be more completely in harmony with the sentiment of France which has led to his universal acceptance. Moreover, whether we disapprove of Carlyle or not, he was a writer magnificent in exactly the directions where Péguy, who lacks conciseness and wanders into endless repetition, is weak. Both writers are austere, both adopt the camel's-hair clothing and the wild honey of the desert; each has the recklessness of the professional satirist. But here the parallel ceases. With the harshness of Péguy there mingles a tenderness unknown to Carlyle.

The poetry of Charles Péguy has been so little read in this country that we may be permitted to quote a sonnet, on Sainte Geneviève, as patron and guardian of Paris, in which the temper of his mysticism is seen at its best. He is rarely, it must be confessed, so concise as this :

' Comme elle avait gardé les moutons à Nanterre,
On la mit à garder un bien autre troupeau,
La plus énorme horde où le loup et l'agneau
Aient jamais confondu leur commune misère.

Et comme elle veillait tous les soirs solitaire
Dans la cour de la ferme ou sur le bord de l'eau,
Du pied du même saule et du même bouleau
Elle veille aujourd'hui sur ce monstre de pierre.

Et quand la nuit viendra qui fermera le jour,
C'est elle la caduque et l'antique bergère,
Qui, ramassant Paris et tout son alentour,

Conduira d'un pas ferme et d'une main légère
Pour la dernière fois dans la dernière cour
Le troupeau le plus vaste à la droite du père.'

The attitude of Péguy, a satirist, a spirit of anger and reproach, yet recognised in this time of extreme crisis as the very symbol of the holy unity of France, throws a light upon the whole situation. Our claim that what we see so magnificently produced before us, for the healing of the nations, is not a New France, miraculously created, but the old France welded together and passed through the fire of affliction, is not affected by the fact that there are now and again breezes in the Chamber, or that the newspapers yelp at one another, or that the inevitable tongue of pessimistic slander wags in Parisian drawing-rooms. These are accidents on the surface of manners, and they only show that time brings, in the long suspense, a certain light forgetfulness. But some movement of troops, some machination of the cunning and treacherous enemy, some reverse of one of the Allies, has but to intervene and these storms in the conversational teapot are forgotten in a moment, and all is ' union sacrée ' once more. It is very difficult for a foreigner, unaccustomed to the easy persiflage and enchanting provocation of French talk, not to be deceived into taking seriously what is no more than the traditional Gallic habit of disputation.

It is more difficult still to decide whether the harmony which now reigns through all strata of French society, and is a national strength more valid than triple walls of brass, whether this is or is not to be durable. In other words, when victory comes at last, and the forces of Teutonic crime are disarmed, will the social grades continue to live at home in unity, or shall we see break out again the guerilla warfare of royalist and republican, of intellectualist and activist, of socialist and reactionary? That, of course, it is beyond the power of any prophet to decide. Posterity has a most provoking way of settling matters in such a manner as to contradict the safest formulas of the philosophers. But we may confidently believe that the fortune which has led France through so many strident centuries will not abandon her in the twentieth. No doubt, when the danger is removed, the instinct which holds back every man from an expression of opinion which might offend his neighbour will be relaxed. Somebody has said that Frenchmen must argue with one another, to pass the time, as an alternative to playing chess. But we may be allowed to doubt whether, after this prodigious lesson, the nation will ever again repeat the levity of Boulangism or the bitterness of the Dreyfus *affaire*.

Some things we may vaguely see, without presuming upon prophecy. Crude anti-militarism has shown itself to be a transient folly, and it will be a very long while before that nonsense will be repeated. If mutual confidence between the nations should be resumed, new aspirations after universal peace may be developed, but they will hardly come in our time. France will doubtless feel that, for a couple of generations at least, the treacherous brute is prowling at her eastern frontier, and anti-militarism will be the last thing in the world to dream of. The fatuous love of the human race first and one's own country next has always been a will-o'-the-wisp to lead certain speculative French minds a dance over the swamps. This will be quite absent in the future, and the irritation which it caused at home will be removed. A calm military patriotism, universally accepted, will be a source of constant practical unity. The events of the present vast war must diffuse throughout French society those qualities of abnegation, discipline, and honour on which the late M. de Mun laid such stress until the very hour of his departure.

The name I have just quoted recalls a very touching episode in the unity of France. It seemed as though the deaths of two great opposing leaders of thought were necessary to seal in blood the pact of parties. We have seen that, at the very moment when war broke out, Jaurès, the head of the extreme socialists, was murdered; on the 5th of October, exhausted by his laborious anxiety, the Comte de Mun, leader of the Catholic party, was found dead in his bed. A phrase written next morning by the most violent of his opponents sheds a flood of light on the temper of France. M. Gustave Hervé, celebrating M. de Mun in the 'Guerre Sociale,' declared, 'Qu'importe qu'il aimait la France autrement que nous, 'et pour des raisons opposées, puisqu'il l'aimait autant 'que nous?' At that moment of complete national reconciliation, M. de Mun was mourned as respectfully and even tenderly by the extreme socialists, as by those practising royalist Catholics whom he had courageously represented through his long and strenuous career.

The intellectual basis upon which the splendid unity of France is built has no exact parallel elsewhere in the world of to-day. Without derogating in the smallest degree from the signal merits of our own national system, or of that of our other allies, it can hardly be questioned by any impartial observer that we see in France the riper results of a more consistent and a more complicated civilisation than is presented by any other country. The French possess in a higher degree than their neighbours the habit of dealing on broad lines with series of abstract ideas. Nothing is more striking in conversation with very young Frenchmen than the enfranchisement of their intelligence and their habit of dealing rather with general principles than with individual cases. This faculty of intelligence has had a great deal to do with the blessed unanimity of French opinion, a unanimity of the highest importance to the world in general, since in our sacred common resistance to the brutality of German arrogance it is the noble apostolate of France which leads the intelligence of the Allies. And in this connexion, we may ponder over the words spoken by M. Eugène Lamy at the annual public séance of the French Academy (25th of November 1915):

'Une inspiration plus haute leur révéla que les plus décisives paroles devenaient vaines si la France était battue, que pour un

peuple la source du génie national est l'indépendance, que les espèces les plus nobles n'enfantent pas en captivité, que la race française, surtout pour être féconde, a besoin de sa spontanéité souveraine. Or, une race étrangère prétendait envahir non seulement notre sol mais notre intelligence, soumettre aux déformations de son dressage notre autonomie, écraser notre génie sous le marteau-pilon de sa culture. Ils comprirent que si cette violence les emportait, ils n'auraient plus de continuateurs.'

Continuation ! That is the keynote of French unity. The spiritual treasure which has been handed down by an unbroken line of ancestors must be guarded and transmitted at all hazards and in spite of all sacrifices. Few expressions have been more widely repeated in France this year than the saying attributed to a soldier in the trenches who, at the moment when an assault on the enemy was ordered, cried out ' Debout ' les morts ! ' It is the dead, the dead of ten centuries of vicissitude and glory, who rise at this moment to fight with their living brethren for their heritage of humanity and liberty and light against the dark genius of Prussian slavery and tyranny. The memory of Valmy is frequently invoked in the course of existing affairs, and it is a glorious one, but national feeling is far more unanimous in 1915 than it was in 1792, and General Joffre has a more majestic task before him than fell to the lot of Dumouriez. When M. Hervé dines with the Abbé Colin, chief of the Catholic party in Lorraine ; when the ultra-socialists are reconciled with M. Briand ; when the bishops have put the whole of their wonderful organisation at the service of the collection of gold and the subscriptions to the ' Emprunt de la Victoire ' ; when priests are everywhere calling for rifles ; when the influence of M. Bergson and of M. Barrès permeates all intellectual society without encountering the smallest hindrance ; when the ' sans-patrie,' as they used to be called, exhibit an enthusiasm not exceeded by any Bonapartist or Royalist,—then we may say that the Germans, who have blundered in so many things, have at least done one thing completely : they have soldered together in one impenetrable mass the fighting energies of France.

Nor need there be any fear that the benefits of national unity will be transient, or confined to the duration of the war. In this connexion, we will but quote the words so lately (Dec. 11, 1915) addressed by M. Ribot to a brilliant assembly gathered in the Palais Mazarin :

'Que ce soit un des bienfaits de la guerre, et en quelque sorte le prix de nos souffrances et de nos sacrifices, d'avoir uni les cœurs et les volontés et éteint les brandons de haine entre des hommes qui luttent aujourd'hui la main dans la main pour le salut de la patrie commune! Que demain, si les divisions nées de l'antagonisme des doctrines et surtout de la diversité inévitable des conditions d'existence ne sont pas effacées, du moins il ne se mêle à ces luttes nécessaires et légitimes aucun sentiment de colère, aucun de ces mauvais ferments qui enveniment les plaies et corrompent le sang des nations les plus vigoureuses! Qu'après avoir tant sacrifié à la défense du pays, nous sacrifions encore au besoin de marcher d'accord quelques-uns de nos intérêts, et cela de grand cœur, avec la même générosité, le même oubli des préoccupations égoïstes, c'est ce que nous voulons tous, ce que nous espérons dans la sincérité de notre âme.'

Let us not perversely look for mysterious phenomena in connexion with the splendid effort of the French, nor pretend that circumstances have called up out of chaos the phantom of a New France. There has been no 'miracle,' even in the victory of the Marne; no intervention of supernatural powers unknown to the country of so many heroes of intellect and action. It is needless, even, although seemly and gracious, to invoke, as Péguy did, the memorial figures of Jeanne d'Arc and Ste. Geneviève. If we treat them as symbols, as faces of heroines long dead who shine down from the heavens,—well and good. But let us not involve ourselves in admitting a breach of the spiritual continuity with the past. Above all, let us put far behind us the impious suggestion of a punishment brought down upon the head of France for her sins and frivolities. What we really see, and should forbid ourselves to permit to be obscured, is a natural revival of the ancient virtues characteristic of France in all her higher moods, recovering themselves after the shock of treacherous attack, and shining with unequalled brightness precisely because of the unparalleled volume and force of that attack. The unity of the nation is the expression of a store of vitality long amassed for this very purpose of defence in time of sorest need. But the resuscitation of the intelligence of France, of her activity and her probity, should be to us who stand at her side a subject of admiration, not of astonishment.

EDMUND GOSSE.

THE HELLENIC FACTOR IN THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST

1. **The Balkans.** By D. G. HOGARTH and others. (Section on Greece by ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.) Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1915.
2. **Hellas and the Balkan Wars.** By D. J. CASSAVETTI. Fisher Unwin. 1914.
3. **The Ottoman Empire, 1801–1913.** By W. MILLER. Cambridge: University Press. 1913.
4. **Eleftherios Venizelos.** By Dr. C. KEROFILAS. John Murray. 1915.
5. **La Turquie et L'Hellénisme Contemporain.** Par VICTOR BÉRARD. (Cinquième Édition.) Paris. 1904.
6. **L'Indépendance grecque et L'Europe.** Par G. ISAMBERT. Paris. 1900.

DURING the last few months the interest of European diplomacy has been concentrated upon Greece. This attention must be highly flattering to a kingdom which came into existence less than ninety years ago, and whose subjects, even since the large accretions of 1913, are fewer in number than the inhabitants of London. Greece has, however, always been treated by the Western Powers with the somewhat patronising indulgence which one is accustomed to bestow upon a wayward youth whom one has known from babyhood. The kingdom of the Hellenes is indeed the nursling of the Entente Powers. It owes its existence to the friendly intervention of Great Britain, France and Russia, and its place in the European economy is defined by treaties to which they were the principal parties. Twice they have found it a king, and in supplying its financial necessity they have not been lacking in liberality; one of them has trained its army; another its navy. If the word gratitude were included in the vocabulary of politics, it might surely be expected to be on the lips of Greece in addressing France, Russia and Great Britain. But he who looks for gratitude in politics is too simple to mingle in the affairs of men. Nor is it, as a rule, reasonable to do so. Nations rarely act or

can be expected to act from motives that are purely altruistic, still less in exclusive deference to sentiment.

If there is an exception to this rule it is furnished by the attitude of the Western Powers towards the Hellenic Kingdom. Neither England nor France had anything to gain by the success of the Greeks when in 1821 they rose in revolt against the Porte. On the contrary a traditional friendship—only temporarily broken by Napoleon—had subsisted between Paris and Constantinople for two centuries and a half, while a good understanding with the Caliph was an asset of considerable value to the Power which was rapidly advancing towards supremacy in India.

Two considerations, both of them purely sentimental, would appear to have inspired the policy of Great Britain and France towards the nascent Greek State. On the one hand, there was the incalculable debt which they in common with all civilised nations owed to Hellenic culture. The mere name of the Hellenes, once more upon the lips of men after many centuries of complete oblivion, thrilled the hearts of those who owed to Greek philosophy, to Greek literature, and to Greek art a debt larger than they could acknowledge, still less repay. It is true that in the blood of the modern Greek there are mingled many strains besides those which he derives from the Athenian or Lacedemonian of old. Still, he bears the same generic name ; he speaks a tongue which is at least as near to classical Greek as is modern English to Anglo-Saxon ; and alike in temperament and in social and political habits he exhibits characteristics not widely dissimilar from those which distinguished the contemporaries of Pericles though they may sometimes seem to approximate more closely to those which were noted by the satiric pen of Juvenal.

The persistence of ancient tradition in modern Greece has indeed been gravely underrated. A heavy-handed Teuton * flung a bombshell into the Philhellenist camp, in the early 'thirties, by asserting that the so-called Greeks were in reality Slavs. The assertion contained sufficient truth to make it disconcerting. From the middle of the eighth century to the middle of the ninth, the Slavs did actually form the predominant element in the population of the Peloponnesus.

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* Professor Fallmerayer of Munich.

But though the traces of that predominance still survive in a considerable number of place-names, the Slavs were gradually absorbed by the superior civilisation of the Greeks, and thus the older race reasserted its pre-eminence. The late Sir Richard Jebb put this matter in its just proportions. 'The 'modern Greek nation . . . contains, as all would allow, a large 'infusion of Slavonic blood; but it is a fact equally well estab- 'lished that the strain of Hellenic blood has been perpetual, 'and that the Hellenic element is that which has determined 'the type of the modern nationality.' *

The same distinguished authority has indicated two further links which, apart from language and blood, connect the modern with the ancient Greeks. The first is 'A marked aptitude for 'city life, as distinguished from rural life on the one hand, 'and on the other from the life of a larger political organism.' With this partiality for city life we may connect perhaps the aptitude of the modern Greek, at any rate, for commerce. The second feature is the devotion of the Greeks at all periods of their history to mental culture, 'not merely from a perception 'that knowledge is power, but also, and more, for the sake of 'the intellectual and moral pleasure which literature and art 'bestow.' †

The cultured classes of the two great nations of the West were, then, powerfully attracted towards the Greek cause by the imperishable memories of the past. But Philhellenist sentiment did not rely exclusively upon the past for sustenance. It happened to harmonize with two forces destined to influence most powerfully the political future of Europe. When the Greeks in 1821 raised the standard of insurrection against the Turks they did so in the name of freedom and nationality. They enjoyed, therefore, the advantage of a further coincidence.

At that date Europe was beginning to appreciate the reasons which had from the first made the Holy Alliance suspect in the eyes of English statesmen. However benevolent the purpose which had inspired the original scheme of the Czar Alexander, it was soon stripped of its idealism when Metternich assumed control of its practical operations. The ideas of

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* Modern Greece, pp. 52, 53.
† *Op. cit.* p. 54.

liberalism and nationality, ignored or suppressed in the settlement of 1815, were by 1821 reasserting their influence amid the orgy of reaction into which many of the restored Princes plunged after the triumph of 'legitimacy' at the Congress of Vienna.

Thus the Greek revival came at the psychological moment for disappointed liberalism both in France and England. In the former country, the influence of the Count of Artois, the ultra-clericals and the Emigrés was making rapid headway against the moderate 'constitutionalism' of Louis XVIII and the Duc de Richelieu. In England Lord Liverpool's Government was attempting to allay a mass of accumulated suffering and discontent by the repressive legislation embodied in the 'Six Acts.' In both countries the tide of liberalism was, consequently, rising fast, and with the idea of liberalism was closely associated that of 'nationality.' Napoleon had worked better than he knew. Purely selfish in his aims, he had given, alike in Germany, in Italy, in Poland, in Switzerland and in Spain a powerful impulse to the development of nationalism.

In the Turkish Empire national sentiments had remained for more than four centuries completely submerged beneath the Ottoman flood. But they were never wholly extinguished. In Serbia, for example, the memory of a sometime national independence had been sustained mainly by the ballad literature of a freedom-loving peasantry. Even in the eighteenth century there were sporadic insurrections among the Southern Slavs, and in 1804 there was a rising under 'Black George' which might almost be described as national. But Europe was preoccupied and the Serbian revolt attracted little attention, though some concessions were made to Serbia in the treaty which in 1812 was concluded at Bucharest between the Sultan and the Czar.

Much more important, from the international point of view, was the insurrection of the Greeks in 1821. That insurrection plainly intimated to the European diplomatists that a new factor had entered into a problem already sufficiently difficult and complicated. Europe had indeed been confronted with that problem, in one form or another, ever since the Ottoman Turks had first crossed the Bosphorus (1356), had destroyed the kingdoms of Serbia and Bulgaria and, finally, by the conquest of Constantinople (1453), had extinguished the last

feeble remnant of the Greek or Byzantine Empire. But the problem had now assumed a new aspect.

For two centuries after his initial conquests the rapid advance of the Turk brought terror to the Christian States of Europe. During the two following centuries, on the other hand, his equally rapid decadence involved them in embarrassment. If the sick man was really on the verge of dissolution, upon which of the Powers would his inheritance devolve, or how would it be partitioned among them?

The Habsburgs had been constantly at war with the Turks for the best part of three centuries. Russia had joined in the fray in the eighteenth century, and in 1774 had concluded with the Porte a treaty, that of Kutchuk-Kainardji, which seemed to suggest that henceforward the 'Eastern Question' was to be regarded as the special, if not the exclusive, concern of the Romanoffs. That suggestion was strengthened by the Treaty of Jassy (1792) and by the Czar Alexander's dealings with Napoleon at Tilsit and Erfurt. The Greek insurrection came, therefore, as a sharp reminder to European diplomacy that before the advent of the Turk there had been in South-Eastern Europe 'nations' which, though quiescent and dumb under the tyranny of the Ottoman, had never forgotten the greatness which had once been theirs, and through the long centuries of suffering, had never surrendered the hope that they might some day reassert their independence and might again in the future play in the affairs of men a part not unworthy of their past.

It is the purpose of the pages that follow to disengage from 'that shifting, intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting 'interests, rival peoples and antagonistic faiths that is veiled 'under the easy name of the Eastern Question,'* the single thread which has become known as the 'Hellenic factor'; to put that factor into proper perspective, and to estimate its significance relatively to the other factors which combine to make up the problem of the Near East.

In March 1821 a band of Greeks under Prince Alexander Hypsilanti raised the standard of revolt in Moldavia. At that

* The phrase is Lord Morley's.

moment the Holy Allies were in conference at Laibach, summoned thither by Metternich to consider what measures should be taken to suppress the revolutionary outbursts which had lately followed each other with alarming rapidity in Spain, Portugal and Southern Italy. The news from the Balkans fell upon the diplomatists as a bolt from the blue. The Moldavian rising proved in the event to be a mere flash in the pan, but it was the opening prelude of a movement which did not halt until it had added a new nation—the kingdom of the Hellenes—to the European Commonwealth.

Though the Greek rising came as a surprise to European diplomatists, it was in reality far from being sudden or unprepared. Any close observer might have discerned symptoms of Hellenic revival during the previous half-century.* Turkish methods of government had themselves contributed in no small degree to maintain among the subject peoples, and particularly among the Greeks, some elements of independence. The Turk is a born fighter, but for the dull work of administration he has never shown the slightest aptitude. Hence he was always content, provided the tribute of money and children was forthcoming, to leave a large measure of local self-government in the hands of his Christian subjects. More than this. He drew into the service of the central government a large number of shrewd Greeks, some of whom rose to the position of Grand Vizier. The offices of 'Dragoman of the Porte,' the head of the diplomatic service, and of 'Dragoman of the Fleet,' first instituted in the seventeenth century, were almost invariably filled by Greeks, and from the beginning of the eighteenth century Greeks were appointed to be Hospodars, or Provincial Governors of the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. These high officials naturally secured the appointment of compatriots to the subordinate posts, and in this way a Greek bureaucracy gradually made itself indispensable to the Ottoman administration. The existence of a local Christian militia, the Armatoli, though the force was reduced in the eighteenth century, was another element in the preservation of Greek nationality. The survival of a hardy race of mariners on the sea-board of the Peloponnesus and in the islands of the Ægean contributed to the same end, while the

* Cf. Gladstone: *Gleanings from Past Years*, iv. p. 274 *seq.*

conspicuous success of the Greeks in commerce and the formation of numerous joint-stock companies promised material assistance to a national struggle for independence. By the commercial treaty concluded between Russia and Turkey in 1783, the Greeks obtained the privilege of trading under the Russian flag. But infinitely more important than all other causes in combination was the part played by the Orthodox Greek Church, and in particular the singular devotion exhibited, both in a pastoral and in a political sense, by the parish priests. As to the general position of the Orthodox Church under Ottoman rule, Sir Charles Eliot has plausibly argued that the Turkish conquest was actually beneficial to its interests. From the first the conqueror Mohammed II. (1451-1481) betrayed a curious anxiety to maintain the ecclesiastical traditions of Byzantium ; he wanted the Byzantine Church to look to him as its patron and protector against the Church of the West, and he gave to the Greek Patriarch in Constantinople a quasi-papal position by putting the whole of the Orthodox Church in the Turkish dominions under his jurisdiction. In this way the Patriarch became the representative not only of the Greek Church but of the Greek nation, 'the recognised intermediary 'between them and the Ottoman Government.'* Synods still met, after the Turkish Conquest as before, in Constantinople ; the Ecclesiastical courts exercised their wonted jurisdiction and enforced their judgments by excommunication and by the imposition of other spiritual penalties. When we seek the reasons for the survival of the Hellenic nationality, the peculiarly privileged position so long enjoyed by the chief official of the Orthodox Church must not be ignored.

To these causes, many of them of long standing, must be added two more which began to operate only towards the end of the eighteenth century. The first was a literary revival of the Greek language,† and the second was the outbreak of the Revolution in France. There can be no doubt that the French Revolution stirred long dormant feelings in the minds of many educated Greeks, and in 1814 a secret society—the *Philiké Hetairia*, or association of friends—was founded with the avowed object of expelling the Ottomans from Europe and

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* Turkey in Europe, p. 242 *seq.*

† Cf. Jebb, 'Modern Greece,' p. 46.

re-establishing the Byzantine Empire. The precise degree of significance to be attached to the influence of this society has been computed in varying degrees by writers of equal authority * ; but it is indisputable that it was the *Philiké Hetairia* which gave coherence and unity of aim to a movement which had hitherto been lacking in these characteristics.

With the events of the Greek insurrection of 1821-1829 it is unnecessary to deal in detail. They are narrated in innumerable text-books, and, in a well-known monograph, Prof. Alison Phillips has unravelled the intricacies of a singularly confused episode with characteristic lucidity and skill.† The enthusiasm of Lord Byron, the knight-errantry of Lord Cochrane, General Church and other Philhellenist volunteers cast over the war a glamour which in truth it only partially deserved. Never surely did any movement display a more confused and perplexing medley of brutality and nobility, of conspicuous heroism and consummate cowardice, of pure-minded patriotism and sordid self-seeking, of self-sacrificing loyalty and time-serving treachery. Nevertheless, the first three years of the revolutionary war (1821-1823) were marked by conspicuous and all but consistent success. In 1822 a Constituent Assembly met and promulgated a constitution ; a legislative assembly was elected on a popular franchise, and an executive of five members was appointed under the presidency of Alexander Mavrocordatos.

But a new phase of the struggle opened in 1824, when the Sultan called in the aid of his powerful vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt. In that year Mehemet Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha, occupied Crete, and in 1825 he crossed to the Morea itself, which was completely devastated by the Egyptian troops. Missolonghi, after an heroic defence, to which English volunteers largely contributed, fell in 1826, and in 1827, despite the efforts of Lord Cochrane and General Church, Athens was compelled to surrender.

The Greek cause seemed desperate. It could be saved only, if at all, by foreign intervention. Was such assistance likely to be forthcoming ? In order to answer that question we must refer briefly to the diplomatic situation and examine the

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* E.g. by Finlay and Gordon respectively.

† The War of Greek Independence. Smith, Elder & Co. 1898.

attitude assumed by the several Powers towards events in the Near East.

To Russia, the secular enemy of the Turks, the dictator of the treaties of Kainardji, of Jassy, and of Bucharest, the Greeks, when raising the standard of insurrection, naturally looked for encouragement and assistance. The more so since at the moment the Czar's Foreign Minister was Capodistrias, himself a Greek, and the destined champion of Greek independence. The Czar Alexander was by now too deeply committed to Metternich's interpretation of the Holy Alliance to give any countenance to a revolutionary movement. The Greeks, after all, were rebels against the authority of a legitimate ruler, they were morally indistinguishable from the rebels in Spain, in Portugal, in Naples, and as such to be left to their fate. This was the verdict of the allied monarchs at Verona. In the delivery of it Great Britain had no part. But the Czar Alexander, though he 'discerned the revolutionary march in 'the troubles of the Peloponnese,' had his own quarrel with the Sultan. Between 1822 and 1826 events tended to bring the two movements, the Greek insurrection and the Russian dispute with Turkey, though in origin quite distinct, into closer and eventually inextricable relations. In 1825 Alexander died and was succeeded by his brother Nicholas, a man of very different temper. For the Greeks Nicholas cared as little as Alexander, but he was even less disposed to allow the Sultan to play fast and loose with Russia.

What was the attitude of Great Britain towards the new developments of the Eastern Question? Officially, Canning adhered to the principle of non-intervention which had been laid down, in opposition to the Holy Alliance, by Lord Castlereagh. He was, however, like most of his countrymen, warmly interested in the Greek cause, and he ardently desired that they might succeed in throwing off the Ottoman yoke. Towards the end of 1825 the Greeks had formally placed themselves under British protection, and had implored Great Britain to send them a king. To this request it was, of course, impossible to accede, and Canning was obliged to make it clear that Great Britain could not depart from her policy of strict though benevolent neutrality.

Both in England and Russia, however, the tide of Philhellenist sentiment was rising rapidly and might at any

moment get beyond the control of the Governments. More particularly was this the case after Ibrahim's devastation of the Morea. Accordingly, on the accession of the Czar Nicholas, Canning induced the Duke of Wellington to undertake a special mission to St. Petersburg. He was to adjust, if possible, the disputes between Russia and Turkey, and so avert the threatened war, and also to arrive at a common understanding on the Greek Question. The Protocol of St. Petersburg (1826) was the result. In the following year France came in, and in 1827 Canning concluded with Russia and France the Treaty of London (July 1827). Under this Treaty the three Powers agreed to force an armistice upon the belligerents and to recognise the autonomy of Greece under Turkish suzerainty. This Treaty was the crown of Canning's policy. From first to last he had striven to attain two objects : (1) to secure, without any violation of formal neutrality, virtual independence for the Greeks ; and (2) to prevent the Russian Czar from taking advantage of the Greek movement, for which he cared little, to realise ambitions for which he cared much. But the Turk, obstinate as ever, frustrated Canning's policy and played straight into the hands of Russia.

In order to carry out the Treaty of London the three Powers sent an allied squadron into the Levant ; but the instructions given to the admirals were curiously, perhaps designedly, ambiguous. They were to 'prevent all collision between 'the contending parties without taking any part in the 'hostilities.' Fortunately the Turks cut the Gordian knot by firing on the allied squadron, and the result was 'the 'untoward accident of Navarino' (October 20, 1827). By the evening of that day the Turko-Egyptian fleet 'had dis- 'appeared, and the Bay of Navarino was covered with their 'wrecks.'

Before Navarino was fought Canning was dead, and the policy of his successors robbed England of all the fruits of his patient and sagacious diplomacy. What Canning had foreseen so clearly and had laboured so assiduously to avoid immediately occurred. While the Duke of Wellington apologised to Turkey for the 'untoward accident,' Russia advanced single-handed against her, and after two years' hard fighting dictated the Treaty of Adrianople (14th September 1829). Russia obtained ample securities and compensation for herself, and on behalf

of Greece she wrung from the Porte a virtual acknowledgment of independence.

The final settlement of the affairs of Greece was relegated to a Conference in London, and by the Convention of London (7th May 1832) * Greece was declared to be an independent and monarchical State under the guarantee of the three Powers, who jointly guaranteed a loan of 60,000,000 francs.

It was comparatively easy for the protecting Powers to declare that the government of Greece should be a monarchy ; it was more difficult to find a monarch. The Crown, having been successively declined by Prince John of Saxony and Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (who preferred Belgium), was ultimately accepted by Prince Otto of Bavaria. Capodistrias, who had been President of the executive, was conveniently assassinated in 1831, and the way was clear for the Bavarian Princeling who, at the age of seventeen, ascended the Greek throne on January 25, 1833.

Greece was now fairly launched upon its career as an independent State. That it had already begun to disappoint its friends it would be idle to deny ; and more disappointments were in store for them. But if Greece fell short of the hopes of its friends, the efforts of its friends seemed inadequate to Greece.

' The spirit of Greece,' writes Mr. Toynbee in a notable passage, ' had travailed, and only a principality was born, which gathered within its frontiers scarcely one-third of the race, and turned for its government to a foreign administration which had no bond of tradition or affinity with the population it was to rule. And yet something had been achieved. An oasis had been wrested from the Turkish wilderness, in which Hellenism could henceforth work out its own salvation untrammelled, and extend its borders little by little, until it brought within them at last the whole of its destined heritage. The fleeting glamour of dawn had passed, but it had brought the steady light of day, in which the work begun could be carried out soberly and indefatigably to its conclusion. The new kingdom, in fact, if it fulfilled its mission, might become the political nucleus and the spiritual example of a permanently awakened nation—an "education of Hellas" such as Pericles hoped to see Athens become in the greatest days of Ancient Greece.'

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* The text of this important document will be found in Hertslet, ' Map of Europe by Treaty,' ii. pp. 893 *seq.*

The task committed by the Powers to King Otto could not, in the nature of things, have been an easy one, and the young King displayed little skill in overcoming difficulties. Consequently, a military revolt broke out in 1843 which compelled the King to dismiss his unpopular Bavarian advisers and to accept a constitution, based upon the French Charter of 1830, with a bi-cameral legislature and a responsible executive.* The King proved, however, unwilling or perhaps unable to fulfil the functions assigned to him under a 'constitutional' régime and in 1862 he was forced to abdicate.

The protecting Powers had again to look out for a 'constitutional' King. The Greek people looked, not unnaturally, to England for the production of this rare exotic, and by plebiscite offered the throne to Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria. The three Powers had, however, pledged themselves not to put any of their own cadets upon the Greek throne, and the offer had perforce to be declined.† Foiled in their attempt to obtain the services of an English Prince, the Greeks then tried to get an English Statesman as their King. The offer of the Crown was actually made to and declined by Lord Stanley, and Mr. Gladstone's name was also mentioned, much to his own amusement, in the same connection.‡ Ultimately, however, Great Britain secured for the Greeks the services of Prince William George of Denmark, who in 1863 ascended the throne as King George I.

Perhaps with the view of commending the new Sovereign to his subjects, perhaps as a solatium for the failure to obtain an English King, England offered to hand over to Greece the Ionian Isles. The significance of these seven islands as the key of the Adriatic and as stepping-stones to Egypt had been keenly appreciated by Napoleon, who acquired them for France by the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797). Most of them fell into British hands between 1809 and 1814, and at the

* Details of this revolution will be found in 'British and Foreign State Papers, 1843–1844,' vol. xxxii. pp. 938 *seq.*

† Cf. Joint Note of 15th December 1862 (State Papers, vol. lviii. p. 1107), and translation ap. Hertslet, iii. p. 2073.

‡ 'Though I do love the country and never laughed at anything else in connection with it before, yet the seeing my own name, which was never meant to carry a title of any kind, placed in juxtaposition with that particular idea made me give way.' Mr. Gladstone to a friend—ap. Morley, Life, i. p. 620.

Peace of 1815 Great Britain accepted from the Powers a formal Protectorate over the islands. But the arrangement did not work smoothly, and in 1858 Bulwer Lytton, then at the Colonial Office, persuaded Mr. Gladstone to undertake a special mission to investigate the grievances of the islanders. The system of administration was such that, as Gladstone himself said, 'not Cherubim and Seraphim could 'work it.' The High Commissioner Extraordinary had a mixed reception in the islands, but everywhere he found one sentiment prevailing among the inhabitants: an ardent wish for immediate union with the Greek Kingdom. To this step he was himself strongly opposed, believing that the surrender of the Protectorate by England 'would be nothing less than a 'crime against the safety of Europe as connected with the state 'and course of the Eastern Question.' As a substitute he offered the islands constitutional reform, which they did not want. Within four years Mr. Gladstone had changed his mind; Lord Palmerston came round to the same opinion, and in the Queen's Speech of February 1863 the offer of the islands to Greece was publicly announced. The National Assembly of the Hellenes gratefully accepted the gift on March 20,1863,* and a Protocol concluded in London on June 5 provided simultaneously for the cession of the islands to Greece and for the nomination of the Danish Prince to the Crown. Article III. of the definitive treaty concluded (13th July 1863) between Great Britain, France, and Russia of the one part and Denmark of the other, runs as follows: 'Greece under the Sovereignty of Prince William 'of Denmark and the guarantee of the three courts, forms a 'Monarchical, Independent and Constitutional State.'

The first task awaiting the new Sovereign was to urge upon the National Assembly the importance of completing without delay the revision of the Constitution. By the end of October 1864 the work was accomplished, and on November 28 the King took the oath to the Constitution and the Constituent Assembly was dissolved.

The Constitution thus inaugurated was frankly democratic. The Senate, established in 1843, was abolished, and legislative power was vested in a single chamber with an absolute veto reserved to the Crown. The Boulé, as it is called, was to consist

* Cf. Hertslet, ii. p. 1530.

of not less than one hundred and fifty deputies apportioned to the several provinces according to population. The deputies were to be elected for four years by direct and universal suffrage and to receive payment for their services. Half the members, plus one, were required to form a quorum. A special procedure was ordained for constitutional revision. Ministers were to be responsible to the Chamber, but the means of asserting their responsibility were not defined until 1876. There was to be a Cabinet of seven members nominated by the King, not necessarily from among deputies of the Boulé. All Ministers might speak in the Boulé, but could not vote unless they were members of it.*

Such were the main features of the Constitution which continued practically unchanged down to 1911. In the latter year, the Council of State, a prebouleutic body, was revived; soldiers were declared ineligible for seats in the Boulé; the quorum of the Boulé was reduced to one-third; and elementary education was made both compulsory and gratuitous. If parliamentary government has not hitherto proved a conspicuous success in Greece, it has not been for lack of meticulous constitutional definition. But the truth is that this particular form of polity postulates conditions which are not found in combination nearly so often as most Englishmen and some foreigners imagine. It demands, in the first place, a long and laborious apprenticeship in the art of self-government among the people; it demands among the elected representatives, as Cromwell perceived, substantial unanimity as regards the 'fundamentals' of government; it demands in the Sovereign (if it is of the constitutional-monarchical type) consummate tact and considerable political experience and education. These prerequisites have not always been forthcoming in the modern Hellenic State, and at the present time † the parliamentary constitution is being subjected to a strain to

* The text of the Constitution of 1864 will be found in Dareste, 'Les Constitutions Modernes,' vol. ii. pp. 301 *seq.* and an analytical commentary in Demombynes, 'Les Constitutions Européennes,' vol. i. p. 801 *seq.* Curiously enough, the Hellenic Constitution is entirely omitted from all the collections of constitutional *Texts* I have been able to consult in English, and I find no reference to it in the accessible American books such as Woodrow Wilson and Lowell.

† December 1915.

which it is manifestly unequal. Supreme power seems, indeed, for the moment to have been transferred from the Chamber and the responsible Ministers to the Monarch and the Military Chiefs.

It is, presumably, this obvious fact which has induced a member of the British House of Commons to commit himself to the following statement : ' Greece is no longer in the enjoy-' ment of the constitutional government which in 1863 was ' guaranteed to her as solemnly as the neutrality and independ-' ence of Belgium had been guaranteed to that State in 1831 and ' 1839.' * A careful perusal of the Protocol of the 5th of June 1863, and the Treaty of London of the 13th of July 1863, seems to afford no sufficient warrant for this statement. The pertinent clause (Article III.) has been already quoted above : Greece was to form ' a Monarchical, Independent and Constitu-' tional State.' If by ' Constitutional ' was meant anything more than that the Constitution should be embodied in a written document, or *Charter*, its implications must have varied considerably in the minds of the three signatory Powers—Great Britain, Napoleonic France and autocratic Russia. Apart, however, from the ambiguity of the term ' constitutional,' it would seem to be a gross exaggeration to affirm that the maintenance of the ' constitutional government ' in the English sense has been guaranteed to Greece ' as solemnly 'as neutrality and independence to Belgium. Nor, indeed, could it be. Neutrality is pre-eminently a question of international relations; ' constitutional government ' is a matter of domestic concern. Would Mr. Swift MacNeill regard it as a *casus foederis* if the Greeks were, to-morrow, to decide in favour of a republic in preference to the monarchy decreed by the protecting Powers in 1832 ? Ever since the days of Lord Castlereagh it has been an accepted canon of British diplomacy that while ' England ' stands pledged to uphold the territorial arrangements estab-' lished ' by international covenants, ' with the internal affairs ' of each separate State we have nothing to do.'† The language of Canning re-echoed that of Castlereagh : ' England must ' insist on the right of nations to set up over themselves what-' ever form of government they think best.' Any departure

* Mr. Swift MacNeill, M.P., in a letter to ' The Times,' December 10, 1915.

† Castlereagh's Protest against the Laibach Circular.

from this sound principle is bound to involve consequences which could not be contemplated without dismay.

It is time, however, to turn from the internal affairs of Greece to its territorial delimitations as defined by international agreements. The first, that of 1832, drew the northern frontier of Greece at a line from the Gulf of Arta on the west to the Gulf of Volo on the east. The delimitation was both niggardly and stupid. It gave to Greece Eubœa and the Cyclades, but it left Crete in the hands of the Turk; it secured for Greece the Pass of Thermopylæ but surrendered that of Makrynovos. But unsatisfactory as was the line drawn in 1832 it remained unaltered for half a century. On the outbreak of the Crimean war the Greeks were anxious, not unnaturally, to take advantage of the preoccupation of the Turks to acquire the long coveted Greek provinces of Epirus and Thessaly. But at the first hint of a movement on the part of Greece to attain these objects the Western allies occupied the Piræus, King Otto was coerced into a highly distasteful neutrality, and at the Peace of Paris (1856) Greece got nothing. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 was, in a territorial sense, more productive; though not immediately. In the war itself Greece had taken no part. There was a strong party in Greece which believed that the moment had come for taking by force of arms the great prize—Thessaly and Epirus—denied to her by diplomacy in 1856. But Trikoupis, who was Foreign Minister, unwisely preferred to trust to diplomacy and in particular to the goodwill of Great Britain, which, as in 1854, strongly opposed the intervention of Greece. Popular insurrections broke out in Crete, Thessaly and Epirus, but the peace between Greece and Turkey remained technically unbroken. As a natural consequence Greece, an outside suppliant at the Congress of Berlin, came away empty-handed. Lord Beaconsfield, jealous for the integrity of the Ottoman dominions, suggested that Greece was a 'country with 'a future, who could afford to wait.' So long as she persists in her preference for a somewhat devious diplomacy; so long as she continues to 'fear her fate too much' to 'put it to 'the touch,' so long will her deserts appear too small to merit the attention of lukewarm friends; she will be allowed to wait. Mr. Gladstone, in 1878, contrasted the fate of Greece with that of the Balkan States which, relying upon Russia, had made war upon the Turk and reaped their appropriate reward. Greece,

who kept her sword in the scabbard and relied upon English benevolence, got nothing more than a passing sneer from Lord Beaconsfield. The Congress of Berlin did indeed invite the Sultan to grant to Greece such a rectification of frontiers as would include Janina and Larissa in Greek territory, but the Sultan, not unnaturally, ignored the invitation.

Two years later (1880), after Mr. Gladstone had come into office, the Powers suggested to the Porte the cession of Thessaly and Epirus, and at last, in 1881, the tact and firmness of Mr. Goschen wrung from the unwilling Sultan one-third of the latter province and the whole of the former. Crete, on the other hand, still remained under the heel of the Turk. So, also, fortunately for Greece, did Macedonia. Lord Beaconsfield did not exhibit much positive benevolence towards Greece, but negatively she owes him a considerable debt. If he had not torn up the Treaty of San Stephano, Bulgaria would have obtained a commanding position in Macedonia, Serbia would never have got Uskub and Monastir, Greece would still be sighing for Kavala and perhaps for Salonika. Yet, as M. Kallostypi wrote in 1886, 'la Macédoine est vraiment le 'fondement de l'Hellade unie et grande, la Macédoine est le 'boulevard de la liberté grecque, le gage de son avenir.'

But the immediate ambitions of Greece turned, for the next few years, in the direction not of Macedonia but of Crete.

Crete, more definitely even than the Peloponnesus, may be regarded as the quintessence of Hellenism. The Cretans are 'as pure Greeks as exist to-day,'* and the 'Great Greek island,' as the Hellenes term it, has been the scene of perpetual insurrection ever since the time (1669) when it passed under the dominion of the Turk.† In the war of independence, Crete, as we have seen, was handed over by the Turk to Mehemet Ali as the price of his assistance. Reduced to submission by measures of terrible ferocity it remained in Mehemet Ali's hands until 1840. It was again in revolt in 1841, in 1866, and in 1886; while in 1897 it was the disturbances in the island which precipitated the 'Thirty Days War' between Greece and Turkey. That war was disastrous to Greece; it discredited the Dynasty; it involved the retrocession of a strip of territory

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* Cassavetti, p. 4.

† There are said to have been fourteen insurrections since 1830. See Kerofilas, 'Venizelos,' p. 47.

in Thessaly and it necessitated the payment of a considerable indemnity. On the other hand it virtually assured the final emancipation of the 'Great Greek island.' In 1898 Great Britain, Russia, France, and Italy landed troops in the coast towns; in 1899 they declared Crete to be an autonomous State under the Suzerainty of the Sultan, and appointed Prince Gèorge of Greece as High Commissioner under their own protection. In 1905 the Cretan Assembly proclaimed the union of the island with the Kingdom of Greece, but at that point the Powers intervened; Prince George resigned the High Commissionership; the King of Greece, by permission of the Powers, nominated M. Zaimis to succeed him, and for the next three years the island was policed by an international military force. In 1908 the islanders, excited by the proclamation of Bulgarian Independence, by the 'Young Turks' revolution at Constantinople, and above all, by the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to Austria, again demanded annexation to Greece. A provisional Government was set up with M. Venizelos as Minister of Justice and Foreign Affairs. The Powers, while refusing formally to recognise the provisional Government, entered into 'administrative relations' with it. If at this crisis Greece had acted with courage and promptitude the Cretan problem would probably have been solved there and then, but in fear of the Turk on the one hand, and on the other of the Powers, the Greeks allowed the favourable opportunity to slip.

In Greece itself, however, there was grave discontent, which eventuated in July 1909 in a *coup d'état* by a newly formed 'Military League.' From the chaos which ensued the kingdom was saved by the courageous wisdom of the King and the political genius of the sometime leader of the Cretan insurrection—M. Venizelos. Invited to Athens to advise the League, Venizelos was ultimately called into counsel by the King. He persuaded the League to dissolve itself, and he procured the summoning of a national Convention which met in September 1910. In October, Venizelos became Prime Minister and carried out the revision described above,* together with a long series of far-reaching domestic reforms.

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* p. 34.

More important, however, than internal reconstruction was the diplomatic achievement of Venizelos. The formation of the Balkan League of 1912 was primarily the work of this remarkable diplomatist.* The Turko-Italian war in Tripoli gave him his chance. He seized it with the high courage and the consummate adroitness which differentiate the great statesman from the time-serving politicians whom parliamentary government—not in Greece only—is apt to breed. Then, as M. Gueshoff writes,

'A miracle took place. . . . Within the brief space of one month the Balkan Alliance demolished the Ottoman Empire, four tiny countries with a population of some 10,000,000 souls defeating a great Power whose inhabitants numbered 25,000,000. . . . Once the Turks were driven back to Constantinople and Asia Minor, the Eastern Question would cease to be a source of troubles and dangers. On May 30, 1913, this solution of the problem was consecrated by the Treaty of London. The Balkan war thus ended as it had begun—by a miracle. More territories were being reclaimed from Turkish hands than in the case of the most victorious war ever waged by a Great Power against the Sultan.'

But not even Venizelos could smooth out the tangle of Hellenic, Serbian and Bulgarian claims in Macedonia. His failure to do so issued in what M. Gueshoff has truly described as 'an 'impious fratricidal struggle'—the second Balkan war of 1913. How far that failure was due to an irreconcilable conflict of interest between the allies, and how far to the intrigues of Berlin and Vienna is a point which cannot yet be determined. It is sufficient for our immediate purpose to note the results.

The military success of the Greeks in the two Balkan wars greatly surprised both friends and foes; most of all perhaps did it surprise the Greeks themselves. As a net result of war and diplomacy Greece almost doubled her territory and population.†

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* For the Bulgarian view clearly and temperately stated, with ample documentary evidence, cf. 'The Balkan League,' by I. E. Gueshoff, late Prime Minister of Bulgaria. John Murray, 1915.

† The population of Greece before 1912 = 2,666,000; after 1913 = 4,363,000. In area Greece occupied before the wars 25,014 square miles, and 41,993 after. There are said, however, to be some 3,000,000 Greeks still 'unredeemed' under Turkish rule. Bulgaria gained only 125,490 inhabitants and 9663 square miles. Serbia gained 1,636,291 inhabitants and 15,241 square miles.

Towards the north-east Greece obtained southern Macedonia, including the great city of Salonika, and the seaboard as far east as, and including, Kavala; on the north-west she obtained Epirus, but not that portion of southern Albania which is known to the Hellenes as northern Epirus, and which they occupied at the beginning of the European war. Turkey finally abandoned her suzerainty over Crete, which was at last formally annexed by Greece, and Greece secured (by the award of the Powers) all the Aegean Islands of which the Porte could dispose, except those which command the entrance to the Dardanelles—Imbros and Tenedos. The Sporades, including Rhodes, have been held since the Tripoli war by Italy, and Greece has recently refused an ill-timed offer of Cyprus from Great Britain.

Greece is palpably halting between two opinions; hesitating, not unintelligibly, to commit herself definitely either to one or the other of two alternative courses, both of which are fraught with peril to an adolescent State. Through much tribulation has the Hellenic Kingdom struggled into existence; slowly and painfully have the Hellenes realised their national identity and achieved national unity. Had they listened to the voice of the one political genius whom in modern times their race has produced they would undoubtedly have taken some risks; but in politics nothing great can be achieved without risk. If Cavour and Victor Emmanuel had not risked everything in 1855, if Garibaldi had hesitated in 1860, Italian unity would not be an accomplished fact to-day. During the last hundred years Greece has incurred an incalculable debt to the Powers of the Triple Entente. In 1915 she has sadly neglected the opportunity of repayment. The bond she had given to her Serbian ally she has shamefully dishonoured. Faithlessness and ingratitude may earn a traitor's recompense; but well-rewarded treachery has, before now, proved to be the prelude to suicide.

J. A. R. Marriott.

A NATION OF WORKERS

'HIS Majesty's Government are fully alive to the great importance of the economic, social, commercial and financial problems that will arise after the war, and I am strongly of opinion that not even our preoccupation with the immediate and paramount task of ensuring victory ought to prevent us from taking measures to ensure that these problems shall be carefully explored by skilled experts in advance.'

So said the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on December 13th, and his words, expressing as they do the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government, are the most complete justification for the plea that the gravest and fullest consideration should be given now, even whilst we are wrestling with the unique problems of the present, to the equally unique problems of the future. If, without going into full detail, those problems can be outlined with sufficient clearness to provoke intelligent discussion and anticipation the purpose of this article will have been accomplished.

First and foremost we must always remember that we are looking forward not to possibilities but to certainties. We can be excused if we were not prepared, as our enemies were prepared, for war. To us war had long seemed a mere contingency —a possibility rather than a probability. But we shall be inexcusable if we are not prepared for peace and the questions which arise out of it ; for, whether it come in six weeks or six months or six years, peace is as inevitable as sunrise or full moon. Let us, therefore, now, while we have time, call to our assistance all the available experience, the intellect and the ability of the nation, in order to have a clear and definite plan for meeting the difficulties of the future. Peaceful nation as we were, we yet in peace time, as has recently been disclosed, maintained a Committee of Imperial Defence, which, in spite of limitations, worked out as thoroughly as possible the problems to be faced in war and embodied them in a ' War Book.' Is it too much to ask that a Committee of at least equal influence and standing should even now be preparing a ' Peace Book ' on similar lines ? We must never forget that the standing of

British business and of British goods throughout the world depends on the conclusion of a victorious peace. Anything less than that would tarnish inevitably and tarnish for generations the very goodwill of every house of business trading outside these islands. It will reflect fairly or unfairly upon the quality of every article exported from this country and indeed the Empire. Victory in the present war is essential to the success of our future commerce as well as to our future liberty.

Though the problems to be faced may be grouped under the head of Business it must not be supposed that this means the greedy and grasping acquisition of wealth : discussion on such a subject would rightly be viewed with chilly indifference by statesmen and people alike. Business, as the term is here used, connotes something far greater and higher : it covers the whole problem of the preservation and future of the race. It is the problem of fitting and training and educating the coming generations, on whom will depend the race and the ideals for which so much human life is being sacrificed at the present time.

The broad outstanding fact with which we shall be faced for many years to come is the necessity of paying for the war. Few people are now simple enough to believe that any appreciable portion of the huge cost will be recoverable in the form of an indemnity. It is to ourselves, and ourselves alone, that we must look to pay our bills. From the enormous drain of money which will result will come a very considerable lowering of incomes, and in consequence it will be necessary for a far larger proportion of the population to be active workers. This is in itself far from being a disadvantage ; indeed, no finer thing could happen to a nation than that every one of its members should become a worker. Side by side with this increase in the number of workers, including of course women workers, must be an increase in the other requisites for the production of wealth—new factories built, new machinery installed, new supplies of raw material tapped.

But while we shall be compelled to build up in the after-war period the machinery for increased production, on the other side of the account we must anticipate decreased internal consumption. We might place roughly in three groups the products which are in abnormal demand at present. First and

foremost come the actual munitions of war—shells, guns, high explosives and the like—the demand for which in time of peace is comparatively insignificant. Secondly, there are those manufactures which, while they are required in enormously enhanced numbers in war-time, yet meet a steady and regular sale under normal peace conditions. Clothing, boots and motor-cars come under this heading. Lastly, there are those trades whose exceptional prosperity at present is only a by-product of the war, being due, not to the actual needs of the fighting forces, but to the temporarily increased spending power of certain sections of the non-combatant population : the furniture, musical instrument and cheap jewellery trades are good examples of this class.

Taking each of these three groups in turn, it is clear that consumption in the first will drop, not perhaps instantly, but within a very limited period after the conclusion of peace, to negligible proportions. The present inflated demand in the second and third groups will also fall below pre-war figures, as the lessening of incomes becomes felt. It may be to some extent possible to diminish our imports by producing at home some commodities now produced abroad, but with the machinery for a great increase in production and with internal consumption greatly reduced, we shall have to devote our best brains and our keenest energies to seeking fresh customers—in other words, to developing our export trade.

It is from our export trade in the past that we have derived our commercial greatness, our position in the markets of the world, even to some extent the geographical area of our possessions—for trade not only follows the flag but frequently precedes it. It is upon our export trade that the commercial existence of our race will depend to an even greater extent in the future. There is no need for despondency : the underlying principles of British workmanship—honesty and courage, industry and persistence—are still with us : we have the inherent capacity, we have the opportunity, we have the traditions, the reputation and the goodwill, but all these qualities require to be fertilised and rejuvenated.

We must never forget that we shall have not only to develop our overseas trade but to develop it in the teeth of such competition as we have never had to face before in the whole of our commercial history. In the first place, we shall have to meet,

in the markets of the world, the United States—a strong and virile nation with limitless national resources, with a whole-souled respect for the acquisition of wealth, with boundless energy and immense capacity, with no other traditions than those of self-preservation—a nation moreover as yet unaffected by the ravages of the great war. Their competition should be a healthy incentive to us : it is under such conditions of competition that our people has attained to greatness—it is prosperity and not striving that has threatened to be our undoing. Our driving consideration must be not only the preservation of our Empire but the maintenance of our position as leader of the business nations of the world. That is the end we must now strive for, and it can only be achieved if we strive whole-heartedly and with clear foresight and knowledge.

But competition with the United States is far from being the only competition that we shall have to meet. Through all the long years in which Germany in secret was forging and tempering her sword for ' the day ' she never ceased to carry on in the open her campaign of ' peaceful penetration,' flooding the markets of the world with her wares. Will she not, when at last she is compelled to surrender her sword, broken, blunted and soiled, revert to her weapons of peace ? Industry in Germany is not flourishing, but it is by no means at a standstill. Where raw materials are available there is little doubt that she is still continuing to manufacture, using for the purpose all the stores of labour which are quite incapable of being employed in the army, but which she has organised with no less method and assiduity than she has applied to her fighting forces. Since her foreign trade is for the moment practically non-existent and her internal consumption is perforce largely reduced, this means that she is quietly building up a vast stock of manufactured articles to be ' dumped ' upon the world's markets at the proper time and by her own peculiar and none too scrupulous methods. For a while at any rate we shall have to meet the competition of a nation which is not only prepared to sell at or below cost price but will willingly use any trick or artifice to secure once more a foothold in the market-places of the world.

Into all production and all trade, but more especially into trade with foreign countries, there enter three elements—the worker, the manufacturer and the Government. These three factors are independent and should be considered together in

any 'careful exploration' which takes place. Unfortunately, they are usually considered separately. Great as our successes have been in the past—so great that Germany was willing to fight to wrest from us our commercial supremacy—they have been achieved with little co-operation and co-ordination between these three factors. Too often indeed their various interests have been treated as mutually antagonistic, instead of mutually indispensable. Every criticism, every suggestion for the employment of better methods, of greater co-ordination, has been met with the chorus of 'Look what we have achieved!' and only a few men of affairs have had the vision to say 'Look what we might have achieved!' It is not to what we have achieved, but to what it is possible to achieve, that we must look if we are to save our commercial existence; and in such an attitude there is no room for complacent satisfaction with old methods and old shibboleths because they have been successful in the past.

Of these three factors the worker must be considered first. For many years past he has loomed increasingly in the consideration of national problems, but in those of the future he will be a still more important factor; indeed, without the cordial and enlightened co-operation of the worker, national commerce will encounter speedy disaster. With the question of the individual worker is inseparably bound up that of the Trade Unions, whose attitude may largely determine our position in the future. The Trade Unions have done much to improve the position of the working man of this country: they have aimed at preventing the money-grubbing and merciless employer from exacting from his workers an effort grossly disproportionate to the reward received; but the Trade Unions have never shown a clear comprehension of the wider relations of capital and labour and the mutual interdependence of the two. Nor is there much hope of good results from the Trade Union movement unless the leaders are able to lead. Above all things, if Trade Unionism is to be successful it must be able to bind its adherents to their agreements.

The worst feature of Trade Unionism, in practice if not in theory, is the deliberate limitation of the productiveness of the individual worker. A nation derives its strength, not from an average in which the highest factor is mediocrity, but from the average between little or no capacity on the one side and a very

high degree of capacity and efficiency on the other. Any unnatural and artificial restraint of this higher efficiency must lower the sum-total of production, and consequently reduce the only fund out of which the workers can ultimately be paid. Yet the practice of limiting output is so widespread that it can almost be described as universal. The aim of the worker, whether singly or in combination, has been simply the acquisition of more and yet more money for given services, regardless of all other conditions—an aim which leads, as has recently been pointed out by a member of the Government, to an increase in the price of commodities and consequently in the end creates merely a vicious circle.

The worker and the Union alike must learn to realise that wages cannot be considered absolutely ; they are in all cases relative to the amount of service rendered in return. If they bear a proper proportion to the work done they are fair wages and they can only be too high or too low in so far as they exceed or fall short of the value of the services rendered. While this is, in the main, a question which has arisen through the action and claims of the worker, the employer cannot be altogether exonerated from the tangle, almost the deadlock, which has resulted. The crass stupidity, whether of the individual or the Union, which limits output, is matched by the crass stupidity of the employer who reduces piece rates because his employees are earning what he considers too much money. A reduction in piece rates may be justified, if the existing rates result in prohibitive cost or if improved mechanical devices have been introduced. But where the rates are such as to enable the manufacturer to secure satisfactory sales, and where no change has taken place in the machinery supplied or in the methods of production devised by the manufacturer, it is grossly unjust for the employer to make any reduction in the rate paid to the employee. Unhappily, this is only too often done by a section of the employers of this country. The spirit which governs employment of labour has not yet been sufficiently divorced from the spirit of greed. More co-operation and greater sympathy between employer and worker are absolutely essential, not merely for the progress, but even for the preservation, of our country as a commercial power.

A little more knowledge and thought will enable both the employer and the employee to realise the paramount import-

ance of this question of wages, or rather of wages in relation to cost, as an essential element in the solution of the problems with which we shall have to grapple. After the war we must give primary consideration to those who have been fighting for the Empire, especially to those who have suffered physical injury. There is scarcely an employer of standing in the whole country who is not under a binding promise to reinstate those of his employees who have joined the Colours. The possibility of the fulfilment of that promise is dependent, not on his own goodwill or integrity, but on the success of British trade, and that means, in the main, British trade with oversea countries. The wares of this country will be purchased by the people of other countries because of their value, and there will be the most strenuous competition on the part of all other producing nations, and of two in particular, to give greater value than ourselves. Value is judged by selling price; selling price depends upon cost price of materials (which may be regarded as, broadly speaking, equal for the various competitors) *plus* the amount of work given by the individual workman in production for a given sum in wages, which is the variable factor. We shall, in short, be plunged into another war, a 'peaceful 'war,' in which the weapons will no longer be rifles, guns, and bombs, but the capital and skill of the employer, and the skill and, more particularly, the willingness of the worker. Once let the latter be roused to this fact, and the question of wages will take on a new aspect, and we shall be in a fair way to be delivered from the slough of doubt and distrust into which we have fallen in the relations between capital and labour. Moreover, the matter has a personal aspect as well as a national one —the amount of work done affects cost, and cost affects sales, and the result of a considerable decrease in sales will be not only a diminution of British trade and British prestige but also a reduction in employment. Unless each unit of labour can be made more efficient, it will be impossible to maintain even the labour which is employed at present, much less to absorb the large mass of additional men which will be available on the disbandment of the civilian armies.

Another point which needs most careful consideration and a wider outlook on the part of the Trade Unions is the question of the employment of women. While a sympathetic hand has been held out to women who are anxious to use their strength

for the purpose of helping to win the war, at the present time Trade Unionism only welcomes them in many occupations as a temporary expedient to facilitate production of material for war purposes : at present it refuses to recognise the necessity for their assistance in the great trade war which will follow the declaration of peace. In a nation of workers, straining every nerve to make good the ravages of war, the ideal is that not only every man, but also every woman who can be spared from the duties of the home, should be playing a part in adding to the national wealth. We cannot be considered to have developed all our resources of energy or done justice to our nationality until every facility has been given to the employment of women and every arbitrary restriction removed.

So much for the worker, the first of the three great factors in our commercial success. What now of the employer—the man who directs the vast sum-total of skill and energy available in the British workman ? Not only our commercial greatness but much even of our territorial extension has been due to his activities. That the individual employer has been the mainstay of British trade in the past cannot be disputed : that the individual employer will be capable of dealing with the much more difficult problems of the future is very doubtful, so long at least as he clings to exclusively individual as contrasted with co-operative methods. Probably the greatest factor in the astonishing rise to success of German commerce has been the inspiration of German business activities by the spirit of patriotism and the sacred duty of increasing the material welfare of the Fatherland. There is reason to believe that we have reached the limits of national commercial development by means of the individual alone. What we shall need in the future will be more co-operation, more co-ordination of effort. The success of British trade has been the sum-total of the separate successes of individual traders : both could be much greater if all were working together as an organic whole. To arrive at this end there must first be some radical modification in the character of the average business man and then an equally radical change in his methods. In the past the Alpha and the Omega of the aims of many of our business men have been the acquisition of sufficient wealth to enable them to dissociate themselves for ever from business

and to establish a family of drones—cultivated, ornamental drones, no doubt, but drones nevertheless. In the Britain of the future there will be no room for drones, except among the physically, mentally or morally unfit. There seems to be as great a tendency among those born in the sphere of trade to desert it at the first opportunity as there formerly was to shun it on the part of those born amongst surroundings alien to business. Under such conditions it is not unnatural that the business man has overlooked the higher aim of business as a means to national prosperity and greatness, and these latter results have come rather as by-products of individual ambition.

Nor is it strange that the employer's relations to his work-people have suffered from his half-concealed antipathy to trade. Regarding them not so much as allies working side by side with him in the great struggle for British supremacy, but rather as temporary instruments in his own personal striving for wealth, he is in a fair way to become a parasite rather than a patriarch among his employees. The leadership of an industrial army is just as grave a responsibility as the leadership of a fighting force. We need in the commercial world far more of the human sympathy, the real comradeship, between leaders and led which are so great a feature of the wonderful relation between officers and men in the British Navy and Army. No greater future can be conceived for any one of us than that we should be able, through our enterprise and energy, to contribute to the well-being of the race, to its education, its fitness and the humaneness of its existence: and in the age of reality which will follow this age of unpreparedness, of luxury and false ideals, the man who will matter will be he who makes a definite contribution to the common weal by providing British men and women with an outlet for productive industry.

Side by side with the change in character we must look for a complete revolution in methods on the part of the British business man. The keynote must be the entire abandonment of precedent and convention, except in so far as concerns the homely principles of honesty, punctuality and good value. There are old customs, old practices, old designs, which cannot be improved upon to-day, but we must get out of the habit of worshipping the old simply because it is old and of opposing

every innovation simply because it is new. The processes of our grandfathers may in certain cases be the best even for modern conditions, but they are not the best *ipso facto*.

Let us consider for a moment some details of the methods by which our great trade rivals have been able to build up a growing volume of business in markets not so very long ago regarded as exclusively our own. Their one outstanding feature is willingness to supply the article that is wanted, to recognise the elementary principle that the man who pays the piper has a right to call the tune. It is an amazing tribute to the sterling excellence of our goods that we have for so long and in so many instances called the tune while our customers paid the piper : but it is an achievement which cannot be continued indefinitely. Sooner or later every customer will begin to realise, as many had begun to realise even before the war, that it is preferable to get the goods one wants rather than to get the goods one ought to want. More and more the world's markets are rejecting the fine, solid, durable wares of British manufacture and accepting the cheaper, flimsier articles from the workshops of our trade rivals, because the representatives of the latter have studied the needs of each particular market and have put up their goods in the actual form in which they are required. By all means let us preserve our reputation for quality, but let us lose it for obstinacy. The British manufacturer has failed to encourage the creative genius of our designers who through the application of their art could lessen the cost and add to the value of the wares he produced. The British manufacturer will say that it is impossible that the trained skill of his craftsmen can be applied to the production of articles of unsubstantial quality, and he calls upon the spirit, the principles and the customs of his grandfathers as an incontrovertible reason and a complete justification for the production of the particular article which he is selling, in the particular form in which he continues to manufacture it. The logic may be unanswerable, but logic is cold comfort when markets are gone : and just as British success is the sum-total of the successes of individual British traders, so the sum-total of markets lost to individual traders means the gradual closing of the world's markets to British trade. That is why change is necessary if we are to survive as a commercial nation.

His own conception of what is best for his customers is not the only thing which the British manufacturer endeavours to force upon them. It is but rarely that he condescends to express his prices in the currency of the country with which he is dealing : it probably does not occur to him that that country may employ something simpler than the quaint archæological survival, which we call our weights and measures system : and as for language, his tacit, if not his expressed, opinion is that English ought to be good enough for anyone. This attitude is the product of what we broadly call our insularity.

The question of language is of the first importance in every field of our national activity. It may be false, or at least only partly true, that at a critical period the staff of a particular British Embassy included no one who was acquainted with the language of the country to which it was accredited, but it is undoubtedly typical of our general attitude. In the age of reality and enhanced activity which is coming, it will be absolutely necessary for us to be on speaking terms with the languages of our chief customers, even if this should involve some rearrangement of our ancient and much-prized educational curricula. A knowledge of Greek is no doubt a desirable possession, just as a knowledge of golf is a desirable possession, but we must in future shape our education towards the acquisition of such knowledge as is not only desirable itself, but is most conducive to the extension of our foreign trade. A knowledge of Chinese may not add so appreciably to our culture as the study of Greek, but it would add to our power as a commercial nation to be able to tell the Chinaman something of our wares in his own idiom. So with Russian : the potential purchasing power of that vast empire is enormous, and a study of its language could not but be beneficial to those who will be responsible for the conduct of British commerce in the days to come. Spanish and Portuguese, small as are the territories of Spain and Portugal in Europe, are the two keys which jointly unlock those great Republics of South America, the wealth and purchasing power of which are realised in this country only by the few. Languages are merely one side of our educational system which requires remodelling in accordance with our needs of the future : here, as elsewhere, we must be guided by the broad principle that conventions, traditions and shibboleths are not of virtue simply by

reason of their antiquity, but that each must be re-examined in the light of altered conditions and if necessary ruthlessly abandoned. Our youth must be fitted to advance the Empire's industry.

We have seen that one of the grave needs for the success of British commerce in the future is greater co-operation between individual traders. An attempt has been made to secure this to a certain extent through the action of Chambers of Commerce, which have been widely formed in the chief industrial centres of the country. They have been founded as the result of the enthusiasm of the commercial community and have done much good work. Their capacity is derived mainly from voluntary effort, and, in a time of grave crisis, voluntary unpaid effort may be equal and even sometimes superior to services for a pecuniary reward. But in time of peace it cannot be urged that voluntary effort, as exemplified in the majority of our Chambers of Commerce, has been sufficient. Chambers of Commerce have the advantage of a personnel sufficiently brilliant and able to satisfy the most hostile critic of our commercial methods ; unfortunately, the activity of this personnel is too often limited to the appearance of a number of names on the printed matter of the Chamber. Nor can anyone possibly quarrel with the purpose of Chambers of Commerce, which is broadly the advancement of British trade. The charge against most of them is that their achievements are not sufficient to retain the interest of those who demand a practical result in return for the sacrifice of time and thought. At the same time the existence of Chambers of Commerce acts as a deterrent to any further effort towards the object they have in view, but which they do little to accomplish.

Moreover, as we have seen, co-operation is alien to the nature of the average British business man. Unless, therefore, we can count upon a complete reversal of his habits, character and prejudices, it is clear that co-operation must be imposed, or at any rate fostered, from without. In other words, it is necessary to introduce the third factor of our preliminary survey—some sort of action by the Government, as representing the power, the force and the resources of the whole people. It is an axiom of our law that, amongst the rights and privileges which attach to every man and woman born in this country, is that of

being fed, and the nation, through the Government, is responsible for seeing that each is provided with food. This can only be done in one of two ways, either by supplying the necessities of life by means of poor relief provided at the expense of the well-to-do (and that way ultimately lies national bankruptcy) or by seeing that everyone is provided with the opportunity of working, and so earning a livelihood for himself or herself. The Government after the war will be faced with the necessity of extending either workshops or workhouses. The latter alternative is unthinkable ; it will, therefore, be imperative to widen the scope of our productive industries, and, to do this, it will be essential, as already explained to extend our foreign markets. It is just within the bounds of possibility that our rulers will still be saved this trouble, by the energy of our business men, but there is reason to fear that we have practically reached the limits of the possible extension of national advance by individual effort, and that further progress will be dependent upon co-ordination under the auspices of some authoritative organisation specially constituted to deal with the development of British trade.

There is, of course, already in existence the ' Committee of ' the Privy Council on Trade,' or, as it is more briefly known, the Board of Trade, but a mere recital of some of its duties is suffic ent to show that only a very small portion of its time and energy can be directly devoted to the specific task of assisting British manufacturers to hold the markets of the world. Its functions include the collection of trade statistics, the issue of patents, the maintenance of standard weights and measures, certain bankruptcy proceedings, the registration of joint stock companies, matters connected with railways, tramways and the supply of water, gas and electricity, the control of merchant shipping, harbours and lighthouses, the management of labour exchanges, and the administration of the Conciliation Act, the Trade Boards Act, and many other statutes affecting the relations of capital and labour. It will be seen that few of these functions bear any immediate relation to the specific object at which we are aiming. And even in the matter of the collection of trade statistics the Board of Trade hardly makes the fullest and best use of the data it has obtained. The attitude of Board of Trade officials in the past has been : ' If you come to us we will answer your inquiries, we will give

'you all the information in our possession, we will assist you 'to the best of our power. If you have not enough initiative 'to come to us, why should we bother about you?'

This is not the attitude which will develop British trade as it must be developed in the future; an aggressive organisation is needed which will force existing openings and opportunities upon even the laggards, will educate and energise those slow of thought and action, and do its utmost to create fresh opportunities for trade expansion. Trade is acquired for a business largely by making known the products of that business to the people most likely to consume those products; trade can be acquired for a nation by a process which is merely the same process on a much larger scale. It is impossible that any individual firm can gather complete knowledge of the habits and requirements of the whole of the consuming nations, except at an altogether prohibitive cost. The work must be done by a Central Agency which would collect the necessary information and distribute it to every firm engaged in the production of the specific articles required. Such an organisation would be useless if it were staffed and maintained in the swaddling clothes of Civil Service tradition. What is urgently needed is not the ordinary civil servant, but the business man; and not the superannuated or retired business man living upon the glories and successes of the past, but the young and virile leaders of commerce, the men who are responsible for the successful businesses of to-day. The organisation must have a paid staff, and, if it is to attract the talent which the nation needs, paid not according to the standards of Government remuneration, but on a scale bearing a fair resemblance to the rewards of successful business enterprise. It must have executive and not merely advisory powers; there are many brilliant advisory committees already in existence and doing excellent work, but they are hampered by the inability to give force to their recommendations. And above all, this organisation or National Trade Agency should have at its head a man who is not a politician, but such a man as the whole nation is looking for to-day, a man himself successful in business, who can put upon his staff, and through it upon the commerce of the country, the impress of his own dominant personality. This is a position any of the recognised leaders of modern commerce should aspire to fill. It cannot be denied

that hitherto business affairs have not been represented as they should in the counsels of the nation. Parliament has come to be regarded as an assembly in which fluent mediocrity and a desire for self-advertisement too often take the place of real capacity, and, as success in business does not always connote readiness in speaking, the business man has been apt to fight shy of a House of Commons in which his talents are wasted. An organisation for the development of British commerce, presided over by a business man, and staffed by other business men, would do much to redress the balance in favour of one of the chief necessities in our struggle for national existence.

As already noted, one of the functions of such an organisation as is here suggested will be the more thorough collection and dissemination of facts relating to foreign trade. The machinery for this is largely in existence in the shape of the Consular Services. The personnel of our consulates abroad may be of the most incalculable value in developing the objects which we have in view. But the service is hampered partly by the out-of-date instructions under which it acts and still more by the multiplicity of the duties which it is required to perform. It is absurd, for example, that an official whose whole time could be advantageously employed in fostering national trade should be required in addition to undertake the assistance of wrecked seamen and other stranded British subjects and all the legal functions of a notary public : these duties are important, no doubt, but they should be completely dissociated from the purely commercial work of the consulates and separate individuals should be entrusted with them. The facts thus collected at first hand would be analysed, dissected and classified by the trained staff of the proposed National Trade Agency, and would be brought, not *en masse* but in so far as they were appropriate, again and again to the notice of all manufacturers in this country.

But this would be only the beginning of the work. No successful trader is content to wait, Micawber-like, for something to turn up : if opportunity does not occur he goes out and makes opportunity : and the nation as a whole must imitate more and more in the future this practice of the successful trader. More publicity for British goods is necessary—not for this or that speciality, but for British goods *qua* British goods. It is perhaps hardly necessary

to remark that such publicity would embrace far more than merely press advertisements and the dissemination of printed matter. It would include all questions of trade exhibitions at home, British representation in foreign exhibitions (now in the hands of a special section of the Board of Trade), the visits of business men from abroad and their introduction to commercial facilities in this country, etc. There is little difficulty in getting a grant for the expenditure of a quarter of a million pounds on poor relief, but an application for a grant of a quarter of a million for national publicity would petrify the officials of the Treasury. Yet this sum judiciously spent year by year in educating the people of purchasing nations to the advantages of goods manufactured in the British Empire might result in the payment of many additional millions in wages and, by the increased volume of British trade, in a decrease of total taxation many times the amount of the sum so invested in publicity. It is, however, certain that if the proposed organisation were dependent upon Treasury grants it would very speedily fall under departmental and political control, and would become only another Government department stamped with the combined vices of the Civil Service and of the House of Commons. Some means must be devised for making the businesses of the country directly responsible for financing an organisation which would directly contribute to their prosperity. There are already in the country various quasi-governmental, quasi-independent bodies, which furnish useful analogies. There is the Bank of England trading as an independent concern, governed by representatives of commerce in the City of London, yet acting in effect as one of the most important departments of the British Government. Again, there is the Port of London Authority drawing its resources from dues levied upon goods and shipping entering the Port and freed from direct Government control. Another example from the point of view of finance is furnished by Trinity House, which levies dues upon all the shipping entering British ports and uses the money to provide lighthouses for the benefit of that shipping. Working upon these analogies it should not be difficult to construct a National Trade Agency completely independent both of politicians and of civil servants.

The incidental reference above to goods manufactured in the British Empire may serve as a reminder that it is not

only the trade of these islands that is concerned. One of the duties of the proposed organisation will be the development of the trade of our Overseas Dominions, both as concerns the export of their goods to foreign countries, and the encouragement and regulation of internal trade between the constituent parts of the Empire. Having regard to the part which the Dominions have played in the world-war there can be little doubt that their position and importance in the councils of the State will in future be vastly greater than they have ever been in the past.

One of the factors which has made for the rapid commercial development of countries other than our own has been the possibility of obtaining easy credit facilities. The formation of some system of national banks in this country which would make it possible for traders to develop their businesses on rather easier terms and with less restrictions than are imposed under existing conditions is one of the problems with which the proposed organization would have to deal. It ought also to deal with the question of business education, whether viewed in the narrower sense of providing employer and workman alike with the particular knowledge required for their specific callings, or whether for the purpose of giving a wider outlook upon the problems of commerce and a deeper sense of their importance in the economy of the nation.

There are many other questions which might well be dealt with by the one central authority, as, for example, the fostering of invention; freight rates, both on the railways in this country and for the transport of commerce overseas; the consideration of the wages question; the improvement and maintenance of newspapers devoted to particular trades; but some of these are of comparatively secondary importance. The matters of cardinal importance, on which national attention should be concentrated without a moment's delay, have been set forth above, and may be briefly summarised.

We shall first be faced with the problem of paying for the war and finding work for British workers. The after-war period will see a decrease in internal consumption coupled with the facilities for a large increase in production, making it imperative that we should find a much wider market for our products abroad. In order that we may secure and hold this market against vigorous competition, it is necessary that our methods

should be overhauled and improved, and that workers and employers should be educated as to the needs of closer co-operation, and should be inspired with the ambition to play a larger part in the world's work for a common end. To secure this co-operation to the fullest extent throughout the Empire it will be necessary to establish an organisation solely concerned with the development of national trade, staffed by successful business men and under the leadership of one of the outstanding personalities in the business world. With the formation of such a National Trade Agency, conducted on business lines in the interests of business, we should at least be on the way to the methodical stimulation of the current of commerce which is in the truest sense the life-blood of the nation and the essential condition of our national existence.

H. E. Morgan.

MR. BALFOUR'S GIFFORD LECTURES

Theism and Humanism ; being the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1914. By the Rt. Hon. ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR. Hodder and Stoughton. 1915.

IT is in some respects a favourable moment for the discussion which Mr. Balfour gives us in his Gifford Lectures. His lines of thought form a natural sequel to controversies which were prevalent among English and Scottish philosophers during a century and a half. Such debates call into evidence just those gifts of clear and subtle argument for which Mr. Balfour is conspicuous. They were interrupted in the eighties by the undue ascendancy of German philosophy. The mentality created by its almost exclusive study was unfavourable to the continuance of these particular controversies. Into the merits and defects of the philosophies of Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte I do not propose here to enter. But they appealed to gifts very different from Mr. Balfour's. And I concur heartily with the recent remark of a distinguished writer that they were not in harmony with the special genius of the English mind. The thought of these Germans was massive and imaginative and did not lend itself to the precise issues which the practical Englishman, when he is a thinker, is disposed to set himself to attempt to resolve. Their influence created an atmosphere almost fatal to the form of dialectical reasoning in which Mr. Balfour is an expert. The philosophies whose influence preceded theirs in England were far more akin to the English taste and brain and were such as gave scope for Mr. Balfour's special gifts. Berkeley's 'Dialogues,' Hume's 'Treatise on Human Nature,' and Reid's 'Inquiry' were marked before all things by lucidity and close reasoning.

The same may be said of the writers who continued the struggle and discussed the rival systems of Empiricism and Intuitionism in the days of Mr. Balfour's youth. Mill and McCosh were both dialecticians. So also was Sir William Hamilton. Huxley, who succeeded Mill as a champion of Empiricism, was a dialectician. The Cambridge philosopher whose

influence on Mr. Balfour was so close and who held the balance between rival views with such delicate poise—Henry Sidgwick —was supremely lucid in argument; Dr. Martineau had more imagination, and his style was more rhetorical, but his thought was equally clear. The two last named lived to see the domination of Germanism in thought and were both, I think, somewhat disconcerted by it. Martineau, at seventy years of age, with characteristic youthfulness, tried to row with the stream and buried himself in German philosophy for years. He told the public when he was more than eighty years old that the result had been on the whole a profound disappointment and a sense of wasted labour. Sidgwick never wholly took to German methods of thought; his mind was cast in a different mould. Whatever view we may take of the respective claims of the various thinkers of whom I have spoken, the German philosophy unquestionably created a fashion in thought unfavourable and somewhat contemptuous towards the attempt to come to close quarters in argument. The genius of these Teutonic writers has always had in it something of the barbaric. Fertile suggestion and imagination were more remarkable in them than finished processes of reasoning or the statement of definite issues.

The war has led men to look with a critical eye at the undue ascendancy of Germanism in any department. This result may of course take ridiculous shapes, as in the proposed banishment of German music from the concert room, but it also has a rational side. Germanism in philosophy had assumed some of the intolerance of a fashion. Oxford was spoken of by a witty critic as the place where 'good 'German philosophies go to when they are dead.' The saying certainly implied that in some quarters the awe-stricken deference paid to Germanism was irrational. It would be absurd to question the genius of the classical German thinkers, but it is well to realise their limitations, and it is well to recognise that they have unjustly disparaged lines of argument regarding the foundations of belief which are really fruitful and valuable.

I think then that Mr. Balfour's work is more likely to commend itself to the thinking public at the present time than it would have been twenty years ago when he published

his 'Foundations of Belief.' He has, indisputably, much of the lucidity and the power of close and explicit reasoning which marked the English and Scottish writers to whom I have alluded, and he takes up the very problems which the rival schools discussed in two centuries, though he considers them especially under the aspects brought into evidence by the theory of evolution since the days of Mill's supremacy. And he is especially occupied with the developments of modern science and their bearing on epistemology.

These Gifford Lectures have great literary merit. They abound in happy illustrations and telling sayings. Life-long convictions are expressed with a literary power which their author has not hitherto shown in the same degree. The argument is less closely worked out than the criticisms on Naturalism in the 'Foundations of Belief,' and there is nothing in these lectures which goes so deep as the chapter in the earlier work which treats of 'Beliefs, Formulas, and Realities.' But some of Mr. Balfour's favourite lines of argument, first outlined in the 'Defence of Philosophic Doubt,' are now given with fresh wealth of illustration. And there is much incidental speculation of interest on side issues. The central contentions in the lectures are—as already intimated—those on which Mr. Balfour had insisted in his former works. But they are more directly applied to the construction of a philosophy of Theism. He shows once again most effectively (1) that the naturalistic account of the origin of human knowledge derives the rational from the purely non-rational, thus vitiating the high claims of our rational nature by the poverty of its source; (2) that Darwin's theory of evolution, taken in its simplest form in which the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest are the determining causes of the development of the higher from the lower, entirely fails to explain the existence of our higher faculties—notably of our aesthetic and moral impulses, for these cannot be shown to have any survival value. The ultimate conclusion on which special stress is laid in the Gifford Lectures is given in the following passages:

> 'My desire has been to show that all we think best in human culture, whether associated with beauty, goodness, or knowledge, requires God for its support, that Humanism without Theism loses more than half its value.'

'The root principle in these lectures which, by its constant recurrence in slightly different forms, binds together, like an operatic leit-motif, the most diverse material, is that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and emotions, we must find for them a congruous origin. Beauty must be more than an accident. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational. If this be granted, you rule out Mechanism, you rule out Naturalism, you rule out Agnosticism; and a lofty form of Theism becomes, as I think, inevitable.'

I cannot but think that the book with all its power shows traces of Mr. Balfour's besetting sin, a love of paradox and of dialectical puzzles. Had greater space been given to elaborating his central argument more fully, and less to the puzzles—some of which have no real existence—the work would have been more effective. There are no doubt paradoxes which are insoluble as there are antinomies which are ultimate—which the human mind cannot transcend. And the recognition of them is necessary to any satisfactory account of human knowledge. But to see a paradox or an antinomy where mature reflection finds neither the one nor the other is not helpful. On the contrary, it savours of a taste for riddles and generates a certain mistrust in the reader.

Mr. Balfour is apt to carry his thought just so far as to reach a paradox and then to stop short with a certain apparent glee at having reached it. Had he carried his thought a little further the paradox would have disappeared. The contrasts he draws would no doubt be less startling and rhetorically effective, but his conclusions would be more accurate. A noteworthy instance of this habit of mind was the chapter in the 'Foundations of Belief' in which he dealt with non-rational causes of belief. Up to a certain point his argument was exceedingly successful and powerful. As a refutation of Locke's famous *dictum* which aroused Cardinal Newman's wrath in the 'Grammar of Assent' as much as it has aroused Mr. Balfour's—that no one should 'entertain any proposition with greater 'assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant'—Mr. Balfour's argument was irresistible. He showed with great clearness and with abundance of telling illustration that the mass of beliefs on which individual men act and must act in daily life are not the result of a careful weighing of evidence. And this led him to discuss the province of authority in generating our beliefs. We accept on many subjects the current

beliefs of the society in which we live without any explicit reasoning process at all. In this sense we act by authority and not by reason. Authority has many forms. There are the current maxims of our day and of our country. There is the influence, on which Mr. Balfour has always laid so much stress, of psychological climate, in determining our beliefs. There is our habitual trust in experts ; we trust our banker, our doctor, our lawyer ; we may even trust a favourite newspaper for our views on public events.

But Mr. Balfour in several passages of his book alluded to such beliefs as though they were *simply* due to the influence of authority and not in any sense to the action of reason. He spoke of them as simply 'non-rational.' But is this generally so? I think not. In the first place a vast mass of current beliefs which the individual in any society accepts on authority are due to the reasoning of many persons and to the experience and thought of mankind in the past. The reasoning of a community is co-operative. The banker and the lawyer each reasons—so does the journalist. The doctor has at his back the discoveries of medical science which include a mass of experiment and reasoning in the past among acute experts. This at once marks off the causes of the beliefs we accept for our daily use from wholly non-rational causes of belief even where the beliefs are non-rational in the individual himself.

But, moreover, the individual man does not as a rule accept such beliefs blindly, but has some reasons for their acceptance ; partly conscious, partly sub-conscious. The fact that a man does not institute a process of explicit reasoning does not mean that his beliefs are simply non-rational. There is throughout the process an interaction between reason and authority for which Mr. Balfour does not adequately allow ; and this greatly impairs his telling contrast between the two categories. The individual believes no doubt very largely on faith in authority, but that faith is not a wholly non-rational faith.* The wide sphere in which authority acts on our beliefs is largely due to our latent consciousness that we are part of a rational social system.

* I do not forget Mr Balfour's distinction between 'authority' as a non-rational cause of belief and the acceptance of 'authorities' as a rational source of belief. His argument fails, I think, to bear the distinction adequately in mind. I have dealt with this point in 'Problems and Persons' (Longmans), page 169.

Mr. Balfour's effective paradox that 'our chief superiority to 'the brutes consists not so much in our faculty of convincing 'and being convinced by the exercise of reason as in our 'capacity for influencing and being influenced through the 'action of authority' breaks down. Authority itself acts on us largely through its appeal, more or less distinct, to our reason. The brutes do not detect as we do the rational claim of authority. The dog's obedience to his master *is* non-rational. A man's deference to the expert is not. The reverse of Mr. Balfour's paradox would be nearer the truth than the paradox itself.

In the above argument Mr. Balfour has however initiated an investigation of the utmost importance into the rational and non-rational causes of belief—an investigation for which we may be extremely grateful, though some of his statements are exaggerated and paradoxical. But in the present volume he takes up the same subject—of non-rational causes of belief—and carries his contention to a further paradox, which I venture to think is simply a case of confused reasoning, and has not the fundamental utility of the earlier discussion. He asks if, regard being had only to those causes which Naturalism recognises, even the conclusions of Euclid are the products of 'uncontaminated reason,' and he decides that they are not in the following passage :

'It is neither self-interest nor party passion that induces us to believe, for example, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Has our thought then, in this case, freed itself from the dominion of a-logical conditions? Is our belief the child of uncontaminated reason? I answer—No. Though the argument, *qua* argument, is doubtless independent of time, the argumentative process by which we are in fact convinced occurs in time, and, like all psychological processes, is somehow associated with physiological changes in the brain. These, again, are part of the general stream of physical happenings, which in themselves have nothing rational about them. Follow up this stream but a little further and every trace, not only of mind but of life, is completely lost; and we are left face to face with unthinking matter and its purposeless movements. Logical inference is thus no more than the reasoned termination of an unreasoning process. Scratch an argument, and you find a cause.'

Is there not in the above passage a real confusion? Mr. Balfour might as well argue 'If I am dead, I cannot reason.

'Therefore a heart and lungs in activity are among the causes 'of my accepting certain logical conclusions, which are accord-'ingly partly due to, and contaminated by, non-rational causes.' This argument regards the physical condition of mental activity as one of the causes of our drawing a particular conclusion from certain premisses. Surely this is inaccurate. Life with its physiological processes is a condition of all cerebral activity, which is the concomitant and condition of reasoning in man on earth, but it is not a cause of our conclusions being logical, or indeed a cause of our actual conclusions at all, except in the limited sense that you cannot reach any conclusions whatever if you have not vitality enough to think—which is a useless truism. Such a contention as Mr. Balfour's in this passage is not, like his treatment of the contrast between reason and authority, an exaggeration of what is useful. It is hard to find in it anything but a useless truism or a useless paradox. Nor does the Euclid illustration help Mr. Balfour's central argument, on behalf of which it is put forward. Rather, it drives that argument to the point of scepticism. The central argument is not a sceptical argument. He points out in it that in the course of evolution the living derives from the non-living ; the rational and moral from the non-rational and non-moral ; reason—presumably uncontaminated reason —succeeds in course of time to the wholly non-rational. This derivation includes all that Naturalism knows in the causal series, therefore we are driven to postulate a further rational and moral cause of which Naturalism knows nothing. To that cause are due the new elements which arise in the course of evolution—life, reason, conscience. But if we go on to maintain, as Mr. Balfour does in the Euclid illustration, that the present conclusions of reason are still observably contaminated and due to non-rational causes because mental activity demands certain physical conditions, we impair this main argument that the truly rational derives from the non-rational. For there is no such thing as the truly rational if reasoning is invariably contaminated by non-rational causes. We regard the operations of reason as so observably untrustworthy in the present that our very inference to a rational cause of evolution becomes worth very little. The argument becomes similar to Huxley's attempt to prove that memory is trustworthy by remembered instances of its

veracity. And we have the old puzzle of Epimenides the Cretan. God is invoked no longer as the rational cause of what is observably rational in us, but as a *Deus ex machina* who performs the constant miracle of purging our reason from the contamination of physical conditions which make its conclusions in the ordinary course non-rational. Mr. Balfour almost suggests the formula of the eighteenth-century materialist, 'The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile.' But even the materialist did not maintain that the *conclusion* of the reasoner was 'contaminated' by the physical cause of the reasoning process.

But the strongest and most important instance of these somewhat unsatisfactory paradoxes is to be found in Mr. Balfour's views on the history of thought, which seem to pass suddenly from legitimate criticism to complete scepticism. These views are a survival, apparently, of a youthful impatience which he describes in an interesting autobiographical passage:

> 'I went to Cambridge in the middle sixties with a very small equipment of either philosophy or science, but a very keen desire to discover *what* I ought to think of the world and *why*. For the history of speculation I cared not a jot. Dead systems seemed to me of no more interest than abandoned fashions. My business was with the groundwork of living beliefs; in particular with the groundwork of that scientific knowledge whose recent developments had so profoundly moved mankind.'

The disposition evinced in this passage to regard the history of thought as merely a history of successive intellectual fashions, with no bearing on the groundwork of living beliefs in the present, appears to me to be the deepest intellectual defect in Mr. Balfour's system. He would probably no longer state the case in the simple and rather crude language of his undergraduate days, but the opinion itself is apparent in the concluding lecture of this work. He distinctly intimates that no beliefs remain exactly the same for all men in all ages and at all stages of culture.

'That there are beliefs,' he writes, 'which can and should be 'held, with the same shade of meaning, by all men, in all ages, 'and at all stages of culture, is a view to which by nature we 'easily incline. But it is, to say the least, most doubtful.' And again, 'My view is that the contents of a system are 'always reacting on its fundamental principles so that no

'philosophy can flatter itself that it will not be altered out of 'all recognition as knowledge grows.' It appears to me that in these passages we have a true position exaggerated to the point of absurdity. Doubtless there are discoveries which transform many an intellectual system as completely as Copernicanism transformed some chapters in Christian theology. Indeed theology does supply a good illustration of Mr. Balfour's contention so far as it is true. Historical critics and Biblical critics are now doing far more than making additions. Their conclusions do react on beliefs once so little deemed open to question that they appeared fundamental. But Mr. Balfour's sweeping statement goes far beyond this and is, I venture to think, quite unwarranted by the facts. There are many philosophical beliefs which are held in the same sense in each successive age and present the same problem to its thinkers. They are 'living' beliefs for every generation. And if some among them defy the recognised epistemologies in our own time they have always done so. The growth of knowledge works in their regard no such complete change either in belief or in philosophy as Mr. Balfour maintains. Our knowledge of the existence of other thinking beings besides ourselves is to my mind the most impressive of the beliefs which are permanently the same and present permanently insoluble problems in the attempt to find their rational justification. No one has ever succeeded in analysing the grounds for this belief. The advance of thought neither modifies the belief nor changes its explanation.

Our belief in the external world—an assumption on which the value of all scientific knowledge rests—is in the same position. Take again the working postulate of science, that the future will resemble the past; this also is a permanent belief while it is incapable of proof and has always been so. Once more, our belief that memory tells truly of the past—a belief which is the basis of all coherent reasoning—is not capable of any proof and never has been. All these instances, while exceedingly cogent as directed against the idea that any epistemology can be complete which does not recognise the necessity of ultimate assumptions, are equally destructive of the paradox to which Mr. Balfour proceeds in the passages quoted.

The defect of many philosophers—that they believe they

can give a full account of knowledge without admitting such unproved assumptions as have here been enumerated—was well worth pointing out. And Mr. Balfour has in these lectures, as in his earlier works, exposed it with great ability. Cardinal Newman in an early letter expresses the state of the case very happily. 'The human mind,' he writes, 'is unequal to its 'own powers of apprehension, it embraces more than it can 'master.' But this profound remark applies to systems of epistemology throughout the history of philosophy. They are all defective. And when once this is said, enough is said.

The enormous changes of modern times in our outlook on life, of which Mr. Balfour makes so much, do not affect the fundamental principles of philosophy. They affect its superstructure. The greatest change ever wrought in our outlook on the world is no doubt that which modern science has brought, and Mr. Balfour's keen interest in its development has led him, I think, before now to maintain that this immense change involves a revolution in philosophy itself. But this is precisely where I venture to join issue with him—notably in his criticism of Berkeley's Idealism. The difficulty of analysing how far our knowledge of that external world which science investigates is objective, and how far it is subjective, is a difficulty which permanently confronts the human mind. But it has no bearing whatever, as he seems to suppose, on our confidence in science. The more we reflect on the matter the more impossible it seems to assert confidently that the physical world, known to us under the categories of sensible knowledge, is the full reality. The man with five senses knows more than the blind man. We who know more than a race of blind men could know have no right to assume that we know all, or that the reality may not as far exceed our present conceptions as the world known to vision exceeds that known to touch. Reid's Idomenians conceived space as of only two dimensions. We have no right whatever to be sure that the aspects of the world revealed to us by our existing five senses are commensurate with reality. We can conceive of a higher state in which what Tennyson has called 'a last and largest 'sense' might as much enlarge our own knowledge of reality as the gift of sight would enlarge that of a race of blind men. Or we might even conceive with Newman that other senses

might be given to us which would make the same reality appear quite different. They would make us cognisant of other aspects of reality. Such hypotheses may make us uncertain as to the true translation of physical truth into terms of metaphysics; they may make some people sceptical of all metaphysics. But they leave untouched the basis of physical science, namely our belief in a world not ourselves which it investigates accurately in terms of those ideas of external reality which our senses supply. My knowledge of a table is constituted by my present senses. Yet I can reason from it quite securely on the same plane of knowledge, while the fact that I cannot reach another plane which may be attainable by a higher intelligence does not throw doubt on my conclusions, which remain on the same plane as my premisses. To make the tentative and uncertain nature of metaphysical speculation a ground for scepticism concerning physical science appears to me to be a confusion. The developments of physical science add no new difficulty. They only enlarge the sphere to which old difficulties apply.

Such defects as I have ventured to criticise in Mr. Balfour's habit of mind in no way impair, however, the great value of his central contentions or the literary merit of these lectures. Indeed I have almost unconsciously been led to dwell at perhaps undue length on the defects, just because I feel so strongly the value of much of Mr. Balfour's thought. His strength lies in the refreshing common-sense which marks some of his criticisms on current epistemology. Before all things Mr. Balfour seems to bid us to have no illusions, but to face frankly in our theory undeniable facts which we all admit in our practical beliefs. But when he goes on to urge some of the paradoxes here enumerated, as though they were on the same level with these important necessities of thought, the effectiveness of his position becomes greatly diminished for the general reader. The atmosphere of compelling common-sense seems to disappear. His examination of the necessity of accepting certain important assumptions—certain beliefs, which are in this sense non-rational—is subtle, profound, and valuable. To show again how largely authority acts on us sub-consciously is a most fruitful and interesting task, and one which throws real light on the genesis of knowledge in the individual. Mr. Balfour, if even on this subject he occasionally

passes into exaggeration, has initiated a most fruitful discussion, on lines which after some correction of detail may be accepted. Authority is in some degree for the individual a non-rational cause of belief, and the investigation of its exact province and the limits of its indirect rational justification is an exceedingly interesting and important undertaking. But when he proceeds to assign non-rational causes for the conclusions of Euclid, and this by a process which I cannot but think to be simply inexact reasoning, the effect on the reader is irritating. Common-sense gives place to paradox. The seeker after truth appears to be transformed into the *dilettante* who makes a hobby of riddles and enjoys a puzzle for its own sake. To point out ultimate assumptions which are necessary, though we cannot adequately ascertain their grounds in reason, is a help to the thinker, not because it involves a puzzle, but because it recognises facts and necessities though they are puzzling. The Euclid paradox, on the other hand, gives only the pleasure which an acrostic or a chess problem may afford. The chief exercise of mind for which it calls is the discovery of the fallacy underlying a statement as obviously false as Mr. Balfour's contentions in respect of the necessity of unproved assumptions are obviously true. Therefore I think the above criticism of real importance in Mr. Balfour's own interests, lest those who are irritated by the puzzles and impressed by the absence in them of any useful purpose may approach with mistrust other lines of thought which are marked, as I have said, by profound insight and common-sense.

To the present writer the reading of these lectures could not but bring back the scene in which he first heard Mr. Balfour's argument propounded, and that scene has perhaps now something of historical interest. On March 25th, 1896, the Synthetic Society, the successor of the old Metaphysical Society, held its first meeting at the Westminster Palace Hotel, and Mr. Balfour read the paper of the evening and outlined in it, roughly indeed, but unmistakably, the argument now elaborated in his Gifford Lectures. The scene was an interesting one from the presence of so many men who either then or afterwards were eminent in various fields, and it was rendered accidentally picturesque by the fact that it was the night of the Speaker's *levée*. Many members,

including Mr. Balfour, Mr. Haldane, and Mr. Bryce, were in uniform. The venerable Dr. Martineau led the criticism on Mr. Balfour in a speech which showed extraordinary mental youthfulness in his ninety-third year. Richard Hutton drawled out in his deep tones some trenchant strictures on Martineau's speech and supported Balfour's paper in its essential points. Canon Scott-Holland threw the light of his singularly picturesque imagination on the discussion. Oliver Lodge, who afterwards took so prominent a part in the proceedings of the society, was not there. He joined, I think, directly after this first meeting. But most of our effective speakers were at this first meeting. The present Bishop of Winchester was in the chair and held the balance finely in his summing-up. Frederick Myers and the present Bishop of Oxford gave us what was well worth listening to, and Bryce was especially clear and effective in his dialectic. Lord Rayleigh was, I think, a silent listener.

In recalling the pictorial aspect of the scene one cannot forget the beautiful presence of George Wyndham, then a young man of thirty-one, in all the brilliancy of his early promise. He was in uniform like so many of the company, and he and I, as the secretaries to the society, sat at the bottom of the table at the dinner which preceded the discussion. Most brilliant he was in his table talk, but I do not think that he took a share in the formal debate.

Mr. Balfour's central argument at this meeting, as in the present volume, was that the sequence of causes of the evolution of the human reason which Naturalism supplies traces back in the last resort to wholly non-rational causes. Mankind with its gift of reason derives from animals without reason, these in turn derive from the non-sentient creation until ultimately we get back to the primitive *nebula*. The ultimate cause then of the human reason, so far as Naturalism can tell us anything about it, is non-rational, and he insisted that an ultimate rational cause must be postulated as an alternative to the human reason being wholly discredited by its source. If reason is to have a rational value it must have a rational origin. Again he argued that natural selection will not explain the genesis of the higher powers in man, in so far as these powers do not in fact tell for success in the struggle for existence. This point I remember was a favourite one with Huxley in relation to the sense of

beauty. It materially qualified Huxley's advocacy of naturalistic principles.

But there is in the story of evolution another important confirmation of the presence of mind behind physical nature, on which Mr. Balfour did not touch at this meeting, and does not touch in the Gifford Lectures. As conscious reason develops from the non-rational in the course of evolution it finds in the physical universe itself tokens of a reason already at work in nature and determining its course. This point was put with great effect at the second meeting of the Synthetic Society by the late Mr. R. H. Hutton. Mr. Hutton's words have never been published, and they are worth publishing. Moreover, they enlarge the sphere of Mr. Balfour's argument and develop it.

'What I wish to discuss is the most reasonable explanation of the evident correspondence between the external universe in which we live, and the constitution of the faculties which we find so serviceable in helping us to explain its order and to resolve the secrets of its manifold resources.

'The simplest way of accounting for the correspondence, and I think the truest, was that which Plato long ago suggested when he said ὁ Θεὸς γεωμετρεῖ. He did not know, of course, that one day we should discover that the course of a planet around its central sun, if undisturbed by other attractions, is an ellipse, and that we should evolve a calculus by which we could prove that in that ellipse the radius vector of the planet would sweep over equal areas in equal times. But he knew enough to be sure that there was plenty of geometry in the constitution of the world, and, as it is certain that man did not make the suns and planets, there seemed to him the most striking evidence that he who did make them was a being furnished with a mind, and that, a mind greater than that of the greatest geometrician ; and further, that we men had received from him the faculties for elaborating our comparatively limited geometry.

'This seems to me to be the ultimate issue between the theist and the agnostic. The theist begins with the greater, and accounts for the less ; the agnostic begins with the less, and, I will not say accounts for, but traces its tardy expansion into, the greater. Now, which is the better procedure ? I have no choice but to prefer the former, and on the following grounds. Every step which even the agnostic takes in explaining the slow flowering of reason out of that (as it proves) intelligible universe with which alone he starts, lets in a flood of new light which comes from a much wider horizon of thought than any which the groping of an individual consciousness could demand.'

Hutton's addition to Mr. Balfour's argument opens the door, I think, to a fertile field of thought. He adds strength to Mr. Balfour's argument for a rational cause alike of the universe and of human reason, and for a rational author of evolution, in the remarkable fact that the human mind finds in the non-rational world elements corresponding to its own rational knowledge. The greater and smaller aspects of the universe alike, as presented by astronomy and chemistry and other sciences, show clear indications of a mind already at work in the constitution of that universe. The universe presents movements and combinations which are calculable by the mathematician.

But this suggests a yet further addition to Mr. Balfour's argument for Theism which Hutton did not elaborate. We can now see that even before the dawn of human reason evolution was a gradual unfolding of Reality to the sentient consciousness. We thus find in the general course of evolution a cogent argument not only for the validity of the reasoning process, but for the validity of many beliefs which are at present outside the sphere of our rational analysis. Evolution is a long process, in the course of which the sentient and subsequently the rational consciousness are constantly attaining to fresh relation with reality, that reality being perceived at first only dimly amid illusion, afterwards more clearly and coherently. The story of evolution therefore justifies a faith which is in excess of our ability at the moment to verify it rationally, because it shows that faith—dim and partly confused—is normally the precursor of further knowledge. New faith amid illusion again and again gives place gradually to corresponding knowledge from which illusion is banished. Thus the religious consciousness has a *prima facie* claim to represent our relations to a Reality higher than anything accessible to the lower animals—though as yet we men see that Reality through a glass and darkly. Our conception of God is the crowning faith in this long process. It awaits the full conditions of experimental knowledge in a higher state.

This argument from the past course of evolution is best brought home by considering the immensity of the new world opened out to the sentient being by the first dawn of sight. The sense of sight eventually gave to the inhabitants of this small planet a direct relation with the solar system and the fixed stars. The problem of the origin of the eye gave Darwin

to the last, he used to say, 'a cold shiver,' from the difficulty of accounting for the origin of a sense which ultimately gave such far-reaching relations with the environment. If we trace the eye from its earliest rudiment in the lower forms of sentient life—pigment cells covered with transparent skin—to the first appearance of the optic nerve, then onward to the appearance of the lens, and then onward to the complete vertebrate eye, it is clear (assuming the development of the organ to correspond to a parallel development of the sense) that there has been a gradual advance in sensible experience, from *mere* sensitiveness to light to a confused recognition of external objects, which steadily became more and more exact until the animal consciousness reached the comparatively perfect vision of our own eye with the vast field which it opens to our investigation. It is tolerably plain that at each stage there was a growth of illusion—because the increase in extent of perception lacked precision at first. Even at the present stage our own accurate vision gives by itself, until corrected by reason and observation, many fresh illusions, one of the most obvious of which is the idea of the position and movement of the stars conveyed by sight alone. Sight so rudimentary that it could not descry the stars at all would have been free from these particular illusions. To other optical illusions also individuals are liable, as in judging of distances or in the apparent direction of a stick lying under water; to others, again, from some special defect, as with the colour-blind. At an earlier stage, when sight was rudimentary, there would probably be illusions still more marked and various as to the distance and position of neighbouring objects vaguely perceived.

If we conceive rational endowment to have come at a low stage in the development of the visual organs—for instance, if we imagine the first appearance of the optic lens to have come to beings with minds—we should have a case in some respects parallel to that of our present religious consciousness. In the early stages of sensitiveness to light there might have been agnostics as to the claim that these new impressions gave real knowledge of objective reality. They might have maintained the whole of this new kind of experience to be purely subjective. Others, noting the universality of the new ideas, their consistency and their coincidence with

undeniable experiences in touch, might have maintained that this new phase pointed us to 'a beyond,' though the exact nature of that 'beyond' could not yet be known. And their faith would have been justified by the event.

The theological agnostic maintains in Tyndall's words that we have 'neither a faculty nor the rudiment of a faculty' for apprehending God. He regards theological controversies as simply so much waste of energy, issuing in nothing, corresponding to no subject-matter on which the human mind can have any knowledge.

The position I would maintain is the opposite one—that the rudiment of a faculty is precisely what we have; that the rational and moral nature of man—the highest development yet reached in that unfolding of the faculties of the sentient being to external Reality which we can trace step by step from the lowest forms of conscious life—themselves point to a further evolution in the apprehension of Reality. Religious faiths have all, at the lowest, been attempts to express this initial apprehension. The test of the claim of a rudimentary faculty of knowledge—that it gives an initial apprehension of truth, and is not a mere source of illusions—must be indirect. The faculty does not come to be explicitly and fully rational until it has ceased to be rudimentary; therefore, direct rational justification is impossible. If it claims to be the instinctive continuance of an explicitly rational process—like the insight of genius in a scientific discoverer—it must justify its claim by success. If its efforts to realise itself issue in nothing coherent, in no line of fuller development, it fails to justify itself. If its activity, however confused, does show, like the developments of rudimentary sight, some coherent though inexact perception, it justifies its reality, though not its accuracy. Accuracy, like direct rational analysis, can only come with fuller development. May it not be maintained that the intimations of the rudimentary faculty for the apprehension of the ultimate Reality represented by religion have developed sufficiently to justify its claim in spite of the largely barren controversies which have accompanied the development? Such controversies are parallel to the immense waste which has ever been the concomitant of real advance in evolution.

I suggest then—not as a mere analogy, but as an induction

from the laws observable in the process of evolution in the past, as an argument from one stage to another of the single process of ever-growing knowledge of Reality—that belief in Theism presents features which justify us in regarding it as an approach towards the apprehension of that Reality of which conscience makes human beings more dimly aware.*

When in the development of sensible perception sight gave new coherence to conceptions of magnitude and distance, which even after the fullest developments of touch would have remained obscure, while it explained the past, it gave the first glimpses at the future ampler revelations of sight itself. The developed eye of the mammal gave in turn some sensible knowledge of that solar system which it needed the whole Copernican theory to explain with any approximate adequacy. The reality of sensible knowledge is more and more confirmed in the course of evolution by the fertility of the field of coherent discovery it opens, and the consistency of the system it reveals.

May it not, then, be maintained that similarly the rational and moral faculties of man, while they explain lower stages of experience, likewise suggest further and higher stages? that while they explain the past, they forecast the future? that while they explain phenomena of which sensible knowledge by itself gave only an initial apprehension, they give likewise an initial apprehension of a further Reality, full knowledge of which would, in turn, complete their somewhat indefinite intimations? Is not this an intelligible explanation of the appearance, at the highest stage of evolution hitherto reached, of conscience and the religious consciousness? And when—in spite of theological logomachies which represent partly, as I have said, the waste incident to evolution—men of religious genius one after another give a more coherent account of the Being to whose existence all religions point, have we not the growth in consistency which justifies faith or trust,

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* Of course we argue philosophically and by inference from the physical and psychical world on behalf of Theism, but such proofs are on an entirely different plane of reasoning from that which I am considering. They do not bring us to that direct knowledge of Reality with which I am here concerned, and which is attained fully only in another world.

and is the first test that we are on the track to more systematic knowledge? When the Elohim who created heaven pass into the Jehovah, the personal God—yet conceived partly as tribal and not without human passions—and the Jehovah Himself becomes more definitely moral in the teaching of the Prophets until He passes into the Christian God clearly conceived as the embodiment of holiness; and that conception itself becomes gradually more definite as the content of the moral law is more clearly seen and the remnant of anthropomorphism is driven out by a more spiritual conception, have we not, in this definite line of advance, good cause for believing that we are witnessing a further unfolding of knowledge, an advance in the perceptions of the race, and not merely bitter wrangling over a fantastic illusion of the brain—an ironical reversal of the development of the sentient and rational nature towards wider knowledge?

Lastly, when the Christian revelation comes to us ultimately on the authority of One who lays claim to a supernatural inspiration, to an actual experience of the spiritual world, which ordinary man has not, are we not justified in accepting His teaching by at least two of the tests which guide us in accepting, in the course of the evolution of scientific knowledge, a great unifying hypothesis framed by genius, (1) because it develops further what our own moral faculties suggested, and thus gives us trust in the insight and veracity of the teaching authority; (2) because it is found to work in practice as affording a basis for moral action? Descartes included in his 'Morale par Provision'—the rules he followed while his methodic doubt was in process of being resolved by philosophy—adherence on authority to the religion of his birth. I maintain the philosophical value of this view over and above its ethical convenience. For only by its acceptance can we find whether the religion in question does or does not supply the clue to the normal development of the transcendental intimations contained in ethical experience.

I submit, then, that while the ground for trust in the authority of the Christian Church which traces firmly the lines of Theism is not similar to the ground for trusting a scientific teacher which is supplied by an elaborated discovery to a mind which is capable of verifying it in detail, it has a real similarity to that ground which is regarded as an adequate working philosophy

by a man of average intelligence, who can sufficiently understand the discovery to trust in the discoverer's higher knowledge, and whose trust is practically confirmed by finding that the discoverer's hypothesis explains the facts of experience.

And the further claim of revelation as appealing to faith, as enabling us to see only 'through a glass darkly,' is, at all events, an evidence that the exponents of Christianity themselves have recognised this element of rational trust as distinguished from complete reasoning, which separates the motives assignable for our acceptance of religious truths from those which establish the truths of science. No one denies that a knowledge of the Reality represented by religion far more logically explicit than we possess is conceivable, and we should be very glad to have it. The question is which is the greater paradox, to deny that the highest development of the rational and moral nature is pointing to a truth at all, or to assume that it must be, and acting on that assumption to adopt the best clue we can find towards its further explanation.

The above argument is supplementary to the generally recognised proofs of Theism, and deals not with inferences from the visible world to its cause, but with the capacity of man to have a direct knowledge of God—a capacity not realised in this life, but which, if the argument is sound, would result from a further development of human knowledge and especially of the human conscience. The argument is directly complementary to Mr. Balfour's central contention in the Gifford Lectures. Neither line of thought excludes the other. Both arguments are based on the assumption that the evolutionary hypothesis is true. But Mr. Balfour's argument for Theism looks back to evolution in the past, the argument sketched in these pages looks forward to the future. According to Mr. Balfour God must be postulated as the ultimate Reality, the initial cause of a process which evolves the rational from the non-rational, the moral from the non-moral. The rational and the moral are ultimately derived from a Being who is Himself rational and moral. The considerations sketched in the above pages supply an argument not from the derivation of development in the past, but from the direction and outcome of future development ; they point to the fact that the evolution of conscious nature is leading us towards a direct

knowledge of that Reality from which Mr. Balfour contends that it ultimately proceeds.

I first outlined this argument at the Synthetic Society in February 1897, and later on I received support from the fact that Professor James Ward, who had no knowledge of my paper, and who joined the society some years afterwards, put forward an argument closely similar in April 1902, under the title 'Faith and Science.' The similarity of our contentions was so remarkable that I venture, with his permission, to quote some of his words. He argues that throughout evolution a primitive credulity is subsequently justified by reasoned knowledge—that is by proofs that beliefs arising in the course of evolution did in fact represent further relations between the consciousness and Reality.

'A certain primitive credulity,' he writes, 'characterises our earliest ventures; we do not wait till there are sufficient reasons for action: it is enough for youthful energy that there are none against action.'

And he proceeds to justify this instinctive tendency by the actual results in the course of past evolution of acting on instinctive faith. Such instinctive faith has in fact again and again proved to have been coincident with what is ultimately established as verifiable knowledge.

'If we took a wider sweep and glanced back at the history of the organic world, describing it analogically, in terms of experience rather than in the language of biology—in which, however, such terms are more or less covertly implied—the parable would not be uninstructive. We should find that almost every forward step could be formulated as an act of faith, not warranted by knowledge, on the part of the pioneer who first made it. There was little, for example, in all that the wisest fish could know to justify the belief that there was more scope for existence on the earth than in the water, or to show that persistent endeavours to live on land would issue in the transformation of his swim-bladder into lungs. And before a bird had cleaved the air there was surely little in all that the most daring of saurian spectators could see or surmise concerning that untrodden element to warrant any risk to his bones to satisfy his longing to soar; although, when he did try, his forelegs were changed to wings at length, and his dim prevision of a bird became incarnate in himself. Such illustrations are largely fanciful, I am well aware—too Lamarckian even for Lamarck. Still, when we regard the development of living forms as a continuous whole, we seem forced to recognise as immanent and operative

throughout it a sort of unscientific trustfulness, comparable, might I say, to the faith of Abraham, who, " when he was called to go out into a place which he should after receive for an inheritance, obeyed and went out, not knowing whither he went."

' So far, then—psychologically and historically—there is nothing unique in religious faith at all : it is only the crowning phase of a long series.'

This passage from Professor Ward's paper is exactly parallel to my own parable from the development of sight. Assuming the Darwin hypothesis, if the sentient being did not act trustfully on the first vague sensitiveness to light, the perfect eye of the mammal could never have been developed. A mistrusted and unused organ of vision could have been of no assistance in the struggle for existence. The usefulness of a faculty and the fact that it increases the relations of consciousness with external reality are the two sides of the same quality.

My own underlying assumption—which I think Professor Ward would not contest—is that the successive unfolding of fresh aspects of reality is a continuous process of which the ideal culmination is the full knowledge of Reality—thus physical evolution is a process leading *towards* that knowledge which is the subject-matter of metaphysics. Successive aspects of Reality are unfolded by a process which, if continued indefinitely, would issue in the unfolding of all its aspects.

One final word. Both Mr. Balfour's argument and the argument I have endeavoured to set forth in these pages agree in one point : they both endeavour to constitute a proof of Theism in a category outside the recognised demonstrative or metaphysical arguments. They are both directed against an attitude of mind which insists on demonstrative evidence of Theism as the only alternative to Agnosticism, which is tolerable to intellectual honesty. I do not personally question the view that a theistic philosophy is the true one, a non-theistic philosophy false ; but we must never forget the important fact on which St. Thomas Aquinas dwells in the fourth chapter of his ' Summa contra Gentiles,' that the road of philosophical demonstration is not possible to the mass of mankind. Broad considerations which do not amount to demonstrative proof may bring to light and reinforce some of the sub-conscious reasons which have led mankind to believe in God. Both Mr. Balfour's line of thought

and my own urge on behalf of Theism certain presumptions raised by the evolution theory—presumptions directly opposed to that naturalistic interpretation of the theory which has been allowed to pass muster as its obvious correlative. Naturalism derives reason and conscience directly from associations of ideas and tribal instincts, and it is disposed to see no difference in kind between the parent and its offspring. But their earlier pedigree, if traced on the same principle, reaches antecedents which are yet more obviously non-rational and non-moral, and in the remote past were even non-sentient. This fact discredits the whole principle of estimating the significance of a faculty by its antecedents in the course of development as though such parentage proved that there was no new element in the offspring. It goes to show, on the contrary, that development is a truer idea than evolution—that the process is one of constant growth, constant addition. Clearly, when we come to conscious life each stage in its evolution gives new perceptions differing in kind from the previous stage. Mr. Balfour boldly claims this fact as ratifying the conviction of mankind, which demands a source for reason and morals distinct from the shady ancestry which naturalistic evolution provides, and finds that source in a holy and all-wise God, 'the root of the causal series which 'produces beliefs and of the cognitive series which justifies 'them.'

The position I have myself outlined opposes Naturalism from another side—the side not of origin but of direction. I contend that the dim knowledge of God in the human conscience assumes a fresh significance from the theory of evolution. Agnostic evolutionists have been wont to disparage the transcendental significance of conscience on the ground I have just intimated, that conscience is only the development of certain social and tribal instincts, and therefore contains no more than these contained. I argue on the contrary that the significance of a faculty should be judged not by what it proceeds from but by what it leads to. The significance of the first pigment cells which make the living consciousness sensitive to light is shown not by the less developed organisation which immediately preceded their appearance but by the developed eye and complete sense of sight of which these pigment cells were the harbinger. In Hutton's phrase the

greater explains the less. Theism is the highest of those ideas of reality which have been successively reached in the course of evolution, and if earlier faiths have been justified by the event, so presumably will the dim knowledge of God which the human conscience affords be justified when our nature receives such development as shall make its intimations no longer dim and obscure but clear and perfect.

I may add that this estimation of the significance of a faculty by the gradations of its development may stand independently of the theory of evolution itself—that is from the view that these gradations have developed successively, though of course that theory makes the argument more impressive. Whether the additions to the physical apparatus of sensation were or were not successive in point of time, they are actually before us as a fact in the animal kingdom. The dim perceptions of lower animals are further developed in higher. We thus have in any case the argument for the significance of conscience which is found in the hierarchy of knowledge and of consciousness. Conscience professes to give a dim knowledge of a fresh Reality which is to the animals as inaccessible as light is inaccessible to the lowest forms of sentient life. And if we can think of the development of consciousness apart from the concurrent development of its physical instrument, the idea of a beatific vision for man made perfect in another world is clearly correlative with the argument which we draw from our conscience in our present imperfect condition. In this life, where spiritual perception is inchoate, we see through a glass and darkly. Our spiritual and intellectual faculties, purified and perfected in a higher sphere, will enable us to see the same Reality face to face.

If all man's highest endowments culminate in the knowledge of God we have then another path by which Humanism issues in Theism. Humanism reaches its perfection only when it is merged and completed in the full apprehension of the God from whom it proceeds.

WILFRID WARD.

THE IDEAS OF MAURICE BARRÈS

1. **Œuvres de Maurice Barrès.** Passim.
2. **La Pensée de Maurice Barrès.** Par HENRI MASSIS. Paris: 'Mercure de France.' 1909.

WHEN the naturalist school of French literature died, a tremendous scope was given to individualism. It might have been thought that the formula of naturalism, consisting as it did in the careful observation of objective fact and nothing more, would have allowed considerable play to individual temperament both in the choice of matter and of point of view. In fact it was not so. Whether the cause was the influence of Zola or some inherent characteristic of the philosophy on which naturalism was based, naturalist writers, with very few exceptions, found their matter in sexuality and their point of view in a materialistic determinism which threw psychological values into the background. This was of course a mistake even from the standpoint of the formula. In the case of Zola cloudy generalisations like heredity and environment became the true protagonists of his unending pages. Proper names might have been replaced by chemical formulae without affecting the movement of his stories. The example of the master was likewise to a great extent responsible for the sexual preoccupations of his disciples. The public at length grew tired of books hardly to be distinguished from pornography. When 'La Terre' appeared Anatole France fulminated a literary excommunication, accusing the book of *lèse humanité*, and according to Remy de Gourmont not six people could be found on the staff of the 'Mercure de France' willing to read the novel with sufficient care to review it.

Among the *jeunes* who at the moment of the fall of naturalism gave a new orientation to French literature, one of the most striking and successful was Maurice Barrès. From that day to this his success has increased until there is perhaps hardly any other man of letters in France who stands quite

where he does. This is partly due to his immense versatility. He has told us in the 'Amateur d'Âmes' of 'l'âpre plaisir de 'vivre une vie double, la volupté si profonde d'associer des 'contraires. . . . L'homme qui me plaît, je le compare à 'une belle troupe dramatique où divers héros tiennent leur 'rôle. . . . ,' and assuredly the visitor to Paris who sees his name covering election posters and is told on inquiry that Maurice Barrès is a Nationalist politician and president of the Ligue des Patriotes, forms a very different impression of him from the one to be derived from reading his early books. Yet, as a matter of fact, such a distinction is too abstract. Barrès pursues in his political life the same ideas which he has expressed from the first in his literature. In spite of his versatility he is perhaps the most completely unified of modern thinkers. He might have taken the 'Sibi unitus 'et simplificatus esse' of à Kempis as his motto.

So unusual a state of mind has puzzled many. People cannot believe that the author of 'La Mort de Venise' can be vitally interested in an election. Even Anatole France, that prince of critics, was taken in. When he wrote that 'Barrès 'n'a point d'instincts, point de passions. Il est tout intel-'lectuel, et c'est un idéaliste pervers,' he was strangely mistaken. He mistook Barrès for a mere *littérateur* which, had he been of his own generation, might have been pardonable. His astonishing gifts might well have made us thankful to the gods if he had been merely that. But he is really not that at all. His literature is merely one of his ways of worshipping life. He is a passionate lover of experience and his books are the intellectual reintegration of his daily activity. After the electoral campaign of Nancy in 1889 he wrote in the 'Figaro': 'Je goûtai 'dans mes adversaires l'énergie de leurs insultes. Pas de 'milieu plus sain. Délicieuses bagarres de septembre et d'octo-'bre ! Incomparables ballottages ! C'est là que je me pris à 'aimer la vie, l'instinct tout nu !' He loves contact with the soul of the people, 'cette belle chose vigoureuse, bien vivante,' so different from the abstractions which inhabit libraries.

There exists a tradition that the interests of thought and active life are mutually exclusive. It is traceable to Goethe, who laid down that 'politics will always absorb the poet. 'To be a member of Parliament, to live in discussions, in daily 'excitements, does not suit the delicate nature of a poet.' This

is, we think, just one of those points on which the ultra-abstract tendency of the German mind leads it astray. Certainly the lives of poets do not bear out the contention. One has but to think of Milton, Chateaubriand, Hugo, to take some great names at hazard, even Goethe himself, to see that in fact the preoccupation of the beauty of ideas, the essential qualification of the poet in prose or verse, frequently goes with considerable activity in the sphere of action. The nationalist doctrine of Barrès is but the translation into action of his personal philosophy.

Into the nature of that philosophy we must now inquire. Fortunately Barrès has made it easy for us to do so. Whether or no the habit of preparing electoral programmes has forced the philosopher into an unusual explicitness of statement, he has certainly made it impossible for us to remain in the dark as to his meaning. He has never indeed composed a formal system. Anything of the kind would be quite false to his genius. But he has written many books hard to classify, some of them more like novels than others, almost all in the form of autobiographical narrative full of criticism of life and art and nature. This criticism takes the form of a scrupulous notation of his own intellectual and temperamental reactions to the spectacle of his experience; each of his books thus analyses a state of mind of which it is at the same time an acutely ultimate expression. From the first Barrès proclaimed himself as definitely in reaction against the impersonality of the naturalists. He united his first three books, 'Sous l'Œil des 'Barbares,' 'Un Homme Libre,' and 'Le Jardin de Bérénice,' under the comprehensive title of 'Le Culte du Moi.' In the manner of Spinoza, he has reduced the process of this religion of the self to the following proposition:

1. *Nous ne sommes jamais si heureux que dans l'exaltation.*
2. *Ce qui augmente beaucoup le plaisir de l'exaltation c'est de l'analyser.*

Consequence. *Il faut sentir le plus possible en analysant le plus possible.*

Barrès thus affirms himself not only as a philosopher but as a lyric poet, and in truth, although he has never written but in prose, he is a lyric poet of a high order. In many ways, as we shall see, he derives from the great lyrical masters of the

romantic period, he bears the marks of their heredity in his love of pathos and melancholy, his taste for travel, for landscape, for works of art and for the careful notation of the minutest sentimental concordances of the external world with his feelings. 'Un paysage est un état d'âme,' said Amiel, a phrase which exactly describes Barrès' method of approach to nature. There is nevertheless a profound difference which it is important to note. The romantic imagination in the earlier part of last century conceived of beauty as remote and distant, as essentially one with the unknown. The true romantic of those days travelled afar to distant America or to the Southern Seas and brought back his glittering treasures in whose beauty their strangeness was almost the determining element. 'It is,' says Pater, 'the addition of strangeness to beauty that constitutes the 'romantic character in art; and the desire of beauty being a 'fixed element in every artistic organisation, it is the addition 'of curiosity to this desire of beauty that constitutes the 'romantic temper.' The curiosity of Barrès is, so to say, central rather than circumferential; he enlarges his perception in depth rather than in radius. He here shows the influence of German idealism and of the psychology that depends on it, and uses for artistic purposes the essentially artistic method of Bergson. The Parthenon does not touch him so profoundly as a familiar village spire of his native Lorraine. Hippolytus represents to him his own intellectual passion: 'L'amour, 'chez lui, ce n'est encore que se donner passionnément à tout ce 'qui augmente et réjouit son être; il aime les eaux vives, les 'bois, la chasse, le sommeil réparateur, et son souci est moins de 'maintenir son espèce que d'exister.' 'A tout ce qui augmente 'et réjouit son être,' there is the true note of Barrès.

This perpetual awakening of new sensations is one of the essential principles of lyrical art. The lyric poet, whether he write in verse or prose, is before everything else an echo. His impressionability, the capacity of his nerves for sensation, has been educated or has spontaneously developed to such a point that nothing happens to him without prolonging itself in his sensibility in reverberating vibrations. This exceptional sensibility is what primarily distinguishes the true lyric poet from the normal man. The sensibility of the latter is easily fatigued and asks no better than to sleep under the bedclothes of habit;

that of the former is abnormally sensitive to every passing impression. Thus the lyric poet creates his world afresh every day, every moment ; his curiosity is stimulated by constant novelty. ' Ma méthode de culture,' says Barrès, ' est de créer des sentimentalités nouvelles pour les projeter sur mon univers ' qui se fane à l'usage avec une prodigieuse rapidité.' The cultivation of this incessantly renovated sensibility is what Barrès means by the ' Culte du Moi.'

In his essay on his friend Stanislas de Guaita, Barrès dates his spiritual birth from his eighteenth year. His professor of philosophy, Burdeau, had discovered to him ' the unfore- ' seen and moving horizons of metaphysics ' ; De Guaita had revealed to him Baudelaire, Gautier, and Flaubert. Their books penetrated his soul and awakened in him a new sensibility. Philosophers fascinated him, but not to the point of discipleship. The *verba magistri* never became to him a creed, they did but stimulate his imagination to create varying modes of feeling. ' De tous les systèmes,' says M. Massis, ' il faisait de la substance sentimentale.' He could no more think in the terms of anyone else's system than he could talk in anyone else's voice. And so in ' Sous l'Œil des Barbares,' the first volume of the trilogy of the ' Culte du Moi,' the barbarians are not merely philistines, indeed not philistines at all. ' Les Barbares c'est tout ce qui n'est pas moi . . . le moi, ' voilà la seule réalité.' In this way he affirmed his individuality and kept his soul intact. Following the example of Descartes, he aimed at knowing himself more intimately. He soon, however, came to recognise with Pascal the bitterness and disgust which are too apt to company the analysis of the self. ' Je m'abandonne avec jouissance à la plus stérile ' mélancolie. . . . Tout mépriser, tout désirer. Le bâille- ' ment universel, l'à-quoi bon, qui fait le dernier mot de nos ' activités. . . . Je suis las, las avant l'effort, ah ! qui fera ' que je veuille ! ' His soul grew possessed by dryness. In vain he analysed his emotions and solicited fresh material for feeling. The monotonous solitude of his meditations horrified him. Solipsism revealed itself as a gradual suicide of the soul, and he came to perceive that reciprocity is as much the law of the mind as of the heart (for, in spite of Spinoza's magnificent *boutade*, we cannot really love God if he has not ' first loved us '). Renan has expressed this

mood in 'Patrice.' 'Mes propres sentiments deviennent 'pour moi un curieux sujet d'expérimentation. Ah! plût 'à Dieu que je fusse délivré un jour, une heure, de moi-même 'et que je sentisse avec la naïveté d'un enfant!' The feeling is not uncommon in youth and by no means confined to philosophers. Owing to their paucity of premisses, logic is ferociously strong in the young; like the flaming sword at the gate of Eden, it seems to bar their way in all directions. They are unaware of the extreme complexity of experience, for they have so little, and their heart with its 'reasons' is still the clinging twin of their head. There is something gauche and virginal about their handling of life, their pathetic greed for pleasure, and their lack of presence of mind to enjoy it when they get it. Often, if not always, the ardour of anticipation trips up their desire at the moment of fruition. So they turn in on themselves, thinking to find there a kingdom easier to rule than the dazzling, blinding rush of external life. But they know as little of the mechanism of their soul as of the world around them and they fall a prey to the bitter languors of melancholy. Life is empty to them because they are empty themselves. Many are the fanaticisms of the head or the senses that may catch them on this rebound. Love, a motive for will and action, is what they now cry out for. Their primary egotism is inverted, they long for something or someone to whom they can devote themselves in a frenzy of self-sacrifice. 'Ô 'maître,' cries Barrès, 'où es-tu, que je voudrais aimer, servir, 'en qui je me remets. . . . Toi seul, ô maître, si tu existes 'quelque part, axiome, religion, ou prince des hommes?'

Barrès belongs to the race of great artists who may fall sick unto death but who inevitably recover under the pressure of the interior force that animates them. With his own hands he healed his wounds. In the course of the trilogy of the 'Culte du Moi,' and particularly in the last and crowning volume, which was originally to be called 'Qualis Arti-'fex pereo,' and in fact received the title of 'Le Jardin 'de Bérénice,' we find an effort which, at first spasmodic, becomes at length a firm determination to find a stable conception of life. The title which he gave to the first volume of the trilogy, 'Sous l'Œil des Barbares,' has a prophetic value. It is indeed wonderful that, in this first book, Barrès

should have unmasked his natural enemies and challenged them to battle in what is, after all, but a tentative essay by an extraordinarily clever young man. He tells us who these barbarians are :

' Si Philippe [the hero of the trilogy] se plaint de vivre sous l'œil des barbares, ce n'est pas qu'il se sente opprimé par des hommes sans culture ou par des négociants ; son chagrin, c'est de vivre parmi des êtres qui de la vie possèdent un rêve opposé à celui qu'il s'en compose. Fussent-ils par ailleurs de fins lettrés, ils sont pour lui des étrangers et des adversaires.'

These ' barbarians ' are strangers and adversaries no doubt, but it is not always easy to recognise them. They may speak his language without accent, they may be masters of it. Their words are fair, they do not threaten, they hold out promises of indefinite expansion. There are great names among them, Rousseau, Michelet, Byron ; they are in a way a part of himself ; the irony which suspects their prestige has a desperate battle to wage with his instinct of veneration. These complications render fascinating and uncertain the duel engaged between Philippe and his foes. It is no mere cut-and-thrust encounter in which strength must win the day. He has to free himself from magic spells, to break chains which he loves. This is the drama presented by Barrès' mental evolution. The barbarian, in the Barrèsian sense of the word, is anyone, no matter how great, how supremely successful in his own line, who preaches to us revolt against our natural limitations. Whether he makes us blush for our humble origins, or whether he magically extends the prospects to which he invites us, his constant aim is to drag us out of the home where we were born. A grey, eager, suppressed adolescence left Philippe without defence against the first troupe of gypsies who offered him a place in their caravan. So he welcomed in a sort of religious transport German metaphysics and romantic literature, ' Les Fleurs ' du Mal ' and the ' Critique of Pure Reason.' ' Après tant ' d'années je ne me suis pas soustrait au prestige de ces pages ' sur lesquelles se cristallisa soudain toute une sensibilité que ' je ne me connaissais pas.'

It would seem that metaphysics produced more effect on him than Ste. Beuve and Baudelaire. Philosophy is perhaps a romantic muse. There is at all events no doubt

that the pages in which Barrès described the fever into which his philosophical excursions threw him are among his finest. In the prelude to ' Les Déracinés ' he shows us the young generation fascinated by its professors of philosophy. Professor Bouteiller is not an exception but a type. French philosophy, grave and sober with the Cartesians who maintained its official classical tradition, superficial and verbose with the fluently optimistic school of Victor Cousin, after the war of 1870 became an adventure at once serious and romantic. Philosophy as incarnated in Bouteiller and his like, grave as German savants and ardent as apostles, presented in vague and passionate outlines the essential element of religion. To them, in fact, it was religion ostensibly transposed into the key of pure thought but reproduced with all its emotional and moral intensity. Children of seventeen were fascinated, hypnotised by the magnificent speculations which their teachers unrolled before them. They savoured, like young gods, the rapture of comprehension, and though this rapture may have faded soon enough, they remained intoxicated by the habit of sumptuous dreaming, gained for ever to the cause of their own enthusiastic independence of soul. No wonder that this metaphysical romanticism should have worked the same ravages as the romanticism of the poets. Both produced the same rupture of equilibrium, the same ferment of revolt, the same ambition to find in the abstract or the chimerical a less narrow fatherland than the real world; both gave their adepts the same illusion of being able to re-create the universe and themselves ' nearer to the heart's ' desire '; both reinforced the same ignorance of natural limitations; both handed them over to the same tyranny of the ' barbarians.'

The theory of the ' Culte du Moi ' hardly makes clear how Barrès became conscious of this servitude. From the first he intended to practise that religion, and his ' barbarian ' masters were far from urging him to suppress his ego. The point to determine is how he was led to substitute for the romantic worship of the self which implies submission to the ' barbarians ' that other form of the religion which indicates the docile acceptance of one's own limitations. Although in this first book he does not decide definitely between the two disciplines, there are not wanting indications that the

yoke is chafing his neck. We have already mentioned the precocious despair which attacked him. To his cry, 'Mais 'vois donc, que je suis las, las avant l'effort, et que j'ai peur,' Philippe's mistress replies, 'Ah! tu sais trop de choses.' Too many things, indeed. No wonder that 'la suprême fleur 'de toutes ces cultures, l'héritier d'une telle sagesse, étendu 'sur le dos, bâillait.' That yawn is the signal of his emancipation from the yoke of the Egyptians. He yawns, therefore he is saved. He is ready for the master whenever he may come, 'axiome, religion ou prince des hommes,' provided that he comes from the depths of his own subconscious self and that he speaks in his own natal accents.

In the second book of the trilogy, 'Un Homme Libre,' Philippe retires with his friend Simon to a deserted country house on the borders of the departments of Meurthe-et-Moselle and the Vosges in order to make a prolonged spiritual retreat. 'Courons à la solitude! Soyons des nouveaux nés! Dépouillés 'de nos attitudes, oublieux de nos vanités, et de tout ce qui 'n'est pas notre âme, véritables libérés, nous créerons une 'atmosphère neuve où nous embellir par de sagaces expéri-'mentations.' But this is easier said than done, even with the aid of a highly ingenious adaptation to the new spirituality of the Exercises of St. Ignatius. The book was almost as much misunderstood as 'Sous l'Œil des Barbares.' It appeared in 1889, two years after the first volume of the trilogy. A preface to the edition of 1905 is so important a document for the understanding of Barrès' development, that the reader may pardon a somewhat lengthy quotation.

'Ceux qui ne connurent jamais l'ivresse de déplaire ne peuvent imaginer les divines satisfactions de ma vingt-cinquième année: j'ai scandalisé. Des gens se mettaient à cause de mes livres en fureur. Leur sottise me crevait de bonheur.

'"Sous l'Œil des Barbares" parut en Novembre 1887 et "Un Homme Libre" vers Pâques, en 1889. Les maîtres de la grande espèce vivaient encore. Je croisais dans le quartier Latin Taine, Renan et Leconte de Lisle. J'avais vu, de mes yeux vu, Hugo. Jour inoubliable, celui où je causais avec Leconte de Lisle et Anatole France dans la bibliothèque du Sénat et qu'un petit vieillard vigoureux—c'était le Père, c'était l'Empereur, c'était Victor Hugo—nous rejoignit! Je mourrai sans avoir rien vu qui m'importe davantage. Ah! si quelque jour, je pouvais mériter que l'Histoire acceptât ce groupe de quatre âges littéraires!

'Ainsi quand j'étais jeune, il y avait encore des dieux. Mais

une pensée toute avilie faisait recette auprès du public. On prenait la grossièreté pour de la force, l'obscénité pour de la passion et des tableaux en trompe-l'œil pour des pages " grouillantes de vie." Il y avait toutes les raisons du monde pour qu'un petit livre d'analyse ne fût point remarqué. En outre " Un Homme Libre " était peu compréhensible.

'Croyez-vous donc que j'eusse voulu être entendu de n'importe qui ? J'écrivais pour mettre de l'ordre en moi-même et pour me délivrer, car on ne pense, ce qui s'appelle penser, que la plume à la main. Mais le premier venu allait-il pencher sa tête par dessus mon épaule, sur mon papier ? " Fi, Monsieur ! m'écriais-je, moyennant 3fr.50, vous voudriez connaître mes plus délicates complications. Faites d'abord des études préliminaires, car rien ne m'assure que vous soyez né pour que nous causions ensemble." Cette disposition méprisante a ses inconvénients. J'ai créé un préjugé contre mes livres. Pendant une dizaine d'années, il y eut sur " L'Egotisme " de M. Barrès, sur le " Moi " de M. Barrès les plus sots jugements, et il semblait presque impossible que je les surmontasse—en effet, il n'a fallu rien moins qu'une guerre civile. . . . J'ai péché contre ma pensée, par trop de scrupule. J'ai craint d'introduire mon didactisme en supplément aux faits . . . j'ai voulu me produire tout nûment. Je voyais s'éveiller mes groupes de sensations, je les notais, je les décrivais, j'acceptais ma spontanéité. J'oubliais qu'il s'agit de créer un rapport entre l'auteur et le lecteur et qu'ainsi le plus probe philosophe doit se préoccuper de l'effet à produire . . . Mes aînés Anatole France et Jules Lemaître me comblaient ; ils m'ont dès la première minute traité avec une grande générosité, mais ils prétendaient que je fusse un ironiste. Ils ne voyaient pas que je voulais prouver quelque chose, et que l'ironie n'était qu'un de mes moyens. . . . Les jeunes gens me dédommageaient . . . ils distinguaient dans " Uu Homme Libre " des forces d'enthousiasme. Ils virent que je cherchais une raison de vivre et une discipline. Ils s'intéressèrent passionnément à une recherche qu'eux-mêmes eussent voulu entreprendre. . . . " Un Homme Libre " racontait une recherche sans donner de résultat, mais cette conclusion suspendue, " Les Déracinés" la fournissent. Dans " Les Déracinés " l'homme libre distingue et accepte son déterminisme. Un candidat au nihilisme poursuit son apprentissage, et, d'analyse en analyse, il éprouve le néant du moi, jusqu'à prendre le sens social. . . . Je ne permets qu'à des catholiques les diatribes contre l'égotisme ; si vous n'êtes pas un croyant, d'où prenez-vous votre point de vue pour flétrir l'individualisme ? . . . Ce fier et vif sentiment du moi que décrit " Un Homme Libre," c'est un instant nécessaire, dans la série des mouvements, par où un jeune homme s'oriente pour recueillir et puis transmettre les trésors de sa lignée.'

In the education given by his native soil, by the great minds of his country's past, the young man finds at once his liberty

and his determinism. For he is himself that past pressing on in the present into the future. As Bergson says: 'Tout ce 'que nous avons senti, pensé, voulu depuis notre première 'enfance et avant que nous fussions nés, est là penché sur le 'présent qui va s'y joindre, pressant contre la porte de la 'conscience qui voudrait le laisser dehors.' But it was in the smile of Bérénice that his destiny definitely appeared to him. This naïve and lucid little person revealed to him instinct as superior to analysis. In the soiled and yet spiritually intact child-courtesan he recognised woman, the people, nature, the force and suffering of things. In her sad garden of Rose-monde at Aigues-Mortes his heart went out to the movement of the past, in her soul he touched the mysterious realities of life. He now came to realise that while he had been building his castles in the air he had allowed the foundations of his humble home to fall into ruin. He had dissipated the energy of his soul in the pursuit of an infinite variety of modes of thought and feeling. 'Après une analyse aiguë et profonde,' he says, 'je trouvais dans mon petit jardin la source jaillissante. 'Elle vient de la vaste nappe qui fournit toutes les fontaines 'de ma cité. . . . Acceptons notre conditionnement, c'est 'une épine dorsale. Quand nous l'avons nous pourrons 'alors inventer notre vie.' And he sums up his return to his native mentality by saying: 'J'ai trouvé le bonheur, en 'm'abandonnant à ce rythme qu'on donne à son cœur, si 'l'on remet à ses morts le soin de le régler.'

Here then we have the full formula of Barrès' traditionalism. At first the soul, attracted by doctrines in proportion to their novelty, endeavours to acquire strength by their absorption. Some she succeeds in adapting to herself, if by chance there exist a secret affinity between her and them; but for the most part she is distracted and puzzled, and in the meantime her own heritage from the past gets weaker. So she returns, in order to save her life, to her own provincialism. A perfect cosmopolitanism is the snare of a superficial rationalism.

'Everyone is immortal in his own place,' says Goethe in the second part of 'Faust,' and it is only by discovering and accepting the actual conditions of our dependence on the universe that we share in its eternity. By so doing our own individuality ceases to be the ghost of our conceited imagination and becomes a real and justified cause in the network of

phenomena. Thus is reached that achievement of the complete ego which is the principle and end of Barrès' ethic. 'Mon 'être m'enchante,' he says, 'quand je l'entrevois échelonner 'sur les siècles, se développant à travers une suite de corps.' His philosophy is essentially realist. Disabused of abstract systems and cured by his sentiment for reality of the passion for dialectical explanations of the world, he seeks above all for harmony. He claims no metaphysical certitude, but he affirms the reality of life and teaches that intrinsic grandeur consists in accepting the laws of life. This to him is 'truth,' to find our own point of view from which experience becomes harmonious. Yet his traditionalism remains dependent on his personality. 'Trouver un but à son âme, lui fournir un 'idéal où elle relie tous ses désirs et qui leur donne du ressort, 'voilà une besogne nécessaire. Mais ne soyons pas dupes 'de nos inventions. Profondément une âme n'a pas d'autre 'fin qu'elle-même.'

This purpose for his life Barrès has found, as is well known, in the revival of national spirit in France. We are not here concerned with his political activities; it is sufficient to note that they are not only not discordant with his interior life but that they are as a matter of fact the natural and harmonious expression of it. Before the war he was the remorseless enemy of those numerous politicians, many of them of Jewish and German origin, who under the plea of progress were occupied in filtering away the traditional French spirit into a thin rationalist cosmopolitanism. Inevitably he was anti-Semite as soon as the question of Jewish influence in the country was raised. Thinking that he recognised in Boulanger the saviour whom France was expecting, he instinctively backed his claims. At Déroulède's death, he succeeded him as president of the Ligue des Patriotes Français, and he may be said at this moment to be at once the completest incarnation and the central force of everything which that society stands for. Though not himself a 'practising' Catholic, he realises that the cause of French Catholicism is one with the cause of France. In his 'La grande pitié des Églises de France' he has republished his many speeches made at the Palais Bourbon in favour of the proper preservation of those ancient monuments of pious days. It is no mere antiquarianism that moves him. He sees clearly enough that Catholicism

is the characteristic religious complement of the French mind. This being so, there are not wanting some who think that the final stage of his development will involve his personal submission to the Church. It may be that it will be so. Just as he has found in an enlightened patriotism the ideal nourishment for his individual personality, so he may come to find in the Catholic symbolism the 'panis supersubstantialis' of his soul. Père Ferchat of the Society of Jesus published some years ago in the 'Études des Pères Jésuites' two remarkable articles under the title 'L'Itinéraire d'un Intellectuel' on the religious orientation and implications of Barrès' thought. According to him 'l'idée chrétienne est le ressort caché de la 'rénovation qu'opère en cette âme le souvenir de ses morts.' In the particular case this is probably true, but there is no logical connexion between Barrès' *culte des morts* and the Catholic 'devotion to the Holy Souls.' Barrès worships the dead in himself, in his daily thoughts and activities, in the life of their descendants. The Church prays for their eternal repose. However, although this instance of Père Ferchat's is not particularly well chosen, we think Barrès' state of mind is certainly susceptible of a possible Catholic interpretation. And it is matter of common knowledge that many of those who have been most influenced by him have come to give a practical expression to that interpretation. The remarkable movement of French 'intellectuels' during the last ten years towards the Church has been due to no small extent to his influence. Take this dialogue from 'Les Déracinés':

'Robespierre a raison, dit Rœmerspacher; pour créer le devoir social, il faut une religion. Pas la religion d'un côté et la science ailleurs, mais l'une et l'autre se pénétrant. Seulement à qui demander cette unité vitale?

— Au catholicisme, dit Saint-Phlin.

— Le catholicisme en France, répliqua dédaigneusement Suret-Lefort, c'est les congrégations, le parti jésuite: immédiatement vous serez impopulaire. . . .

Saint-Phlin, surexcité, l'interrompit.

— Tu réduis le catholicisme au cléricalisme, état d'esprit éphémère entretenu par des taquineries administratives. Les Catholiques, qu'on chasse le plus possible du gouvernement, contre qui l'on gouverne, ce sont des gens du type français, et on leur substitue le plus possible des protestants et des juifs dont beaucoup possèdent encore des habitudes héréditaires opposées à la tradition nationale. Sturel, Rœmerspacher, laisserez-vous confondre avec sa caricature

de sacristie une religion d'une puissance de vie sociale incomparable et qui depuis des siècles anime ce pays ? '

The conversation is resumed a few pages further on, and Saint-Phlin, the only Catholic among the speakers, says :

' Le ton de sacristie vous dégoûte. Mais les Homais, les Bouchard, les Pecuchet, les professionels de l'anticléricalisme vous semblent-ils préférables aux bedeaux ? C'est dans leurs expressions élevées qu'il faut comparer le système scientifique et le catholique. Celui-ci fournit aux nations modernes une discipline morale que jusqu'à cette heure personne n'a pu dégager de la science. Pourquoi chercher autre chose ? La vérité, c'est ce qui satisfait les besoins de notre âme, comme une bonne nourriture se reconnaît à ce qu'elle assure notre prospérité physique.'

Barrès himself would not, we think, quite go the length of such a purely pragmatist definition of truth. What then is the precise sense in which his thought lends itself to a Catholic interpretation ? The question is not without interest, for a strong Catholic reaction is likely to follow the war in France, and ' le barrèsisme ' is certainly one of the most important purely intellectual elements which tend in that direction.

At the end of the new preface (1905) to ' Un Homme Libre ' Barrès says :

' Au milieu d'un océan et d'un sombre mystère de vagues qui me pressent, je me tiens à ma conception historique, comme un naufragé à sa barque. Je ne touche pas à l'énigme du commencement des choses ni au douloureux énigme de la fin de toutes choses. Je me cramponne à ma courte solidité. Je me place dans une collectivité un peu plus longue que mon individu ; je m'invente une destination un peu plus raisonnable que ma chétive carrière. A force d'humiliations, ma pensée, d'abord si fière d'être libre, arrive à constater sa dépendance de cette terre et de ces morts qui, bien avant que je naquisse, l'ont commandée jusque dans ses nuances. . . .'

He has arrived at what he calls his ' conception historique ' by the necessity of transcending the limits of his own personality in order to keep it alive. The wish to live, that is, to expand in a system of determined relations, has carried him beyond his ego, beyond the logical bounds of the solipsism which was his first ideal, to recognise that his whole value as an individual comes to him—humiliating thought—from his place in a series. Thus the chrysalis of his egotism is broken and he

wings his way into a new world in which he rediscovers himself incomparably greater than before. He finds himself the authentic heir to vast accumulations of thought and beauty, he discovers in the indications of his forebears the direction in which he himself can create. In this way he places himself in a 'collectivité un peu plus longue que mon 'individu.' Only a very little longer, however, and moreover, a collectivity without beginning or end, and therefore without purpose. 'Je ne touche pas à l'énigme du commencement 'des choses ni au douloureux énigme de la fin de toutes choses.' In order to triumph over the restrictions of time and raise his life to the power of his dream, he gives himself the satisfaction of self-identification with the past which survives in him and with the future which he conditions. 'C'est tout 'un vertige délicieux où l'individu se défait, pour se ressaisir 'dans la famille, dans la race, dans la nation, dans des milliers 'd'années que n'annule pas le tombeau.' But can an unconscious immortality in posterity content him? And if it be said that his content comes from his present consciousness of that future immortality, is he not also conscious that this ball of stone will one day be the final tomb of all the generations of men? It is at all events conceivable that a man might follow the process by which Barrès first loses and then finds again his individuality and feel that that process cannot stop where apparently it does stop in Barrès. 'Il est trop certain 'que la vie n'a pas de but et que l'homme pourtant a besoin 'de poursuivre un rêve.' It is phrases like these that make one feel that Barrès himself sometimes suspects that he has not yet reached the goal of his pilgrimage.

There is only one name for a unity which shall transcend and contain and give reality to the transient human show. Barrès himself may never pronounce it, but its ultimate affirmation seems to follow plausibly from his position, if not to be actually implied in the first steps of his development. At least that affirmation is thoroughly congruous with the affirmation of the not-self which was his point of departure. For the affirmation of God is neither more nor less gratuitous than that original affirmation. Solipsism can be refuted by no process of reasoning. We cannot break the prison bars of the self without virtually proclaiming that the necessity of our psychological life is a surer guide

to truth than a syllogism. At a lower depth of introspection, the necessity for God may present itself under an equally imperious sanction. For what the self craves for is to recognise its own absolute reality, its eternity. But as far as we can see, it has no more permanence than the foam on the wave. The series of human generations, the particular system of determined relations in which the self finds itself enmeshed and by the assertion of which it borrows for a time an enhanced and extended life—*without the assertion of which it would die*, this is the point—is seen on the most elementary reflection to be as ephemeral and evanescent an illusion as its own independent existence. Either then the self must go further and assert an eternal reality which shall ensure its own together with the reality of those human relations on which it has fed, or it has merely postponed the moment of its despair. There are no compelling intellectual reasons for doing so, any more than there are for transcending solipsism. But to those who have reached that point of analytic introspection which reveals that the reality of the self depends on the reality of God, there is psychological sanction enough. There is the sanction of the death of the soul. At that depth the only vital support is the message which St. Theresa heard in ecstasy, 'Seek thyself in Me.'

It may be said that it is one thing to affirm God and another to accept Catholicism. No doubt there are theists who are not Catholics. Not many, however, in France. Moreover, the essentially concrete and realist nature of the Barrèsian method with its characteristic aversion to metaphysical assertions would, if it led to any acceptation of religion, surely lead to the acceptation of the religion of the collectivity in which a man finds himself. For religion is invoked to give reality to collectivity. As to Barrès' own attitude as expressed in his books—and any other inquiry would be an impertinence—it may be defined as love of and sympathy with Catholicism up to faith, exclusively. He has never written a word that goes beyond that.

The ethic of Barrès resumes itself in the one precept to live in harmony with oneself. Among the ideas which solicit our energy, let us select those which move in the direction of our own instinct and our own intelligence. Our first duty is not to bring confusion into the house of our soul. 'Une seule

'règle vaut : celle que nous arrachons de notre cœur sincère.' Man, like Michelangelo's Moses, holds his law in his own hands. In order to harmonise himself with others, it is first of all necessary that he should be himself, fully, completely. It is by digging deep into our nature that we shall discover the essential unity of ourselves with others. Such is the philosophy which lends depth to the spiritual adventures that are the staple of these wonderful books. It fortifies and elevates the energy of the individual, dignifies the idea of the State, and ennobles our personal interpretation of life. It offers us a reasonable faith in our individual destiny in the place of an arid metaphysic that would dissipate as illusions all those slowly formed unities on which our moral life depends ; it offers us a discipline which is conditioned by our own initiative.

The influence of Barrès in France has been growing for the last twenty years. At the present moment it stands at its zenith. Nor are there any signs of its decline. It has been a leading element in the intellectual formation of the splendid young generation who are fighting so gloriously for their country and for the liberty of Europe at this moment. It has given them an intelligent patriotism. Could a writer have served his country better ? That service will outlast the war, and among the influences that will go to form the new and emancipated France, none will be more important than that of Maurice Barrès.

ALGAR THOROLD.

THE RESTORATION OF MONARCHY IN CHINA

AT this crisis in the history of Western civilisation, when the inherent strength and cohesion of democratic institutions are being tested in the crucible of war by the highly centralised system of Prussian autocracy, there is food for much reflection in the political and moral detachment of the Chinese people. Unperturbed by the stupendous clash of arms and ideals which convulses Europe, a quarter of the earth's population continues, on lines prescribed by its experience and immemorial traditions, to seek the solution of its own insistent problem, the problem of so reconciling its political and social systems with a changing environment as to obtain something like security for life and property. If one may judge by the utterances of Chinese officials and writers, there is, in their attitude of aloofness from Europe's war, an element of judicial complacency. Indeed, it would be strange if, after all that their defenceless State has suffered at the hands of European advisers and aggressors, they should not discover in the present devastating struggle good reasons for continuing to doubt the advantages of Western civilisation, and reassurances of justification for persisting in their own patriarchal ideals of government. Looking back over the long record of vitality and achievement which their country has produced under a non-militant type of civilisation, the scholars and statesmen of China may well ask themselves what shall it profit the nation to forsake the teachings of the Sages if the end of the new learning be Armageddon ?

For the past fifty years, China has been warned by missionaries and diplomatists that she must reform and change her ways if she would take her place in the comity of civilised nations ; that she must rebuild her state upon material and military foundations, or risk the loss of national independence. These warnings have been earnestly emphasised by demonstration of the social and political advantages enjoyed by Western nations, and of the dangers which threaten a people whose

economic and military forces are not scientifically organised. Yet, in spite of surface manifestations of conformity to these exhortations, in spite of the noisy activities of an exotic body of foreign-educated intellectuals, it may safely be asserted that at no period have the Chinese people or its rulers been really convinced of the moral superiority of Western institutions. On the contrary, every page of their history proves the persistence of their faith in that system of moral philosophy, deep-rooted in the soul of their people, which has preserved the race, if not from foreign attack, at least from internal disruption; which, even through periods when the Empire was invaded and governed by alien rulers, has preserved, unconquered and invincible, the vital spirit of its homogeneous civilisation. This faith is likely to be strengthened rather than impaired by the spectacle which Europe now presents to the placid mind of the Chinese people. They can hardly fail to be impressed by the claims advanced by a government of personal autocracy to moral and material superiority over the world's most enlightened democracies. They may further reflect that the ideals of a democratic commonwealth do not necessarily inspire, in those who profess them, a nobler spirit of self-sacrifice than that evoked by the *Kultur* of German autocracy.

The protracted period of unrest which culminated four years ago in the accidentally successful revolution of Young China, the abdication of the Manchu dynasty and the proclamation of a Republic at Peking, differed from many similar crises in the history of China chiefly by reason of the fact that the possibility of foreign intervention, in defence of real or alleged foreign interests, created new dangers that were realised alike by Young China and Old. The perils to be apprehended from the Government's failure to meet its obligations in the matter of foreign loans and treaties were not to be overcome by any of the rough-and-ready methods by which autocratic authority had been wont to re-establish itself after similar internal convulsions in the past. The collapse of the Manchu dynasty had been plainly foreshadowed for half a century. The tottering fabric of its discredited power had only been held together, since the Taiping rebellion, by the resourceful statecraft of the Empress Dowager Tzŭ Hsi and by the support of the Treaty Powers, concerned for the protection of their trade.

The forces which actually drove the Manchus from the Dragon Throne were in themselves insignificant. The success of Young China's conspiracy was due to the utter incompetence and cowardice of Tzŭ Hsi's successors, rather than to any definite policy or organised force of the revolutionaries. At the critical moment of disruption, precipitated by a series of local and unimportant outbreaks, the Government at Peking proved to be without leaders, funds or organisation of authority to stem the tide of Young China's undisciplined iconoclasm.

One man alone, Yuan Shih-k'ai, stood firm for a time and struggled single-handed for the maintenance of the Throne, as the only effective rallying-point for the reorganisation of a government suited to the needs of the people. At the outset he fought with determination, stoutly declaring his belief that the attempt to establish a Republic in China could only produce 'internal wrangling leading to anarchy.' But when at last he found himself unsupported by the foreign Powers, whose financial assistance he had had every reason to expect; when he realised that the metropolitan administration and the *literati* of the provinces were just as much disorganised and terrified as the Manchus themselves by the swift development of the revolution, he followed the opportunist traditions of his class and creed, consenting (with perceptible mental reservations) to accept the Presidency of the Republic. It is a fact significant of the condition of public affairs in China that, only three months before, he had declared that to be a party to the establishment of a Republic 'would brand him as a liar 'before all the world,' and that Young China never saw fit to charge him with inconsistency in this matter.

As it was at the time of the triumph of the Young Turks in 1908, so it was when Young China upset the Dragon Throne in 1911. Misled by the tumult and the shouting of students and professional agitators, who proclaimed the birth of a new era to the cry of 'liberty, equality and fraternity,' many observers at a distance and some upon the spot welcomed the establishment of the Republic as a proof of the Chinese people's political consciousness and fitness for representative government. In the infectious enthusiasm of the moment, the deep-rooted economic evils, which are the permanent cause of social and political unrest in China, were overlooked; the clamour of self-seeking politicians was mistaken for an outburst of patriotic

fervour, with the result that the permanence and constructive capacity of the new forces were greatly exaggerated.

In particular, many English and American missionaries were vocationally disposed to believe in Young China's intentions and ability to reclaim the people by virtue of Western learning and democratic institutions. In their zealous enthusiasm at the prospect of reaping the long-delayed harvest of their teachings, they were led to believe in the sudden awakening of the Chinese people's political morality. Therefore they overlooked not only the instinctive conservatism of the inarticulate masses, but the self-seeking ambitions which had produced this ferment—to say nothing of the corruption and administrative incapacity which, from the outset, characterised the revolutionary movement. They believed, in fact, in the miracle of a national re-birth. Thus it came about that the inauguration of the Republic was widely proclaimed in Europe and America as the dawn of a new era for China. For a year or more diplomats, journalists and missionaries vied with one another in forecasting the nation's brilliant future : everything that, after long centuries of education and effort, Europe had evolved in the direction of constitutional government, was to be introduced at once, and with complete success, in the new Utopia of the Far East. All the ancient foundations were to be uprooted with the Throne : Confucianism, the cult of ancestors, the patriarchal philosophy of the Sages, all were to be replaced, in the twinkling of an eye, by the latest thing in democratic institutions, with a Constitution broad-based on the nation's will, a government of the people by the people for the people, universal suffrage, conscription, and even votes for women.

Opinions of this kind, arising out of one of the most persistent delusions common to humanity, are more easily disseminated than dissolved. With regard to China's brief vision of Celestial Socialism, there are evidently some who still believe in the mystic power of political formulæ to accomplish the impossible and to change the whole structural character of the race. Yet the history of Young China's brief authority has been written with bloodshed and chaos throughout the land, in such a manner as to shatter beyond repair the people's faith in the healing virtue of the new dispensation. Within six months of Sun Yat'sen's declaration that the passing of the

monarchy heralded ' the dawn of peace and prosperity, ' just ' laws and honest administration,' the people's instinctive desire for authoritative rulership had been clearly demonstrated. Even at that time Young China, absorbed in futile dissensions and sordid intrigues, had manifested the hopelessness of its bright vision of the millennium, while the present military dictatorship was beginning to assume definite direction and authority. Eight months after the revolution, the military and police authorities of the provinces had warned the members of the National Assembly ' to cease from thwarting the Govern- ' ment by their senseless and selfish factions.' The political phenomena, which had been regarded by many as evidence of the fitness of the Chinese people for self-government under European institutions, had proved to be superficial and transient. The reaction of the *literati*, of the military and the merchant classes against Sun Yat'sen's political adventures proved clearly, if proof were needed, that the real causes of unrest in China remain economic in their origin and that, for these, the catchwords of Republicanism could provide neither remedy nor relief.

It is unnecessary here to recapitulate all the steps by which, during the past three years, Yuan Shih-k'ai has succeeded in gradually bringing something like order out of chaos, restoring the authority of the central government in the provinces and repairing the administrative and fiscal machinery dislocated by the revolution. As a study of masterly statecraft ' steadily 'pursuing the unbroken continuity of time-honoured traditions,' the subject is one of fascinating interest. To anyone familiar with the career of this super-Mandarin, as Viceroy of Chihli under the Manchu dynasty, with his adroit opportunism and nicely-balanced adjustment of shrewd conservatism and progressive tendencies, there has been nothing surprising in the measures which he has adopted to meet the exigencies of a delicate and dangerous situation ; but there is something very remarkable and admirable in his firm grasp of that situation, in the unerring ability with which he has combined the *suaviter in modo* with the *fortiter in re*. At the outset, and until he had secured control of funds sufficient to purchase the loyalty of the military commanders in the provinces, he practised the policy of wait-and-see *à l'Orientale*, with consummate skill, frequently stooping to conquer but losing no ' face ' in

the process, employing all the arts and crafts of expediency, first to conciliate and then to divide the active elements of Young China.

Many of the stratagems and devices employed by Yuan and by his secret agents at the provincial capitals during the first two years of the Republic were characterised by venality, 'frightfulness' and corrupt intrigue. The Velvet Glove worked silently, using the best materials within its reach and biding its time to reveal the Iron Hand. When finally, by a bold stroke, Yuan had successfully negotiated the foreign loan which gave him command of the sinews of war, the forces of his opponents had become so disorganised that their last attempt at armed rebellion (the 'war to punish Yuan') was foredoomed to ignominious failure. Thenceforward, while solemnly professing respect for the theory of Republicanism, the President proceeded steadily to restore the principles and practice of autocratic government. After the dissolution of the Young China party, he made an end of the National Assembly and the provincial self-government Assemblies, carefully explaining at each step the necessity for these measures by Republican 'mandates' couched in the classical phraseology of Imperial decrees.

In October 1913, after his definite 'election' to the Presidency, he proclaimed his policy in words which left little room to doubt his determination to restore the ancient edifice of autocracy. 'Restrictions have been placed on my authority,' he declared, 'which have hampered me in my work of pro-'moting the country's best interests.' True, he reaffirmed his faith in gradual reforms and his intention to proceed in due course to the establishment of constitutional government. But the Provisional Constitution was suspended (it had never been more than a scrap of paper) and replaced by 'the Presi-'dential system' of government, that is to say, by One-Man-Rule. To preserve some semblance of constitutional methods, Parliament was represented by an 'Administrative Conference,' composed almost exclusively of the President's nominees, *literati* and officials of the old régime. Upon the advice of this Assembly, supported by numerous 'petitions' from his own faithful henchmen, the civil and military governors of the Provinces, a vigorous revival of Orthodox Confucianism was organised throughout the country, as a preliminary

to the President's dramatic emergence in the *rôle* of High Priest to perform the solemn sacrifice of the Winter Solstice at the Temple of Heaven.

There is no doubt that the people as a whole regarded this momentous step as equivalent to the complete restoration of the classical tradition of government, and with it, of the Dragon Throne. But for Yuan and his advisers, the time had not yet come to put the crowning touch to their work. Everything must be done decently and in order, without unseemly haste. There were still elements of internal disorder to be dissolved, influential waverers to be won over to the policy of centralisation, foreign opinion to be conciliated, many 'faces' to be saved. Therefore, each step taken towards the substance of autocratic government was accompanied by professions of deep respect for the shadow of Republicanism.

The Administrative Conference played their solemn game of make-believe in accordance with all the rules of orthodox tradition; even the restoration of the Worship of Heaven, they explained, was 'Republican in spirit.' And all the while, Yuan, 'in the profound seclusion of the Palace,' kept a firm grasp on the situation, gauging the force of public opinion from every quarter, timing every move in the game with the precision of a master-player, steadily increasing his hold over the provinces and their revenue-producing capacity. He knew—none better—that the loyalty of the majority of his supporters, and particularly of the army, is *au fond* a loyalty of loaves and fishes. He realised that his power to rule the Empire must ever depend on control of ready money sufficient to secure the removal or conversion of malcontents and to provide for the repression by force of widespread elements of disorder. As for the masses of the people, he has declared his firm belief that they, like himself, are 'no lovers of changes 'which run counter to immemorial custom'; for the rest, he knows that they care not at all what the form or fashion of the Government may be, so long as it secures for them surcease of civil strife and reasonable security for life and property.

The Presidential mandates issued during the past eighteen months afford striking proof of Yuan Shih-k'ai's profound knowledge of his countrymen and of his conviction that they will welcome the restoration of the autocratic form of

government to which they are accustomed. These mandates afford also instructive examples of the curious admixture of patriarchal philosophy and childish naïveté which characterises the Chinese mind (whether Young or Old) whenever it attempts to graft new wood of European origin upon the venerable tree of native statecraft. The avowed purpose of the most important of these mandates was ' to lay the permanent foundations ' of the new constitution in China ' ; their immediate and practical result has been to remove the last vestiges of constitutional procedure. The Presidential Election law, promulgated in December 1914, conferred ten years of office on the President, who is eligible for re-election by a vote of two-thirds of the Administrative Council. To ' prevent intrigue and strife,' the President is empowered to nominate three persons (whose names he records and secretes upon a table of gold), one of whom is to succeed him in the event of his death.

Another mandate, issued in response to a memorial by the Censors, decrees that henceforth ' no member of any political ' party shall be eligible for membership of Parliament.' By the first redrafting of the Constitution in March 1914 (the work is still proceeding), full powers were conferred upon the President to declare war and make treaties without reference to parliament (doubtless a wise measure, since parliament had ceased to exist). In his hands, also, was placed supreme authority over the finances and armed forces of the country. Finally, a leaf was carefully selected from Great Britain's wait-and-see procedure of parliamentary reform, by the promise of a model Parliament, to consist of an Upper and a Lower House, which is to be elected and convened at some convenient season in the future. For the present, however, all the necessary functions of automatic recorders of the President's wishes are fulfilled by his faithful retainers and nominees on the Tsan Cheng Yuan, or Council of State. And the President, be it noted, is not liable to impeachment.

Thus, out of the chaos left by the passing of the Manchus and the turmoil of the revolution, Yuan Shih-k'ai's genius of statesmanship, conforming strictly to the ancient classical model, has succeeded in effectively restoring the authority of the metropolitan administration, with himself as its head, in the undisguised capacity of dictator. Every stage in his intricate programme has been silently and skilfully carried

out with the polished smoothness of a conjuring performance, and the general effect on the audience has been such as to completely justify those who hold that the Chinese people are in no sense fitted, or even anxious, for self-government. In other words, only under a benevolent form of despotism, conforming to the Confucian traditions of government, can law and order be maintained. By his very aloofness and dignified reticence, by his acute perception of the 'happy mean,' and pursuance of the lines of least resistance, by his masterly handling of semi-independent military chiefs and provincial officials, Yuan has succeeded in establishing himself in the eyes of the people as the Strong Man, the Man of Destiny, the only ruler in sight who can possibly hold in check the ever-present elements of disorder.

When compelled by *force majeure* to bow to the demands of Young China after the revolution of 1911, Yuan Shih-k'ai was well aware, and was at no pains to conceal his opinion, that the republic was an accidental and transient phenomenon which, because of its fundamental opposition to Confucian principles and ideals, must speedily disappear before the deep-rooted conservatism of the masses. At the same time, because of that very conservatism and the semi-divine position of the occupant of the Dragon Throne as the apex of the Confucian system, Yuan Shih-k'ai perceived clearly the dangers and difficulties inseparable from the creation of a new dynasty.

The divine right of monarchs in China being intimately bound up with the sacred institution of ancestor worship, it is a matter of tradition that no new dynasty can rightfully claim the 'mandate of Heaven' unless it has overthrown its predecessor by force of arms. It is safe to say that when Yuan struggled to retain the Manchu hierarchy in its place, as a figure-head shorn of despotic authority, he did so because he realised that the eventual restoration of the Throne was inevitable, and that grave dangers must confront the creation of a new Imperial house. Those dangers have undoubtedly been lessened by the insidiously gradual assertion of Yuan's autocratic authority during the past three years, and by the fact that the people (including the Manchu clans) have thus been led to regard him as the head of the State. It is no longer true, as it was when Sir Robert Hart advised against the

abolition of the Manchu dynasty in 1901, that 'there is no man 'of mark whom all China would accept' in their place. Yuan has had time to make his mark, and has made it, in such a manner as to gain the approval of the great majority of his countrymen. Some of his methods have been extremely 'slim,' and certain of his swift reprisals have been barbarous according to Western ideas, but all have conformed to time-honoured precedents of Chinese rule, and therefore none have aroused anything like popular indignation.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that, the mind of the classical orthodoxy of Confucianism being what it is, Yuan was wise, four years ago, in endeavouring to retain the Manchus on the Throne. It is necessary, in view of the latest developments of the situation at Peking, to bear in mind that in 1912 he declared the well-deserved unpopularity of the Manchus to be a remediable evil, which he proposed to remove by 'depriving 'the reigning family of all power to renew the misgovernment 'of the past and to retain them only as an emblem of mon-'archy.' It should also be borne in mind that, during his tenure of office as Viceroy of Chihli and close adviser of the Throne, Yuan himself had given repeated proofs of wisely liberal tendencies and progressive methods of administration, always combined with a keen perception of the peril of sudden changes.

He, foremost amongst the high officials of China since the death of Li Hung-Chang, had recognised the advisability of adopting the arts and sciences of the West. In his own *yamen*, he had surrounded himself for many years with the ablest of the foreign-educated students, and had advanced many of them to high office in the State. If he took the side of the Empress Dowager against the Emperor and K'ang Yu-wei's Reform movement in 1898, it was because he saw no prospect of practical constructive statecraft in the sweeping changes which they proposed to introduce. But it was he who subsequently, in 1901, successfully urged upon Tzŭ Hsi the necessity for taking definite steps in the direction of constitutional procedure. It was he again who, in 1904, inspired the momentous decree which abolished the classical essay system of examination for the public service, making graduation at one of the modern colleges the only road to official employment. Finally, it was upon his advice, carried out by his

lieutenant, T'ang Shao-yi, that the Empress Dowager decreed the abolition of the opium traffic.

The whole policy of his administration as Viceroy reflected, in fact, his perception of the new intellectual and political forces which Western learning, intercourse with foreigners, and improved means of communication had created, and his intention to direct these forces along constructive and not destructive lines. It is extremely interesting to compare the methods and results of his viceregal policy with those reflected in his Presidential Mandates of the past two years. Throughout them all we find evidence of persistent devotion to that doctrine of the 'happy mean,' which was the corner-stone of Tzŭ Hsi's statecraft and the secret of her lifelong success. For him, as for her, there are certain things which change not, namely, 'the three fundamental bonds (between sovereign 'and subject, father and son, husband and wife) and the five 'great moral obligations. These are as the sun and moon, for 'ever enlightening the world; but in all other matters, there 'should be no hide-bound finality of ideas, no rooted objection 'to change.' *

In other words, Yuan Shih-k'ai has endeavoured to combine progressive statesmanship with devotion to the principles of orthodox Confucianism. This being his policy, and because the Confucian *literati* and gentry constitute the backbone of the intellectual life of China, every step which Yuan Shih-k'ai has taken towards the restoration of the monarchy reveals his desire to secure, above all, the approval and support of the scholar class. Whether he will secure that support, and having secured it, whether he will make bold to found a new dynasty in his own person, remains to be seen. The consensus of opinions conveyed by the memorials and petitions that have poured in upon the Council of State from the provinces, and especially those of the military chiefs, indicate a desire and expectation that he shall ascend the Dragon Throne without further delay. But these opinions, and the men who utter them, are obviously inspired by the wirepullers at Peking, and do not necessarily represent any greater sincerity of con-

* Quoted from the Decree issued by Tzŭ Hsi at Hsi-An on the 28th of January 1901, proclaiming her conversion to the principles of constitutional government.

viction or public enthusiasm than the loyal sentiments professed by the same classes upon the proclamation of the Republic. The dominating feature of the situation lies in the fact that the direction of affairs is at present in the hands of the army, and that its leaders, looking to Yuan as their chief and as the sole dispenser of honours and wealth, desire his elevation to the Throne, because as Emperor his prestige amongst the instinctively conservative people must be greatly increased, and with it his opportunities of rewarding his active supporters.

From the almost indecent haste with which all sorts and conditions of office-holders and place-seekers have hastened to join the 'Chou An Hui,' and to denounce the futility of Republicanism, it is evident that the agitation for a return to the monarchical system, like all politics in China, is fundamentally a matter of loaves and fishes. In noting the apparent unanimity of public opinion which they express, and the rarity of dissentient voices, it must be borne in mind that, except in the press of the Treaty Ports, opposition has been effectively silenced by the arbitrary measures of the police and provincial authorities. Nevertheless, opposition does exist, not only amongst the revolutionary leaders and refugees in Japan, but also amongst the more conscientious and patriotic elements of Young China and amongst the orthodox Confucianists whom Yuan has endeavoured to conciliate.

The ablest and by far the most influential writer on political affairs in China to-day is Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, whose opinions on the subject of the restoration of the monarchy were published in the ' Peking Gazette ' during the month of September. His articles undoubtedly represent the views of many conservative scholars and of the numerically small but influential body of constitutional reformers. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's whole record affords striking evidence of the permanent power of the pen in China, when wielded by a scholar whose personal integrity remains unquestioned. A protégé of the great literary Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, he was one of the foremost advocates of the Reform movement in 1898, and was appointed at that date by His Majesty Kuang Hsü to assume control of a Translation Bureau for the publication of standard foreign works on political economy and natural science. After the *coup d'état* he escaped the fate of his colleagues by flight to

Japan ; there for many years he edited a newspaper which enjoyed a wide circulation. After 1900, his writings undoubtedly influenced many high officials in close touch with the Court, including Chang Chih-tung and Yuan Shih-k'ai, and from them originated much of the good advice which these Viceroys gave to Tzŭ Hsi in regard to constitutional reform.

When the revolution broke out in 1911, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao opposed the Republican movement and boldly supported Yuan's policy of retaining the Manchus on the Throne as a limited and constitutional monarchy. He returned at this period to Peking and took office as Minister of Justice in Yuan Shih-k'ai's short-lived Cabinet, just before the abdication of the Manchus. Later he became a member of the Council of State and of the Committee appointed for the re-drafting of the Constitution. In August last, realising that the agitation organised by the 'Chou An Hui' at Peking, together with the avowed policy of the military leaders, pointed to an early restoration of the monarchy, he sent in his resignation and announced his intention of retiring into private life and devoting himself to literary work. Yuan Shih-k'ai tried to dissuade him, but with his usual fearlessness, Liang proceeded to publish opinions which placed him definitely in opposition to those who advocated the creation of a new dynasty. Briefly stated, these opinions amount to the expression of his conviction that the perils of change are greater than those of retaining any existing form of government ; in other words, he opposes the restoration of the monarchy upon the same grounds that led him to oppose its abolition.

Many of Liang's arguments display the curious naïveté which distinguishes the writings of even the ablest Chinese scholars and the solemn puerility of mind in which they approach the discussion of political questions. His analysis of the causes of the successful rule of President Diaz in Mexico, for instance, reads like the work of a prize pupil at a ladies' seminary. But in spite of much irrelevant and academic theorising, he undoubtedly voices several objections against the restoration of the monarchy, which are important if only because of their appeal to the *literati*. For example, when he declares that public opinion would approve the President's accession to the Throne, 'if he had first defeated a foreign foe

'in a decisive battle' or had suppressed a great rebellion by force of arms, his argument amounts to insistence upon the observance of historical precedent. Another objection, more obviously practical, lies in his assertion that 'full recognition 'of the monarchy is not likely to be accorded to China by 'certain Powers until after the Peace Conference of Europe has 'concluded its business.' China, he declares, is busily seeking the means to secure a seat in that Conference, 'but how 'could she obtain representation if the new government had 'not been formally recognised?' Referring to Japan, he observes, that 'the country which has the loudest voice in 'our affairs is that which lies close to our elbow,' and he predicts (not without reason, as events have proved) that 'if this country has occasion to consider the question of 'recognition it will also have occasion to interfere. Even a 'little child,' he concludes, 'can foresee that Japan will not 'recognise the new government without demanding the con-'cession of further privileges, which China dare not refuse.'

Finally, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao declares that the President's oath of allegiance to the Republic, and his numerous pledges given to support its provisional constitution, cannot be put aside. Indignantly he asks, 'Is the Chou An Hui endeavouring 'to make the President forswear himself, or take refuge from 'its importunities in some foreign country?' He affects to forget that Yuan Shih-k'ai was pledged with equal solemnity to support the monarchy, and that he can plead several classical precedents for now 'bowing to the will of the people.'

Liang is on firm ground, however, when he asserts that the one thing needful for China's salvation, the reform of the country's finances and administration, will not be brought nearer by restoring the monarchy, but that, on the contrary, it is likely to be rendered more difficult by reason of the disorganisation which must accompany the change. 'A constitution 'is eminently desirable,' he says, 'but its realisation has been 'prevented in the past, not by the form of our government, 'but by the character of our officials and the general condition 'of the people.' He realises that these obstacles will not be removed with the abolition of the Republic; he therefore comes to the same conclusion which formed the basis of his advice to the Throne in 1898, namely, 'that the head of the 'State should set an example by establishing the foundation

'of constitutional government, while doing everything possible 'to educate and lead the people to take an intelligent interest 'in political questions.'

I have laid stress on the published opinions of this famous writer, not only because they are bound to influence the orthodox *literati* and to provide arguments for those who oppose Yuan's accession to the Throne on public or private grounds, but because they undoubtedly carry weight with Yuan himself. As a close student of history, he is not likely to forget how the Valedictory Protest of the Censor Wu (1879), concerning the illegitimate succession of the Emperor Kuang Hsŭ, lived and worked in the memory of scholars and officials so powerfully as to affect all the subsequent career of the Empress Dowager. He is well aware that although the army can put him on the Throne, his head must lie uneasily upon the Imperial pillow unless he can persuade the *literati* to regard and proclaim him as Emperor invested with the 'Mandate 'of Heaven.' Thus reoccupied, the Throne would resume its immemorial right to the reverence of every Orthodox Confucianist, and would be identified with the fundamental principles of ancestor-worship. Yuan's undisguised efforts to win the support of scholars like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and K'ang Yu-wei are evidence of his comprehensive grasp of the problems which beset the creation of a new dynasty.

Making all due allowance for the seriousness of these problems, the policy followed by Yuan Shih-k'ai since the abdication of the Manchus would appear on broad grounds of statesmanship to be better suited to the needs of the country than anything which has been advocated by his critics and opponents. His steadfast opposition to the chaotic medley of empty democratic forms, proclaimed as Republicanism by Sun Yat'sen and his followers, was speedily vindicated by results. The hopelessly undignified proceedings of the first Parliament of the Republic, its cheap and nasty imitations of European Radicalism, and the flagrant corruption of its demagogues, were enough in themselves to cause a general reaction in favour of the Confucian tradition and the patriarchal system of government. The pinchbeck programme of the Young China party, utterly discredited within a year of its announcement, was sufficient to convince every impartial observer that, for the present and for the immediate future, China's only

protection from the instability of a rampant democracy lay in the establishment of despotic authority in capable hands. As President, Yuan has displayed the two qualities essential for autocratic rulership in China, namely, courage and the wisdom to build upon the solid foundations of time-honoured tradition. He has acted consistently and firmly upon his conviction that progress must ever be subordinate to law and order, and that, if China is to achieve prosperity and good government, it can only be by virtue of institutions which conform to the structural character and genius of the people. In his practical recognition of this vital truth lies his chief distinction and his claim to supreme authority.

Assuming that the course of events, or his own ambition, will compel Yuan Shih-k'ai to discard his original intention of retaining the Manchu dynasty as the figure-head of a limited monarchy, and that he will allow Imperial greatness to be thrust upon him, many difficult problems must continue to confront his statecraft. In the first place, the position accorded to the Manchu Princes and to the young Emperor by the terms of the Abdication Decree (drafted under Yuan's personal direction) was unmistakably designed to provide for contingencies of reaction and to permit of the Manchus being reinstated, should occasion arise. The Court has been allowed to retain all its ancient dignities, privileges and etiquette, and has preserved the closest relations with the Presidential Palace, to the evident satisfaction of ultra-conservative mandarins.

The recent attitude of the Iron-capped Princes and other Manchu dignitaries towards the monarchical movement is somewhat difficult to explain. With the exception of the Imperial Guardian and the Emperor's Tutor they appear to have generally supported the Chou An Hui programme and the enthronement of Yuan. Prince Ching, for example, advised the Clansmen in September that they should forward a petition to the Council of State, in the name of the Imperial House, advocating the restoration of the monarchy. It is probable that, as far as the majority of the Manchu nobles are concerned, the question which has weighed with them most is the permanent security of their pensions, but it is by no means improbable that some secret arrangement has been come to between Prince Ching and Yuan Shih-k'ai to preserve the

ancient dignities and ceremonial of the Clansmen and Court. Very interesting were the negotiations, which ended in October, for the Court's removal to the Summer Palace, leaving the Forbidden City henceforward as the residence of the President ; very interesting also a memorial submitted by certain Censors at about the same time proposing that, in the event of a new dynasty being founded, the ancestral province of Feng-Tien should be restored to the Imperial Manchu house. But even more significant is the statement, made public in Peking on the 28th of November, that the sixth daughter of Yuan Shih-k'ai was on that day betrothed to the young ex-emperor, Hsüan Tung. The go-betweens were Prince P'u Lun (himself at one time lawful aspirant to the throne) and General Yin Chang, ex-Minister for War. This arrangement, typical of Yuan's statecraft, should facilitate the amicable adjustment of several delicate problems.

The fact that Yuan Shih-k'ai's authority has been upheld and the Republican régime ended, by virtue of his command of the country's military forces, presents another grave problem. No one knows better than Yuan himself that his authority over these undisciplined armies depends entirely upon his ability to retain their 'loyalty' by high pay and liberal rewards : his intimate knowledge of the economic conditions and history of China can leave him no room for doubt on this score. With the disappearance of the Manchu's prestige and central authority, the only alternative to the military dictatorship which he succeeded in establishing lay in perpetual strife between the semi-independent commanders of provincial armies, with widespread destruction of all productive industry.

Using the only materials at his command, by methods of the traditional Chinese type, he secured the unstable allegiance of generals like Chang Hsün and Tuan Chi jui, and by their aid put an end to the activities of revolutionaries, free-lances and brigands. By their aid, for the time being, he has re-established the authority of the central government and restored law and order throughout the greater part of the country. But he is fully alive to the dangers which the State must incur by allowing the civil authority to be subordinate to the military. He knows also from personal experience that every body of soldiery in China is a rebel force *in posse*,

ever avid of change because change means plunder, ever open to conspiracy, to treasons, stratagems and spoils. But Yuan learned statecraft under Tzŭ Hsi, probably the ablest exponent in Chinese history of the art of *divide et impera.* Given time and a fair share of luck, he may be expected to find means of persuading a large portion of China's ' braves ' to exchange their swords for ploughshares. It is all in his favour that the classical traditions of the public service in China permit of the conversion of high military commanders into civil dignitaries.

The danger of assassination (to which all high officials in China are exposed at the hands of Young China militant and other malcontents) is one against which Yuan Shih-k'ai has been able to protect himself successfully in the seclusion of the Forbidden City. Nevertheless, the use of bombs by conspirators of all sorts has become a chronic factor in public life, and this undoubtedly tends to create among timid officials and journalists a disposition to walk delicately and to speak smooth things. The moral effect of this political terrorism is manifested in the hesitating attitude of more than one branch of the metropolitan administration, in the utterances of the Native Press, and even in the Government's attempts to conciliate the revolutionary element by acts of amnesty and absolution.

As regards the danger of foreign intervention, Yuan Shih-k'ai has certainly estimated the risks. Judging by the reply conveyed by his Government to the representations of the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires on the 30th of October (with reference to the possibility of disturbances, following upon the restoration of the monarchy, which might prejudice Japanese interests) he would seem to believe that the Japanese Government will have less occasion and reason for interference in China's affairs under a monarchy than she has had under the republic. Has not Count Okuma declared that a return to the monarchical system is a matter for the Chinese to decide for themselves ? Yuan's attitude in this matter plainly intimates that the danger of foreign intervention is one which will not be either increased or diminished by any change in the form of China's Government. So far as the European Powers are concerned, it has been practically eliminated by the war, and as for the Japanese, recent events have clearly proved

that it is not likely to be eliminated by any arguments which China can produce, either as a monarchy or a republic.

On the other hand, Yuan Shih-k'ai is well aware that tamely to submit to foreign dictation in such a matter could not fail to diminish his authority throughout the country and to stimulate a renewal of political agitation and conspiracies by he revolutionary leaders in Japan. His attitude in this matter has been instinct with passive fatalism, of the kind which he has displayed on more than one critical occasion. If the friendly European Powers are unable or unwilling to protect China from wanton aggression, by moral suasion or otherwise, her own resources are clearly powerless to prevent it, and the future lies therefore upon the knees of the gods.

But whether under a monarchy or a republic, under despotic or under constitutional government, China must remain confronted with those deep-rooted causes of unrest which are inseparable from its existing social system and economic condition. In a former article published in this Review,* these causes were explained, together with their effects on the domestic and foreign politics of China. Space does not permit of recapitulating them here ; but it is of interest and importance to observe that the movement for the monarchical restoration is in large measure ascribable to the same economic and social causes as that which for years inspired the anti-dynastic movement of Young China, and led, by a chapter of accidents, to the proclamation of the Republic. And these same causes must continue to operate, no matter what form authority may take, precisely as they have operated for centuries, because the nation's chronic disease of disorganisation is the natural and inevitable consequence of a social and ethical system which inculcates procreative recklessness and passive helplessness.

The rapid growth of the anti-dynastic movement, from 1907 to the revolution of 1911, was undoubtedly due in great measure to the disorganisation and distress created amongst the candidates for public service after the abolition of the Confucian system of education. The old competitive system of examination in the classics, whatever its demerits, had been for centuries an important factor conducing to national cohesion and stability. After 1905, thousands of students,

* The Causes of Chinese Unrest, July 1912.

wholly or partially educated on modern lines in Japan and Europe, began to return to China, seeking admission to the public service. The failure of the Government to provide posts for them, under a reorganised system of administration, was the root cause of Young China's restless conspiracies. At the same time, the *literati* of the old régime, whose livelihood was in jeopardy, became severely shaken in their loyalty to the Throne; thousands of 'expectant' officials in the provinces, finding themselves condemned to a life of obscure poverty, swelled the ranks of the malcontents, and the Government was thus left practically without supporters among the younger and more ambitious aspirants to public office. Had the Manchus followed a policy of *divide et impera*, setting one class of aspirant against another, creating finely-matched forces of 'Ins' and 'Outs,' the revolutionary movement might well have been checked in its earlier stages.

Just as the fundamental problem of existence amongst the teeming masses of the population lies in trying to fill two stomachs from one bowl of rice, even so economic pressure manifests itself in the higher strata of society, by producing a great cloud of candidates for every public post. Under the old classical system, those who were turned empty away became a band of Hope under the title of Expectants—an ever scheming, ever hungry horde of place-seekers; more philosophically patient than Young China, because of the ethical restraints of Confucianism, but nevertheless a constant factor of unrest. During the brief period of Young China's triumph, the men of the old régime had nothing more to hope for; the classics had been utterly overwhelmed by the rush of Western learning in top hats and frock coats. But gradually, as Yuan Shih-k'ai's hand became strengthened and as the Confucian system recovered its ancient pride of place, the problem of the unemployed or expectant official began to assume features very similar to those of the pre-revolutionary period.

According to the 'Peking Gazette,' there are some fifty thousand expectant officials who have qualified for office under the system of examinations which has grown up, in desultory and indeterminate fashion, since the revolution. These men have been opposed to the Republican régime, if only because it held out to them no prospect of immediate employment; they might gain, and had nothing to lose in

any case, by a change in the form of government. Hence the eagerness of the very men who acclaimed the abolition of the monarchy to make themselves as conspicuous as possible in advocating its restoration. Pending a radical reorganisation of the public service, the ' expectant ' class must continue to be a source of agitation, disaffection and intrigue.

It is also to effective reorganisation of the public service, in the hands of the best men available, that the ruler of China must look to secure from the provinces regular revenues sufficient to meet the expenses of government (greatly increased by Yuan's obligations to the army), as well as the heavy burden of the nation's foreign debt. The excellent results achieved during the past two years in the reorganisation of the Salt Collectorate, under the expert direction of Sir Richard Dane, justify the belief that Yuan Shih-k'ai not only realises the necessities of the financial situation, but that he will be able in time to evolve the machinery to cope with them. China can only be saved from bankruptcy and partition by the systematic development of her own economic resources, and by the provision of revenues sufficient to enable the Central Government to pay its way without further recourse to foreign loans.

It remains to be seen whether as Emperor Yuan Shih-k'ai can carry out this stupendous task. Opinions may differ as to the capacity of the present generation of mandarins to produce the necessary qualities of personal honesty and intelligent patriotism; but the consensus of opinion is undoubtedly general and justified, that Yuan Shih-k'ai is the only national leader capable of putting an end to the devastation of civil strife and of directing the forces of reorganisation. And this being so, the mind of the masses regards his accession to the Throne as perfectly natural and proper. After the misery and disillusion of the revolutionary strife, the Mandate of Heaven is rightly given to the Strong Man. Should he fail in strength or wisdom, Heaven will take it from him again. Such is the philosophy of the Chinese, bred in them by the accumulated experience of centuries.

J. O. P. Bland.

LUXEMBURG AND THE WAR

I ARRIVED in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg about three weeks before the outbreak of the war, and stayed there, in a country-place outside the main track of the military movements, until the end of October 1914. My movements were restricted. The Trier Commandant decreed that I must not wander beyond a radius of three kilomètres from my hotel, and I made very few and only quite unimportant attempts to evade the edict ; but that mattered little. Though I could not go about looking for news, plenty of news was brought to me, and also plenty of rumours, plenty of gossip, and plenty of criticism of the invader.

There are many reasons why the Luxemburgers might have been expected to sympathise with the Germans. Included in the Zollverein, they do most of their trade with Germany. Though they belong to the Latin Monetary Union, they transact most of their business with German currency. The *patois* which they commonly speak, even in the best circles, has close affinities with the German language. Their hotels flourish on the support of German tourists. Many Germans have settled in their towns, and many of their daughters are married to Germans. And yet they do not like the Germans, and have never liked them. Before the war it was a case of

> 'I do not love thee, Dr. Fell,
> The reason why I cannot tell ;
> But this alone I know full well,
> I do not love thee, Dr. Fell.'

After a week of war, the dislike had grown to loathing, and the reasons for the sentiment were obvious to all.

During the whole of my stay in the Grand Duchy, I met only one man—a small shopkeeper—who frankly avowed a desire to see his country incorporated in the German Empire. 'We 'should like,' he said, 'to remain a Grand Duchy, like Baden ; 'but we already have all the inconveniences of inclusion in 'the Empire, and we may as well have the advantages also.' But that man was a lunatic and a liar. I judged that, not only

from the significant way in which his neighbours tapped their foreheads when referring to him, but also from his own conversation.

Apart from this one small tradesman, all the Luxemburgers whom I met, to whatever class of society they belonged, detested the Germans. Or rather, to be strictly accurate, they detested the Prussians. Germans other than Prussians were vague figures whom they hardly visualised; but the figure of the Prussian was at once definite and odious to them—equally definite and equally odious to every Luxemburger from peasant to Prime Minister.

It was the Prime Minister himself—M. Eyschen, whose recent death, probably hastened by Prussian vexations, is a great loss to his country—who summed them up in the most vigorous language. A foreigner belonging to one of the Allied Countries had asked M. Eyschen's advice and help in some matter of business which would have to pass through the hands of the Prussian military authorities. The advice given was to let the business slide and do nothing which would attract the attention of the Prussians,—*ne pas les mettre en éveil.* And then followed the criticism: *'Vous connaissez cette mentalité prussienne. 'Je n'ai pas besoin, je suppose, de vous renseigner là-dessus. 'Ils sont capables de n' importe quelle cochonnerie pour gagner 'la partie.'*

They are; they have proved it in the Grand Duchy, in small matters as well as great; and it might be hard to say whether their grosser offences or their trivial acts of arrogance and bad taste have left the greater bitterness behind them. Intense indignation was felt at the action of a member of the House of Metternich who, after having been billeted on one of the leading citizens of Diekirch and regaled on the best wine in the cellars, went away without paying his bill, leaving on the dining-room table his visiting card, bearing the message: 'Thanks for your kind hospitality. God will reward you for 'it.'

One could multiply anecdotes of the kind, but these will suffice for the moment. They show what the feeling was, and they bear out, in their way, the statement which I heard that, if they had had an army of even ten thousand men, the Luxemburgers would have blown up their bridges, blown in

their tunnels, and defied the Germans to come on. Having no army at all in the proper sense of the word, but only a Palace Guard and a military band, they could, of course, do nothing of the kind ; and that is how they escaped the fate of the Belgians. But they had no illusions—no faith whatever in the plighted word of the King of Prussia ; and they did not scruple to say so during the exciting days of the diplomatic preliminaries. They trusted the French, but the Germans they did not trust. 'If there is war,' they said, 'the Ger-'mans will attack France through Luxemburg. The Prince 'Henri railway line is a German line, and we all know why the 'Germans built it.' The one thing which they did not foresee was the rapidity of German action. They are themselves a leisurely people, as becomes a race given over to the cultivation of roses ; and they did not realise all that an *attaque brusquée* might mean. They pictured the German army concentrating, as well as mobilising, on German soil ; and, in spite of their foresight, they were, in the end, taken by surprise, believing, even after the declaration of the *Kriegszustand*, that they would still have a few days' respite.

I thought so too ; and, as I was an invalid, only partially convalescent from an unpleasant illness, I did not hurry to get away. That is how it happened that, living close to the frontier, I actually trod German soil, for a few minutes, after the *Kriegszustand* had been proclaimed, and might very possibly have been caught and detained there if I had not kept my eyes open.

As I was in the heart of the country, there was little to be seen. A few peasants were standing in a devotional attitude by the roadside, singing *Die Wacht am Rhein* ; but there was no danger of molestation from them. They were ignorant people who hardly understood, as yet, who was the enemy, or what the excitement was about. Presently, however, I saw the glittering helmet of a corpulent gendarme who was toiling laboriously up the hill on a bicycle ; and it seemed wiser to retire towards the frontier as he approached. As he drew near he gave me a significant look, which was probably meant as a good-natured warning. Interpreting it as such, I walked a few yards and so reached neutral ground ; and then the gendarme gravely descended from his bicycle, and, with equal gravity, drew a steel chain across the road between him and me.

That was the formal closing of the frontier—a ceremony simultaneously performed on all the roads entering the Grand Duchy from Prussia. A party of Luxemburg citizens who had been motoring that afternoon in Prussia had difficulties on their return. Their car was taken from them at the frontier, and they had to complete their journey on foot.

That was on the Friday. On the Saturday night we heard a report that a Prussian detachment had entered the Grand Duchy, somewhere further to the north, but we could not ascertain whether the rumour was true or false. At about ten o'clock on the Sunday morning the veil was lifted, and we knew what we were in for ; excited messengers running up the street with the news : *' Les Prussiens sont à la gare de Luxembourg.'* This at a time when quite a number of tourists were on the hotel terrace, waiting for conveyances which would take them to Luxemburg, *en route* for France and Belgium. A good many of them started in spite of the obstruction. Those who were bound for Belgium got through, though they had to leave their luggage on the frontier. Those who were bound for France got as far as Luxemburg, but could get no further. I was one of the few who stayed behind ; and that is how I came to know rather more than is generally known in England about the Prussian invasion and occupation of Luxemburg.

It turned out to be true that the invasion had begun on the Saturday evening. A Prussian detachment had, in fact, appeared at the railway station of Trois Vierges, called in German Ulflingen, torn up a little of the line, and demanded the surrender of the telegraphic apparatus ; and so the first act of war had been committed. The invasion in force, and the occupation of the capital, had been delayed until the small hours of the Sunday morning. It had evidently been intended to confront the Luxemburgers with a *fait accompli* when they came down to breakfast ; but that object was not achieved. Somebody telephoned from Wasserbillig ; presumably other people telephoned from other stations. At any rate, it became known that an armoured train was on its way from Trier, and that a stream of Prussian soldiers in motors, on motor-cycles, and on bicycles, was pouring along the high road in the dark. Luxemburg had to make up its mind in a hurry how to act.

Mr. Buchan, in his history of the war, states that ' the Grand ' Duchess motored up and wheeled her car across the roadway,

'but she was bidden to go home, and her chauffeur was com-
'pelled to turn. One of the Ministers of State made a formal
'protest, which was greeted with laughter.' The story told on the spot was somewhat different. Two of the officers of the little Luxemburg army, it was stated, were hurriedly sent out with written protests; one of them to meet the motorists, and the other to meet the train. The officer who met the motorists had no chance even of reading his protest; a revolver was pointed at him, and he was told to get out of the way. The protest of the officer who met the train was ignored; he was left reading it while the Prussian officer, who had not even returned his salute, proceeded to take possession of the Post Office.

To get there, he had to traverse the famous Pont Adolf; and it was on that bridge that the Luxemburgers had erected their one and only barricade. The English legend has it that there again they encountered the Grand Duchess in her motor; but, as a matter of fact, the barricade consisted of a prison van of the sort known in France as *panier-à-salade* and in England as 'Black Maria,' drawn across the road, with a gendarme standing at each end of it. The gendarmes, being able-bodied men, made themselves useful in removing the 'Black Maria.' They served, and could serve, no other purpose; and they were threatened with instant death if they did not obey. The course thus cleared, there was no longer even a show of resistance; and the invaders did what seemed good to them, making haste to issue two proclamations, of which the second gave the lie to the first.

The first proclamation was to the effect that they had only entered the Grand Duchy for the purpose of protecting the railway lines from the French; the second set forth that they found themselves compelled to proceed to the military occupation of the Grand Duchy. There was a further announcement that full compensation would be given for all damage done, and that all goods requisitioned would be paid for in cash; but neither promise has so far been fulfilled. As regards the damage, there has only been a scandalously inadequate payment on account; while it was roughly computed that, of the goods requisitioned, only one-third were paid for in cash. For a further third, it was said, receipts were given, and the rest was simply appropriated without acknowledg-

ment. Nor was the manner of the military occupation tempered by consideration for the rights and dignities of the citizens. Soldiers were billeted on them whether they wished it or not. Emplacements for guns were dug in their vegetable gardens, and their orchards were destroyed because they obstructed the line of fire. Their army was confined to its own barracks, and a number of prominent men were arrested.

And not only arrested, but treated badly. I conversed with some of them after their release and heard their stories. They were taken to Trier in circumstances which led the Trier populace to believe that they were convicted spies, with the result that they were followed through the streets of Trier by a mob howling for their blood, and felt relieved when the prison door closed on them. In the prison itself they were treated, not as respectable persons whom it was unfortunately necessary to detain as a measure of military precaution, but as criminals, placed in solitary confinement, provided only with the ordinary prison fare, and required to clean their own cells ; when they were let go, as no charge could be brought home to them, they were offered neither compensation nor apology. The record is a damning one, fully bearing out the Prime Minister's estimate of the Prussian character : *' Ce sont ' les derniers des cochons.'*

Meanwhile the army was pouring into the Grand Duchy, and pouring out again in the directions of Belgium and France. War had not yet been declared when the military occupation began ; and some days elapsed before we, in the country, knew for certain whether war was actually being waged or not. The negotiations were still, so far as we could tell, proceeding ; and we clung to the hope that a satisfactory result would come of them. At last, however, we got the truth from a staff officer —a fat little man with enormous goggles who came into the hotel garden and called for beer and cigars. Our landlady stood beside him while he imbibed, and told him what was in our minds. It was as though lightning flashed at her through his goggles. *' Nein, es ist los,'* he said ferociously ; and then we knew where we were, and waited to see what would happen next. But nothing in particular happened, except that we heard a good deal about the movements of the troops, and had opportunities of quiet conversation with a good many of the soldiers who were stationed in our village, or passed through it.

Most of them belonged to the *Landwehr*, and came from villages in the immediate neighbourhood, assembled in such haste that comparatively few of them were even in uniform; the others merely wearing forage caps and having white badges stitched to the sleeves of their mufti. There were many of them who had friends, and even relatives, in our community; so that the atmosphere, as yet, was hardly the atmosphere of war. Both their behaviour and their reception were friendly, and cordial greetings were exchanged. They belonged to the class which has everything to lose and nothing to gain from war, and they knew it, and, being among friends, did not scruple to say so. They had no quarrel with the French, they said,—none whatever; and their mental equipment, of course, owed nothing to the writings of Treitschke and Bernhardi. So far as they had any ideas at all about the origin of the quarrel, they vaguely believed that Russia had begun it; and they were frankly appalled by all that they had heard about the magnitude of the struggle. I discussed the matter myself with three lumbering peasants who came into the café for beer, and were quite willing that an enemy should treat them. Their reluctance to leave their own families was much greater than their desire to bring trouble to other families in other lands. They blamed those whom they called *die Regierungsleute*; and they exclaimed, with looks of apprehension, and even horror: '*Es ist ein Weltkrieg; es ist schrecklich.*'

Nor was it only among these local peasants that one found the war unpopular. Several batteries of Saxon artillery passed, one day, up our village street, and were allowed to halt for half an hour and refresh themselves. To most of them refreshments were carried out on trays; but a considerable number of the bolder of them penetrated into the kitchen of our hotel, and made rather a long stay there. We naturally inquired afterwards what they had done and said. Their talk, it seemed, had been, not of glory and conquest, but of their distress at leaving wives and children whom they hardly expected to see again. They had given vent to their emotions to the extent of weeping on the shoulders of the cook—one gallant Saxon head on each shoulder of the comely and sympathetic Luxembourgeoise, while other Saxon warriors stood *en queue* awaiting their turn to pour out the tale of their

fears and sorrows in the same privileged position. Nothing could have been less like an arrogant progress of bloodthirsty barbarians ; and one would fain hope that none of these men were at Louvain, or Aerschot, or Dinant, and that some at least of them will get home safely.

Their half-hour passed, however, and they moved on. The place was once more quiet, for the garrison guarding our bridge made no disturbance ; and we once more lived under the menace of the unknown, waiting for the news which did not come, and filling up the deep gaps in our information with gossip and rumours : gossip about individuals, and rumours about the progress of the campaign.

On some matters we possessed information which would have been exceedingly valuable in England at the time if only we could have conveyed it there and gained credence for it. From Mr. Buchan's 'History' I gather that England is still uncertain as to the task assigned to the Imperial Guard ; we, in the Grand Duchy, knew that the Imperial Guard had passed through Luxemburg with the Crown Prince's army, to attack Longwy and Verdun. In England, again, it does not seem to have been known, until rather late, how large was the German army sweeping through Belgium ; we in the Grand Duchy formed an estimate, from information received, which coincided almost exactly with the eventual English computation. We heard, moreover, of the passing of the German marines through Malmédy, some days before their presence was remarked at the front. If only, therefore, I could have flown to the British Headquarters on an airplane, I could have told things worth telling. But our knowledge was only of the things which were likely to happen. Of the things which had happened or were happening we were kept in ignorance ; and it was only by accident that we now and then picked up an item which deserves, but has not yet found, a place in grave chronicles of military operations. The one salient case which I recall relates to a brilliant exploit achieved by certain French franc-tireurs, to whom Mr. Buchan pays homage thus :

'In the retreat from the Meuse a body of 400 French riflemen —probably from Langle's 4th army—were cut off on the east bank of the river. They had with them a million cartridges, and with this ammunition they managed to reach a sanctuary in the southern hills. There they remained, and speedily became the

terror of the German invaders. Fed by the country people, they waged guerilla warfare upon German detachments, and did enormous execution. With their excellent marksmanship they picked off the enemy at long range, and in spite of a price on their heads and desperate efforts at capture, they lived securely in their mountain fastnesses. Some day, it is to be hoped, a second Michelet will tell the tale of their bold adventure, or a new Dumas weave it into a breathless romance.'

The fame of those riflemen reached Luxemburg; and Luxemburg knew all the particulars of their greatest *coup*—a *coup* well worthy of the pen of a Michelet or a Dumas. They actually put the Kaiser himself to flight, and were within an ace of killing or capturing him.

The Kaiser's headquarters had, for a long time, been established at Luxemburg, where, to his great annoyance, no citizen ever saluted him in the street, and no shopkeeper tried to grow rich by pushing the sale of his portrait. At last, he made up his mind to remove to Charleville; and his departure was attended by all the proper pomp and ceremony. He sent a sum of money—grossly inadequate in the view of the critics of such proceedings—to the municipality, for distribution among the poor, though he probably did not overhear the scornful comment: '*Sans doute il en a plus besoin que nous.*' He paid a farewell visit to the Grand Duchess, on whom he was rather fond of forcing his society, and left a magnificent bouquet with her. Meanwhile, his apartments had been dismantled, and his luggage had been packed; and he set out with his Tirpitz and his von Moltke, and the rest of his staff—an impressive procession of some forty gorgeous motors.

Luxemburg breathed freely, believing that it had seen the last of him; but when Luxemburg came down to breakfast the next morning it discovered, to its amazement, that he was still there—or, rather, that he had returned in the small hours of the morning. But he had by no means returned in the condition in which he had set out. He had left a good many little things behind him—a good deal of baggage, a good many cars, and a good many members of his staff—and most of the cars which he had brought back bore the marks of bullets. Naturally Luxemburg was inquisitive; and presently, through the post-prandial indiscretions of officers in the cafés, the truth came out. The franc-tireurs had known that the Kaiser was coming, and had prepared an ambuscade for him. He

had unsuspectingly run into it ; he had been under fire. There had been casualties—killed, wounded, and missing ; and it was by the merest accident that his own name had failed to figure in the list. If only the bullet had found its proper billet, the whole history of the war might have been different.

So far as military history is concerned, that is my one bit of exclusive information ; but the rumours and the gossip are also interesting. And the rumours were really wonderful ; though the Germans had only themselves to thank for our readiness to give credence to any wild report to the disadvantage of their arms.

Nowadays their official bulletins seem fairly accurate. Like all official bulletins, they have to be discounted ; but the rate of discount is not abnormally high. At the beginning, however, it was different. The invincibility of the German army was then an article of faith, and truth was freely sacrificed to the determination to keep the belief in being as long as possible. So we caught the High Command out in two very grave equivocations. They announced that Liège had been taken at a time when, though the town itself had been rushed, all the forts were still resisting ; and they announced the result of the battle of the Marne in the following misleading language :

' The news having been brought in by one of our airplane scouts that superior forces of the enemy were approaching from the West, our right wing has been withdrawn.'

The phrasing may have deceived Germany, but it certainly did not deceive Luxemburg. ' Hullo ! They've been beaten, ' have they ? ' was the comment of the citizen of Luxemburg who showed me the announcement ; and after that we had more faith in any extravagant legend than in the official news. We preferred, for instance, the story brought by a French prisoner of war who, passing through the Luxemburg railway station, thrust his head out of the carriage window, and bawled, before his custodians could stop him : ' *Vous êtes* ' *trop peureux, vous autres Luxembourgeois. Les choses* ' *marcheront très bien. Le drapeau français flotte à Mulhouse,* ' *à Schlettstadt, et à Colmar.*' And, of course, we soon had our own version of the battle of the Marne. Von Bülow, we were assured, had there lost 160,000 prisoners, and had then himself surrendered to Private Rousseau of the Belgian army.

And then there was the rumour that the Russians were in Berlin, and the rumour that the French were on the point of taking Metz. That was the most circumstantial of all the rumours; for it came at a time when we daily heard the distant thunder of the guns, and it came in instalments with the cumulative effect of a sensational serial story. The French have taken one of the forts of Metz; the French have taken two of the forts of Metz; the French have taken three of the forts of Metz; the French are bombarding Metz; the Metz railway station is in flames. 'In a fortnight or so,' said one of my friends, 'Metz will be a French town, and then I shall 'be able to go there and collect a debt.' But then followed the anticlimax. 'How about Metz?' I asked my friend on the following day. 'Well,' he replied, 'a commercial 'traveller has just arrived from Metz to sell apples, and he 'says that everything is quiet there.'

So that rumour went the way of all rumours; but other rumours succeeded it. There was the rumour of the Russian army imported from Archangel,—a rumour which actually reached us by airplane, descending from the skies in the shape of a written message from Captain Aubry to the citizens of Luxemburg, exhorting them to be of good courage because the said Russians, together with the British Marines and a contingent from Canada, had landed in Belgium, and had almost reached Namur. This arrived at a time when, as a matter of fact, the German Marines were marching through Malmédy to commence the siege of Antwerp. So our hopes were once more shattered, after running so high that we actually organised a sweep-stake—the pool to be taken by the fortunate man who drew the day on which our own village garrison was withdrawn.

Of course, too, we got rumours of German, as well as French and British, successes. Belfort had been taken; the German fleet had come out to give battle, and had sunk fourteen British dreadnoughts. The enemy's rumours, it was clear, were not less subject to inaccuracies of detail than ours. In so far as they related to events alleged to have occurred at a distance, both our rumours and theirs are only worth citing as psychological curiosities. It is only in connexion with the occurrences in our immediate vicinity that we lighted upon the *petits faits vrais* which form instructive footnotes to history.

There was, for instance, an abundance of *petits faits vrais* illustrative of German arrogance and bad manners. At Diekirch, where officers and soldiers were billeted in the houses of leading citizens, they ruined many drawing-room suites by dragging them out into the gardens and there sprawling on them. In the hospitals they tried to coerce the Luxemburg doctors who had volunteered to help them into neglecting the French wounded in order to give first attention to their own; while they endeavoured to confiscate for the exclusive use of their own wounded all the soup which philanthropic women had prepared for the wounded of all nationalities. They arrested the Diekirch station-master for no other reason than that he had avowed himself a Socialist. Anywhere and everywhere their officers hustled Luxemburg citizens out of their way, just as they had been accustomed to hustle civilians off the pavement at Berlin. A Luxemburg member of Parliament who was hurrying to some important appointment in his motor once politely asked a German lieutenant, whose car was standing still in the middle of a narrow road, if he would be so very kind as to allow him to pass. The lieutenant turned on him with an insolent stare, and answered, '*Haltet den Maul*'—which is the precise German equivalent of the English 'Hold your jaw.' Hearing these stories, one was not surprised to hear further that the word 'Prussian' had, from time immemorial, been a term of abuse in Luxemburg—that naughty children were commonly called 'Prussians,' much as in England they are sometimes called 'young Turks'; and that even a real Prussian generally lost his temper if a stranger saluted him as *Preuss*, because he knew what qualities the appellative connoted.

If the Germans were arrogant, however, they were also exceedingly thick-skinned, and a good many sharp lessons had to be given to them in a quiet way before they realised how cordially the Luxemburgers disliked them. The Kaiser, as I have mentioned, could not understand their refusal to be dazzled by his presence, and the determined way in which they ignored his existence when he walked abroad. Another thorn in the flesh was the boycotting of the concerts given by the German military bands; but the unkindest cut of all was the attitude of the Luxemburg ladies towards the proposal that they should form Red Cross Societies.

In my own neighbourhood, at all events, the plan was

launched under favourable auspices. The Catholic clergy—secret adherents, a good many of them, of the Blue Blacks—supported it ; the doctor, having a German wife—a boisterous lady, firmly convinced that the German Emperor would soon be Emperor of Europe—was willing to give up a portion of his time to the work. A resident German lady—the widow of a high German functionary—went round the village canvassing, talking of *Barmseligkeit,* and pointing out that there were sure to be lots of French, British, and Belgian prisoners who, no less than the Germans, would need attention. A building was selected as a hospital ; classes of instruction for the volunteer helpers were organised ; a public meeting was called ; appropriate humanitarian speeches were made. And then, while we were all looking out for our first consignment of wounded, the scheme collapsed.

We wondered why, and presently we found out. It appeared that, when the appeal for recruits was addressed to the meeting, a lady had risen and offered her services for the nursing of French, British, and Belgian wounded only. It further appeared that this lady's proposal had expressed the general sense of the meeting ; that several other ladies had mustered sufficient courage to hedge their offers of service with the same invidious restriction ; and that absolutely no lady present, with the exception of those of German birth, was willing to work for the Red Cross unless she were allowed to pick and choose the nationality of her patients. The Prussians had made the mess, and the Prussians might clear it up—that was the general sentiment ; and as the Prussians could only get the ladies of the neighbourhood to conduct a hospital for them on those lines, they naturally preferred to dispense altogether with their assistance.

In the capital, I believe, some of the ladies did help in the hospitals, but not by any means without friction. An attempt was made to assign them to German wards, leaving the French and Belgians to the care of German nurses who could not speak their language ; but that refinement of cruelty was not accepted. The Luxemburg ladies got their way by threatening their resignation ; and after that they found, of course, many opportunities of manifesting their sympathies, with the result that many interesting hospital anecdotes filtered through to us. One of them related to the visit paid to the hospital by the

Kaiserin, who left a flower on the bed of every sufferer—to the intense disgust of the French wounded, who knew how the German soldiers had ravaged their homes in flagrant violation of the laws of war. They tossed the flowers indignantly on to the floor, and the Luxemburg nurse consoled them. 'Never 'mind,' she said. 'I'll get a dust-pan and a brush, and we'll 'soon have that rubbish out of the way.'

Another story of a very different character came from a provisional ward in which French and German wounded were lying side by side. There was a Frenchman there who had a smattering of German, placed next to a German who had a smattering of French; and there was a Luxemburger present who spoke both languages. The time was just after the defeat which had induced the Crown Prince, as M. Jean Richepin put it in the *Journal*, to 'hide his bleeding hinder 'parts behind the walls of Metz.' The German was muttering. He had, or thought he had, some news, and the Frenchman wanted to hear it. 'What is he saying?' he inquired. 'He 'says,' replied the Luxemburger, 'that they have taken Verdun.' 'Muck!' exclaimed the Frenchman incredulously; and then it was the German's turn to be arrogant and disdainful. He gesticulated proudly and exclaimed: '*Ja, das auch haben* '*wir genommen.*'

Enough of hospital stories; other gossip claims our attention. One can, of course, no more guarantee all the gossip than one can guarantee all the rumours; but it reflects the atmosphere, and one feels that there is truth in it as surely as there is alcohol in a glass of punch. Presumably it was not for nothing that two sisters in whose society the Crown Prince passed a great deal of his time in the Grand Duchy were known, through a pun on their names, as *Die Kahn-Prinzessinen*; and it is at any rate certain that Luxemburg regarded the Crown Prince, not as a martial hero, but as a grotesque Don Juan. At the time when he was supposed to be besieging either Longwy or Verdun, he was actually at Esch, where he lounged with his legs hanging out of the window of his residence, occasionally descending, or so it was reported, to brush up the whiskers of his orderlies with the vacuum cleaner attached to his motor car. If Luxemburg hated the Prussians collectively, its hatred for this particular Prussian was powerfully tinctured with contempt.

Luxemburg, again, was easily persuaded that the German army was disaffected and nervous ; and of both facts there was a certain amount of evidence. Two minor panics occurred in the Grand Duchy to my own knowledge. One took place on the outskirts of the capital, where, one dark night, officers were galloping wildly up and down the roads, calling to all the peasants : ' We hear that the French are coming. ' Where are they ? Have you seen them ? ' The scene of the other was Diekirch, where the sudden arrival of a new body of troops threw the whole garrison into consternation. They were Landsturm rigged out in eighteenth-century uniforms taken from a military museum, and looking as if they had stepped straight out of a pantomime or a comic opera. The regulars, not recognising their uniforms, very nearly fired on them, though an officer, taking, as he supposed, his life in his hands, galloped out to them, shouting ' Hullo ! What ' soldiers are you ? ' and so averted the catastrophe. At the same time any number of harmless citizens were arrested and charged with signalling to the enemy ; among them two little girls who had been inspecting the German general through coloured glasses.

The disaffection stories were mostly stories of the extraction of German bullets from the bodies of German officers ; it was one of the disadvantages of allowing Luxemburg surgeons to help in the hospitals that incidents of the kind attained publicity. The probability of their truth was strengthened by the fact that some German soldiers, being on friendly terms with the Luxemburgers, confided to them that it was their fixed resolve to shoot their officers as soon as the confusion of battle gave them a chance, Moreover, we heard a good deal of the disaffection of the Bavarians, due, it was said, to their reluctance to fight against the Queen of the Belgians, who was a Bavarian Princess. Certainly there was no truth in the report which reached us that 40,000 Bavarians had surrendered, bag and baggage, without fighting, to the French ; but it was no less certainly true that a small party of degraded Bavarian officers were marched through the streets of Luxemburg with their hands tied behind their backs. That spectacle assuredly was not arranged merely for the entertainment of the Luxemburgers ; something, it was obvious, had happened. And we had further proof that the war was not

equally popular with all those who were waging it in the suicide of a German colonel at Diekirch. For days he had been heard muttering his comments on 'Germany's unrighteous 'war.' Then, one morning, he failed to come down to breakfast; and when his room was entered it was found that he had blown his brains out during the night.

These things, of course, are trifles—even in war-time life behind the front continues to be made up of trifles; but it must not be supposed that it was solely on the trifles that the Luxemburgers concentrated their attention. If they chuckled over every story of German discomfiture, they also looked before and after and speculated as to the future of their country. Before the war, there were a few among them who questioned the value of their political isolation, saying that 'small countries have small ideas'; but that sentiment did not survive the outbreak of war, and was never very widespread. The general feeling was expressed in the refrain of the national anthem: 'We want to remain what 'we are.' The sincerity of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's announcement that he had done Luxemburg a wrong for which he meant to make full reparation may perhaps be gauged from the fact that the singing of that song was forbidden. The suppression of it was certainly one of the things that made the Luxemburgers most indignant; and it was also a grievance with them that none of the guarantors of the Neutrality Treaty of 1867 had instantly flown to arms when the neutrality was violated. Their *amour-propre* was a little hurt at the thought that the cause of Belgium had been taken up so much more promptly than theirs; and they wondered whether their rights would be as safe as those of the Belgians in the hands of the Allies.

It was gratifying, at any rate, to find them confident that the Allies would have the last word in this matter. Never, after the check at the Marne, did I find any doubt in Luxemburg that Germany would ultimately be beaten. The soldiers who returned from the front brought with them more tales of carnage than of victory; and that impressed the uneducated. The educated had reasoned the matter out. They were equally convinced that it would be a long business and that Germany would eventually be worn down. It was on that assumption that they used to ask me: 'What will happen to

'us after it is over? Shall we be allowed to remain what we 'are?' I said that I knew of no reason why they should not. I promised to plead their cause when the proper moment arrived. But I also asked their own views of the matter—their own appreciation of the alternatives to remaining what they were. I put the question to a good many of them, and the answer was always pretty much the same.

Luxemburg, I gathered, is much more loyal to itself and its traditions than to its reigning dynasty. It accepts Grand Dukes and Grand Duchesses, but the enthusiasm with which it accepts them is strictly regulated by their individual merits. The present Grand Duchess is much admired for her beauty, and liked for her gracious manners, but—there are at least two important 'buts.' She is believed to be under clerical influence, and that does not suit the advanced politicians. She was believed, before the war, to be under Prussian influence; and there was a good deal of complaint that too many Prussians occupied positions at her Court. In Luxemburg, as in the Balkans, and perhaps in Holland, it seems to have been a part of the Kaiser's policy to get a potentate in his pocket and so control the destinies of a nation: a policy in which he possesses a great advantage over all possible competitors in the fact that innumerable Catholic as well as Protestant princes are prepared to reign or marry at his bidding and in his interest. The policy did not succeed in Luxemburg—no critic of the Grand Duchess suggests that; but there was an apprehension, at one time, that it might succeed—a feeling that the Grand Duchess was, in a general way, 'too fond of Prussians,' and would very likely end by marrying a Prussian prince. The Kaiser, according to popular rumour, has not yet abandoned the hope that she may do so, and has proposed a member of his own family as a suitor for her hand; but there is no chance whatever of his getting his way. The Grand Duchess—I once more quote popular rumour—says that she would sooner end her days in a nunnery than accept the hand of a Hohenzollern; and if she did contract such a marriage she would infallibly lose her throne as soon as Luxemburg was free to take it from her. Such loyalty as would prevent such a proceeding does not exist in Luxemburg. Loyalty there means loyalty to the State, not loyalty to any given ruler of the State.

The former kind of loyalty, however, is intense. Luxemburg is very proud of itself as a land of successful social experiments. It claims to have coped with the more pressing problems of poverty, resisted the evils of industrialism, and developed an admirable system of education. It is also very proud of its history, about which native men of learning write many monographs; one such monograph, by my friend Herr René Engelmann, relating how Victor Hugo sought sanctuary at Vianden in the early days of the Franco-German war of 1870, lies before me as I write. On the whole, therefore, one may say that the essential factors of nationality are present in Luxemburg and the Luxemburgers certainly have the feeling and pride of nationality. At the same time the Kaiser's contempt for his own honour has somewhat shaken their faith in the value of guarantees of neutrality; so that a talk with them about their future was apt to run on the following lines:

'We would prefer, of course, if possible, to remain what we 'are.'

'I know. It may be possible. In fact I see no reason why 'it should not be. But if there must be a change—if you must, 'for your own protection, be included in some larger political 'unity . . . ?'

'Not in Germany, at any rate. You know how the Prussians 'treat the Poles, the Danes, the Alsatians. Why should they 'be likely to treat us differently?'

'In France, then?'

'That would be more tolerable. The French are sympa-'thetic. We get on very well with them. Still we feel that 'our national identity would soon be lost in France; and that 'is what we want to avoid.'

'Would the same objection apply to union with Belgium?'

'A little, perhaps, but certainly not to the same extent. 'We and the Belgians are very good friends; we have much of 'our history in common. Moreover, Belgium is small, and is 'already a nation of conglomerates. We resemble the Walloons 'quite as much as the Walloons resemble the Flemish. We 'should not feel that we lost our identity in joining them. 'We could join on equal terms—terms which would preserve 'our characteristic institutions. The Germans of Malmédy and 'Moresnet might be glad to be taken in with us; they are 'Walloons and speak French.'

'Then the matter has been discussed?'

'I don't know whether it has been discussed in official circles, 'but some of us have spoken about it among ourselves.'

So I heard people talk; but it seems premature to express any opinion as to the propriety of the proposed solution of the problem raised. The fact that some prominent Luxemburg nationals were among the victims of German barbarism—and the Luxemburgers do not hesitate to call it 'barbarism'—at Louvain may or may not be a point in its favour; but there is one further link between the peoples of Belgium and Luxemburg to which it is worth while calling attention. In both countries there were, before the war, a great number of fanatical clericals; and in both countries these clericals have been first discredited and then converted by the course of events. The clearing out of the Congregations from France did, at one time, provoke a certain amount of pro-German sentiment in both countries; and the Luxemburgers know perfectly well that the clerical party in Belgium was responsible for the neglect of the national defences. If there had been no 'frightfulness' the pro-Germanism might have died hard. As the result of 'frightfulness' it died a sudden death; for clerical opinion is made by clergymen, and clergymen naturally take the line that the expulsion of nuns, however reprehensible, is a venial offence compared with the arrest of parish priests as hostages, to be murdered if certain acts are committed by parishioners over whom they have no control, and who, very likely, do not even go to mass.

In the two countries, therefore, there seems to be increasing unanimity upon two propositions: the first, that the Germans are as impious as they are underbred; the second, that a clerical government is a standing menace to the State. Agreement upon these points would certainly make for harmony in any future political collaboration.

FRANCIS GRIBBLE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUMPTUARY IDEALS

1. **The Tudor Sumptuary Laws.** By WILFRID HOOPER. 'English Historical Review.' July 1915.
2. **The History of the Worshipful Company of the Drapers of London.** Edited by A. H. JOHNSON. Humphrey Milford. 1915.
3. **English Economic History : Select Documents.** By A. E. BLAND, P. A. BROWN, and R. H. TAWNEY. G. Bell and Sons. 1914.
4. **English Life and Manners in the Later Middle Ages.** By A. ABRAM. G. Routledge. 1913.
5. **Social England in the Fifteenth Century.** By A. ABRAM. G. Routledge. 1909.
6. **English Society in the Eleventh Century.** By P. VINOGRADOFF. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1908.
7. **Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar.** By T. RICE HOLMES. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1907.

THE worldly art of being careful, Martha's burden, has never been fostered in England. The art itself is a product of stringent economic conditions, and those conditions have never existed in England on so wide a scale and for so long a period as to produce in the national mind what may be called a sumptuary ideal. There is probably no continental nation that has not faced poverty on a large scale for a long period, and in the carefulness of continental women we see the result of the conjoint pressure of such poverty and of sumptuary laws that were the outward sign of a national recognition of the virtue of carefulness. No doubt on the Continent there are other more remote causes such, for instance, as the inheritance of the conception of family life revealed by the text-books on Roman law. The idea of keeping family life intact by means of the organisation of family finance is an outstanding feature of Roman law ; it was handed on to all the nations of Europe other than England and, when the day of modern codes came, it was incorporated in those codes. It is a significant fact that in the only part of the British Isles which received the Roman law, Scotland, the same spirit

of family carefulness exists as is seen on the Continent. England repudiated Roman law when it seemed likely to become the governing factor in the municipal system of law. She had not inherited it and declined to receive it from the hand of foreign ecclesiastics. Scotland was less insular and found that this system of law met with peculiar ease the economic pressure which she bore in common with continental nations. The tradition of comfort in England and other forces made us as a nation disinclined to adopt laws that imposed frugality on the family in the interest of the next generation. Even to-day there is no duty imposed on the head of an English family to provide for his widow or his children. Maintain them he must, if he can, in his lifetime, but after his death there is no fund that provides maintenance for his widow and portions for his daughters.

The very customary marriage settlement among the well-to-do classes in England no doubt does all this, but the point is that the settlement is a voluntary act, and coincides with the age-long insistence of the English to be free of legal burdens in the confines of their private lives. The psychology of the matter is one of extraordinary interest. It marks off the English and the Irish from all other nations, including the Scottish nation. We will not have our sumptuary ideals framed into laws. We will not in matters of private life have our moral duties imposed upon us by statute. If they are so imposed, we evade them. If they are left unimposed, then the more thinking section of the community carries the ideals into practice with exemplary virtue, while the less thinking and the non-thinking sections forget that there are such ideals till too late. Then the Poor Law operates in those cases where the personal resourcefulness of the survivors, or the help of relations and friends, fails. The Roman, the continental and the Scottish laws insist that the living shall bear part of the burdens of posterity, shall not leave widows and children and grandchildren to the cold pity of collaterals or of an official, but shall be compelled to live in some measure a saving life for the sake of others. More than two thousand years of sumptuary ideals carried into practice have created the spirit of carefulness in the continental nations.

From time to time the most startling examples of what this spirit means and is capable of are seen. One instance

was the speed with which France paid off the heavy indemnity to Prussia in 1871. Another instance is the French 'Loan of Victory' to-day. Those marvellous 'stockings' that the French peasant woman knits and fills have really no parallel here, though our Savings Banks are some indication of what we might do if we chose. If the French peasantry to-day were securing the wages that men and women and children are obtaining in England, vast reserves would be built up with amazing speed: reserves, it must be remembered, not ordered to be created by law, but brought into existence by the habit of carefulness of mind, by the applied sumptuary ideals which are part of the moral structure of their lives. We in our excess of freedom have lost these ideals in the very belief that we could best retain them by not insisting upon them. It may well be hoped that the vast internationalisation of ideas which is the result of modern trade and modern exchange of thought will arouse in the English national soul these sumptuary ideals, and that from this great war we may at least derive the benefit of a new outlook on personal economy. Meanwhile it is well, nay it is necessary, to look with care at the direct causes which lie behind our economic carelessness, to examine the one period in English history when an attempt was made to impose carefulness on the people, and to try to ascertain in what direction the national psychology of sumptuary ideals may best be reinforced.

The economic history of England is redolent of waste, and the workman to-day who is earning five, six, or seven pounds a week and who spends it all week by week, without any regard whatever to the bad times that will probably follow the war, is the legitimate descendant of men and women who have had the same attitude towards life in England for unnumbered centuries.

It is difficult to ascertain any specific cause for the wastefulness of the people of this island, but probably the cause is a combination of isolation, independence, prosperity, drunkenness and the comparative absence of war. Except in specific periods, such as the century after the Roman occupation ceased, and the second half of the fourteenth century after the Black Death, the island, in its isolation, to the mid-fifteenth century knew nothing of economic want; was not dependent

on continental markets ; was indeed without a market of its own ; was independent in a fashion unknown on the Continent ; was free of war as an endemic evil. Drunkenness throughout all that period was a national vice, and gluttony was a concomitant evil. No doubt in the fifteenth century many changes took place. The steady national resistance to the intrusion of foreign traders broke down ; a national market had come into existence and was at last in something like full economic relationship with the continental market ; but the isolation of the people as a whole was not broken down, the spirit of national independence deepened ; war became more and more sporadic ; national ignorance became more marked than in previous centuries with the steady decay of the priesthood, the withdrawal of direct religious authority and the growth of a form of mysticism that defied even reasonable worldliness. The spirit of wastefulness indeed became dominant in the late fifteenth century as economic changes swept through the country and the old order of landholding and of local control passed away.

Our extravagance is and always was a product of our environment, and that is partly in our power to change. But to change it wisely it is necessary to consider in something like detail the historical causes that have framed that environment. As far back as the days when Pytheas, the Massilian traveller and scientist in the fourth century before Christ, circumnavigated Britain, we hear of the Britons as a beer-drinking people. In Cornwall he found, acording to Dr. Rice Holmes, 'a friendly and comparatively civilised' people. It was not merely a coastal civilisation derived from foreign sources. In the lake-dwellings at Glastonbury, first inhabited more than two centuries before the Roman conquest, relics have shown that 'skilled agriculturists, potters, weavers, 'wood-carvers, and coopers lived in the village,' that there were no weapons of war, while 'the explorers were 'astonished to find a bronze mirror, tweezers, rouge, and other 'exotic objects.' Indeed far away on the Yorkshire Wolds 'the arts of the toilet' had been elaborated. The Roman occupation certainly did nothing to interrupt the native comfortableness of Britain. We know from Tacitus that Roman comforts and luxuries were welcomed, and we know moreover that in the desperate days after the Roman with-

drawal the inhabitants were sufficiently at ease to develop a heresy of the first rank and support it in public meetings with the speeches of richly garbed ecclesiastics.

It is difficult to differentiate, so far as material comfortableness goes, post-Roman from pre-Roman Britain. The hospitable island attracted and absorbed Jutes, Saxons, and Danes and remained, as it had apparently always been, a home for well-fed, well-clad peoples. The Ecclesiastical Canons of the centuries that carry us up to the Conquest show us this. The Church is continually engaged in condemning the love of drink and dress and food. Solid extravagance and plenty of means for it seem to underlie and overlie the troubles and sorrows and woes that successive incursions from less happy lands brought. We are never in the presence of a thrifty people ; and we are always in a land of plenty. It was not altogether surprising that William and his Normans desired to acquire this fair land. Domesday Book reveals no mean domain. The picture of the food rents to which Professor Vinogradoff draws attention, of ' tribute in corn, in honey, in beer,' of the feeding of king or lord on his frequent progresses, of the presentations of oxen, pigs, sheep, fish, is a picture of a land flowing with milk and mead and beer and savouring of all manner of meats. The early medieval English ate and drank well.

No doubt there is another side to the picture. The pre-Conquest days had seen much slavery, and post-Conquest days show us a large population of serfs compulsorily bound to the land on which they were born, a population with many servile duties and no political freedom. But it is also plain that this population had many advantages from the purely material point of view now being considered. They gradually acquired in fact holdings more or less permanent, and fully adequate for material subsistence, and in times of stress they had the advantage of the economic forces of their lords. The peasantry were well-fed, but coupled with this great boon was a disadvantage which they did not recognise, and which the nation itself has never sufficiently recognised—the absence of personal responsibility. This defect has stamped its impress on the race, and though centuries have elapsed since the feudal system ceased to be an economic factor in English life, the sense of personal responsibility has never been fully introduced into the mind of the masses of the nation.

Our whole history for at least fifteen hundred years before the Black Death of 1349 seems to show us a people who with successive accretions were always, in the main and subject to local disturbances, prosperous, well-fed, irresponsible. That they were also pugnacious, quarrelsome, insular, patriotic to the last degree, religious in a marked but unusual fashion, addicted to song, drama and drink, we know from many sources. Unfree labour was the economic curse of the land. It rendered inevitable, what the nature of the people and the abundance of food, drink, and means of clothing rendered probable, national extravagance. On this people the Black Death of 1349, the last and most terrible of our foreign invaders, fell heavily. It not only levied a death toll of the most enormous proportions, but it entirely disordered the economic life of the country. It destroyed serfdom at a touch; it put feudalism out of action; it began the banishment of Roman Catholicism; it brought to birth puritanism and protestantism; it substituted pasture for arable; it made men hungry, discontented, grasping, fierce; it gave Englishmen the alternative choice of very strenuous sumptuary ideals or of enormous efforts to recover their comfortableness. They chose the latter.

In her two works, 'Social England in the Fifteenth Century' and 'English Life and Manners in the Later Middle Ages,' works of quite the first order of merit, in which original research of the most meticulous kind on an extended scale is made to subserve a brilliant picture of a vanished age, Miss Abram depicts for us a people who are determined at all costs to be rich, well-fed, and comfortable. The French Wars and the Wars of the Roses, contests that interested the people very little, ended the economic dominance of the nobles. Thus we are told:

> 'Economic forces were not only able to hold their own, but also materially to affect the development of other tendencies; and so religion and politics were tinged by a commercial spirit, and commercial intercourse formed the subject of much diplomacy. Consequently England made great strides as an industrial country; but her devotion to trade prevented her from paying much attention to other affairs, and she was hardly aware of the great awakening of thought which was going on in the South of Europe.'

Miss Abram shows us a vast development of the manufacture of cloth of innumerable kinds, of silk goods that herald

an age of luxury. We see miners, brewers, brick-makers, ship-builders, busily at work. We see specialisation in trade, the birth of new guilds, the creation or revival of fairs and markets. Corn-growing declined, partly because of lack of labourers, partly because the pasture-land that bore sheep and supplied mutton and wool was more profitable. The famous transition from arable to pasture was well under way, and this gives us some idea of the richness of England as a corn-land in the days before the Plague. If home trade was more than active, foreign trade spread with amazing rapidity to Ireland, Flanders, Holland, Zealand, Prussia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Levant. The English determined to have the foreign trade in their own hands and in their own ships, and penalised alien merchants in England in every possible way. The government was continually at the back of the merchants. The age of barter was past, the age of bills of exchange was at hand ; banking became an English business. The extension of oversea trade smote the State regulation of prices hip and thigh. A ' frenzy of trade ' seized the entire community, and ' the ' commercial spirit pervaded all departments of life and in- ' fluenced almost every sentiment.' Lawlessness of both sexes and all classes, says Miss Abram, was ' one of the most ' marked characteristics of the period.' Judges were defied in their courts, arrest was resisted. We read of a woman who made a writ-server ' devour the same writte . . . both wex ' and parchement.' The Channel swarmed with pirates drawn thither by the vast new trade. A great new middle-class—the product of trade—arose, and the richer members of it intermarried with the nobility, while it was largely recruited from the new yeomen class that occupied the land.

The abundance and the variety of food set forth in the Household Books must have made England envied on the Continent. The variety of fish—sea-fish, salted fish, river fish—is amazing. Sea-carriage was cheap and the coast-wise fisheries were supplemented by the Iceland fisheries. In the fish-dinner that followed the funeral of Nicholas Bubwith, Bishop of Bath and Wells, eighteen varieties of fish were served. Game and poultry were plentiful. The fifteenth century middle-class had everything that we have except turkeys, and they also ate peacocks, gulls, swans, herons and

cranes, sword-fish, dog-fish and porpoise. The author of the 'Italian Relation' comments on the 'immense profusion of 'every comestible animal' in England.

John Stow in his famous 'Survey of London' (so admirably edited some years since by Mr. C. L. Kingsford) gives us in the section 'of Orders and Customes' a pretty picture of England's fancies in dress and dish as the speeding ages went by. He shows the twelfth-century London described by Fitzstephen. It was a little town, but vastly frequented by traders and strangers. Such a place for eating and drinking never was. Fitzstephen tells us that 'Upon the river side, betweene the 'wine in ships, and the wine to be sold in Taverns, is a common 'cookerie or cookes row: there dayly for the season of the 'yere, men might have meate, rost, sod, or fried: fish, flesh, 'fowles, fit for rich and poore.' The cookerie is open day and night for travellers. To Fitzstephen, London seemed like the New Jerusalem. It had but two plagues, he says: 'im-'moderate quaffing among the foolish sort, and often casualties 'by fire.' Stow, writing at the beginning of the seventeenth century, declared that the 'quaffing' had 'mightily increased, 'though greatlie qualified among the poorer sort, not of any 'holy abstinencie, but of meere necessitie, Ale and Beere being 'small, and Wines in prices above their reach.' Thus in the poorest days, when the Tudors for a century had tried to enforce sumptuary ideals, the poorer sort drank freely, despite the absence of the sack that Falstaff loved.

The household expenses in great families during the Middle Ages strain the imagination. Thus it cost Thomas Earl of Lancaster for housekeeping from Michaelmas 1334 to Michaelmas 1335, £7957 13*s.* 4½*d.* in the money of that day. Of this sum, over £3500 was spent on wine, and £1079 on clothes and liveries. In the same reign, Hugh de Spencer was found to possess at the date of his banishment 28,000 sheep, 1000 oxen and steers, 1200 kine with their calves, 2000 hogs, 300 bullocks, 40 tuns of wine, 600 bacons, 80 carcases of Martinmas beef, 600 muttons in larder, and 10 tuns of cider: 'Which 'provision for household,' says John Stow with a happy sigh, 'sheweth a great family there to be kept.' But there were as good things to come, for of Warwick the King-maker we read that in his house 'there was oftentimes six Oxen eaten at a 'breakfast, and every Taverne was full of his meate, for he

'that had any acquaintance in that house, might have there 'of so much of sodden and rost meate, as hee could pricke 'and carrie upon a long Dagger.'

Stow also tells of Richard Redman, Bishop of Ely, who, in and about the year 1500, in addition to his own vast household, entertained the poor on a gigantic scale; of Nicholas West, another Bishop of Ely, who, thirty years later, besides maintaining a century of household servants, daily supplied at his gates two hundred poor people with bread, drink and warm meat; of Cardinal Wolsey with his four hundred servants or so, 'omitting his servants' servants, which were many'; of Edward, Earl of Derby, who just before Stow's time twice every day fed over sixty aged persons 'beside all commers,' and supplied 'every Good Fryday 2700, with meate, drinke, 'and money.' He tells us that

'the late earle of Oxford, father to him that now liveth, hath beene noted within these fortie yeares, to have ridden into this citie, and so to his house by London stone, with 80 gentlemen in a livery of Reading Tawny, and chaines of gold about their necks before him, and 100 tall yeomen in the like livery to follow him without chaines, but all having his cognisance of the blew Bore, embroidered on their left shoulder.'

But for transcendental epicureanism, the pillars of Church and State were but candles to the City merchants. In 1515 the ever worshipful Company of Drapers celebrated the election of Sir William Butler and the revival of learning with a feast so sumptuous as to exhaust the Gargantuan capacities of heroes. The list of comestibles, some strangely unfamiliar to modern usage, was carefully recorded. Down to the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth noblemen's houses were the scenes of magnificent hospitality, of splendid charity, of solid manifestation of great and easily acquired wealth; but the nobility also set an example of extravagance in clothing, ornament, wine and food that was not lost upon the people.

After the dissolution of the monasteries, the burden of hospitality to the poor was taken up in considerable measure by the bishops and great landowners and merchants. The problem, as the great Elizabethan Poor Law Act proved, was insoluble by such means. Indeed a vast pauper class had been fostered, and all sumptuary ideals had been banished by the endless manifestations of plenty, easily shared, that the landless

men saw around them on every side. The old medieval tradition of plentifulness was maintained. The fifteenth century had made all classes regard freedom in food and drink as a perquisite of the English race. Sir John Fortescue especially states that the plentifulness was universal and pronounces the 'comune peple of thys londe, the beste fedde 'and also the best cledde of any natyon crystyn or hethen.' Miss Abram thinks he is comparing them with the people of France, whose condition was very bad. While the rest of Europe was more or less starving the English people lived on the fat of the land. Native beer and mead were supplemented in all middle-class households by good, cheap, French wines; but for the rich, wines poured in from all over Europe, Spain, Portugal, France, the Rhine, Italy, the Mediterranean. In Chaucer's time the really poor fared comparatively badly, living largely on bread, beans, bacon, herrings, cheese, and vegetables; but we do not think that this was true fifty years later, when the immediate effects of the Black Death had passed away. Indeed Sir John Fortescue's evidence on the subject is very weighty, but no doubt bad harvests in particular years then, as later, affected the food of the peasant. The cottages of the poorer classes were certainly variable in quality: some were excellent, others, if we judge by the fourteenth century rent (from 3*d*. to $\frac{1}{4}d$. a year) as Miss Abram judges, must have been wretched in the extreme. But it is not possible really to judge by rent, since service probably supplemented rent at that date, and sixty years later the general rise in conditions certainly improved housing. Indeed the fifteenth-century cottages referred to by Miss Abram were excellent.

Miss Abram's evidence as to public health is of great value. Plague was endemic and the people suffered from 'tubercle, 'gout, dropsy, quinsy, palsy, ulcers, tumours, whooping cough, 'lunacy, rheumatism, cancer, and dysentery, several varieties 'of fevers, jaundice, cramp, asthma, sciatica, herpes, and many 'kinds of skin diseases.' Considering the manner of life, the inconceivable sanitary conditions, the incompetence of doctors and the absolutely unwashed condition of the people—washing is a modern invention in the western world—it is remarkable that the public health was as good as it was. It must be remembered that the people at large gave little time to books, were not tormented with newspapers, took an immense amount

of sleep, worked hard physically, had a good deal of refined amusement in the way of music and song, loved fine architecture as well as beautiful dress, had a great sense of humour. They were horribly coarse and out-spoken, but the very fact seems to show that vice was rather a surface evil than one that ate into the heart of the people. One of the most curious contrasts is the religious sense which pervaded the people despite the often inferior quality of the clergy and despite the very gross and greedy lives of all classes. There is nothing elsewhere quite like it in the history of mankind. It explains the English Reformation and the Elizabethan age as nothing else can.

But for our present purpose the point to bear in mind is the resemblance of that age to ours in the matter of reckless national extravagance. Economic necessity had not then any greater significance for the people than it has now. It may be asked, how was it possible for a people with so shrewd a gift for trade as was possessed by our fifteenth-century ancestors to be extravagant? The essence of successful trading is the power of knowing when buying, when selling, is of the maximum economic significance. The answer is a simple one. The English people of that age, like the English people of this age, never related consciously the economics of the household to the economics of a world market, or even of a national market. At that time in nearly all cases their foreign trade was conducted with people suffering from economic necessity and ready to barter their goods on terms largely advantageous to the English. The resulting profits, and a great abundance of home production, were available for home extravagance. Such extravagance reacted of course on the general market as all waste does, but this waste was distributed over the whole European area so that the reduction of wealth due to waste was hardly felt in England at all save—and it is an important proviso—in that section of English society which lived on the margin of subsistence.

Great trading gifts are not inconsistent with extravagance; the two are often linked together, with the result that the maximum efficiency of the nation is never reached. In the mid-fifteenth century as in the mid-nineteenth century the vast growth of trade was secured in the teeth of wide-spread ignorance. In both periods the labouring classes were totally

illiterate, though the earlier period had the advantage of a religious faith that touched every class. In the earlier decades of the nineteenth century religion made practically no appeal to the mass of the workers in the industrial districts of the north, with the result that a materialistic outlook was added to a purely wasteful national policy. On the other hand the workers of the nineteenth century secured political freedom, and this was the beginning of better things. The only cure for national extravagance is personal responsibility coupled with true education of body, mind, and spirit. Political freedom was a step on the road and we are gradually supplementing this with real education to-day, though progress is so slow as to dishearten the most hopeful. The fifteenth-century workers sought their freedom in a religious revolution and in free access to learning: a century later both these goals were gained, and the Elizabethan age was the result.

Elizabethan England made the one great attempt in our history to cure national extravagance. The Statute Book is redolent of the effort; the very gibes at a cheeseparing queen and a parsimonious parliament are evidence of the fact; every effort was made to cleanse the land of dishonesty. The law was overhauled; the Bench was cleansed; the administration of charities and trusts was sweetened; the whole educational system was perfected; a poor law was specially devised to turn the wastrel into a man, while partially successful attempts were again and again made to supply every man with an outfit for life in agriculture or trade or learning. The heroic effort failed, but it is one that stands out in the history of economics with startling clearness like a snow peak against a sky of trouble.

English legislators had not been content to try to meet national economic extravagance by good counsel and good indirect legislation. In three ages they attempted, by direct legislation, to stem the tide of personal extravagance, and it is significant that in no case was the legislation merely aimed at the rich. All classes were grossly extravagant, and the legislation struck at the foolishness and greediness of all classes with equal force. We do not speak of the earlier sumptuary legislation contained in Church canons; the value of that evidence is not to be neglected, for it shows from early Saxon times onwards that the habits of the people were the same—

the habits of men and women dwelling in a land of plenty. The first parliamentary effort at sumptuary legislation took place in 1363, when England was desperately struggling with the economic troubles that followed the Black Death, which, beginning in the late autumn of 1348, was still smiting the land, and had in fact renewed its efforts in this very year. The Westminster statutes of the thirty-seventh year of King Edward III. included a group of acts dealing with diet and apparel. The eighth chapter regulated the diet and apparel of servants:

'Grooms as well servants of lords as they of mysteries 'and artificers shall be served with meat and drink once a day 'of flesh or of fish and the remnant of other victuals, as of 'milk, butter, cheese and other such victuals, according to 'their estate.' This class was limited to a total expenditure of two marks on clothes and hose, and could wear neither gold, nor silver, nor silk. Yeomen were similarly limited to forty shillings; esquires, gentlemen, and certain merchants, to four and a half or five marks, and the latter class might wear silver. Knights of a certain wealth might spend six marks on 'the whole cloth for their vesture,' and, if of considerable wealth, they could 'wear at their pleasure, except ermins 'and letuses and apparel of pearls and stone, but only for their 'heads.' There was one other class that needed special attention, the ploughmen or serfs, who did not possess forty shillings' worth of goods. They were only to wear blanket and russet wool to the cost of twelve pence, 'and shall wear 'girdles of linen according to their estate,' and shall not eat and drink excessively. Clothiers were to be warned of these regulations, which extended to the wives and children of the various folk.

Such legislation seems to show that England, at her worst moment, was by no means in a desperate economic case. Nor is there any reason to suppose that sumptuary legislation had any permanent effect. Indeed a century later, when England had grown rich once more, it was frankly abandoned so far as food was concerned. It was the extravagant clothing of the upper and middle class that was then attacked. In 1463, by the fifth chapter of the third year of King Edward IV., knights and their wives were forbidden to wear cloth of gold; knights bachelor and their wives were forbidden to wear cloth of

velvet upon velvet ; no person under the state of a lord could wear purple cloth of silk ; esquires and their wives were forbidden to wear velvet, or fur of ermine ; and such gowns as they might wear should be, to correct the unpleasing shortness of clothes, of a certain length. No labourer or servant was to wear cloth costing more than 2*s.* the broad yard ; kerchiefs for anyone were not to exceed 10*s.* a piece, and no shoe could have a pike more than two inches in length. This attempt at sumptuary legislation, read in connexion with the material supplied by Stow and by Miss Abram, shows us a people of amazing wealth, pride and sense of comfort, and extravagance. The Act of 1463 was probably quite ineffective. It was replaced by further legislation in 1483, when women, other than the wives of husbandmen, were exempted from the law. In 1510 a despairing parliament under the influence of Henry VIII. determined to deal with the problem in much more drastic fashion.

The subject of Tudor sumptuary legislation has recently been discussed in useful elaboration by Dr. Wilfrid Hooper. He tells us that the Act of 1510 (1 Hen. VIII. c. 14) 'agaynst 'wearing of costly Apparrell' was modelled on the statutes of 1463 and 1483, and, like them, insisted on the gradation of ranks and on the limitation of apparel. The new Act provided for the forfeiture of prohibited articles in addition to the imposition of fines, and enabled any person to sue in respect of both remedies. In other words, a system of espionage of neighbour upon neighbour was introduced. The severity of the Act was, however, mitigated by the granting of licences of exemption and by the exemption of all women. In 1511 the Act was strengthened by a Royal Proclamation, by which all but Lords and Knights were forbidden to wear silk and camlet in doublets only, while the King and his Court set an example by wearing 'long grey cloth gowns in the 'Hungarian fashion.' New regulations and laws followed fast, for the Tudors were obstinate folk.

The Act of 1510 was re-enacted in 1514 (6 Hen. VIII. c. 1) ; in 1515, however, a new Act of Apparel (7 Hen. VIII. c. 6) exempted the Court officials (the King himself was not long controlled by the Hungarian fashion), and the Fellows of the Inns of Court were allowed satin damask and camlet, while the King exercised occasionally his right of dispensation. With

such an example, Wolsey's popularity was not increased by his attempts to enforce these Acts of Apparel; his own amazing hospitality made his efforts seem unreasonable. Indeed the Royal Proclamation of 1517 for 'reducing the excessive fare 'at feasts' placed Wolsey in a class by himself, for the new rule allowed nine dishes for a cardinal, while a peer of parliament had to content himself with six like a mere Lord Mayor or Knight of the Garter, and persons of medium well-to-do-ness, who could spend £40 per annum, were ordered to starve on three dishes. All these efforts were useless, and an Act of 1533 (24 Hen. VIII. c. 13) for 'the Reformacyon of excesse in 'apparayle' imposed forfeiture once more of the offending goods and a cumulative fine of three shillings and fourpence a day.

In 1542 we have a plaintive proclamation complaining that the Act was not followed. The King could do no more. His people were even more obstinate than he, and the hero of the Field of the Cloth of Gold confessed himself conquered. In 1554 Philip and Mary made one little effort (1 & 2 P. & M. c. 2) to control the apparel of the 'meaner sort.' In 1558 there came upon the scene the most obstinate and the most thrifty of English monarchs, and she determined to have her father's exemplary legislation obeyed to the letter.

On October 21st, 1559, Elizabeth issued a proclamation summarising the Acts of 1533 and 1554, and ordering the magistrates to see that they were obeyed. In November the Privy Council wrote to the Corporation of the City of London, suggesting that 'two watchers should be appointed for every 'parish, armed with a schedule of all persons assessed to the 'late subsidy at £20 per annum, or £200 in goods and upwards, 'in order to see that the prohibition against silk trimmings was 'being obeyed.' The suggested watch gave rise to a system of surveillance which was soon regularly adopted throughout the City. This was no new system. A precedent had been provided by the Act of 1510 which, as above noted, gave power to any person to sue another for a breach of that Act. The Queen was determined to gain her point at all costs. In 1561 Cecil had to despatch an agent to inspect the country at large. The following year, under a Clothes Conformity Proclamation, 'watchers' were appointed throughout the country. In the City there were four watchers in each ward, to deal, *inter alia*,

with the 'very monsterous and outraygous greate payre of hose' affected by the City bloods.

Nor was this the worst blow at the patient capital. The Common Council, in a passion of loyalty, suppressed the feasts of the Livery Companies, and in 1572 and again in 1582 regulated the apparel of the apprentices. The hand of the unhappy Council was directed by the mind of Elizabeth; and her carefulness in these, as in other innumerable directions, has been called by all manner of names throughout successive ages. But she feared the future as little as the present. In 1566 the hapless City Companies had been ordered to appoint 'sadde and discrete personages' to watch at the entrance gates of the City between 7 and 11 in the forenoon, and between 1 and 6 in the afternoon for persons 'usinge or wearinge any 'greate and monstrous hosen, silk, velvet or weapons restreyned 'and prohibited.' Such persons were to be haled to the Guildhall. It was as if to-day sad and discrete persons, in the guise of special constables, were to guard London Bridge and the various termini for trains and omnibuses, and there to seize the young men and maidens of our day, and carry them off to the nearest police station.

The Queen, through her willing instrument Burghley, foreran the Puritans, who, without legislation to help them, stamped out the last cheerfulness of the Middle Ages. As she grew older the Queen grew more determined and extended the burden of carefulness to her own sex. The watch at the City gates continued till 1581. Meantime proclamations harried a heedless world. In 1574, 1577, 1580, 1588, and 1597, they reiterated the duty of carefulness. Starched ruffles of excessive length and depth were anathema, while terrifying swords and daggers were forbidden. Between 1560 and 1585 the Cambridge undergraduate lived in terror, and the same was true of Oxford between 1564 and 1594. In 1588, 1595, and 1596, the Star Chamber exhorted the justices of the peace to exercise justice with unfailing courage. Burghley died in 1598, worn out with these and his other labours.

The last proclamation, dwelling on 'the decay of hospitality 'and the confusion of degrees,' had been issued in 1597. It was the swan song of the sumptuary laws. A century of effort had failed, though it had honourably failed, and had, to some extent, revealed to the people at large the absurdities of personal

extravagance. James I. fully intended to take the whole matter in hand, but, by one of the accidents that are not wholly accidental, the power was taken out of his hands. In 1604 legislation was introduced, abolishing the existing sumptuary laws, but giving the King power by proclamation to deal with the whole subject in the fashion that the Stuarts loved. Such a proposal roused a parliament that had lost the guidance of the iron Queen, and the Act which was eventually passed (1 Jas. I. c. 25) abolished the sumptuary laws without reserving the proposed power to the King. So, by a side wind, English sumptuary legislation passed into history. Scotland has a different story to tell. Her last statute of apparel was passed in 1698 and this remained on the Statute Book till 1906.

The attempt to impose sumptuary laws upon England had been an astounding experiment to which the English public had replied with the whole *vis inertiae* which is its strength. The legislation did not appear to represent a national need. The country did not feel the need of any sumptuary ideals; did not realise that economic carefulness would make the nation not only strong but the dominant force in Europe. England cared for none of these things. The psychology of the country was under Elizabeth what it had been and was yet to be for centuries. England was not prepared to follow the advice or the orders of the most careful of all her monarchs; her people were not prepared to make provision for the future; they resented legislation of any kind that purported to deal with the private life of the citizen. Within limits, the country was no doubt obedient to the wishes of Queen Elizabeth. It is, for example, inconceivable that, if the Queen had ordered certain rules to be obeyed in her royal palaces, her parliament, sitting in one of those palaces, would have used the immunity of the palace to evade the very sumptuary law that the sovereign had proclaimed for all royal palaces. But sumptuary laws, as such, met with no willing response, and they have not been directly re-enacted until our day. That there are sumptuary laws in force at this hour, few will deny, and, curiously enough, they are meeting with a more willing acceptance than was the case three or four centuries ago.

On August 31st, 1914, an Act was passed to enable orders to be made in connexion with the present war for restricting

the sale or consumption of intoxicating liquor not only on licensed premises but in clubs. Under the Defence of the Realm Acts the lives of the citizens have been interfered with at every turn, and the interference, as in the case of the Lighting Orders, has often had a direct sumptuary effect. Beer has been smitten not only with the restrictions on the hours of sale but with additional duties. The Defence of the Realm Amendment Act of May 19, 1915, in creating State control of the liquor trade in certain areas is sumptuary legislation of the first importance. The Liquor Board have enormous powers. They may even prohibit the sale of liquor except by themselves. They have already prohibited treating. The orders of the Board have been revolutionary, yet because of the necessities of the war they have been accepted without any serious murmuring.

Beyond this consideration there seems to be a new note in society. A larger number of men and women than ever before are earnestly thinking about social problems. A hundred years of social reform and temperance effort is at last taking its effect. There is growing up in many classes of the community a new sense of the need of carefulness. It is true that it finds no personal echo among members of parliament, but a far-reaching psychological change is rapidly taking place, and reasonable sumptuary ideals may yet win their way into the hearts of the English people.

J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY.

NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AND SEA COMMERCE

The American Note of November 1915.

IN spite of its length and the mass of technical detail involved, the main issues raised by the American Note of November 1915 are fairly clear. Careful examination of the facts, of statistics and of precedents will no doubt be necessary before an official and authoritative reply can be sent, and probably this may take some time, especially as the Foreign Office must at present be overburdened with urgent business of the utmost importance. The Note is no doubt important from the ethical and political as well as the legal and practical point of view, but for the present it is well, for Englishmen at least, to confine themselves to the legal and practical questions which may affect the action to be taken in the immediate future. We may leave it to the men of highest character in the United States, whose names are known and honoured here, to deal with the ethical side, with the moral questions involved in the attitude of the United States Government during the present war.

It is important to examine what the issues between the two Governments really are, and to call attention to the principles involved.

At the outset it is necessary to clear our minds from the irritation which naturally arises when a number of claims are urged on matters which, though important in themselves, appear trivial in comparison with the issues at stake in the tremendous conflict in which we are engaged—a life and death struggle to save mankind from the domination of a Power which, by its acts, denies the very existence of Right or Justice. These claims are so various, the arguments in support of them so involved, as to suggest that the authors of the Note put in everything which happened to occur to anyone who was concerned with the matter. One is reminded of the deputation which put forward a number of ' planks ' for a political ' platform ' to a young parliamentary candidate

—still under the illusion that political questions were to be considered on their merits. After dealing with several he came to one of which it was difficult to discover the real meaning. He tried to ascertain exactly what was meant, and why the proposal was put forward, and obtained the answer, 'We really do not know; we put it in because some of 'our people wanted it, and we thought it would do no harm. 'We will go on to the next question.'

The two main positions taken by the framers of the Note appear to be: first, that the exercise of belligerents' rights and in particular the decisions of their Prize Courts ought to be regulated and controlled by the rules of International Law which particular enactments of one State cannot override; second, that it is the right, even the duty, of a neutral State, to insist as far as possible on the observance of these rules. To both these propositions, if rightly understood and fairly applied, full assent may be given. It is necessary, however, with regard to the first to add the proviso that the appeal is to be made to the real fundamental principles of International Law which, like every system of jurisprudence, must treat decided cases as illustrations of the application of principles. New and different conditions make it necessary from time to time to modify the subsidiary rules. The system must be capable of growth and adaptation to new circumstances if it is to be a living thing. The spirit quickeneth, the mere letter is dead. In the case of International Law in particular, circumstances change so much between one war and another that it is most essential to distinguish between what is permanent and fundamental and what is based on the special conditions existing at the particular time when the cases put forward arose.

The second proposition—that it is the right of the neutral to use pressure to secure the observance of law by belligerents—must be subject to the proviso that such right involves the duty of putting pressure on all belligerents alike to observe rules and agreements and still more to abstain from acts which are outrages on common humanity.

The specific grounds of complaint put forward in the Note are shortly as follows:

1. Detention of vessels and cargoes without proofs obtained at the time of seizure.

2. The taking of vessels into port for examination instead of searching them at sea.

3. The reception of 'extrinsic evidence' to justify proceedings against ship or cargo.

4. The presumption from the fact of the great increase of imports of certain articles into neutral countries that articles of the kind shipped to those countries are intended for re-export to the belligerents who cannot import them directly. Cotton, rubber and other commodities 'more or less useful for military 'purposes' are mentioned in particular. It is stated that 'even if goods listed as conditional contraband are destined 'to an enemy country through a neutral country, that fact 'is not in itself sufficient to justify seizure.'

5. That British exports to the neutral countries in question have 'materially increased' since the war began.

6. The claim of the British Government to include certain articles in their list of contraband of war is objected to.

7. That harbour dues, warehousing and other expenses have been charged even when cargoes have been released, and that a condition has been imposed that subsequent claims against the British Government shall be waived.

A second part of the Note states the objections raised to 'so-called blockade' measures imposed by the Order in Council of the 11th of March.

The third part challenges the validity of the Orders in Council altogether, and also appears to deny the jurisdiction of the British Prize Courts to deal with questions relating to the detention and condemnation of vessels and cargoes at all.

In examining these claims and contentions it is desirable to rely exclusively upon the principles of International Law, and to assume that any municipal enactments which contravene those principles cannot alter the rights of neutrals.

So far as the present controversy is concerned the fundamental principles of International Law may be stated as follows:

It is the right of a belligerent country which has naval forces sufficient for the purpose to arrest and to examine vessels and cargoes where there is reasonable suspicion that those cargoes are intended and destined for an enemy country and are of such a character as to be likely to assist its naval

and military forces in carrying on the war. If the articles are in themselves of such a character that from their nature it is to be expected that they are required for warlike purposes (e.g. ammunition) they may be treated as absolute contraband and, if destined for the enemy country, may be condemned to forfeiture by the regular prize courts of the belligerent who seizes them. If the articles in question are of such a character that they can be used either for peaceful or for warlike purposes (e.g. food), and if the circumstances show that they or a substantial part of them are in fact destined to be used for the military or naval forces of the enemy, they may on that condition be condemned as conditional contraband. In either case forfeiture may be incurred, even though the commodities are consigned to a neutral country, if the whole circumstances of the case show that they are in fact destined for the enemy and intended to be forwarded to him.

It is impossible to settle beforehand at any period a list of articles which shall in future wars be treated either as absolute or conditional contraband, or of those which are to be excluded from such liability. The question depends on the state of scientific knowledge at the time and on the conditions under which the war is carried on. Two years ago it was not contemplated that a belligerent would use poisonous or asphyxiating gases in carrying on war. Can it be urged with any show of reason that articles likely to be used for the manufacture of such gases ought not now to be placed on the list of absolute contraband and condemned if intended for the enemy country, whether passing to it directly or through a neutral country, although only a few months ago it might have been thought that the articles in question were not capable of any such use? A few years ago the use of air planes in war did not appear to be a serious question. Can it now be said that articles suitable for use in the construction of air planes ought to be allowed to pass to an enemy as non-contraband?

Is it to be contended that articles which are now being used for most deadly purposes are not to be treated as contraband because at some former time, when no such use was contemplated as possible, it had been held that they were innocent? The attempt to restrict by definite convention the commodities which may be treated as contraband in

future wars by an agreed list of specific articles is absurd on the face of it. International Law, in order to be adequate as well as just, must have regard to the circumstances of the times, including the circumstances arising out of the particular situation of the war or the conditions of the parties engaged in it.

This statement is specially important in dealing with the question of conditional contraband. If a war were being carried on in the Far East between the expeditionary forces of two European countries, foodstuffs in transit from neutrals to those countries might as a rule be treated as non-contraband and free from seizure. It is different where whole nations are in arms, where the whole country is adjacent to, if not actually the scene of, military operations. It has been well said by distinguished American jurists that

> ' In a war in which a nation is in arms, where every able-bodied man is under arms and is performing military duty, and where the non-combatant population is organised so as to support the soldiers in the field, it seems likely that belligerents will be inclined to consider destination to the enemy country as sufficient, even in the case of conditional contraband, especially if the Government of the enemy country possesses the right of confiscating and appropriating to naval and military uses the property of its citizens or subjects of service to the armies in the field.'

In the present war it would be a sound application of the fundamental principles of International Law to treat as contraband any materials or any food-stuffs which are likely to be used to make munitions, or to support any persons in the enemy country who are actively engaged in fighting or in the preparation and transport of munitions. It is no doubt right that notice should be given to neutrals of the risk they run in exporting such articles oversea; but the real question is: are the articles in question as matter of fair inference from all the facts of the case, or a substantial part of them, likely to be used by the enemy country for the purpose of aiding it in carrying on the war?

Dealing with the first three of the specific complaints above recited, it is hardly necessary to point out that the universally admitted right of a belligerent to stop contraband would be meaningless unless the belligerent were entitled to take the steps necessary to make his right effective. Until the vessel

suspected of carrying contraband has been stopped and searched, it is frequently impossible to obtain full proof of the essential facts. To make an adequate search without taking the vessel into port may be quite impracticable. The most dangerous goods are often carefully packed and concealed. We have heard of munitions in piano cases, explosives labelled as 'pickled cucumbers.' Under present conditions, or at least under the conditions existing a few weeks ago, an attempt to keep the vessel on the open sea while a full search was made would involve danger not only to the property but to the lives both of searcher and searched. A submarine might torpedo the warship engaged in the search and send it and its crew to the bottom. If the search is to be effective it must under modern conditions be made in port, and common humanity demands that it should be so made. The third complaint is matter of procedure. Provided there is no unnecessary delay, what reason can there be for excluding any relevant evidence with regard to the goods or their real destination? Why should not both sides be at liberty to put forward everything which will enable a just decision to be given in accordance with the true facts?

The fourth and fifth complaints raise questions of great practical importance. It may at once be admitted that the stopping of contraband proceeding from neutral countries and the prohibition of exports from this country are intimately connected. In some cases the export of certain articles from this country is prohibited to ensure the maintenance of our supplies of commodities required for carrying on the war or for supporting our population. With this neutrals have nothing to do. The other reason for prohibiting exports is that the prohibited articles, if consigned to neutral countries, may be sent on to the enemy and aid him in prosecuting the war. It seems clear that the list of articles of which the export is prohibited to neutrals in countries which are able to pass them on to the enemy ought to include all those which it is proposed to treat as contraband, and that, if licences for the export of any such articles to those neutrals are granted, it should only be under conditions at least as strict as those which are imposed with regard to goods passing oversea in neutral vessels. No export should be allowed to any traders in the neutral country who are in the habit of exporting goods

to the enemy ; no export should be allowed except to known consignees, and guarantees should be required that those goods will not be exported to the enemy. As regards articles that are really vital to the enemy for helping him to prosecute the war the greatest strictness should be observed. The use to which each article can be put, its potential military value, and the conditions of trade relating to it, must be carefully considered.

There are, however, some commodities, such as mere luxuries, about which it is unnecessary to be particular. The money spent by the enemy in purchasing such articles will be a greater loss to him than the benefit derived from the possession of the articles purchased. The cry that we must take active steps to prevent anything whatever passing over the seas to neutrals who may let them pass ultimately to the enemy is unreasonable. It would be foolish for the British Government to trouble about articles which are not either of actual or of potential military value. To do so causes irritation among neutrals and damages British trade without affecting the military resources of the enemy. Indeed, if the enemy chooses to ' spend his money for that which is not bread and ' his labour for that which satisfieth not,' why should we try to prevent it ? Ladies' garters are no doubt useful articles and often contain india-rubber, but is it necessary seriously to try to prevent such articles going to a neutral country for fear they might pass on to Germany ? No military purpose of the Allied Powers would be served by depriving German ladies of elastic garters, nor is it conceivable that the German Government could afford to acquire rubber for motor tyres by buying up the garters. How many thousand pairs of garters would be required for one set of tyres ? Would it be necessary to stop a small consignment of tennis-balls to a girls' school in Lausanne lest the Germans should obtain at extravagant cost a negligible quantity of rubber ?

The questions which have arisen with regard to neutral trade were admirably dealt with by Lord Emmott in a recent speech in the House of Lords, which may perhaps have influence in shaping a proper policy in spite of the peculiar and almost isolated position in which the speaker was placed by the fact that he had real practical acquaintance with the subject he was discussing. If properly carried out the best plan of

meeting the difficulties which arise, and of interfering as little as possible with legitimate neutral trade, is that of making definite agreements with specially constituted mercantile bodies in neutral countries, who will guarantee that the goods are required by the neutral country for its own use and will not be passed on to the enemy. Such arrangements have been made with the Netherlands Oversea Trust for Holland, and more recently a somewhat similar arrangement has been effected in Switzerland. The aim of the recent Danish agreement is the same. Whether or not that aim is carried out in the best manner is a question which it is impossible to discuss properly in the absence of fuller information than can now be given publicly. The whole question of trade with neutrals turns on the character of each article and its uses. It is neither just nor politic to interfere more than is strictly necessary with neutral trade, and it is most important to give free vent to our own export trade wherever that can be done without injuring our military interests. We may avoid Scylla and fall into Charybdis unless a clear policy is settled with due regard to all the conditions and with adequate information as to the whole circumstances. So far, however, as the specific American complaint is concerned the answer is one of fact. We have as a matter of fact interfered less with the trade of neutrals than with the trade of our own people, and the precautions taken to control British exports have in fact contributed to the development of neutral trade.

In very many cases the export from the United Kingdom is stopped merely on the ground that more than normal amounts of a given commodity have been received by a neutral country although the consignee is above suspicion and a guarantee has been offered. British traders often bitterly complain that their legitimate trade is stopped and buyers in neutral countries are obliged to place their orders elsewhere. Goods exported from neutral countries are released much more freely.

Yet it is proved that immense quantities of articles required for use in the war are going to Germany from neutral countries. It is proved that quantities of such articles are being taken to those neutral countries over the seas, and that the amounts so taken vastly exceed the amounts which those neutral

countries ever have used or could possibly use themselves. It is known that great quantities of the articles in transit are being consigned to firms which regularly export goods of the kind to Germany. What is to be done? The Germans on their part assert, by their conduct at least, that they will without warning, without examination, without regarding the loss of human life, sink any ship which they suspect may be taking goods of any kind to England. England repudiates any such action as contrary to both International Law and common humanity. The British claim is simply to stop the ship, examine the cargo and papers in the only way in which such examination can be effectively and safely made. If the cargo consists of articles of which the neutral country has already had amounts greatly in excess of its possible requirements, a *prima facie* case surely arises for further investigation. If on such investigation being made it is found that the goods are destined for a consignee whose trade is in goods required by the neutral country for its own use, and are intended to be so used, the cargo is released. But if the only reasonable inference from all the evidence is that the goods were really intended for the enemy, then the fundamental principle of International Law warrants their condemnation.

The best example of the manner in which the British Prize Court does in fact deal with these cases is given in the clear and elaborate judgment of Sir Samuel Evans in the case of the 'Kim.' The facts as to each consignment were carefully examined. In all cases the neutral country had received more than its normal requirements of the commodity in question, but several of the consignments were released. On the other hand, where in addition to the fact that normal requirements had been exceeded the fair inference from all the facts relating to a particular consignment was that it was not going to a *bona fide* purchaser for use in the neutral country but was really destined for the enemy, it was condemned. A denial of the right to condemn in such a case would make a farce of the established right of a belligerent to capture on the high seas goods of actual or potential military value destined for the enemy.

As regards the seventh point, careful consideration will no doubt be given by the British Government to the American claim that pilotage, wharfage and harbour dues ought not to

be charged in relation to cargoes that are detained and then released. The justification for these charges depends on the circumstances of each case. If it has once been ascertained that a cargo is going to a *bona fide* consignee in a neutral country who will give guarantees against export to the enemy, it may be argued with force that the cargo should be allowed to proceed to its destination without any charge to the owner for such expenses. On the other hand, there may be doubtful cases where it is to the advantage of both parties that the cargo should be released on terms or sold rather than that the case should proceed. This is one of the matters upon which detailed knowledge of the special facts of the various cases is necessary before any definite opinion can be expressed.

The second part of the Note deals with blockade. There are two well-recognised ways in which the right of a belligerent to prevent goods going from neutrals to enemy countries can be exercised: first under the doctrine of contraband, second by blockade. Under a blockade the right to prevent goods passing to the enemy applies to all goods whether contraband or not. One port may be blockaded in an enemy country though it may not be possible to blockade all. But blockade must be impartial, that is, the belligerent must not stop the goods of one nation going to a port and allow goods of another to pass into that port.

The clear purpose of this rule is to place all neutrals on an equal footing, and the Americans complain that in effect the rule is violated because we exclude their ships from German ports on the North Sea and the Baltic, while Scandinavian ships succeed in trading with those ports. So far as the North Sea ports are concerned, it does not appear that the facts justify any complaint. So far as the Baltic is concerned, the complaint is plausible rather than convincing. It would be justified if there were any evidence that we were deliberately favouring Scandinavian trade while blocking out American trade. But the authors of the American Note know perfectly well that we are, within the limits of our power, absolutely impartial. The case of the Baltic is exceptional. Until we succeeded in sending our submarines into that sea we had no means of controlling the movements of ships within it. To argue that we ought on that account to abstain from controlling the commerce that crosses the open sea is more ingenious than ingenuous.

It may, however, be admitted that the kind of blockade which the British Government has established does give rise to numerous technical difficulties. Many of the difficulties could have been avoided if we had not hampered ourselves with the Declaration of London. There is reason to suspect that the Declaration was welcomed in some quarters as a partial substitute for an adequate navy. Apparently the conception was that this country was to maintain a perpetual neutrality and to make profit by supplying goods to any countries that happened to be at war with one another, regardless of the possibility that our command of the sea might have to be used as the main weapon of offence and defence in a war of our own. The country has now been told that the Declaration of London is dead. Do not let us continue to cumber ourselves with its corpse.

Lastly, the Note appears to claim that the Prize Courts of a belligerent country are not a proper tribunal to deal with the questions which arise with regard to the seizure and confiscation of ships or cargoes. This claim is directly at variance with the practice established in the past. The rule was clearly stated by Lord Stowell and has been recognised ever since that 'questions of prize have always been matters of the 'domestic jurisdiction of the captor's country.' Such a rule is essential in time of war if the rights of seizure which a belligerent has are to be effectively exercised at all. At the same time it is equally clear from the same high authority that 'the Court is bound to administer the Law of Nations 'to the subjects of other countries in the different relations 'in which they may be placed towards this country and its 'Government.' If the tribunals of a belligerent country disregard this principle, if in fact it is their practice to decide cases in a manner which contravenes the fundamental principles of International Law, a case arises for diplomatic intervention.

The English Prize Courts do not claim to act, and have not as a matter of fact acted, in contravention of any such principles. Lord Stowell always appealed to them; Sir Samuel Evans has worthily followed in the footsteps of his great predecessor.

It is impossible to contend that the procedure of the English Courts has not been directed with scrupulous fairness to discover the truth and do justice between the captors and captured. Anyone reading the recent as well as the older

decisions will be struck by the care taken to note every fact tending to show that any particular consignment was really intended for a particular consignee to be used in a neutral country, and how, where such facts were proved, the cargoes were regularly released. On the other hand, wherever a cargo was condemned, it was on the fundamental principles of International Law that the condemnation was justified.

The jurisdiction of the Prize Courts and the power of the captor's country to regulate their procedure cannot be given up. It is possibly true that an English Prize Court would be bound by an Order in Council even if that Order were at variance with the principles of International Law. If such a case should arise the matter would be one to be settled by diplomacy; but no such case has arisen. Our Courts have not in fact given, and are not likely to give, decisions contrary to the true principles of International Law. It is to these they regularly appeal. American decisions are cited and weighed carefully in the judgments that have been pronounced. The Court has held the scales of justice with even hand. Facts do not support the contention that the English Prize Courts are so fettered by Orders in Council that they cannot do justice to neutrals.

To sum up, it may be suggested that the following propositions cover all action which it is necessary or desirable for this country to take in the exercise of its naval power :

1. A belligerent may stop on the high seas goods which are in fact destined for the enemy and are of such a character as to be likely to be used to aid him in carrying on the war, even though the goods are in the first instance consigned to a neutral country.

2. The belligerent must prevent his own subjects from exporting such goods to neutrals in a position to pass them on to the enemy, unless a proper guarantee can be obtained that the goods will be exclusively used by the neutral and none of them exported to a belligerent.

3. It is useless and indeed undesirable to trouble to prevent the enemy from obtaining from a neutral any goods, which by their nature cannot really aid him in prosecuting the war.

The American Note ends with the declaration that the

'task of championing the integrity of neutral rights which have received the sanction of the civilised world against the lawless conduct of belligerents, arising out of the bitterness of the great

conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that task it will devote its energies.'

England may assuredly welcome that declaration and await the fulfilment of the task. The war was begun by the most flagrant violation of the rights of neutrals which the world has ever seen. It was to fulfil a pledge given to a neutral State that England entered on the war as a united nation and has sworn to continue the war until the outraged neutral has been restored to its independence and received redress for its wrongs. We recognise the unique position in which the United States is placed, by its immense population, its gigantic wealth, its remoteness from the present sphere of warfare, to play the part of champion of neutral rights. Are we to learn that the unprovoked and sudden invasion of a neutral country, the destruction of its historic buildings, the massacre of its old men and children, the violation and mutilation of its women, are matters of less importance to the champion of neutral rights than the observance of juridical technicalities or than the possible loss of a few extra profitable war contracts ? It is for America and America alone to decide what course is consistent with her own honour and dignity.

Let us at any rate recognise a Monroe doctrine with regard to the American conscience. England has no need to plead that in fulfilment of a pledge to protect the neutrality of a weaker State, as well as to preserve her own existence, she is engaged in a struggle taxing her resources to the utmost, that she has set her hand to the task she will never abandon until independence is restored to Belgium, until its exiles can return to their homes and its people enjoy security from outrage. By her own sea power she will protect her shores, and by that power she will continue to take measures to protect, not only her own vessels and the lives of her own citizens, but also those of neutral countries. She will continue the struggle to the end with inflexible determination, and meanwhile will be prepared to discuss calmly and judicially—as though 'twere but ' a pretty case of paltry legacies '—the claims put forward by the United States, proposing only a reasonable interpretation and application, as adapted to present conditions, of the principles of International Law.

Alfred Hopkinson.

Postscript.—This article was already in print before the issue of the very important White Paper which appeared in the press of January 5th. That Paper will enable the country to understand better the purpose and general success of the steps recently taken by the Government as regards German export and import trade as well as the difficulties which had to be met. It may be worth pointing out that if the argument above stated is sound, all that the British Government has done can be justified under general principles without reference, as regards the rights of neutrals, either to the Order in Council of March 1915, which is challenged by the United States, or to the special law relating to blockade in the technical sense, the rules of which the United States alleges to have been broken. A reasonable and indeed necessary development of the law of contraband to meet conditions existing at the present time is all that is required. However, the essential fairness of the action taken and the careful consideration shown for the rights of neutrals will be clear, on whichever ground the British policy is justified. It may be said generally that the maximum injury to the enemy's fighting power with the minimum of inconvenience to neutrals has, on the whole, been secured by the measures recently taken. A. H.

THE MOBILISATION OF INDUSTRY FOR WAR

WHEN this war comes to be reviewed in proper perspective its social and economic aspects will be found at least as remarkable as the military events, and perhaps more instructive. And among them the influence of war on industry and the converse influence of industry on war will take a prominent place. We are, indeed, witnessing a phenomenon so extraordinary and unexpected that we can only see its surface as we pass, and are hardly able to comprehend even that. There has been no time to look beneath and try to read the deeper meaning of it all. But some lessons present themselves which he who runs may read. Never before has the supreme concerted effort demanded by war been so fully brought out and the inscrutable mystery of human conduct been so clearly posed as in this prodigious conflict of industrial nations.

War has been generally regarded as the business of soldiers and sailors, who are men of war. They have to be equipped for it and supplied with necessaries, but that is done by State establishments and a few contractors who specialise in those things. The part of the general public or main body of citizens is to carry on their civil business as well as they can and pay the cost. One would have expected that with the progressive division of labour or differentiation of function which accompanies the development of modern industrial and commercial communities this distribution of services would tend to become more accentuated. But the opposite has happened. War has directly absorbed a far larger proportion of the common energy than ever before, and there seems to be no limit to its power of absorption.

All the belligerent nations are similarly affected in the measure of their industrial development, and the absorption of war is not even confined to them. In neutral countries, too, civil manufactures have been mobilised and attached to the chariot of war upon an enormous scale. This is an astonishing spectacle, and the more closely it is examined the more astonishing it appears. All the accumulated mass of

knowledge, the slow-won mastery of natural forces and materials, the skill, the craftsmanship, the cunning manipulation and blending, the infinite variety of tools, the huge apparatus of world-wide transport by land and sea—all the means which man has in the lapse of ages gradually made his own and applied to maintain life, increase comfort, and serve his daily needs in countless ways—all these are suddenly turned to purely destructive purposes with an ardour and energy unknown to civil life.

These modern weapons of war! The public have grown familiar with some of them by name and take more interest in their production than they have ever done in the production of anything else. The workshop has become a common show visited by all sorts of people who never gave it a thought before in their lives and understand nothing of what they see now. Thousands and thousands have gone farther and learnt to work there for the first time. They know the inside now and have mastered the routine of some processes. But to appreciate what is going on one must take a wide survey and also know the factories and workshops as they are in ordinary times when performing their proper functions. Even then it is difficult to form, and quite impossible to convey, an adequate conception of what war has done to industry and industry is doing for war.

In all the leading countries of the world which represent the fine flower of our civilisation, millions and millions of men and women, directed by the highest technical ability with centuries of science and invention behind it, are labouring day and night, with all the energy they can muster, to produce wonderful things of the most exquisite finish, perfect in form and symmetry, miracles of ingenuity—all for what? To destroy and be destroyed. It is only a development, of course, and a logical one. War has always demanded the best implements that can be got, and the weapons of savages are the most perfect things that they make. Similarly the weapons and armour of the Middle Ages bespoke the most cunning craftsmanship of the day. Since then science and invention have changed the mode, but the same principle still rules, though we had lost sight of it. There is, however, a profound difference entailed by the nature of modern armaments. Weapons have not only changed in character and increased in

power, quantity and variety out of the range of any comparison with the old, but the most important and ingenious of them are of such a nature that their use involves their own destruction. Even a gun has a very short life, and the larger it is the shorter its life. That is to say, the more material, power, and labour you expend upon its construction the sooner it destroys itself. But the explosives have no life at all. If they explode as they ought they automatically cease to exist. And these are the cunning things, the offspring of the deepest scientific research and the highest technical skill—the torpedoes, and time fuses, and high explosive shells.

It used not to be so. The savage fashioning his club or spear with loving care made something that would last him long, with luck perhaps a lifetime. So too with the armourer. He knew that the swords and daggers and mail of proof that were his pride and bore his mark would be valued and cherished and handed down. Some of them have been handed down to this day and still do honour to the hand that made them. The bowman could bend his favourite bow in many a fight and not infrequently recover his arrows. There was some sense in putting trouble and skill into these things. Modern munitions of war lack this quality altogether. They are all doomed to the scrap-heap in a few years at most—even the battleship, the largest, most complicated, powerful, and costly of all. Yet the people who produce them are as keen as though they were turning out things to stand for ever to be admired in a palace of art. 'Look at those shells,' a shop manager will say; 'aren't they beauties?' And indeed they are, not merely in the sight of a shell-expert but to anyone with an eye for texture, harmonious lines, absolute symmetry and perfect finish. He is proud of their quality and quantity, as the work of the shop for which he is responsible. The workmen under him have less responsibility for the product and less pride in it. But the best of them are keen and proud too. They all work harder than they have ever done before. It never occurs to anyone to think of the fate of their handiwork, or to reflect that the 'beauties' they are so proud of are only there to blow themselves to atoms and in doing so to knock other good products of industry to pieces, which the old weapons never did. If they trouble to think at all, it is to reflect

with satisfaction that the work of their hands is going to destroy its fair share of enemy life and is well sacrificed in doing so.

These general observations are not intended to lead up to any moralising on war, though they may seem to invite it. They are an introduction to a more detailed and particular account of the amazing mobilisation of industry for war in this country. The points mentioned—the self-destructiveness of modern weapons, which entails their incessant renewal; the brains and skill devoted to their construction and necessitated by their delicate and complex character; their variety and multiplicity; the keenness of the producers and the pride in their work—all these are conditions which must be understood in order to appreciate both the task and the achievement.

But before going on to that, just a word on the moral to be drawn from what has been said, in anticipation of anyone who is tempted to moralise. At first sight the dedication of the fine flower of what we call progress, and boast of as the glory of our age, to the business of pure destruction on this tremendous scale strikes one as a more trenchant satire on human intelligence than the bitterest satirist has ever penned. And perhaps it is. But the very senselessness of the proceeding and the ardour with which it is pursued indicate that this is a shallow deduction. They reveal some deeper impulse of overmastering potency which lies beyond the superficial vision of the 'great illusion' school. It is an impulse peculiar to man, who alone of all living things makes war, and one bound up with his very nature. The secret has not been plumbed by any of the philosophers and jurists who have analysed war. They never get beyond the principle of self-preservation, which is obviously inadequate because it is common to all living things, whereas the distinctive mark of war is its exclusively human character. However, this is not the place to go further into the abstract question. It only belongs here because it lies behind the extraordinary phenomenon presented by the industrial nations of to-day, which have mobilised their industrial forces for war.

This country affords the most striking example of all for three reasons: (1) it is the most purely industrial; (2) its industries were less prepared for war than those of any other

belligerent ; (3) they have undergone the greatest transformation. The first point is a truism on which nothing need be said. The second is highly important and will be discussed immediately. The third may perhaps be disputed, but it really follows the second. The relation between the two is the main subject of this article.

We entered upon war with adequate means for naval equipment, or such as could be easily expanded to meet the requirements ; but our means for military equipment were on the lowest plane ever reached in modern times. This state of things was deliberately brought about as part of the system of national economy, which was itself a result of our political system. It is idle to blame anybody, because if the responsibility for any of these matters is followed up the trail always leads back eventually to the electors, who are all of us. But the fact remains, and a pretty costly form of economy it has proved to be. The staff of men employed in producing munitions for the Army had been brought down to a few thousand, mainly engaged in the State establishments of which Woolwich Arsenal is the chief. In times past from 30,000 to 40,000 men have been employed there. Before the war the number had been reduced to 8000 or less, and the arsenal does work for the Navy as well as the Army. It is the headquarters for ordnance of all kinds. For small-arms and ammunition there are two State factories, at Enfield and Waltham Abbey ; and these too had been reduced.

Outside the Government establishments we have a number of private firms scattered about the country and ordinarily engaged in making munitions of war. But they all make other things as well, and the proportion of commercial to war work varies according to the orders received. That is the case with similar firms in other countries, and consequently the relative capacity of different countries to produce war material depends in a great measure on the orders for that class of work received by private firms. Such orders come almost entirely from governments, because they alone use war material in any quantity. And there are two sources—the home Government and foreign States. Our own armament firms are generally well supplied with orders for naval material from both sources and are able to keep their works in an efficient state ; but home orders are the more important item.

They precede the foreign demand and in a measure determine it for the following reasons.

When any State wishes to place an order of this kind abroad it looks round the market to get the best value for its money like any other customer. Quality is usually the first requisite and rapidity of execution the second ; but, other things being equal, price determines the choice. Now private firms which are kept well and regularly employed on home orders are thereby placed in a favourable position to execute outside orders, which are occasional and irregular. Their yards and workshops are busy and well-staffed, their machinery in good order and up-to-date, and they are in close touch with the sources of material and of tools. They can expand either at short notice. So they are able to command both quality and speed of execution. They acquire a reputation and are in a position to tender on favourable terms. Conversely, if they are ill supplied with home orders everything gets out of gear and tends rapidly to deteriorate. They lose reputation and cannot get outside orders. Eventually they are forced to give up and make something else.

Our makers for the Navy were in the first position, those for the Army in the second. Fortunately, there is no hard-and-fast line between them. Some firms worked for the War Office as well as the Admiralty, and since the requirements of the latter are much more exacting the transition can be made without difficulty in certain kinds of munitions. Had it not been so, our position would have been far worse than it was ; for at the beginning of the war the private manufacture of military munitions was reduced to a still lower level than the Government establishments. Some firms, after waiting in vain for orders, had definitely given it up ; in other factories it had dwindled away to vanishing point and was only kept going at all on things for practice or sporting purposes. Industrially, we had beaten our swords into ploughshares, as though ' the promised time when war shall be no more ' had arrived. And that was how we went into a war which sundry Ministers responsible for it now say they knew to be imminent. This is not recalled with any political intent, but as an integral part of the story. The ministerial mentality corresponded with the state of productive incapacity for which it was responsible ; and the transformation of the latter has been accomplished by virtue of an equivalent change in the former.

No other belligerent State was in such a bad case at the outset of war, because none had let down its productive resources in the same way. Both France and Germany were in a conspicuously superior position. Their military munition works are kept well employed both by home and foreign orders. Krupp's are no doubt the largest makers of ordnance in the world, but if the military experts of other countries were asked to award a prize for field artillery the majority would probably vote for MM. Schneider. In small arms the Mauser gets the best of the market. It has been part of the German economic policy to assist and encourage the development of their industries in general ; but special attention has been paid to the munition makers, who have been systematically advertised and assisted to undersell competitors by export bounties. This had, of course, a military as well as a commercial object and was part of the German preparation for war.

The knowledge of their superior equipment for production undoubtedly exercised an influence on their counsels in determining the hour for action. The German visit to Sheffield shortly before the diplomatic fuse was fired was not a pure coincidence. Herr Krupp von Bohlen has been much hurt by the suspicion that he came to spy out the land under cover of hospitality; but he was accompanied by one of his chief technical experts who saw all that he could. He did not see anything he was meant not to see, but he saw enough to form a pretty good general idea. The visit was a trick, and a characteristic one. If it were repeated now, it would open the eyes of the Germans. For next to the brilliant feat of the Navy in wiping out the German submarines—which has saved us from certain defeat—our greatest achievement is the creation of the colossal system of war industry that exists to-day. But to see that in its full extent the visitors would have to sweep the country from Cornwall to Aberdeen and from Loch Lomond to the Downs.

When we went to war only a limited number of establishments were in a position to accept orders, and as most of them were doing still more urgent work for the Admiralty, they could only take War Office orders on a large scale by giving up commercial work, extending their workshops, and subcontracting. The most important group is at Sheffield, where five large armament firms have their headquarters, with other establishments and offshoots elsewhere. Three of them have

shipyards also—Vickers at Barrow, Cammell and Laird at Birkenhead, and John Brown at Clydebank—besides other works. An important offshoot is the Coventry Ordnance Works, jointly owned by John Brown (with whom Firths is associated) and Cammell and Laird. The fifth Sheffield firm is Hadfield's, who specialise in projectiles. These five Sheffield firms, being equipped for heavy work of all kinds, have played a most important part in arming our forces. There are two other great firms of a similar character elsewhere—namely Armstrong's at Newcastle and Openshaw (Manchester), and Beardmore's at Glasgow. These seven firms have been and are the backbone of our industrial army in war. They are able to undertake nearly every class of work, large and small, from fuses to battleships ; and their aggregate resources far exceed those of Krupp's. But their particular strength lies in the heavier kinds of work which require appliances that cannot be improvised or set up in establishments of moderate size, such as big guns, gun mountings, the largest projectiles, armour plate, heavy castings for ships and ships' engines. This is mainly naval work, but some of the armament firms were also making guns and shells for the Army at the beginning of the war.

In addition to the ship-building firms already mentioned, there are others who ordinarily supply the Navy with various types of vessels. Palmer's, of Jarrow, is the most important. Yarrow's, on the Clyde, and Thornycroft's at Southampton, specialise in the smaller types of naval craft. There is also a firm at Dudley—Harper, Son and Bean—which has made large projectiles for the Navy for some years. This pretty well exhausts the list of private armament makers in the heavier classes of munitions. Then there are small arms and ammunition, cartridge cases, explosives and aircraft. Birmingham is the chief seat for the first three of these. It has one firm of rifle makers and three which manufacture rifle ammunition and gun cartridges. The chief makers of explosives are Nobel's. The air-craft industry, now gigantic and ubiquitous, was in its infancy.

Such, in outline, were our manufacturing resources for war, outside Government establishments, in August 1914. The scanty list of places itself indicates the preponderance of naval work. The Tyne, the Clyde, Barrow and Birkenhead are ship-building centres, and they were fed by Sheffield, Coventry

and Openshaw. Only Birmingham remains for purely military munitions. How many men were employed cannot be stated, but the number employed on military work was very small. In his speech in the House of Commons on the 20th of December, Mr. Lloyd George stated that between two-thirds and three-fourths of the engineers employed were engaged on naval work. But that estimate includes the War Office establishments. In private armament works the proportion must have been much higher, for some of the firms enumerated were doing no work for the War Office. Hadfield's, for instance, who were great makers of naval projectiles, used to make shell for the War Office too ; but some years ago, after repeated failures to obtain any further orders, and warnings that they would have to close the shell shops, to which no attention was paid, they gave it up. The makers of rifles, revolvers and ammunition were in a similar case and dependent on sporting and foreign orders.

The development of these slender and scattered resources into the colossal all-embracing organisation of to-day is an achievement of which the enemy deemed us incapable. And not the enemy only. The industrial prestige of Great Britain has been falling for many years and has sunk very low in most foreign countries. We are generally regarded as ' played-out ' and doomed to a gradual but hopeless decay ending in extinction. The Germans in particular have long been convinced of it, and this belief has a great deal to do with their contempt for us and the theory of their own destiny which inspires their military aims. They regard themselves as having already taken our pride of place in industry and as on the road to take it in commerce. The logical corollary is that they are destined to supersede the British Empire. So strong is the conviction of their own superiority that they believe we are conscious of it too. And this view provides them with an argument, which they consider unanswerable, for the popular theory that we planned and got up the war. It is set out in innumerable pamphlets; and the motive put forward is the consciousness of our inability to compete in industry and commerce. Envious of German success and despairing of the capacity to cope with it peacefully, we are supposed to have invoked the aid of war by conspiring with our Allies for the overthrow of Germany in order to destroy her trade. They find confirmation in

war-against-German-trade agitations carried on here, urging that advantage should be taken of the war to cripple German trade for good and keep it in a state of permanent subjection hereafter. They point to this campaign as proof of hatred, envy and fear on our part, and it undeniably gives colour to that view, so far as it goes. Happily for us, it does not go far. The future of our trade and industry will depend on our own exertions, not on a vain attempt to effect the permanent economic strangulation of Germany.

The organisation of industry for war is a better answer to the charge of incapacity than these projects. It reveals the latent power which superficial observers miss, but which is still there and equal to any emergency when roused into activity by the pressure of necessity. It reveals strength where we were thought to be weakest, and that is in the faculty for organisation. Only German professors imagine that British manufacturers have forgotten how to manufacture, that British engineers cannot design tools or British workmen use them. The professors actually think that. They say that we cannot make a big breech-loading gun or master a new type of machine, or even comprehend, much less imitate, their submarines ; and their confidence rests in a great measure on that belief. German manufacturers and engineers know better. What they think is that we have grown lazy from over prosperity, which is not only true but pretty nearly the whole truth. Nobody, however, credits us with a capacity for organisation. We ourselves think it one of our weakest points, and in a sense it is. We do not take kindly to it ; we prefer to muddle along anyhow so long as it is possible. But that is a very different thing from being incapable of it when muddling along has brought us to disaster and we are faced by necessity.

That has happened now, and the result will surprise the superficial critics. A total change has been effected ; what was our weakest point is being converted into the strongest, and that has been accomplished by purposeful effort on a methodical plan. The process is not yet complete, and there are still difficulties to overcome ; but that is not the fault of the plan. They are partly due to the mere magnitude of the task and partly to antecedent circumstances. But what has been accomplished amply proves that the nation

possesses as much energy and capacity as ever it did, and that when put to the test our business men can organise as well as any others. For the work of the Ministry of Munitions during the last six months is essentially a feat of organisation by business men.

It is not their fault that it was not done long before. They were willing enough and freely offered their services from the beginning. What made us so slow in getting to work on the right lines and kept us so far and so long behind the other belligerent nations was official incapacity or refusal to recognise the situation; and obstinate adherence to old ideas and methods hopelessly inadequate to this new and unprecedented emergency. It was due, in one word, to stupidity—good, honest, downright stupidity—the quality to which all our failures and blunders in this war are at bottom due. It is a quality which Providence, in its wisdom, has scattered so liberally and impartially over this happy land that every section of the community has its share and is not in a position to gird overmuch at the others. They have all made an exhibition of themselves, and none more than the newspapers whose business it is to set everybody else right. Let us humbly acknowledge our defects—our own, not each other's, of which we are all conscious—and labour together to correct them; but the first step is to acknowledge them.

Reluctance to acknowledge defects has stood in the way of improvement all along, and still stands in the way of completing the task; but the progress made justifies confident hopes. After Mr. Lloyd George's statement on December 20, there is no need to go back to old controversial matters except in so far as it is necessary in order to make clear what has been done. Some confusion of mind prevails about it, which is not surprising; for it is a tangled tale of gradual evolution effected by successive changes in an intricate network of threads crossed and re-crossed in a bewildering way. It is being reduced to order as the functions of the Ministry of Munitions become extended and defined; but the relationship between the old and the new elements, between the several Government departments and between them and manufacturers, is not easy to comprehend. What has happened is that, while the Admiralty remains master in its own sphere,

the Munitions Department has gradually taken over the supply of weapons from the War Office. This has necessarily been a gradual process, because the Ministry had to be created from the beginning and its organisation built up by degrees. It was originally formed in consequence of the shell crisis in May, and the deficiency in that branch of munitions which could no longer be concealed or endured. It was at first supplementary to the functions of the War Office. The need of tapping fresh sources of supply for this particular munition had been at length brought home to the Government, and Mr. Lloyd George, who had either realised the situation more clearly or was less afraid to tackle it than anyone else, undertook the task. His speech at Bangor, so far back as February, had shown his grasp of the munitions problem and his concern about it. Our manufacturing resources had only been drawn upon to a limited extent and the immediate task was to bring them more fully into operation for the production of shell, and particularly high-explosive shell for field artillery.

It was not that the War Office and the armament makers had done nothing. On the contrary, both had been plunged from a state of stagnation into one of extreme activity from the first, and had made great exertions to meet the emergency. The Government and the private factories enlarged their staffs and made arrangements for increasing production as rapidly as possible. And they did increase it. But the problem was still viewed in the light of past experience and measured by former standards. When a more adequate estimate of its magnitude began to dawn on the Government or their advisers in the course of the autumn, fresh efforts were made, but still on the same lines. The armament makers did their best. They put out increasing quantities of work on sub-contract, extended their factories and started new ones. But as the demands of Navy and Army grew more and more insistent during the winter, delivery failed more and more to keep pace. As we have already seen, most of the firms were equipped for naval but not for military work ; and since the increased demands of the Admiralty fully taxed their existing resources the execution of military orders in addition required fresh supplies of labour, machinery, and material,

which took longer to procure in the prevailing conditions than had been estimated. Sub-contractors similarly miscalculated their capacity to fulfil orders in the emergency and found themselves unable to deliver. Interference with railways and other transport services for military purposes augmented difficulties and delays. A general scramble for men, machinery, and material went on all over the country. Competitive rates were offered for labour, with the result that a certain proportion of men did less work than before because they could earn all they wanted in a shorter time. Overtime and Sunday work at higher rates fostered this tendency, and lost time from absence was added to delay in the delivery of tools and material as a standing factor in holding up work.

All this confusion in the workshops was aggravated by conflicting orders and changing demands at headquarters, as the authorities revised their views of what was required in the light of experience. In addition to the adoption of new estimates of quantity on an unheard-of scale, a gradual conversion of ideas was taking place, not without many struggles, about types of guns and projectiles in favour of larger field-guns and howitzers, a much greater proportion of machine guns and of high explosive shells. It was the last item which brought about a crisis in May and led to the creation of the Ministry of Munitions. Mr. Lloyd George has since told us that the output of high explosive shells in May was only 2500 a day with 13,000 of shrapnel against 250,000 by the German factories. The deliveries were only 16 per cent. of the promises. The primary function of the new Ministry was to accelerate and extend the production of this particular munition.

It began with a scheme for organising on a systematic plan the hitherto unused resources scattered about the country. The method adopted was the formation of local committees working for the Ministry and under its supervision. The principle was not new. It had been adopted by the War Office earlier in the year for the fuller utilisation of manufacturing resources in the North-Eastern and Clyde districts, where local committees were set up at Newcastle and Glasgow respectively. But the new scheme was comprehensive and on somewhat different lines. The Tyne and the Clyde are

armament centres, and the large armament firms, with which the War Office dealt direct, were naturally predominant there. The Munitions Office, on the other hand, aimed at bringing in outside manufacturers from all quarters, quite apart from armament firms. It appealed to other employers, who understood engineering and possessed plant capable of being applied to shell-making, and proposed that they should combine and undertake a certain amount of work for the Government. In order to make the scheme thoroughly comprehensive the whole kingdom was mapped out into areas, of which there are twelve—eight in England, two in Scotland, and two in Ireland ; and committees were established in the principal towns to organise the resources of the district in the manner best suited in their judgment to local conditions.

This scheme was inaugurated in June and gradually carried out in the ensuing months. It was the first attempt at systematic and comprehensive organisation. What had previously been done to utilise resources outside the armament makers was considerable in volume, but partial and haphazard. While some manufacturers who had secured orders were held up for lack of men or machinery, others had both standing idle but could get no orders. The Government had taken powers in March under the Defence of the Realm Act to commandeer any factory for war purposes, and sundry committees had been formed for the purpose of introducing order into the prevailing confusion and accelerating operations ; but the business was too big to be handled on the old lines, and such reforms were quite inadequate. It must not be supposed, however, that all the efforts made in the winter and spring went for nothing. On the contrary, they effected a great extension of means, which is still the backbone of our production. The armament makers and other manufacturers working for them or direct for the War Office displayed intense activity in transforming old workshops and in building, equipping, and staffing new ones on a great scale. These operations had not had time to bear fruit in the spring ; but they have since matured and are the main source of that improved supply which so heartened our Army in the autumn, and has gone on improving ever since.

Some misapprehension prevails on this subject, and there is

a disposition to ascribe all the new resources to the Ministry of Munitions. But the largest and most important of those now in operation were started earlier, and they furnish the most striking evidence of the energy of our manufacturers and their capacity to rise to an emergency. It is not confined to guns and ammunition or other weapons, but includes every sort of appliance, and some important groups of production are still under the War Office. An idea of the activity and versatility of our manufacturers may be gained from a list of things being produced by individual firms, whose workshops have been converted to war purposes. Here are three typical instances at Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester respectively: (1) shells of different sizes, airplanes, armoured cars, ambulance wagons and other vehicles, X-ray, electric light and sterilising outfits; (2) small-arms ammunition up to 8,000,000 rounds a week, ditto French, machine-gun mountings, fuse igniters, machinery for making artillery cartridge cases, small-arms ammunition and rifles, shell presses, shell-milling machines, turbines, dynamos and motors; (3) shells of different sizes and kinds, fuses, mines, periscopes, switch-gears, motors and oil engines for submarines. Nevertheless, in spite of all the enterprise and activity, there was no effective organisation, no methodical attempt made to utilise all the incomparable resources of the country or to make the best use of those which were utilised. The Ministry of Munitions has essayed to do both by such a system of organisation as has never been attempted before in this country, and has certainly not been surpassed, if it has been equalled, in others.

The scheme for increasing the output of shell, outlined above, is part of the system, and it has been explained first because it was the beginning. But its intrinsic importance must not be overrated. It has appreciably increased the output, and will do so still more as the local efforts mature more fully and gain in efficiency. But it is essentially a scheme for gathering up many units, both small and large, but particularly the small, and enabling them to contribute in one way or another. And its interest lies in the fact that it has raked the country with a tooth-comb for all the spare units available. It may not have caught them all yet, but it has caught

an immense number over a surprisingly large area. It is not confined to industrial districts; it penetrates into remote regions associated only with agriculture or pleasure resorts. One of the twelve areas is the West of England, with Bristol for headquarters and feelers that run down to Somerset, Devon, and Cornwall. Another is East Anglia, where contributions are levied among the Broads and bathing-places. Wherever two or three lathes are gathered together, there some help is being given. There is a house in London—West Central district—where a man and his wife have given up two rooms, a bed-room and a sitting-room, and have installed four lathes. They are making caps for some form of ammunition, and since there was not room enough for the metal rod, from which the caps are made, to be fed into the machine, they knocked a hole in the wall to give it play. This case illustrates the spirit which the munitions net is able to catch and the small forces thereby enrolled in the service.

That is at one end of the scale. At the other are the complete factories—the so-called national shell factories—set up in the industrial towns. They are generally established in existing buildings which have been re-arranged, adapted and equipped by local business men possessing the requisite technical knowledge and experience. The expense is borne by the Government and the managers give their services. There are now thirty-three of these factories at work, and the best of them have attained a high degree of efficiency. The staffs employed range from 300 or 400 to 1000 persons. Between these two types come all sizes and kinds of workshops, from regular engineering works, which are able to take complete orders on a considerable scale, to small repairing shops, which can make parts. The number of such shops is very great; almost every establishment in which machinery is used has one, and some of them are both large and efficient. The big textile mills, for instance, usually have very good machine shops, quite capable of undertaking fine work. There is no uniform plan; the method adopted varies with circumstances. In some cases tools have been assembled from a number of establishments; in others the work is distributed in parts, which are assembled elsewhere; in others again successive processes on the same body have been undertaken in different shops. The latter

methods are, however, found to present serious practical difficulties in the transport of material and inspection of the work done. The complete shell factory is the more efficient method, when once it has been set going.

However, enough has been said about this particular field to show how it has brought latent resources into play. We will go on to the other developments of the Munitions Office, and particularly the central organisation, which is much more remarkable though less known than the peripheral organisation already sketched.

The complaint is still often made, with much ill-directed sarcasm, that the Government do not make use of the business capacity of the nation. 'Why do they not put the production 'of munitions into the hands of practical men?' is a favourite question asked by knowing people in newspapers and elsewhere. They will be surprised to hear that the Munitions Office is staffed with practical men of the highest standing and capacity. The local committees of business men and engineers at the circumference, described above, have their counterpart at the centre in Whitehall in such a collection of practical men as has never been got together before. They have been lent by a number of the largest, most enterprising and most successful concerns of different kinds that we possess. It would be too much to say that they have no equals in their own lines, but not too much to say that they have no superiors. There are heads of firms, managers and engineers from such armament works as Armstrong's and John Brown's, such business and engineering concerns as the great railway companies and the Cambrian Colliery Combine, such contractors as Pearson's, such trading houses as Harrod's and the Bombay and Burmah Trading Company, such tool-makers as Alfred Herbert's and so on. None of the knowing critics could suggest so good a list; they do not know enough. There is, for instance, the Bombay and Burmah Trading Company. It is said to be the largest trading concern in existence, and the reader will perhaps be inclined to believe it when he learns that one of the assets of that company is £4,000,000 worth of trained elephants alone. Yet the manager of this immense business is content to occupy an assistant's seat in a sub-office of the Supply Department.

The gentlemen referred to are not ornamental figure-heads or members of advisory committees, but working parts of the administrative machinery. Nor are they just dotted about in a haphazard way. Each has his own work to do and his own place in a highly organised system, which will be presently described. The Department is a machine built on a design and composed of parts adjusted to their proper functions. And it is a working machine. Not perfect, of course, either in design or in working, and not free from the reproach of many defects in execution ; but a fine piece of mechanism to have been built up from the ground in so short a time, and equipped to perform such a huge and complicated task, taken over in a state of extreme confusion. It is worth dwelling on for the encouragement of our friends and the discomfiture of our enemies. The Department is so large and the details so numerous—the staff numbers over 3000—that it is difficult to explain the plan of organisation without making omissions or mistakes, for which indulgence is asked from those who are better informed. The best way to gain a clear idea is to define and classify the objects in view.

The final cause of the Ministry of Munitions is the supply of military weapons—that is, guns and projectiles, small arms and ammunition, bombs, grenades, mortars and all the material needed for trench warfare. Its function is to supply all these things in the greatest possible abundance, and therefore the main body or trunk of the organisation is the Munition Supply Department, of which Sir Frederick Black is director-general. It includes a number of sub-departments which may be likened to the internal organs of the body, and it has also attached to it a number of subsidiary appendages which may be likened to limbs. The sub-departments are settled naturally by the several classes of weapons to be provided. These are, briefly, (1) shells and grenades, etc. ; (2) field guns, etc. ; (3) machine guns, rifles, etc., with (4) a co-ordinating department which deals with priority of demand, foreign orders, shipping and statistics.

The largest of these sub-departments is the first, for the deficiency of shell was, as already explained, the origin of the Ministry ; and it is in this branch of munitions that both the need and the possibility of increasing production were greatest. The production of shell sub-department, as it may be called,

is subdivided into several others. One of these has technical charge of the local organisations described above ; and the engineer at the head of it is kept in constant touch by a technical representative stationed in each of the chief district centres and working with the local boards of management. A second subdivision is charged with the supply of materials to the factories and local boards ; a third looks after the supply of machine tools ; and a fourth arranges for the filling of the shell bodies and other articles produced. In short, each of the four is responsible for one of the main requirements, which are (1) factories ; (2) materials ; (3) tools ; (4) filling.

These details will give some idea of the central organisation dealing with production. As an illustration of the qualifications of the gentlemen looking after these practical matters and to show how thoroughly their several spheres of action are being worked, it may be mentioned that the head of the machine tool department is the head of the most enterprising firm of makers that we have, and that he has working under him experts representing each of the principal machine tool districts in the country, which are Lancashire, the West Riding, the Midlands and Clyde-side. One of the great difficulties encountered all along has been the enormous quantity of tools required for equipping workshops, both new and old. They have been procured wholesale from the United States, but the demand has far exceeded all sources of supply. Our own capacity for production is very great in the aggregate, and at a comparatively early stage the Government laid an embargo on all the makers ; but the production and distribution needed organising, and that has been done in the manner described.

As the work of the Ministry has developed and additional functions have been taken over from the War Office, new departments have been added. The latest is that of the State arsenals, which have recently been transferred. This is a very important and necessary move. The management of Woolwich Arsenal has been the object of bitter and unfounded attacks in the House of Commons and elsewhere. Nothing so damaging to us, so disheartening to our Army and our Allies, and so encouraging to the enemy has been said anywhere as the charge of hopeless inefficiency against the national arsenal. It implied absolute incapacity in the production of munitions, because the arsenal is the head,

centre and nerve ganglion of the whole system. It was based on a tissue of mis-statements disinterred from a local Socialist paper of months before, and to anyone with a knowledge of workshop management obviously worthless on the face of them. The arsenal was open to reorganisation and improvement ; all factories are, at pretty frequent intervals, and it had suffered from starvation and stagnation for years through those very political influences which furnished the attack. But the charge of gross mismanagement was unfounded and malicious. That was not the reason for transfer. The Arsenal is not merely a manufacturing establishment ; it is the authoritative centre for specifications and gauges, and the seat of final inspections and tests. When the general responsibility for production passed to the Munitions Office and the field of manufacture became enormously enlarged the central technical establishment, as an organic part of the whole, was necessarily transferred to the same control. The co-ordination required for more complete efficiency could not otherwise have been effected. It has permitted, among other things, the distribution of supervisory functions, the centralisation of which in a single establishment hundreds of miles from most seats of manufacture had become a serious hindrance to expeditious despatch. The whole has now been reorganised by distinguished railway engineers. One result, which may have an important influence in accelerating production, is that the new control will facilitate the simplification of design and relaxation of rigid specification which practical engineers believe to be possible.

So much for the central organisation of production. A brief mention of some supplementary departments must suffice. One of these looks after the local areas in regard to non-technical matters, which are very numerous and varied. Questions are constantly cropping up which need consultation and adjustment. Another department is in charge of inventions. Complaints have been rife about the treatment of inventors and ideas submitted by them. It is to be hoped that the arrangements now made have improved matters. At least they are sufficiently complete. The department is in charge of a practical engineer borrowed from a great firm of contractors, and he is assisted by an advisory panel which includes such men as Sir R. Hadfield, Sir J. J. Thomson,

Dr. R. T. Glazebrook, Major-General Sir G. K. Scott-Moncrieff, Sir Hiram Maxim and other gentlemen of the highest distinction in applied science. Explosives are in charge of another scientific committee, of which Lord Moulton is chairman.

There remains to be mentioned one more department which is in some respects the most important of all. It deals with Labour. We have seen how the other elements of production are being looked after—factories, materials and tools. The supply of labour has caused more difficulty than any of them. It would be outside the scope of this article, which is intended to explain the organisation of industry for war, to enter into the whole question of labour. We must be content to indicate the problem and the effort made to solve it. The chief difficulty consists in an insufficient supply of the skilled mechanics who are, not very happily, called engineers. If they were all angels there would not be nearly enough of them. That follows inevitably from the enormous extension of workshops, which is by far the most striking feature of the national effort. It must be seen to be realised. The great builders are the armament firms. They started building from the beginning of the war and they are still building. They have put up new workshops and entirely new factories by the square mile ; and their activity has been supplemented by many other manufacturers who have turned themselves into armament makers. The most enterprising engineering concerns that we possess have been doing it in all directions. The thing is on a stupendous scale. And nearly the whole of this entirely new workshop space, which runs into hundreds of acres, is intended for machinery which the engineers regard as their special province. It is a matter of plain arithmetic that there could not be nearly enough of them to go round, if not a single man had enlisted.

How many would be wanted altogether for the new work and the old it is impossible to say. Perhaps a million or more. Two armament firms alone—Armstrong's and Vickers'—are employing about 120,000 persons, dozens of other firms are employing from 5000 to 25,000, and hundreds are employing smaller numbers. Not all are in this class of work, of course, but the great bulk of them are. Only a limited proportion are skilled mechanics. The factories now at work are staffed

to a very great extent by other labour, unskilled, half-skilled, and, above all, female labour. It is only in this way that the work can be done at all. There are some highly important classes of work which can only be done by thoroughly trained and competent mechanics. Such, for instance, is the breech mechanism of a gun, which must be finished by hand with great accuracy, the making of gauges and tools and other things demanding the greatest precision. But in munition making there is an enormous amount of what is called repetition work—which means performing the same operation over and over again ; and this can be done by anybody after a little practice. It is not a skilled man's job at all ; his job is to set the machine, teach and supervise the unskilled.

The staffing of the factories depends on the willingness of the skilled engineers to assist in utilising unskilled labour. They have done so up to a point. They have generally raised no objections to the employment of women, and in some places they have permitted the employment of men too. But as the field of operations has extended, the adjustment of skilled and unskilled has become more difficult. The services of all the skilled men are needed for the superior work, and it is necessary to withdraw them from any work which can be done by the unskilled. But this requires a great deal of arrangement and cannot be done without their consent.

The organising work of the Munitions Office, therefore, in regard to labour is twofold. There is the general supply and the adjustment of skilled to unskilled. The first is in charge of a special department, of which Lord Murray is now the head, with officials from the Board of Trade under him. For the second there is a Labour Transference Committee, to which a number of large employers of labour give their services. It has already done a great deal of work and has more to do. But a very important adjunct is the ' National Advisory Committee on War Output,' which consists of leading trade union officials representing the trades most affected under the chairmanship of Mr. Arthur Henderson. Its function is to advise on labour questions, and particularly labour grievances.

The Labour Department is now the turning point of the whole scheme. We have got to this point. The manufacturing resources of the country are pretty thoroughly mobilised.

They consist of (1) the regular armament works with immense new extensions, (2) the large transformed engineering works with their extensions, (3) the further scattered and miscellaneous resources brought in by the special scheme of local committees. Material and equipment are arranged for, the orders for different classes of goods co-ordinated in co-operation with the Allies, the supervision of products reorganised, transport and delivery controlled from the centre. But to complete the scheme there remains to be added to the means of production a number of large new factories, the 'national projectile factories,' planned by the Ministry of Munitions. They have been erected and will be managed for the Government by the armament makers and a few big engineering firms. Some are already complete, others are approaching completion. They are intended for the production of ammunition for the new classes of heavy guns being made elsewhere, and absolutely essential to our military operations. The difficulty is the staffing, and particularly the supply of skilled engineers, of whom 80,000 are wanted. Men must be transferred from other and less important work, and they can be released by the substitution of women and unskilled men. The women have proved that they can do almost anything, and they require very little teaching and supervision. In one factory 320 women, with eight men to help them, are turning out 9000 18-pounder high explosive shells a week. They will be very largely employed, but some of the work is too heavy for them. The engineers must consent to the 'dilution' of the workshops by unskilled or half-skilled labour without reserve. Nothing less will complete the industrial effort and ensure victory.

A. Shadwell.

POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION

A YEAR ago the country was profoundly dissatisfied with the way in which the then Liberal ministry was conducting the war, and high hopes were entertained when the Coalition was formed in May last. It was then assumed almost universally that the combination of the best men of both parties and the definite removal of the possibility of party warfare would lead to a great increase of efficiency and to the concentration of the whole strength of the country on the one purpose of winning the war. After eight months' experience public opinion was certainly dissatisfied with the results achieved. More recently there has been a gratifying rally to the Government as the result of their decision upon the question of compulsion; but doubt is still felt as to the wisdom of the Coalition experiment. In particular, regret is constantly expressed at the loss of a regular Opposition. It is argued that a strong Opposition always watching the Government and ready at any moment to produce effective criticism would have provided a useful check upon the administration. The argument is of doubtful validity. Before the Coalition was formed there was a strong Opposition, but it did not effectively criticise the Government. On the contrary, it deliberately abstained from any serious criticism at all. And the reason was plain. The Opposition could not have criticised the Government and driven home its criticisms unless it had been willing to undertake the formation of an alternative Government. But the mere fact of that willingness, if it existed, would at once have discounted the value of the criticism. Opponents would have argued that the purpose of the criticism was not to improve the conduct of the war but to obtain the loaves and fishes of office, and instantly the ordinary party conflict would have been renewed on another plane. The leaders of the then Opposition, in spite of pressure from the rank and file of the party, were too patriotic to run that risk. They preferred to merge themselves in a Coalition Government,

although in so doing they sacrificed their political freedom without gaining the reality of power. The Liberals reserved for themselves a majority in the Cabinet, and behind that majority there remained unbroken the Liberal majority in the House of Commons. From the political point of view the whole effect of the change was the destruction of the Opposition. But we cannot restore the Opposition as it existed before the war except by going back to the old conflict between the outs and the ins, and that nobody wants. By common consent we have suspended the internal war between parties because of the external war in which our country is involved, and that suspension must continue so long as the greater war lasts.

But the disappearance of the regular Opposition has destroyed one of the essential parts of the machinery which has so long both created and controlled the successive Governments of the United Kingdom. In the absence of that essential part of the old machine we feel baffled. We do not know how to control the existing Government, still less do we know how to create a new one. A totally new type of machine is required for our present needs, but none has yet been discovered. Indeed it is doubtful whether any political mechanism can be devised to give the nation the results it now wants, so long as the ground remains cumbered with the litter of the old plant. Our old political system was designed to facilitate and maintain a perpetual warfare between two parties, each struggling for office. We cannot by altering a few wheels here and there adapt such a system to the purposes of a unified nation bent on the exclusive pursuit of national ends. If the nation is to get, and keep, the kind of Government it now yearns for, it must be prepared for a political reconstruction which will cut at least as deeply into our national life as did the system which broke down eight months ago.

The dominant characteristic of that system for nearly two generations has been the control of the House of Commons by the Cabinet. The old theory that Cabinet Ministers—the 'King's servants'—are responsible to the House of Commons has given way to the now established practice that the House of Commons is itself the servant of the Cabinet which in turn represents the party victorious at the polls. This inversion of rôles is the necessary result of the increased

rigidity of the party system, which followed upon the extension of the franchise. Where a multitude of votes have to be attracted by a candidate in order to secure election, it is imperative to create in each constituency an organisation to look after the voters. Given the party system, that organisation must be of a party character. The large majority of electors know little and care less about most of the issues which are debated in Parliament. But they generally possess a healthy human instinct for fighting, and as an election contest proceeds they take sides with ever-increasing enthusiasm, eager that their party should win. Naturally they will feel aggrieved if the man that they succeed in returning should go over to the enemy. Such a man would have little chance of ever being elected again, even though his action might have been entirely consistent with all his election pledges. It is not pledges or principles that the mass of the electorate cares about, but the party fight. Consequently members of Parliament are compelled, either for financial reasons or for fighting reasons, to be loyal to their party. It follows that the Government representing the victorious party can always rely upon its majority in the House of Commons and thus controls that House, instead of being controlled by it.

The Government in the last resort means the Prime Minister. He selects his own colleagues and can dismiss them at will. In effect, he has usurped the powers both of the Sovereign and of Parliament. That again is intelligible when the party system is in full working order. The leadership of a fighting organisation requires certain obvious qualities which can quickly be estimated by the rank and file of the organisation. A political party has comparatively little difficulty in choosing a leader, and if that party wins an election its victorious general becomes the ruler of the conquered kingdom. He gives orders equally to the King and to the House of Commons; the only limit to his power is the limit imposed by the fear that if he gives the Opposition too much material for destructive criticism they may succeed in turning his party out at the next general election.

Even in peace-time this can hardly be described as an ideal system of government; in war, as the country has seen, it breaks down altogether. The Opposition has vanished and cannot be restored. The Whips of the two parties work

together instead of working against one another. Between them they control probably eighty per cent. of the members of the House of Commons. Parliamentary criticism is therefore reduced to mere nagging, which is neither dignified nor effective. Sniping by franc-tireurs is a poor substitute for the clash of organised battalions.

Under present conditions the only effective restraint upon the Cabinet is the power of the press, and ministers show how conscious they are of that power by their childish petulance in dealing with newspaper criticisms. To some extent the increased power of the press is the result of influences which are independent of the war. For a long time past the value of parliamentary speeches has been declining because they can so seldom lead to any tangible result. Probably not once in a session is a speech delivered which determines even a single vote in the subsequent division. The only effect that parliamentary speeches can produce is through public opinion outside the House, and that effect is clearly dependent on the extent to which speeches are reported and read. The newspapers have discovered that long reports will not be read and occupy space which the purchaser of the paper would sooner see devoted to some other purpose. Speeches which took half an hour to deliver are cut down in the newspaper reports to half a dozen lines ; many speeches are not reported at all. It is characteristic of the official attitude of mind that the abridgement of the newspaper accounts of the proceedings in Parliament has been accompanied by an enormous expansion of the official report of those proceedings. In old days when ' Hansard ' was published by a private firm as a commercial undertaking, only the most important speeches were reported verbatim ; the rest were judiciously and in general very ably summarised. But as soon as the House of Commons became aware that nobody wanted to read what its members said, it abandoned the contract with the representatives of Hansard and established an official report of its own. In this publication, paid for with the money of the taxpayer, practically every speech is reported verbatim. Even members themselves can hardly be so foolish as to wish for a permanent record of most of their own speeches. Certainly no one else wants such a record. Probably not one elector in a million ever buys a copy of the official report. These

costly volumes serve no purpose whatever except to waste public money and to block up valuable space on the shelves of public libraries. The decadence of the House of Commons will certainly not be arrested by any number of volumes of the official Hansard.

The truth is that as long as the House of Commons can merely talk, its influence upon the country must decline, for mere talking is better done in the press. A newspaper article which can be read over the breakfast table has far more effect not only on public opinion but on the minds of Cabinet ministers themselves than a speech of an hour's duration in the House of Commons. In practice ministers refuse to waste their time by listening to parliamentary speeches either from opponents or from supporters, and they would certainly not dream of reading them. But they do read their newspapers, often it appears with some anxiety. As regards the man in the street, the superior influence of the press is even more marked. The newspaper is of necessity fashioned for his convenience since it flourishes upon his pence or halfpence. It sets forth facts, fictions, and opinions in such a way as to attract his notice and if possible to arrest his attention. His judgment of public affairs is perforce almost entirely guided by what he reads in his newspaper, or by what he hears from friends who have read other newspapers.

Thus under present conditions the newspaper press is the only power which stands between the Cabinet and the country. That is a grave defect in our political organisation. The power of the press has been on the whole wisely used, and certainly used with at least as much patriotic purpose as is to be found among politicians. Many newspapers have deliberately put on one side their pecuniary interests in order to discharge what they conceived to be a patriotic duty. The number of politicians who have shown the least sign of willingness to sacrifice their pecuniary interests for the sake of setting an example to the country is not impressive.

Moreover the press, or at any rate a large section of it, is entitled to claim that it has throughout the war shown a keener perception of the problems confronting us than ministers themselves have shown. Handicapped by a censorship which has been managed with almost inconceivable stupidity, the press has nevertheless succeeded in doing immense service

to the country not merely by destructive criticism but by constructive suggestion. It is mainly to the press that the country owes the increased output of munitions, the increased efficiency of our naval power in face of the opposition of the Foreign Office, and the prospective increase in our military strength through the establishment of Lord Derby's scheme leading up to compulsory service.

But though the power of the press has been during the war well used, it is not a power upon which we ought permanently to rely as our sole defence against misgovernment. There is among newspapers no collective responsibility for the power they wield ; there is no machinery for directing that power. A newspaper which has normally adopted a patriotic and a wise course may suddenly swing round on to another tack, and its influence may become a source of serious mischief. That danger is inherent in the very nature of an independent press and cannot be removed. For this reason the country ought not to trust to the press alone. The nation requires some kind of representative body, debating under a sense of responsibility, and above all capable of giving effect to its decisions.

In this last condition lies the crux of the matter. Unless the House of Commons can act as well as talk it will cease to serve any useful purpose. Yet under present conditions it cannot act, because, as above explained, its members are controlled by party organisations, and the dominant organisation for the time being is in turn controlled by the Cabinet. The first essential reform is the emancipation of the House of Commons from Cabinet control. That can only be effected by the constituencies themselves. As long as the constituencies are content to accept as their representatives the nominees of a party organisation, the House of Commons cannot regain its old position. It will remain a useless, a costly, and a discredited survival of a once famous assembly.

Whether it is possible for the constituencies now to undo the mischief that has been allowed to grow up is an issue which depends on the local and national patriotism of individual citizens. The present elector is what Providence and the party system have made him. The labour of earning a precarious income, and the pleasure of spending on a few modest luxuries any small balance that remains after the

bare necessities of life have been provided, occupy most of the time and most of the thought of the large majority of parliamentary electors. Periodically they are invited by political touts to give their votes to this or that candidate whose name they have never heard before. By way of inducement they are offered all sorts of personal bribes. One candidate will provide them with regular work at good pay; another will give pensions to their aged kinsfolk. Other appeals are made to the passion of hate. An attack on landlords is always popular, because in the mind of the workman the landlord is the man who calls for the weekly rent—a necessarily large fraction of a small wage. An attack on capital is also politically profitable wherever employers have been acting harshly. By such devices electors who neither know the candidates nor understand the principles they profess are dragged in thousands to the poll, and the result is proclaimed as the verdict of the people.

It is not surprising that men who wish to keep their hands clean shrink from intimate contact with the practical work of winning elections. In all constituencies a very large proportion of the most respected men hold themselves aloof from the business of electioneering, with the result that most of the work is done by little men with small axes of their own to grind. We have not yet reached the American conception of politics as a peculiarly dishonest form of money making, but we are undoubtedly moving in that direction. The process can only be arrested if the leading men in each constituency, whatever be their rank in life, will work together to secure the election of candidates who shall represent that constituency and nothing else. The original conception of the House of Commons as a body representing the 'communes,' i.e. the boroughs and counties of the kingdom, can only be restored by the energy of the constituencies themselves. The first step towards reform must be a resolve by the constituencies to free themselves from party control, and that resolve can only be reached through the individual effort of the men prominent in each constituency.

Possibly such effort may be widely made in the present crisis; for in all parts of the kingdom and in all classes men and women who were previously indifferent to everything except their own interests and pleasures have been awakened

by the realities of war to a sense of patriotic duty and are thinking and working for their country. But it would be futile to hope that the same patriotic fervour will continue when the present crisis has passed, and therefore it is essential that constitutional changes should be made which will permanently render it easier for the constituency to appoint and control its own representatives.

Towards this end the most immediately important reform is to abolish the payment of members of Parliament out of the National Exchequer and to permit the constituencies to revert to the ancient practice of themselves paying their representatives. The distinction between the two systems is fundamental, both morally and constitutionally. On the moral side it is unpardonable that members of Parliament should vote money to themselves out of the funds they are elected to control. If a private trustee so behaved he would rightly be sent to prison.

There is the further moral disadvantage that since the salaries are self-voted there is no control over the services to be given in return. A member of Parliament is not in the position of a civil servant who has definite duties to perform, has regular working hours and regular periods for vacation. Members of Parliament have no definite duties, no regular hours, no assigned periods for session or recess. The House may sit for six months, or for nine months ; it may sit for three days or five days a week ; it may sit till past midnight or it may adjourn before dinner. This wide liberty which alone differentiates the House of Commons from a Government department affects the whole House in its corporate capacity ; but the liberty of the individual member is wider still. He is under no compulsion to come to the House at all ; he need never do a stroke of work of any kind in return for the £400 a year which he has helped to vote to himself. As a matter of fact, a considerable number of members never attend the sittings of the House ; the majority of members attend very rarely. There are 670 members all told ; in a division on a matter of some importance a few days before the House adjourned for its Christmas holidays fewer than 60 voted.

Yet a division is the one test of the presence of a member of Parliament at Westminster. The normal practice of most members is to keep away from the House during the greater

part of each sitting, but to come down when a division is expected, record their votes and then vanish. Doubtless many members do other work, especially work on committees, which is of a highly laborious character and of real value to the nation. But the point is that there is no compulsion on a member of Parliament drawing a self-voted salary to do work of any kind whatsoever. If, on the other hand, the payment were provided by the constituencies, the mental attitude of the member of Parliament would undergo a change. He would feel that he was receiving an honorarium freely voted by the people who had sent him to Parliament, and that he honourably owed his best service in return.

From the constitutional point of view the change from payment out of the national exchequer to payment by the constituency is equally important. The famous letter of Burke to his Bristol constituents, recently quoted by Mr. Trevelyan as an excuse for retaining his seat, was written at a time (1774) when the conception of democratic government was scarcely even a dream, and was written by a man to whom such a dream would have been a hideous nightmare. But even Burke recognised the general responsibility of a member of Parliament to his constituents: 'Their wishes 'ought to have great weight with him; their opinion, high 'respect; their business, unremitted attention.' And even while claiming that a member of Parliament ought not to sacrifice his 'enlightened conscience' to 'any man or to any 'set of men,' Burke based that claim on the proposition that a member of Parliament owed his judgment as well as his industry to his constituents. To argue that a member of Parliament also owes his judgment and his industry to the nation is to miss the whole point of the constitutional relationship. It is only through the constituency that the nation has any control over the individual member of Parliament; the constituency can call him to account, the nation cannot; therefore if there is to be any payment for his services it is the constituency and not the nation that should pay.

If Mr. Trevelyan, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald and others who are using their position in the national council to oppose the nation's cause were paid by their constituents they could be effectively reminded of their obligations to the people who placed them in Parliament. As matters stand, they

continue to draw payment from the nation, and the only work they do in return is work which the nation does not want done. There is much to be said for the attitude of a man who dares at his own cost to set himself against the prevailing stream of public opinion, and it is to be hoped that this country will ever give wide latitude to the expression of opinions, however unpopular ; but it is a totally different matter for a man to continue to hold a public position and to draw the emoluments of that position in defiance of the wishes of the people who placed him there.

The objection may be raised that if constituencies paid their representatives and could withdraw payment at will or after reasonable notice, the possibility of independence on the part of members of Parliament would be gone. The answer is that in practice the constituencies would exercise a less persistent and less rigid control over the speeches and votes of members than is now exercised by the party Whips. Complete independence is neither possible nor desirable. A man who occupies a position of public trust must be responsible to somebody so long as he continues to hold that position, but the member who thinks for himself will find that direct responsibility to his own constituents, even if enforced by a money tie, gives him a larger liberty than most members of Parliament now possess.

But if the power of the constituencies is to be increased—and it is only by that means that the House of Commons can regain its independence and its dignity—the constituencies themselves must be reformed. In the Act of 1885 which fixed the present distribution of constituencies and the present franchise the worst mistake made was the cutting up of large towns like Birmingham, Manchester and many others into a number of separate constituencies. The result is that these great urban communities have no corporate representation in Parliament to correspond with and strengthen their communal life. The historic conception of a member of the House of Commons as the representative of the *communitas* of the borough or county which sent him to Westminster was completely ignored in the Act of 1885. That Act was based on the assumption that it was the individual elector acting as an isolated unit who ought to determine the composition of Parliament. This fundamentally false view, both of the

nature of Parliament and the nature of man, is traceable to the influence upon English thought of the extreme individualism which characterised both the American Rebellion and the French Revolution. The happy conservatism of our race prevented us from completely destroying in 1832 and in 1867 the original basis of the House of Commons, but the reasons for that basis were probably forgotten and in 1885 it disappeared.

To restore the Plantagenet conception of Parliament is almost as impossible as to restore the Plantagenet conception of monarchy; but it is still possible to give partial effect to the root idea that Parliament represents communities rather than individuals. The most important step is to undo the blunder of 1885 and to treat each great municipality as a unit for parliamentary purposes, giving to it as many members as it is entitled to have on a rough population basis. This object can be both easily and equitably secured by the ingenious electoral device known as proportional representation. It is less easy to apply the same principle in county areas, but it is at any rate possible everywhere to make the boundaries of Parliamentary divisions coincide with the boundaries of local government divisions. Incidentally it is desirable that the size of the House should be reduced. The House of Commons with its 670 members is the most overgrown legislative assembly in the world.

The main function of Parliament ought to be the control of the executive government. The simplest and best way in which control can be exercised is by entrusting the House of Commons with the duty of electing by direct vote a small executive council, as urged in the last number of this Review. As regards legislation, important measures, raising issues which divide the country deeply, should be referred to a direct vote of the electors. So far from destroying the utility of Parliament this change would strengthen the position of the House of Commons as a deliberative assembly. At present there is nothing to be gained by debating highly contentious measures—except to waste time—because the fate of the measure is determined by the strength of the party which has introduced it, and it goes through in whatever shape the Cabinet decides in spite of anything that critics may say. If, on the other hand, the Bill had to be submitted

to a final vote of the whole electorate its authors would be anxious to consider all honest criticism with a view to removing objections which might prejudice its fate on a referendum. Under such conditions the House of Commons could do in the sphere of legislation invaluable work which is at present never done because there is no independent body to do it. At the same time the direct responsibility thrown upon the electors to accept or reject important legislative projects would make them realise that there is something more in politics than a party game.

It is on the public spirit of the electors that the success of our political system, whatever it be, must finally depend, and stress has been laid above upon the importance of identifying parliamentary constituencies as far as possible with local government areas in order that there may be a better opportunity of enlisting for the improvement of the character of our national government such public spirit as is called forth by the business of local government. It ought never to be forgotten that it was out of local self-government that our national liberties grew, and we certainly shall not be able to establish any satisfactory system of control over the central government if we allow the power of local communities to be destroyed.

How greatly their power has been impaired within the past fifteen or twenty years few people have realised. The mischief is largely traceable to the system of grants-in-aid to local authorities from the national exchequer. The only justification for grants-in-aid is the plea of relative poverty. Wherever a particular district is so poor in comparison with the rest of the kingdom that it cannot out of its own resources provide public services on a scale approximating to that generally adopted, it may reasonably ask the richer districts of the kingdom to subscribe out of their plenty to assist its poverty. To a small extent expression is given to this principle by the voting of special grants for certain purposes to necessitous areas. But the great mass of the payments made out of the national exchequer to the local authorities are based upon no such principle. They are based on the proposition that the central government is entitled to force the local governments to undertake certain services, by first taking from the locality money in the shape of taxes, and then paying part of

that money back in the shape of grants if the service is performed to the satisfaction of the central bureaucracy.

The financial significance of the process is obscured by the distinction between rates and taxes; but it is fairly obvious that if the central Government makes large grants to the local authorities in relief of rates, it must first raise the necessary revenue by levying higher taxation than would be required to meet national expenditure alone. The larger part of this additional taxation, as of all taxation, is provided by the wealthier communities—London, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow and other great centres of population. These great municipalities must pay more in taxes towards the grants-in-aid than they get back in relief of local rates, for otherwise there would be no balance available for the poorer districts. And not only are they out of pocket by the system but they are deprived of the control even of their own rates. For the system has been so ingeniously contrived, for the greater exaltation of the central bureaucracy, that the Government, having first laid hands upon the money by means of taxes, is then able to tell the municipal authorities of Leeds (let us say) that if they wish to get back part of what Leeds has paid in taxes they must spend what Leeds raises by rates in such manner as the bureaucracy at Whitehall chooses to direct. There is here a complete denial of what should be the basic principle of local self-government—financial responsibility combined with financial power.

Curiously enough, the present system finds special favour among politicians who pose as extreme democrats. Their view apparently is that if they can succeed in obtaining election to Parliament on a democratic ticket they are justified in using the power of the State to impose their opinions upon the whole country. In the mind of the ultra-Radical the right of self-government means the right of himself to govern other people. In practice every kind of fad is foisted upon the local authorities. A member of Parliament with a passion for gratifying his own hobbies at other people's expense gets hold of a Minister and persuades him that some new type of school ought to be established or some new experiment made in agriculture. A parliamentary grant is provided, and the local authorities are told that they can finger some of this money if they will raise an equal amount by rates.

The result is that the humble citizen is doubly mulcted. He has to subscribe as a taxpayer to the grant and as a ratepayer to the rate. In many cases the only result of the expenditure is that a considerable number of officials receive salaries for doing something that nobody—except the original faddist—wants done.

Until the system of grants-in-aid is abolished the municipalities and counties of the kingdom cannot obtain real autonomy. In turn the abolition of that system depends on a reform of our methods of raising local and national revenues respectively. Both methods suffer from the constitutional defect that the majority of electors are not conscious of any direct liability for the funds controlled by their representatives. Only a minority of parliamentary electors pay income tax; only a minority of local government electors pay rates directly. In both cases this separation between voting power and financial responsibility has grown up because of the trouble and expense involved in establishing a sounder system. The expense of collecting income tax from every household in the kingdom would undoubtedly be far greater than the expense of raising an equal revenue by taxing each household through the tea and sugar it consumes. In similar manner local authorities are saved considerable expense by allowing the owners of small houses and of flats to compound for the rates and to recover what they can from their tenants. As a rule, the landlord, when dealing with his tenants, merges the charge for rates in the charge for rent, and the tenant does not know that rates have been paid on his behalf, and that the payment is being recovered from him. Often he does not even know what rates are, nor how the local authority obtains the money which it spends partly under his control.*

To establish universal direct taxation both for local and national purposes must admittedly involve increased cost for

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* The following story is instructive. A woman who had been occupying a house where the landlord compounded for the rates moved into a house where the rates were payable by the tenant direct. When first presented with a demand note with its accompanying particulars of local expenditure her eye rested on the statement that 'Baths and Wash-houses' cost so much. Her comment to the rate collector was: 'Why, I thought they was free.'

collection. But the question arises whether it is not worth while to face that cost for the sake of the constitutional advantages which can be obtained by no other means. The nation now spends on public elementary education from taxes and rates well over £30,000,000 a year. When that expenditure was much less than it now is, a prominent politician defended the charge with the once famous phrase 'Let us educate 'our masters.' Whether from that point of view the work of the elementary schools has been of much practical value is a debateable matter. But it is certain that the direct payment of taxes and rates would have an immediate educational value in the responsibilities of citizenship. If it is worth while to spend over £30,000,000 on elementary education of a general character, it is certainly profitable to spend say the tenth part of that sum in teaching all the electors of the kingdom the special lesson that public money comes out of private pockets. The resulting economy in public expenditure would certainly more than pay for the additional cost of collecting the revenue.

It may, however, be pointed out that this additional cost would be very greatly diminished if the direct taxes for local and national purposes were collected by one authority. In other countries this has long been done. The taxpayer is presented with a demand note for so much money for the State and so many *centimes additionnels* for the commune. With a system of direct taxation on these lines for local and national purposes the futility of grants-in-aid—except for the purpose of assisting poor localities—would become obvious to everybody, and it would then be possible to leave all the larger local authorities complete freedom to spend their own money in their own way.

This is the essential basis of local self-government. Were it established it would cut at the root of the bureaucratic system which has grown up in this country within the lifetime of the present generation. Even now few people have any conception of the way in which officialism has silently spread its tentacles over the whole life of England. One of the worst cases of centralisation is furnished by the Board of Education. In theory the educational system of the country is based upon local autonomy and is administered by Local Education

Authorities ; in practice these Authorities are under the almost complete control of the officials at Whitehall. If a Local Education Authority, even when it represents a population of five million people, attempts to have a policy of its own, it is pulled up by the power of the Board of Education to refuse to pay grants. An interesting example is furnished by the controversy between the Board of Education and the London County Council on the question of the size of school classes. The London County Council is the Local Education Authority for the whole of London. It is a popularly elected body, subject to re-election every three years, and therefore may be presumed to represent the wishes of the democracy of London at least as fully as the House of Commons represents the democracy of the kingdom. Yet it was compelled by the Central Government to spend against its own wishes large sums of money in building new schools in order to cut down the size of school classes to the figure arbitrarily determined by the Board of Education. Whether in the abstract the Board of Education or the London County Council was right is not the question. The whole point is that a great city like London should be free to determine the matter according to the judgment of its own elected representatives, and should not be coerced into accepting the view either of some bureaucrat in a Government office or of some faddist in the House of Commons. This particular controversy began some years before the war ; the Council was compelled to give way and started upon a scheme of expensive rebuilding to be spread over several years. When the war broke out the Council applied to the officials at Whitehall for permission to postpone the operation of the scheme during the currency of the war, in order to save money and to liberate labour for war work. The Board of Education refused permission, although at the very same moment another Government department, the Local Government Board, was issuing a circular to all local authorities instructing them to cut down expenditure, and in particular to suspend building operations. The correspondence between the two bodies continued throughout the winter and spring of 1914–15. An attempt was made to secure the intervention of the Cabinet ; but as late as April 24, 1915, the Treasury wrote that the Government had decided

that the work must not be postponed. On May 3 the Board of Education, referring to this Treasury letter, pressed the Council to go on with the work. About this time a vigorous press campaign in favour of public economy began; the Cabinet took alarm, and on May 13 the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons which put an end to the proceedings of the Board of Education.

This is an illustration of the way in which, in a nominally democratic country, officials whose names are unknown, who work behind thick walls free from all fear of public criticism and free from any danger of dismissal, can defy the elected representatives of five million people. If this can be done in a matter of considerable magnitude involving a good deal of public controversy, it is easy to understand how in matters of detail the control exercised by the department is persistent and irresistible. Incidentally the Education Department, like most other Government departments, conducts its operations in such a way as to provide paid posts for a very large number of men whose work consists in making work for one another. For example, a whole army of clerks is employed in London to correspond with smaller clerical armies employed by the local authorities in order to work out the precise grant payable to each Education Authority on the basis of the average attendance in each school. A very obvious reform would be to pay a lump sum on the basis of population; but it needed a great European war to induce the officials and the politicians to consider that suggestion, and apparently it has not even yet got beyond the stage of being 'carefully considered.'

When once any form of bureaucratic routine, however foolish, has been established, the corporate interests of the Civil Service become involved in its maintenance, and the difficulty of abolishing it becomes almost insuperable. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole Civil Service, in this as in other countries, is permeated with the trade union spirit. Each department is an end unto itself in the eyes of the men who belong to it. There are, of course, honourable exceptions. In the Civil Service, as in other groupings of mankind, there are individuals who see beyond the departmental boundaries and are willing to promote the general interest even at the

expense of their own particular group. But that is rare both among trade unionists and among civil servants. Broadly speaking, each department puts its own corporate interests before any other consideration. It will resist with passionate energy the attempt of another department to set foot upon its territory or to criticise its conduct. A great many of the blunders and the delays of which the public has so bitterly complained in the conduct of the war can be traced back to departmental jealousy. The departments concerned have deliberately obstructed one another in public work rather than yield an inch of departmental territory.

An example may be given. At a comparatively early period of the war, the War Office asked the Local Government Board to ascertain if any of the skilled mechanics employed by the various local authorities could be spared for the manufacture of munitions. The Local Government Board sent its inspectors round the country, collected the names of several thousand suitable men, and promptly reported to the War Office that these men were available at once. A long delay occurred before any reply was received. The local authorities complained and the men complained of the inexplicable delay. At length it transpired that the War Office had subsequently been in communication with the Board of Trade, and the Local Government Board was invited to correspond with that department. It did so, and the reply received was that if these skilled municipal workmen, whose names and qualifications had been specially registered at great public expense, wished to obtain employment they must apply through the Labour Exchanges. The whole purpose of the manœuvre of course was to maintain the privileges of the Board of Trade as a labour-supplying organisation, and to snub the Local Government Board for daring to cross the frontier.

As may readily be imagined, an organisation which requires to be backed by such methods as these is inherently unsound. That the Labour Exchanges may have done some useful work it would be unjust to deny, but they are regarded askance both by employers and by the better class of workman. Government departments themselves, after patiently trying to get suitable workpeople through the Labour Exchanges,

have been driven to apply elsewhere. Private employers of labour in many parts of the country speak with derision of the Labour Exchanges, and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the competent workman, who is conscious of his ability to command good wages and regular work, would as soon be seen inside a prison van as in a Labour Exchange. If this organisation is to be continued at all as a public service it should be handed over to the municipal authorities, and fees should be charged to make the exchanges self-supporting. Both employer and employee gain when they are brought together, and it is they who between them ought to pay for that service, not the general public.

Stress has been laid upon the organisation of the Labour Exchanges because they furnish an excellent example of the consequences which follow when a false principle is adopted. If Labour Exchanges had been started on a fee-paying basis they would either have justified their existence by their success or they would have died a natural death. But as the whole cost is borne by the public exchequer there is no automatic means of testing the value of the service or of preventing a progressive increase in expenditure regardless of the yield in utility. The moment a Government department has been called into being it sets to work to increase its importance by adding to its expensiveness. The only check is provided by the Treasury, and that check only operates when the country happens to possess a Chancellor of the Exchequer who cares for economy. Even then it is difficult for the Treasury officials to resist the persistent pressure which a spending department can bring to bear. Some plausible excuse can nearly always be found for adding a few more clerks to this or that branch and thus raising the status of its superintendent, or for appointing additional superintendents and so improving the chances of promotion for the men below. And when once the increase has been sanctioned there is no going back. The Treasury possesses no machinery by means of which it can periodically overhaul the work of the spending departments and ascertain whether the nation is getting value for the millions that are spent. All the Treasury can do is to fight against increases, and this it does to the best of its ability, possibly indeed in some cases even

with excessive zeal. It may easily happen that the Treasury officials, knowing that an increase once sanctioned can in practice never be recalled, will fight fiercely to prevent an extra hundred pounds being added to the estimates of a department for a justifiable purpose, while passing with a sigh of impotence the wasteful expenditure of thousands on purposes previously sanctioned.

Before all things a Government department is resolved to resist a reduction of staff. This spirit has even found expression during the war. Civil servants have in the main risen to the call of their country as patriotically as any men. Thousands of young men eagerly volunteered at the beginning of the war ; the older men as eagerly undertook extra duties, working long hours, sacrificing their holidays, and in many cases their health, to help the common cause. In the main the English Civil Service has splendidly proved the grit of the stock from which it comes. But it must be added that there are unpleasant exceptions, due less to personal lack of patriotism than to the pure trade union spirit. Cases have occurred where men eager to fight have been held back by their superiors, not because they were wanted for any useful work, but because if they went it would be demonstrated that their branch had been previously overstaffed. Civil servants, like other trade unionists, are obsessed with the fear of what may happen after the war. They are afraid that a department cut down now will not after the war be restored to its previous strength, and therefore some civil servants are still resisting the call for soldiers and the call for economy just as some skilled tradesmen are still resisting the dilution of labour.

There is no means of getting rid of these evils or of appreciably diminishing them until the nation abandons the principles of bureaucratic socialism which have dominated recent Parliaments. The socialistic tendency of the last ten years is partly due to a conscious imitation of German example, and partly to the ingenious wirepulling of a little coterie of middle-class Socialists, several of whom happen to be either civil servants or ex-civil servants. The unsuitability of the bureaucratic system of government to the genius of the English people has been made manifest by the administrative failures in the conduct of the war. On all sides the red tape of

officialism is condemned, and every man one meets has a collection of stories of official stupidity. Yet it is forgotten that during the past ten years the numerical strength and the range of influence of bureaucracy has been enormously extended by the deliberate action of Parliament. That process must be reversed if the evils from which we suffer are to be removed. Those evils consist not merely in the waste of money now urgently required for other purposes, but in the waste of human energy and the obstruction of national progress. Thousands of men in the prime of life spend their days boxed up in great Government offices doing work which has no human value of any kind—checking accounts that need never have existed, writing innumerable letters about points of the minutest importance, collecting statistics that no one will ever read. And while these men are thus wasting their own lives, their presence in positions of control hinders the nation from getting on with real work.

Nor need we be surprised that the bureaucratic system breaks down when faced with real difficulties, for the system is deliberately destructive of the Englishman's most valuable quality, the power of initiative. A young man fresh from Oxford or Cambridge enters a Government office as a first division clerk, full of enthusiasm, eager for work. Within a very few weeks he discovers that the only work he will be called upon to do for many years to come is work of a purely routine character, and not too much of that. He further discovers that the one unpardonable sin is to show any inclination to think for himself. His business is to carry out orders and to see that the regulations of the Service are followed to the letter. The spirit does not matter. If he should venture to make a suggestion he will inevitably be snubbed. After perhaps ten years of this soul-deadening work he reaches a position where he may be called upon to exercise his own judgment ; he begins to be part of the Government of the country. But the training he has undergone has probably altogether destroyed the elasticity of his mind without having provided him with any compensating accumulation of experience. He has had no means of learning how the ordinary business of the world is carried on ; all he has learnt is how to get through the routine duties of a civil servant. Happily

there are some men whose inherent ability can survive even such a training as this, and in the upper ranks of the English Civil Service are to be found men whose all-round capacity is beyond question. But it is not surprising that Government departments in the main should rarely show any power of imagination, any ability to break with routine.

Even Germany, according to reports that reach this country, is beginning to doubt the blessings of bureaucracy, although there the bureaucratic system has grown up with the nation and is part of the life of the people. The German is taught from his earliest days to look to the official classes for the guidance of his conduct. He walks between fences barbed with the word *verboten*, and obedience has become part of his nature. It is not part of the English nature. The British Empire was not built up by men sent out from Government offices or acting under Government orders; it was built up by the enterprise of the individual Englishman or Scotsman, seeking his own fortune at his own risk, but carrying with him his flag and the love of his country. The bureaucratic system may be able in Germany to produce positive results because it is the expression of the mental habit of the people; in England the bureaucracy is bound to fail because its methods are utterly repugnant to the instincts of the nation.

The most persistent vice of the bureaucrat is the passion for centralisation. This passion is part of the general desire of human beings to exalt their own importance. There is more dignity in ruling over an office which employs 500 clerks than over one which employs fifty, and there is therefore a constant striving on the part of the permanent officials to centralise work in London and to reduce provincial authorities to a position of complete subordination. A striking example may be given from the working of the Post Office. In order to make some concession to the desire of patriotic Scotsmen and Irishmen that their countries should be recognised as separate entities, the Post Office has established head offices at Edinburgh and Dublin, which nominally control the postal organisation throughout Scotland and Ireland respectively. At the head of each of these offices is a highly paid official of the first rank. As a rule he has previously served as one

of the six Assistant Secretaries at St. Martin's-le-Grand who, subject to the Postmaster-General and the Permanent Secretary of the Post Office, govern the postal service of the kingdom. Transference to Edinburgh or Dublin is, from the point of view of pay and status, a promotion ; but it is a promotion which entails immediate loss of power. The highly trained and experienced officer who has been accustomed to deal authoritatively in London with matters concerning every part of the kingdom finds that when he has moved to Dublin or Edinburgh he has become little more than a conduit-pipe for passing on correspondence. He has become definitely subordinate to the men he left behind him in London, who were his juniors in the Service and are below him in nominal rank. Incidentally the country has to pay for two high officials instead of one.

The Post Office is indeed one of the most highly centralised of Government departments. To some extent that centralisation is necessary. For example, the Money Order Department and the Savings Bank, since they involve transactions extending over the whole kingdom, could with difficulty be managed otherwise than from one centre. But in other respects it would undoubtedly be possible to decentralise the administration to a very considerable extent by giving larger powers to the postmasters in the great provincial cities.

A service which is in even greater need of decentralisation is the administration of justice. In few countries are the local facilities for obtaining justice so defective as in England. This was not always so. To quote the words of the recent valuable report of the Civil Service Commission on the Legal Departments (Cd. 7832) :

> ' English justice, like all other forms of English government, had originally been highly localised. The County Courts and the Courts Palatine had, in the years following the Norman Conquest, jurisdiction which in some cases was older than that of the Monarchy. The feudal lords had their own courts, great and small, every chartered town bargained for the right to establish a court, and the Church developed a powerful system of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. By the eighteenth century, after a long contest with the King's London Courts and the King's judges on Assize, all these courts had become more or less completely obsolete.'

This is an excellent illustration of the way in which the central machinery of government is always working to suppress local independence. Brutally it must be stated that in this case the matter is largely one of money. If the local courts do the business there are fewer fees for the London lawyers. The great national upheaval which secured the Reform Act of 1832 led the way to many other reforms of equal or perhaps even greater value—the reform of our municipal corporations, the reform of the Poor Law, and as regards the present matter the creation of County Courts. To quote again from the report just referred to :

' The principle of uniform local courts, whose jurisdiction should cover the whole country, was laid down in the Fifth Report (1833) of the important Law Commission appointed in 1830, and was finally embodied in the County Courts Act of 1846. " The main object sought for by the creation of these Courts was the provision of tribunals throughout England and Wales which should be easily accessible, should have a simple and rather summary procedure, and should be able to collect debts and decide disputes of a trivial character without the delay and expense involved by proceedings in what were then called the Superior Courts." The County Courts were from the beginning extremely successful, and their powers were rapidly extended by legislation. By 1872, when the Judicature Commission reported upon them, they had acquired an equity and in a few cases an Admiralty jurisdiction, and under the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 the more important of them had become local courts of bankruptcy.'

But though the powers of County Courts have been, as above stated, largely extended in certain directions, they still remain on the Common Law side limited by the original conception that ' their business is to collect debts and decide disputes ' of a trivial character.' All the more important cases must still be brought up to London. That means that a London solicitor must be employed, that a London barrister must be feed, that witnesses must be brought up to London and kept there often for a considerable period at very great expense in order to obtain a decision which could better have been given on the spot. On several occasions during the past twenty years, attempts have been made to break away from the original limited conception of the jurisdiction of the County Courts as above defined, and to give them power to deal

with disputes which are not of a trivial character. Bills to enlarge the Common Law jurisdiction of these popular and expeditious Courts have more than once been introduced into the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor for the time being, but they have always been killed by the influence of the lawyers in the House of Commons. The real reform needed is the abolition of all limit upon the jurisdiction of the County Courts, so that every dispute may first be heard in the County Court of the locality where it arises. In trivial cases the judgment of the County Court should be final; in other cases an appeal should lie direct from the County Court to the Court of Appeal, without the intervention of the High Court. This important reform would not only greatly diminish the cost of litigation, thus relieving the productive industries of the country from a heavy and unnecessary burden; but it would also tend to strengthen the local life in provincial towns, and consequently to render them less dependent upon the central government.

If we are to establish a healthy political system the detailed work of government must in the main be left to the local authorities, and they must have power to dispose of it finally without the interference either of the House of Commons or of the permanent officials at Whitehall. Unless the local authorities have full authority and responsibility within the limits of the sphere of work assigned to them, men of ability and position will shrink from undertaking municipal work.

It is, however, equally important that the local authorities should not overburden themselves with duties which are better discharged by commercial companies. There was a rush a few years ago on the part of the municipalities of the kingdom to municipalise everything, and that movement has not yet fully spent its force. It has led to the building up of large local bureaucracies, which are rapidly acquiring the same power of control over our great towns that the central bureaucracy has acquired over the kingdom. There is this element of consolation: that the two bureaucracies, like all Government departments, find their principal joy in fighting with one another, and occasionally while the fight rages the public wins a point—but the public always pays for the cost of the game. So far as industrial undertakings such as gas

works and tramways and electricity supply are concerned, the problem to be solved is how to secure the advantages of commercial enterprise without exposing the consumer to the danger of extortionate charges. If a commercial company can be so controlled that it will be unable to exact more than a reasonable profit, then it is probable—one may even say certain—that better results will be secured through company management than through municipal management. In municipal work, as in Government work, what is popularly known as the 'Government stroke' is persistent. When an enterprise is in the hands of the Government department, everybody who is employed knows that his continued employment is in no way contingent upon the profitableness of the concern. His position is secure as long as he is not guilty of any outrageous offence. Mere idleness in moderation—a very large moderation—is not merely pardoned, it is gently encouraged, for it provides an excuse for bringing more men into the department.

The management of the telephones by the Post Office has provided a scandalous example. Men who were keen workers as long as they were employed by the National Telephone Company altered their whole standard of work as soon as they were taken over by the Government. In place of a sporting chance of rapid promotion to the very highest positions through personal efficiency, they discovered that there was nothing before them but a strictly graded automatic rise year by year up to a certain point and then a dead stop. They also discovered that no one had any personal interest in preventing idleness or in economising materials. The inevitable result has been quickly realised: what used to be a profitable undertaking yielding through taxation a substantial revenue to the State is on the verge of becoming, if it has not already become, a charge upon the taxpayer. The lesson that the country should have learnt from the Post Office management of the telegraphs is being repeated with the telephones.

In the case of municipal undertakings the results are slightly better, because the working can be more closely watched by the people who are concerned as municipal councillors and as ratepayers to prevent waste. But it is hopeless to expect that a municipal councillor elected for a brief term of office,

with his own affairs to attend to, will ever control a big industrial undertaking as well as men who make that work their main business, and whose financial prospects depend upon their success in management. It is not beyond the wit of man to devise schemes which will combine the efficiency of private management with the protection given to the community by public control. In the case of many of the gas companies the problem has indeed been long ago solved. The principal gas companies are restricted as to the profit which they may divide among their shareholders, and cannot increase dividends without lowering the price of gas. Consequently the public shares with the company the benefit of economies in production. In addition, many of the gas companies have established schemes for sharing divisible profits with their employees so as to encourage good work and faithful service. On similar lines it should be possible to establish an equally satisfactory method of dealing with tramways and with electricity supply.

The importance of the subject just dealt with lies in this, that if governing bodies, whether central or local, mix themselves up with trading concerns, not only will the trading be badly done but the proper work of those governing bodies—the work of government—will also suffer. There is the further very important consideration that where large bodies of men are employed directly by a popularly elected body they will inevitably use their votes to obtain better wages for themselves at the expense of their fellow-citizens. This is about the worst form of political corruption that could be devised.

The object we all set before us, at any rate in our better moods, is to secure the welfare and the progress of our country. To that end we are most of us willing to make a large sacrifice of private interests, if the need should arise, and to set aside altogether party predilections. But it is useless to wish for the right thing if we make no effort to obtain it. If our political organisation is to be rendered effective for the promotion of public rather than of party or of private interests, those on whose influence the working of that organisation depends must exert themselves to secure the necessary reforms. All comes back to the constituencies. It is they who determine the composition of the House of Commons and through it

the whole character of our Government. In every constituency there are many men with clear vision and loyal instincts, eager to serve their country but baffled by the confusion of party cries and disgusted by the glimpses they get of the underworld of politics. Hitherto such men have been powerless because there has been no sufficient moral force to rouse the rank and file of the electorate to patriotic action. That force has now been provided, for the war has awakened the moral sense of the whole community. If the men of leading in each constituency will seize the opportunity now presented to them, they will be able to secure the election of a Parliament which will command the respect of the country, and will thereby possess the requisite authority for a reconstruction of our political system.

EDITOR.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ENGLISH

I

THE movements of peoples within historical times have been mainly from East to West. It has thus come about that adventurous crews of pioneers have been constantly tempted to cast themselves adrift from the Atlantic sea-board of Europe in search of new and perhaps better lands. For those who dared this feat in the North the British Isles lay like a net in the sea which caught them in its meshes.

The earliest race we seem dimly to discern in Britain—dark-skinned and dark-haired Neolithic Iberians it may be—doubtless arrived in this way. Then came the successive waves of Goidels and Brythons from France and Belgium, with the Roman armies in their track, and the Angles and Saxons and Jutes from Denmark and the neighbouring regions, and then the later Northmen from Scandinavia, and finally, strongest of all, the Normans who welded the whole mixture into so firmly compact a mass that there was never a chance again for any later invaders, save only occasional bands of rebellious and stout-hearted refugees from the opposite coast, who, from the sixteenth century and earlier until to-day, have been welcomed rather than repelled, slowly to be amalgamated as congenial elements in the general stock.

There were special reasons why this long narrow island of

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Great Britain, running parallel to the north-western European coast (for Ireland was more protected and in the end suffered in its racial composition from that very protection), proved attractive to these various wanderers from the mainland. It was easy to reach for all bold and skilful seafarers. It was a moist and fertile land, pleasant to live in because its marine climate abolished all extreme rigours of cold and heat, full of beauty and luxuriance to the northerner; 'Britain stands 'like a bride adorned in her jewels,' wrote Gildas, the earliest of British historians. There was indeed one peculiar reason, unknown to all these invaders, why they found England attractive. Although migrations tend to be from East to West, what really appeals to the northerner is the warm South. Now, for the northerner, England is a southern land. When we leave in winter the well-nigh semi-tropical Isles of Scilly, we must travel south for a thousand miles before, abreast of northern Spain, we again find a climate as warm as that we have left. The reason is that the Mexican Gulf has sent a shaft of tropical water through the ocean to strike on the edge of this island and bathe its shores in a warm and iridescent mist. The invaders of England, without knowing it, yet felt that they had reached the South. It is, perhaps, a significant fact that on the fiercely piratical Saxons, at all events, England at first had something of the same enervating influence which Italy exerted over the High German tribes, so that they lost their seafaring passion for a while until, reinforced and tempered by other elements, it developed afresh in more orderly forms.

The continental invaders of an island, situated in relation to that continent as England is to Europe, inevitably possess certain characteristic features of mind and temper. Continental migrations are accomplished along lines of least resistance by slow pressure and peaceful inter-penetration, only occasionally exacerbated into acute conflict and actual warfare. Very little selection is involved in such movements of population. Even the pioneers need possess few strikingly distinctive traits of character, for they remain in close touch with the main body of their own people. It is the quality of the social body which counts rather than the quality of the individual unit, and the units, whatever their quality may be, are carried along with the mass.

Migration to an island under primitive social conditions is a very different matter. At the outset the mere desire to leave home and country to cross the sea for a strange land involves some degree of personal idiosyncrasy. The men who experience such an impulse are a little at variance with their environment, restless and uncomfortable, apt to be original, even eccentric. Such is every true-born adventurer. But he must also be bold, self-reliant, capable. If the pioneer of a new world must be something of a dreamer in order to desire a new world, he must be something of a pirate in order to seize it. The men of Columbus's caravels and the men of the *Mayflower* are the eternal types of such pioneers. The invaders of England knew that they would find the shores lined with hostile natives ready to drive them back into the sea, and even the choice of a rugged and uninhabited landing-place itself argued knowledge and skill and high spirit.

Thus it happens that an island, beaten upon by streams of would-be invaders from the neighbouring highly populated mainland, exerts a strenuous selective influence on these would-be invaders. If this selection has been exerted to an unparalleled extent in the case of England, that is because the circumstances themselves happen to be unparalleled.

II

To understand the essential English qualities we must constantly bear in mind this selective action of the sea, for ever at work on the successive racial masses which surged up against the barrier of the opposite shores.

We see, in the first place, why the invaders were more apt to be dreamers and poets than the people of their race whom they left behind on the Continent. Men who possessed the migratory instinct in the extreme form, adequate to impel them to take the risks of leaving their fellows for an unknown island of the west, must have been, to a greater degree than their kin, idealists, a little out of touch with the social environment, reserved towards their fellows but enamoured of Nature, always athirst for the marvels of the unknown and brooding over joys which for them the world had never known. The men of this temper are predestined to be poets, and it is un-

questioned that the English have proved incomparable poets, it may well be the supreme poets of the modern world, as the Greeks were of the ancient world.

The poetry of the common man is religion. The religious spirit is universal but it has been manifested in England in special forms—which were determined by the selective insular conditions of Great Britain. At the outset this selection had in the north special elements to work on. In the writings of a typical Norwegian novelist, Jonas Lie, we may note the obscure depths of religious emotion which seem so often to mark the Norwegian temperament, melancholic, extravagant, for the most part silent; it is the spirit naturally developed under the stress of the perpetual gloom of the Northern winter. In Norway this temper seems chiefly to display itself in passive forms; only its more active exponents were driven by their restlessness of soul to take on the semblance of Vikings. On their arrival on British shores they combined with the native stock to produce a still more active, adventurous, even aggressive race of religionists, though retaining a certain melancholic tendency, still plainly to be discerned, and especially marked in parts of Protestant Scotland and Catholic Ireland, in regions, that is to say, against which the Norwegian wave of invasion specially burst and left its enduring mark in physical types and linguistic vestiges. English religion became characteristically English. This is notably so in its close association with personal character and moral self-government. It is this association which has led to a tendency to hypocrisy and cant, a universal tendency, it is true, but one which the foreigner finds to be specially marked in England. Hypocrisy is an unpleasant and socially disturbing vice; it is better, one thinks, to adopt a low code of morals which may be maintained rather than a high code which cannot be maintained, for the victim of this high-strung moral code can admit no human weakness, and must still wave aloft the standard of his ideal in the eyes of the world even though himself wounded to death. Yet we may also remember that so philosophic and impartial an observer as Fouillée remarks that British cant, while easy to ridicule, yet has its good side, and, he adds, the Englishman is here in agreement with the Catholic Church, which has always held that even an external respect for moral order is better than a cynical absence of respect. The English-

man's religion in general remains more practical than mystical. Mysticism is rare in Britain and comparatively undeveloped. We find it indeed among both the Celtic and Anglo-Saxon elements of the population, in Welsh Traherne and Vaughan, and in Anglian Rolle and Juliana, but these are writers unknown outside England, and two at least of them were once forgotten even in England. The reason seems to be that the mystical attitude is that of serene contentment, of a rapturous acceptance of the world as it is, and such an attitude scarcely lends itself to the spirit of the restless adventurer who feels the sting of a whip which drives him into a strange land. The British religious spirit, of which John Knox may be regarded as a typical representative, has been in the highest degree adventurous, aggressive, iconoclastic, more eager for righteousness than for grace, practically benevolent, it is true, but more apt to be stern than tender. It has reappeared again and again, under ever fresh forms: we see it in those daring spiritual pirates, the Irish saints who swooped down, from time to time, men and women alike, on the Cornish and even more distant coasts, to convert the still heathen savages of foreign lands; we see it in the strenuous Anglo-Saxon missionaries, Boniface and the rest, who died in the hard task of converting Germany; we see it in the austere Lollards of the English Midlands; in the fighting Puritans whose zeal for spiritual purity was only equalled by their lust of spiritual loot, so that every beautiful old English church still bears the scars of the wounds they inflicted; in the heroic Jesuit martyrs of a lost cause; in the Quakers who succeeded in making even quietism aggressive; in the Salvation Army of to-day, which has carried out in another form the methods and the achievements of the first Irish saints. Taken altogether, English religion in all its conflicting aspects remains strikingly uniform and characteristic.

On a more intellectual and serene plane it is the same with English philosophy. The dreamer, the adventurer, the individualist, the iconoclast, the Puritan, stalks through the whole of English philosophy. It is the same, no matter whether we date that philosophy from Scotus Erigena or from the superb audacity and insight of the insolent friar, Roger Bacon. Francis Bacon, throwing aside the whole weighty tradition of antiquity with an exalted faith in Nature and in

Practice; Hobbes, with his disdain for others and his absolute trust in his own good reason; Locke, with all the zeal of a Puritan, laying bare the *tabula rasa* of the mind; Berkeley, with delicate skill building up a dream world on the site of the material world he had destroyed; Hume, with his solvents to melt away all the venerated faiths of his time; William Godwin, the father of all philosophic anarchism; Thomas Paine, who inspired the ideas of the Constitution of the United States; Herbert Spencer, with his concentrated passion of hatred against every fetter that society seeks to bind on the freedom of the individual; John Stuart Mill, who elevated and enlarged the English conception of individualism to become a rampart against the levelling influence of democracy as much as against the crushing influence of autocracy, who sought to bring women within its circle on the same terms as men, and pointed the way to the conclusion that, rightly understood, there is no real conflict between individualism and socialism—all these were daring and high-souled pioneers who left the old world behind them and steered to new and unknown shores. And the new horizons they revealed have enlarged the scope of the world for all mankind.

English poets have fulfilled the English mission in the same characteristic spirit as English philosophers, although, since poetry is more local than thought, they have not had the same universal influence. Chaucer and Shakespeare, indeed, while remaining essentially English, in large measure transcended the specifically insular English traits. The other supreme exponents of English poetry fall into line with the champions of religion and the masters of philosophy. The sensitive dreamer, Spenser, an adventurer in fairy-land whose quest was that of Platonic holiness, and Marlowe, a daring rebel in life and the rapturous conquering Tamerlaine of a new world of beauty, fittingly open the great names of English poetic literature. Chapman, too obscure in his stammering utterance to be among the greatest poets, is yet among the supremely characteristic English poets, alike in his buoyant spirit of heroic adventure and the almost intoxicated ardour of his claims for spiritual independence and moral self-government. Milton, again, not only the devoted lover of Renaissance Italy and the greatest English artist in verse, but a rugged and uncomfortable personality, an

original and unconventional Puritan, an impassioned champion of freedom, is a more typical representative of the insular English spirit than even Shakespeare, who moved in a sphere of imaginative extravagance wherein the universe itself melted like a dream. Milton was at heart a rebel,—'of the Devil's 'party without knowing it,' as Blake said,—and Byron later represented the same insular spirit in a cruder and more obvious form; with the sea in his blood, grandson of a famous sailor, he was a rebel alike in life and literature, a voluntary exile from his own land who died on his way to fight for the freedom of another land, and became in the eyes of all Europe the most typical, and indeed the most influential, of English poets. Scarcely less typical was another and grander spirit, Landor, also a voluntary exile, with the fascination for the South which has inspired so many English poets since Chaucer,—as though England was after all but a stage in the wanderings of the Northern sailor-dreamers,—a rebel who stands only below Milton in the combination of artistry with impetuous even eccentric originality and the consuming passion for freedom. William Blake, again a daring rebel, who in his concentrated genius carried eccentric originality to the point of insanity, a man who was prepared to be aggressive in his violent independence, a political revolutionary—even sagacious in his political insight—and at the same time the daring seer of obscure universes, was as quintessential an Englishman as his namesake the famous republican Admiral. Scarcely less so was Shelley. The exponent in verse of the doctrines of Godwin, that extreme type of self-governing English individualism, he soared on skylark's wings of flame to pour forth in a supreme song the whole of the dreams and aspirations which lie concealed beneath the disguises of the English heart. Keats, who as an artist ranks scarcely below Milton, is typically English in the union of his worship of sensuous beauty with a profound almost Scandinavian melancholy which he never lived to harmonise with that worship. Herein Wordsworth was one of the foremost and most characteristic figures in English literature. The most patriotic of English poets and the most passionately enamoured of English freedom, purely as an artist, however fine his quality, he would hardly rank with Herrick, scarcely in the first line at all. But a subtler rebel than the rest, Wordsworth found the way to harmonise,

rather to transmute, his restless discontent into a new and glorious vision of the world which embraced the lowest things with the highest things in one common rapture. Thereby he ceased to be poet and artist to become high-priest, revealing the rites of a sacred mystery which has been so potent to heal the restless English soul that for many he is even to-day the greatest of English poets, and in that 'Golden Treasury' which is held to be the impeccable anthology of English verse Wordsworth seems to lead the whole choir. One other and later figure must be named. William Morris, a poet in the copious and essential spirit of Chaucer himself, a man of inexhaustible practical energies, the most versatile of artists and craftsmen, was at once a successful business man and a hard-working enthusiast in a political revolutionary cause that might well be termed Utopian and to him became a religion. No child of England has better summed up the Englishman.

It may indeed seem that to put in the foreground the religion, philosophy, and poetry of England is to overlook that hard-headed practicality and relentless acquisitiveness in the world which the foreigner often regards as the real mark of the Englishman and sometimes views with jealous gnashing of teeth. It is not so. Men were poets and magicians, even philosophers, long before they were much enamoured of business or even of piracy. These are both alike secondary. But piracy, which has the same acquisitive object as commerce, and was indeed almost as honourable and legitimate an avocation until the sixteenth century, was, as we know, in the blood of the English even before they reached England, being indeed an essential condition of their arrival, for it was as pirates that the lure of England selected them from among their tamer home-abiding fellows. They were, above all, sailors, and seafaring involves numerous related qualities, not only adventurousness and self-reliance but the inventiveness and the aptitude to become a 'Jack of all trades,' as every sailor is even to-day. These qualities were no doubt latent in the race but they were quiescent. The early history of England is no record of growing acquisition but rather of the slow and steady loss of hereditary possessions, culminating in the expulsion of Queen Mary's garrison from Calais when England lost her last patch of Continental land; it was not till then, in Elizabeth's days, that England's real career on

the acquisitive territorial side began, and it began, we may remember, in the days of Shakespeare, the supreme moment of England's poetic efflorescence ; it began, moreover, in poet's dreams of new worlds, the Utopian El Dorado, Spain and England, often akin and alike led by the same ideals, being almost abreast in the adventurous quest—Spain, indeed, a little ahead, though putting forth her Cervantes at the same moment as Shakespeare arose. In commerce the English lagged still further behind. The English temperament being primarily adventurous, could not easily feel attracted to avocations so tame and pedestrian as those of commerce in their earlier and lower stages. So the Hanseatic Germans, patient and plodding and honest, not disdaining the pettiest profit, and ready to adapt themselves to every market, established a great centre in London to do business for the English. It was not till larger lures were attracted to commerce that the English, who could be rapacious as well as indolent, were greedy to swallow the bait. Hakluyt brought together the records of the daring and the suffering of these pioneers—half of them often ' gentle-' men desirous to see the world '—who first carried English wares into remote lands. They endured endless hardships on sea and on land, sometimes shut up by the caprice of oriental despots, sometimes duped by rival merchants, driven from their ships by pirates, slain by barbarians, the victims of disease in strange cities. Yet persistently they made their way, dined with the Emperor of Muscovy, extorted concessions from the Sophy of Persia, sought to outwit the Venetians, and even dreamed of discovering by God's grace the far country of Cathay. Hakluyt's ' Voyages of the English Nation ' is, beyond all other books, the English ' Odyssey.'

This kind of commerce soon became combined not only with adventure but also with patriotism, and the whole amalgamation was lifted on to a higher plane in the imagination of more magnificent pirates who felt that they had risen above piracy. ' Who was ever a pirate for millions ? ' as Raleigh, the type of these super-pirates, asked of Bacon. A century later the possibility of carrying on the old spirit of high adventure in the new careers of business had become generally realised by Englishmen. For the old Greeks, as for the modern Japanese, business was low and degrading ; even for the devotedly shopkeeping German the rigid rules of caste

still draw a line between the noble and the trader, but in England, after the triumph of Cromwell, the sons of the lords ruined in the Civil War turned naturally to trade. The English shopkeeper thus easily became the English merchant prince; Constantinople and Smyrna and Alexandria soon saw scarce any but adventurous Englishmen in their harbours; and to-day it is the complaint against English business that its methods are aristocratic and haughty. It was not until the eighteenth century, however, when their Dutch rivals on the sea were overcome, that the English acquisitive and practical qualities became developed and seriously organised in colonisation and commerce and manufacture, soon to assume a vast expansion through the new eruption of mechanical inventiveness.

Therewith the English established political economy, and it is significant that the theoretical foundations of that science were laid, in the 'Wealth of Nations,' not by a prosperous man of business but by an absent-minded Scotch professor, a philosopher and a moralist, who elaborated the fruitful conception, already divined by the French physiocrats, that in the mechanism of society the prosperity of all is best attained by the utmost freedom of each to seek his own prosperity unhampered by the whims of ignorant legislators. The great British men of business and the great colonisers of new territory have often been adventurers in whom the spirit of piracy still survived, but, at the same time, dreamers and moralists. The apparent contrast in the English mind between its practical materialism and its poetic idealism has been a mystery even to the English mind itself. But when we place ourselves at the right point of view we see that there is no mystery at all and scarcely even a contrast.

In reality the gradual process of marine selection which produced the English could only select elements that were fundamentally harmonious at the outset, however apparently dissimilar. Moreover, new elements were always welded by intermarriage into the existing stocks, for each successive war of invasion usually reached the same eastern shore of the island and was free to mingle with the elements of the previous wave. Some early writers, like the British Gildas, speak in their rhetorical indignation as though the invaders exterminated the population they found. That was scarcely the case and we may certainly be sure that the women were not

killed out. We may also be fairly certain that those historians are mistaken who have imagined that the invaders were usually accompanied to any extent by their own women. Even the Normans, the latest and most civilised of these invaders, brought no women, and when some years afterwards some of the high-spirited and irate ladies left behind sent over to declare (to the scandal of many churchmen) that unless their husbands returned at once, they would take other husbands, it appears that only a few of the Conqueror's companions responded. We may be sure that most of them found the daughters of the people of whom the Pope had said *Non Angli sed angeli* sufficiently pleasant in their eyes. We may thus account for that high degree of anthropological unification which has taken place in the British Islands. It is true that pigmentation of hair and eyes increases as we go westwards, with, also, areas of heightened pigmentation in sheltered easterly regions, but head-shape, as tested by the cephalic index, is remarkably uniform all over these islands. Very few stocks arrived save by stringent selection of the sea, and the stocks that by force of the possession of certain uniform but unusual complexes of qualities succeeded in arriving, were firmly blended together.

III

What is the worth of England's contribution to the genius of Europe and the civilisation of the world? The most discrepant judgments on the English are pronounced by foreign peoples, never more so than to-day when such judgments are edged by the enmities or the friendships of war. The English, we are told, are loyal and honourable, always daring in enterprise and prudent in action, the patterns of wise moderation and firm stability, the champions of the oppressed and the upholders of freedom in the world. The English, we are also told, are brutal and egotistic, sullen and cruel, the supreme representatives in the world of hypocritical cant and stupid self-conceit.

It would be hopeless to attempt any complete justification of these judgments, either on one side or on the other. No nation always lives up to the eulogy it may deserve at its finest moments, and every nation is the mark for scornful

epithets which are often flung at random. It is possible, however, that there are reasons for the marked contrast in the characteristics ascribed to the English. The pronounced individuality of a highly selected people has inevitably led to the exhibition of great qualities balanced by the great defects of those qualities.

The process of insular selection which made England, while it has introduced into the English nation many unexpectedly correlated characters, has also unexpectedly excluded other characters. It is in this way that, though they have always been very religious, the English have never had any genius for religion. That is the more notable since the Netherlands, with a population out of which the English have been in some measure selected, constitutes one of the chief centres of European mysticism. But the qualities of daring combined with prudence which the piratical invader needs exclude 'The Imitation of Christ.' English religion has been, on the one side, militant and missionary, on the other side philanthropic and practical; beyond this it has been compromisingly worldly, that is to say, infused by the cautious political spirit of England, always occupied in finding a middle path amid its own extravagances. The history of the English Church has been throughout that of a steady and perpetual effort to maintain a balanced compromise between the conflicting ideals of doctrine and ritual which threatened to rend it asunder.

The same influences which have prevented the development in England of the finest manifestations of otherworldliness have equally impeded the more worldly manifestations of self-satisfied earthly philosophy. The art of living may have had its philosophic recognition in England, notably in Shaftesbury, but it has never been embodied in the life of the people as it has in France. Nor, on the higher plane, have massive and receptive personalities, complacently and genially sociable, ever flourished in England as they have, in more or less attractive forms, however unlike, both in France and Germany. There is no English Montainge and no English Wilhelm von Humboldt. The refined social grace of eighteenth-century France and the enlightened cosmopolitanism of eighteenth-century Germany were alike hard to attain by the English, who yet played so large a part in inspiring

the ideals of both lands in that age. Even that pantheistic earthliness which has sometimes so magnificently inspired and almost intoxicated the art of the closely related Flemish has never crossed the narrow sea. It has been transmuted into mist or into flame. Turner is the English Rubens and Swinburne the English Verhaeren, and there is no English Jordaens at all.

The English lack of initiative in the art of living has been accompanied by a comparative lack of genius for great art generally, except in the sphere of poetry, the only art which is apt to ally itself with adventure. The reason clearly seems to be that the artist in life, or in material, like the man of religion, demands stability and serenity; he is not usually embodied in a personality of the migratory and predatory kind. The Netherlands was an intensely active focus of musical development, and its activity has continued to some extent until to-day; but the English school of music never attained high importance and reached its climax in Purcell two centuries ago. There has never been any great original architecture in England, notwithstanding that the neighbouring region of France is the home of Gothic and that the Normans were mighty and even original builders in their own land. English architecture is indeed abundant, endlessly varied, of inexhaustible charm. It appears to have been produced by a practical and versatile people who especially sought convenience and comfort, were admirable craftsmen, and probably at their best in domestic building. But of architectonic power to conceive great buildings, such as we find in so many regions of France as well as in Spain, we find no trace anywhere, except when the architect was manifestly a foreigner, and even the most admired fragments of English building—such as the west fronts of the Cathedrals of Peterborough and Wells—sin flagrantly against the simplest canons of art. There has, again, scarcely been a single great English sculptor, notwithstanding a wealth of excellent anonymous carving. In painting there are no great schools such as may be found on the opposite coast, alike in Holland and Flanders and France, only a few great individual figures, and of these not one that can be compared in universal significance to Van Eyck or Rubens or Rembrandt, who were yet all so closely akin in race. The English have been less artists than amateurs

of art, and that, indeed, on the grand scale. From Holbein onwards great artists were attracted to England, and, earlier than any other people, with a touch of the predatory impulse of their seafaring ancestors, the English swarmed over Europe and with the finest taste gathered up all the beautiful things they could acquire. England is still rich with the artistic wealth thus obtained, and but for the reckless dispersal of so much of it in the Puritan Revolution would now be the envy of the whole world.

The English have always been great amateurs, not only in art but in science, even in life itself. That is the natural method of the individualist. It involves the spirit of adventure, a love of risk, a fine relish for the unknown, an immense self-reliance, and the caution, the diffidence, the perpetual self-questioning without which all the other qualities would merely point the road to destruction. Schools, universities, even traditions have played a comparatively small part in the production of English genius. Everywhere we see pioneers setting out, often alone and unaided, hampered by difficulties on all sides, for the conquest of some new world. The type of the men of this race—the remark has been made before—is set forth in the one English novel which belongs to universal literature. Robinson Crusoe is the complete Englishman. A supreme amateur, cheerfully facing immense difficulties, endlessly versatile in aptitude and resource, joyously exploring a new earth and patiently building up a new civilisation from the simplest and most unpromising materials, Robinson Crusoe is the type of every Englishman who has sailed to find the Poles or penetrated the heart of Africa, ruled Provinces in India or founded colonies in Australia or painfully sought out the secrets of Nature. Isaac Newton or Charles Darwin, the Englishman is still Robinson Crusoe.

The defects of a man of such make-up are obvious. The original process of selection which tended to exclude the supreme sedative influences of mysticism, and art, and the cultivation of fine living, and to emphasise the pursuit of adventure and risk, was still further heightened by the insularity that process culminated in. The energy of the English has always been associated with insularity. It has been almost as difficult for ideas as for armies to enter the citadel of England. Any vital movement on the Continent,

the manifestation of any great new personality, have only succeeded in crossing the Channel after long years. It was the insular stupidity of England, and no enmity on the part of France, which delayed the Channel Tunnel, a stupidity for which a heavy price has had to be paid in the Great War. 'The inhabitants are magnificently apparelled, and extremely 'proud and overbearing,' wrote the Duke of Würtemberg's secretary on entering London in 1592 ; apt to scoff at foreigners, he added, because they seldom go into other countries ; 'superb, haughty, and suspicious,' said the French Ambassador in 1666. Although politically, as the list of Governments from the Reform of 1832 until to-day shows, England is predominately Liberal, beneath political distinctions the spirit of the people is fundamentally conservative. Thus, timid through his imaginative intuition of remote dangers, yet valiant to the point of rashness and even cheerful in the face of real risks, haughty, reserved, yet irritably aggressive, with roughnesses and angularities which tend to become exaggerated even to eccentricity, the Englishman has always been to the foreigner an object of mixed astonishment, amusement, and admiration. How many there must be of whom it has been said, as the Italian said of Landor : 'All Englishmen are 'mad ; but this one—— !'

Yet the most original, the most individualistic, the most reserved of peoples, however greatly prizing the sanctity of the person and the privileges of the home, must still find among themselves a social medium of intercourse. It has thus come about that some of the most precious and distinctive qualities of the English have been slowly evolved in reaction against those primitive qualities by which they won England. In this way we may explain English formality, the English clinging regard for all the conventions, the respect for red tape and the reverence for 'good form.' So has arisen the 'English gentle-'man,' a phenomenon which has often attracted attention. He is the direct outcome of all the irregularities of the English character and the heterogeneous nature of the English population. In a homogeneous population, like that of Russia, such a phenomenon could not have been produced, it would seem too intolerably irksome, if not inhuman. English gentlemanliness is analogous to French politeness, which is a highly polished surface absolutely necessary for the avoidance

of friction among a people of very mixed racial elements with strong social impulses and tense nervous systems. The English gentleman has, however, only been very slowly evolved. He is startlingly absent, even in the highest circles, in the fifteenth century, and we are surprised at his lapses even in the seventeenth. It is because he is so recent that the Englishman cherishes him so reverently and associates with him his highest ideals of conduct, even at the cost of more intellectual acquirements. 'We shall never be gentlemen and you will 'always be fools,' said the German officer to the Englishman in the course of the present war; the flattered amusement which that oft-quoted epigram has caused to the diffident pride of the Englishman is itself a trait of national psychology.

The spirit of the English 'sportsman' is, on a lower plane and in wider diffusion, comparable to that of the English 'gentleman.' Sport in the shape of games is the ideal of the ordinary man in England whose education and social status do not enable him to cherish the ideals of the gentleman. But it is fundamentally the same thing. It is a sublimation of the crude energies of the race; it is a transformation into orderly and socialised play of the predatory contests of the ancestral invaders. It is a training and a discipline. It invigorates the body and balances the mind. Above all, it cultivates the sense of 'fair-play' into a national possession. It is this spirit of sport which animates not only the English politician but even the modern English soldier, who thus comes to approach war in a spirit of adventure and good-humour, even of gaiety, which has often astonished the onlookers by its contrast to that of the German and especially Prussian soldier who, ever since Frederick William I. introduced the obligation of universal military service, has been taught to regard war as a solemn patriotic duty to be carried out obediently as the State may direct in the service of the Fatherland. The Englishman hides his sense of duty behind a mask, whether of phlegmatic stolidity or good-humoured indifference, and in that concealment places his pride. 'No race,' it has been said, 'not even the Chinese, shows less what is going on inside.'

It is also as a secondary reaction, and not as a primary quality, that we must regard another characteristic of the English, already manifested in sport, the tendency to moderation and compromise. The primary English quality resulting

from the selectional process that made England was rather of excessiveness, crudely gross in the Saxon, more finely transmuted in the Norman. That excessiveness seems long to have prevailed unchecked ; in politics and religion alike it was so even in the Civil War of the seventeenth century. The extremity of the evil of conflicting extravagancies seems at that culminating point to have led to a general reaction which before had only been manifested in isolated personalities like Falkland. Then in politics we have the final establishment of the English Constitution, with King and Lords and Commons holding each other in mutual check and balance, while government is carried on by the alternate play of opposing parties as in a game ; and in religion we have the development under the late Stuarts of toleration, which meant the practical recognition of the right of the individual to form, and act upon, his own opinion in the great issues of life generally, as against the claim of external authority to prescribe limits to thought and practice. Both these very English characteristics, it must be noted,—that towards compromise in action and that towards toleration in thought,—can only arise in a developed social consciousness seeking to meet the dangers by which it is threatened ; they are based on reflexion, and directed, not by primitive impulse, but by the controlled effort of will. Thus the ideals of compromise and toleration in English public life are strictly analogous to the ideal of the ' gentleman ' in English private life, both alike secondary results of the same primary characters ; they are not, like the mutual help of the Russians, the outcome of a simple and instinctive feeling of brotherhood ; they involve a high discipline, not often completely attained and needing to be perpetually reinforced. This reinforcement is effected by the play of the primary impulse against which they are a reaction. The violence of the early Stuarts was the stimulus to English political compromise, and the violence of the Quakers the stimulus to English religious toleration. The same process continues to-day. Every violent outburst of primitive English individuality tends to lead to a re-adjustment by which a greater number of individualities are more harmoniously enabled to expand, by the neutralisation of their own destructive and negative aspects in favour of their constructive and positive aspects. Even Socialism is thus in England a

development of Individualism. The process is not always effected without confusion and conflict, as we see in its recent extensions in the sphere of women's activities, but it is the method through which England's part in the world's civilisation is progressively evolved.

When we bear in mind these considerations it seems difficult not to conclude that the English qualities have had a real value in the world. It may be said that even their defects have heightened these qualities. Taken altogether, we see here a primitively adventurous, even piratical people, independent, self-reliant, sometimes self-confidently reckless, yet with inexhaustible reserves of energy and resource, and throughout a jealous regard for the rights of individuality. We see, too, how these qualities became secondarily evolved into an aptitude for caution and compromise and moderation, the element of the English genius for self-government. The form of government which has naturally arisen among people of this temperament is an oligarchy on a democratic basis sufficiently free and robust to expand progressively while still constantly growing more vigorous and more self-conscious. England passed through her brief period of 'Prussianisation,' once and for all, at the firm hands of the Normans seven centuries before the Hohenzollerns conceived the task of moulding the tough Germans of the Mark into a docile State, and even in the days of the Plantagenets, in one of the earliest books of English prose, the English Chancellor, Sir John Fortescue, was laying down the modern English doctrine that the King is simply the delegate of popular power, and that 'the laws of England in all cases declare in favour of liberty.' The English political genius for self-government, thus slowly and solidly evolved, has influenced the political methods of other countries, for which it may or may not have been suited, so that it has sometimes seemed to the foreigner that 'England 'has taught freedom to all the world.' Voltaire remarked, two centuries ago, that the English were jealous not only of their own freedom but of that of other peoples. With whatever conspicuous aberrations, the policy of England in her over-sea Dominions—a policy embodied by such typical Englishmen as the Lawrences and Sir George Grey—has not been one of mere exploitation but rather of a firm and just guardianship which has recognised self-government as the

ultimate goal. In this way the alienation which the Englishman's reserved and haughty temper tends to produce is often converted by his firm justice and strength into a loyalty which has perplexed the enemies of England. This has been so even in Ireland where yet the record of England is seen at its worst, the outcome of evil traditions belonging to a time when the incongruous elements of the English genius had not yet been harmoniously amalgamated. The history of England and her great administrators in regenerating Egypt and slowly educating the population to freedom is a less sullied page and even typical of England's civilising function. But this mark is clear even on the earliest English colonising efforts from the days of Elizabeth onwards. We see it in the wise leadership of Captain John Smith in Virginia, and in the enlightened ideals, ahead of the world even to-day, which inspired Penn at Philadelphia, while most Englishmen now recognise in Washington a far truer exponent of the English spirit than in the benighted Government he opposed. The modern Rome, Professor Sergi has termed England, comparing her mission in the world to that of ancient Rome, and others have made the same comparison. Rome is supreme and unique, and it seems more profitable to compare the career of England to that of the Great Republic on the sea which was indirectly ended by England's rise. Oligarchic, proud, adventurous, and free, with a genius alike for self-government and for the government of others, Venice founded a mighty empire which for nearly fifteen centuries attracted the loyal devotion of its citizens and its subjects, prefiguring in a smaller but more beautiful shape the yet mightier career of England. It was by a happy inspiration that the architect who embodied the spirit of England in the Houses of Parliament, on the banks of the Thames, combined in that delightful pastiche of buildings the memory of Canterbury Cathedral with the echoes of Venetian palaces.

Yet England, however falling short in Roman solidity or Venetian beauty, has always stood for one great quality of supreme human value. England represents the original initiative of personal individuality. Among no other people has there ever been so emphatic an insistence on the self-reliant qualities of the individual, with all his rights and all his duties. Only in the United States has it ever been seen in the same

degree, and then through the same selectional process acting on much the same racial elements. This extreme individualism has certainly been on one side a defect of national character. It has induced an unwillingness to help those who will not help themselves, and an indifference to the resulting sordidness of life which have only been in some measure corrected by the concerted social activity of recent times. The observant Swiss traveller, Muralt, at the end of the seventeenth century, noted the ugly side of this individualism in its disregard of those who incompetently fell out of the social ranks, and though Voltaire, on his famous visit to England a few years later, was impressed by the high general level of prosperity among English peasants, Hogarth was at the same time depicting a less attractive aspect of English individualism. So typical a patriot as John Bright opposed factory legislation, and the sacred name of Freedom was misused to delay the establishment of universal education. But if on the negative side English individualism has often been harsh and stupid, on the positive side it has been the impetus to an endless series of achievements in the physical and spiritual worlds. For it is not only as adventurers and sailors and explorers and administrators—Drake or Clive or Nelson or Cook—that the English spirit of self-reliant individualism has displayed its ardent force and audacity. Notwithstanding that timidity in the intellectual sphere which seems so often to mark the Englishman—as though all his firm valour were of that immediately practical kind which the primary selectional process had evoked—the adventurous and revolutionary spirit of English individualism has nowhere been more conspicuously displayed than in the region of science and philosophy. Hostile to tradition and rebellious to authority, fundamentally Protestant, we see Roger Bacon and Francis Bacon, Hobbes and Locke, Hume and Spencer, spiritual vikings and sublimated buccaneers. The men of this temper were yet constructive as well as destructive; Newton was not only destroying Cartesianism but making the physical universe afresh, and Darwin was not merely tearing up the first chapter of Genesis but writing a more wonderful story of creation; Newton and Darwin together have inspired the main currents of modern scientific thought all over the world, yet even in the absence of these two supreme figures the achievements of English science stand easily beside

those of any land, and they have nearly always been reached by methods of personal initiative and original insight which contrast strikingly with the Teutonic methods of elaborate combined organisation and national plodding thoroughness, systematically testing in sequence every possible solution of the problem in hand until success is achieved, methods well typified by Ehrlich's progress to 606. The German in science is minute but short-sighted ; the Englishman overlooks much, but he still possesses the long-sighted vision of his seafaring ancestors.

It is not only in the higher ranges of life and thought that these methods have dominated England. They have permeated the whole activities of the people and moulded the shape of national development. In Prussia, where it has sometimes seemed possible to find points of contact with England, it is the State which dominates the individual ; within a very few generations a succession of strong rulers, acting on a rugged, recalcitrant, and yet docile population, has here swiftly constructed an artificial State system which insists on setting its seal on the entire activities, material and spiritual, of the people. But in England we find an ancient and independent community which has slowly worked out its own natural ways of self-government without any notion of what a State is. The ordinary educated Englishman is unconscious of the State, he never gives it a thought ; if it should happen that the idea is presented to him he usually reacts to it in violent opposition. The claim of Socialism can only be commended to the Englishman by the argument that, by the removal of social friction and economic oppression, we may enhance and expand the forces of individualism.

It has been possible in England to defend the worst abuses in the sacred name of an individualism that was false because it meant the freedom of some individuals to flourish at the expense of other individuals. Yet the qualities of adventurous energy and restless aspiration, of original initiative, of personal self-government, of free and spontaneous organisation, which have specially stamped the English genius, possess an incomparable value. Whatever other qualities may be required, these qualities, certainly, are indispensable to every fruitful and civilising movement which humanity may undertake.

Havelock Ellis.

SYSTEMATIC COLONISATION

1. **The Colonisation of Australia, 1829–42.** By R. C. Mills. Sidgwick and Jackson. 1915.
2. **A View of the Art of Colonisation.** Edited by Edward Gibbon Wakefield. Parker. 1849. New Edition. Clarendon Press. 1914.
3. **A History of Emigration.** By Stanley C. Johnson. Routledge. 1913.
4. **Land Settlement for Soldiers.** By Colonel H. Pilkington. W. Clowes. 1911.

MANY people have asked themselves lately why the English people are always unready for war, and many answers, unflattering to the nation and its politicians, have been attempted to this conundrum. Far be it from me to defend a single politician for his wilful blindness to what most soldiers knew years ago; but the nation may perhaps allege a more adequate justification for its proverbial unreadiness than its nominal leaders.

The essential genius of the English people is towards creative and constructive work, and the aim of war is, after all, mainly destructive. A German destroys Louvain with pleasure, an Englishman can hardly be induced to destroy a slum in Bethnal Green. And our bent being towards constructive work, we are always ready for colonisation, which is the creation of fresh communities and even nations, and unready for its antithesis, war, which is the destruction, or at least the subjection, of other communities and nations.

Now in this war, as in its predecessors, our constructive work has had to go for the time being. The steady stream of emigration from the British Isles to the Dominions, which had flowed with increasing volume for the past twenty-five years, first slackened and then ceased; some of it, indeed, returned to its source in the Canadian and Australian regiments that have been brought across the sea to fight on European battlefields. But when this war ends the stream of emigration will begin to flow again, and we shall do well to prepare for it.

It is proverbial that wars are usually followed by a period of exhaustion. It is less generally recognised that this is only a partial aspect of the case, and that a great war is nearly always followed by a period of great colonising activity. That is to say, the exhaustion is more apparent than real, except in the event of utter disaster; human energies are merely directed into another channel. Nor is there anything surprising in this, since colonising, which implies settlement in a new country, necessarily springs from unsettlement in an old country, and nothing unsettles the social and economic basis of an old country more than war. Unless there is an outlet to some new country this inevitable unsettlement in an old country may cause serious trouble; for human energies which, if properly guided, will be directed into constructive work overseas, may, if thwarted, be unprofitably directed into destructive work at home.*

Our great wars have nearly always been followed by an outburst of colonising activity. When James I. reversed the warlike policy of the late Elizabethan period the restless spirits of the time sought adventure in Virginia and Guiana. When England rested after the Civil and Cromwellian wars there was a double tide of emigration, Cavaliers going to the old loyalist colonies which their kindred had founded, Roundheads seeking new homes in the congenial puritanism of New England; Carolina was founded by a Restoration statesman, and Pennsylvania by the first of the modern Pacifists.

Again, after the war which ended in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, there was an organised scheme of emigration to Nova Scotia, and the first settlers established themselves in the forests of New Brunswick; the Anglo-Virginians staked out claims across the Ohio, and the French in Canada pushed forward to the Rocky Mountains and Louisiana. The Seven Years' War was hardly finished when the tide flowed strongly again. 'Our people have a strange itch to colonise America

* It would be an interesting subject for an historian to consider whether the excesses of the French Revolution were in any way due to the fact that so few Frenchmen had emigrated during the previous generation They lost Canada, which had engaged many of the most adventurous sons of France in exploration and fur-trading, twenty years before; the fall of French power in India almost at the same time cut off another outlet for Gallic energy.

'when the uncultivated parts of our own island might be 'settled to greater advantage,' grumbled honest Matthew Bramble in 'Humphrey Clinker'; and soon afterwards a popular dramatist remarked in 'The School for Wives' that 'England, by an unaccountable fatality, seems inclined to 'take up her residence in America; and, to cultivate the 'barbarous borders of the Ohio, we are hourly deserting 'the beautiful banks of the Thames.' *

Again emigration was checked during the Napoleonic Wars, but after 1815 it immediately surpassed all previous records. For the next thirty years the United States received a large portion of the surplus population of Great Britain and Ireland; emigrant ships sailed every month to Canada; a government-aided scheme of emigration was set on foot in South Africa; and even Australia, till then reserved almost entirely for penal settlement, felt the tread of British freemen. So strong, indeed, was the movement of free settlers towards Australia that within less than a generation they had compelled the British Government to cease the transport of convicted prisoners, or at least to confine the penal system to the little-known country of West Australia; and by that time New Zealand was no longer the preserve of missionaries and whalers, but the seat of a new British colony.

It may be said that history does not always repeat itself, and that in these wars of the past, great as they were, the destruction of life was far less than in the present war. True: but against that it must be remembered that the population is now far larger, and the destruction of life has not outpaced the growth of population; and also that the displacement of normal social forces in this country has been unprecedented, and is none the less grave because its extent has been somewhat obscured by the clash of great events. The coming of the woman bank-clerk, the woman tram-conductor, the woman ticket-clerk on the railways, was forgotten in the agony of Serbia and the retreat from Macedonia; but the social and economic consequences of the increased employment of women may yet be incompletely defined when the events at Salonika have been resigned by the journalists to the historians.

* 'Humphrey Clinker' was published in 1771, eight years after the conclusion of the Seven Years' War; 'The School for Wives' three years later.

It is quite clear that the displacement of social forces has been too great for them to be speedily, or perhaps even ultimately, restored to their old channels. We began the war with the idea that in a few months we should all return to the old grooves; after twenty months we know that the old grooves themselves have changed, and we have changed with them. Our old politics are vanishing, and after Armageddon the threat of civil war in Ireland will seem a matter of little consequence; our social standards are not less surely changing, and we are already realising how immense was the waste of a system which employed men at low wages measuring tapes and ribbons and doing other light work that women can do, while thousands of women with no domestic duties remained at home and brought down the standard of living by their useless dependence. Many households are in a better position than before the war because the daughters are earning money instead of spending it. They will not readily go back to the old insecurity, and its consequent helplessness and limitation of outlook. And since in a large proportion of cases they seem to have done the work required of them at least as well as the men whom they replaced, their employers will not be prepared to part with them unless they are temporary stopgaps for men whose situations are being kept open. For this aspect of post-war conditions there is no parallel in our history; in previous wars the drain upon our manhood was heavy, but our industries were in a more primitive condition.

But it may be objected that there will be a shortage of men in any case, not merely for home industry but for emigration purposes. The facts so far do not bear out this theory, but indeed indicate rather the contrary.

In the first eighteen months of the war we lost in killed, wounded, missing and prisoners a gross total of half a million men. But of these the prisoners will practically all return and be available after the war. The great bulk of the wounded will recover and be available for some kind of civilian work. Only those who have been killed or so seriously wounded as to be incapable of work are definitely lost to the country. If we take one in ten of the wounded to be so seriously wounded as to be absolutely incapable of work we are certainly allowing too high a percentage, but we will bias the calcula-

tion unfavourably of set purpose. Now in the first eighteen months of war the total wounded of all ranks in all theatres of war was nearly 350,000; we will therefore reckon that 35,000 of these men will be incapable of earning their living here or in the colonies. And to these must be added the 110,000 men killed in action or dead of wounds or disease. The total net casualties of eighteen months' war were therefore 145,000 men.

On the other side of the account we have to remember that about 1,100,000 children are born in the United Kingdom every year, and that the excess of births over deaths is about 450,000 per annum. Since the war began the civilian death-rate has risen, and the birth-rate has fallen; on the other hand emigration has practically ceased. Thus while we have lost 145,000 men by war in eighteen months, we have gained in the same period probably at least 900,000 persons, male and female, by excess of births over deaths and by reduction of emigration. So much for the war of attrition from our point of view; we are clearly far from exhausting the national capital in its most precious and vital aspect—human life.

There may yet be heavy casualties, but we may hope the bulk of the men in our new armies will return. Some, of course, have situations waiting for them—a fortunate minority. A number will find that their employer has himself gone under during the war, and will have to cast about at once for fresh work. If they were engaged in some luxury trade their prospects are not to be envied; it is unlikely that they will find permanent or satisfactory employment in the poorer community after the war. And a further considerable number will be disbanded who had no regular work before the war —there are whole battalions of odd-job men, excellent soldiers no doubt, but in civil life precarious hangers-on to the skirts of industry. How will all these men find work to their hand when peace is signed?

Disbandment of the armies will probably be gradual, and something has been heard of a scheme to give each man a month's pay on his discharge. But industry will not return to normal conditions within a month, and the problem is not one of discharged soldiers alone. Practically all the thousands of men employed on munition work will be available after the war, *and it must not be forgotten that they will have*

the first, and therefore the best, chance in the open labour market. The disbandment of the army depends upon the terms of peace, but the manufacture of munitions will be enormously reduced the moment peace is signed. It cannot be safely assumed that there will be sufficient work at once available for all the men thus displaced.

It seems therefore certain that after this war, as after previous wars, there will be unrest and unemployment, that similar causes on a larger scale will produce similar results on a larger scale, and that we are justified in preparing for a colonising movement of great magnitude as a palliative of our social difficulties. And the axiom of Edward Gibbon Wakefield, the pioneer of modern systematic emigration, is as true to-day as when he wrote it: 'Colonisation is a 'natural means of seeking relief from the worst of our social 'ills, and of thus averting formidable political dangers.'

Now it is quite obvious that emigration will do much to relieve the post-war social problem at home, and to that extent will be a necessary and profitable medicine for Great Britain; but it will not necessarily on that account be successful colonising. Every unemployed man who is emigrated from these shores clearly reduces the amount of unemployment at home; but if he finds no work to his hand at the other end of his journey we have merely shifted the problem a stage, and not only not solved it, but perhaps in the long run aggravated it. It is our business to see that the gulf between emigration and colonisation is properly bridged; hence this plea for systematic colonisation, based on the experience of the past, and modified by the conditions of the present. And it is important to remember in this connection that we are not dealing only with unemployed men. Many of those who after this war would be welcomed back to their old situations by employers who have missed their services will revolt against the drudgery of office stool or shop-counter, and seek a life of more colour and variety outside these islands. The British Empire has been made not merely by the need of bread but the lust of adventure, and in this respect the centuries have not changed us.

It will be said, of course, that the loss of these energetic and capable men will weaken the mother country, already weakened by the loss of so many men in battle; and we shall

be reminded that for the last thirty years Germany severely discouraged emigration, and that part of her tremendous strength in the present war was undoubtedly due to the manner in which she conserved her population at home. To the latter objection the answer is that Germany only discouraged emigration when she found her people would not go to German colonies, but were frequently absorbed in alien communities and so lost to her ; and that in any case the most successful colonising people is not going to model itself upon the least successful. To the former, the age-long objection to colonisation, it seems sufficient to reply that for three centuries past we have been steadily emigrating of our best, yet the England of to-day is not noticeably weaker than the England of James I. The happy soil of England is not so harsh or infertile that it cannot spare something for other lands after supplying all our needs at home.

Those objections being overruled, we have henceforth to look at this problem from the standpoint, not of the United Kingdom, but of the colony we propose to found or enlarge, that is to say, to treat the matter as one of immigration rather than emigration. It is for lack of this simple precaution that many a promising project of settlement has been ruined. Yet after all, while the original aim of emigration is to relieve a congested social organisation at home, the ultimate object is to found or enlarge a new social organisation overseas. A new colony may spring from our overcrowded labour market ; but it will be judged, not by its incidental origin, but by its success, and that success can only be estimated in one way—by the stability and character of the new community.

We build for a purpose, and for that end we must select the bricks and settle the design in advance. It is easy enough to say 'Let us take so many men and emigrate them to such 'a place ; then let them settle and prosper.' The trouble is they may neither settle nor prosper, and, returning home, may discredit the whole community. It is more difficult to select men of known character or resource who will work together in strange and probably hard conditions, but a community founded on such a basis will succeed when the haphazard scheme will fail. The high enterprise of building up a new community that will in time influence for good or evil

the fate of a new nation for centuries ahead—and colonisation properly considered is nothing less than this—must be systematic and undertaken of set purpose by men who have something of a creative and state-making character in their disposition.

Our history is strewn with examples of both the haphazard and the systematic methods of colonisation. The former have seldom succeeded, the latter have hardly ever failed.

Of the miserable pauper emigrants who were sent out to Canada shipload by shipload without any other idea than relieving England of their presence in the hard years between 1815 and 1837, a very large number—some say as many as 50 per cent.—drifted from the north side of the St. Lawrence to the south, and took up their residence in the United States, where the conditions were then better and opportunities greater. They were probably the most active and energetic men among the emigrants who were thus lost to the British Empire, mainly because no adequate statecraft was employed to retain them in Ontario; England, having once got rid of them, cared no more about them than the proverbial poor relation. She was satisfied with having relieved the congestion at home, and, having achieved the beginning, missed entirely the real end of colonisation.

The emigration to Canada was largely in private hands; the Algoa Bay settlement of 1820 was under Government auspices, but it, too, was an unhappy example of haphazard and non-selective colonisation. The most severe critic of the colony declared that numbers of the emigrants were 'tavern 'waiters, broken-down actors, attorney's clerks, pianoforte 'makers, men and women milliners from Bond Street, and 'ladies'-maids'; while one of the actual emigrants, and the most able man in the party, admitted that only about a third were people of respectability or substance, the remainder being mostly persons who had long hung loose upon society, low in morals and desperate in circumstances, often idle, insolent and drunken, if not mutinously disposed and inclined to discontent wherever they were placed.*

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* The less favourable estimate appeared in 'The Quarterly Review'; the more favourable in Pringle's 'Narrative of a Residence in South Africa.'

Against these gross and palpable failures set the success which has rarely been lacking to colonies founded on a systematic basis, in which the emigrants have been carefully selected for the particular purpose in view, and adequate arrangements have been made for their settlement. Halifax in Nova Scotia, for example, was established in 1749 by a picked body of 2500 men—farmers, labourers, mechanics, discharged soldiers and sailors from the Great War—and the colony had no serious difficulties from the beginning. The settlement of time-expired soldiers in Canada after the Napoleonic Wars was, when properly organised, as satisfactory as the pauper settlements without organisation in Canada were unsatisfactory. The emigrants were selected, and they had a sense of comradeship from the start. It was the lack of both these factors that led to difficulties and failure elsewhere; just as the still more stringent selection which was imposed on the New England colonies—founded on that strongest of all bases, a religious sense quickened by persecution—led to their still greater success and gave them the mental and industrial lead over their neighbours which they have since so largely maintained in the United States.

In modern times, the outstanding examples of systematic colonisation are furnished by the Wakefield settlements in Australia and New Zealand. None of these colonies failed—although the South Australian scheme was crippled at the start by official interference and subsequently passed through a critical period when bankruptcy threatened, owing to the folly of its Governor, who encouraged State employment at the expense of private enterprise—but practically all the New Zealand enterprises were successful almost from the outset. Wellington, which Wakefield destined for the capital of the colony, was deprived of the honour which it merited on account of its central geographical position, through jealousy of the Colonial Office against a private enterprise; but a quarter of a century after its foundation Wellington had prospered so greatly that the chastened Colonial Office had to give way and see its own chosen settlement Auckland deposed in favour of the more successful city founded by an independent company. Dunedin, the Scots Presbyterian community, and Canterbury, the Anglican foundation in the antipodes—'an extension of England with regard to the

'more refined attributes of civilisation,' as its founders declared it—both flourished; and both were composed of carefully selected emigrants, bound together by the common tie of religion, which they faithfully transplanted into alien soil.

Wakefield at the start had little belief in colonies founded on a religious basis, owing to his early prejudice against the Church of England, which he regarded as bound hand and foot by his arch-enemy the Colonial Office. Yet his last two colonies were both founded on a religious basis, and they were at least as successful as Wellington, which was purely secular. There is evidence that in this matter, as in others, he profited by experience * and learnt that the religious bond is among the strongest of the ties which can unite an infant community in exile.

The Wakefield system, then, was successful. It was also consistently opposed from beginning to end by the Colonial Office, which interpreted its duties to mean that it should obstruct colonisation,† and alternately sulked and swore (in the decorous manner of officialdom) when Wakefield proved too strong for the bureaucratic fly on the wheel of the British Empire; but the Colonial Office objected to Wakefield, not because there were weak points in his system, but (*a*) because it was the original outcome of an active mind relying on private enterprise; (*b*) because the Colonial Office of that day had no desire to enlarge its responsibilities, and thought it had put the final seal on the growth of the British Empire—as Clive also thought eighty years before, and some of us are thinking to-day, eighty years since; and (*c*) above and beyond all, because Wakefield's theories involved some measure of self-government, and self-government to the Colonial Office

* So successful were the Presbyterian and Anglican colonies in the antipodes that he suggested a Jewish colony on similar lines. 'But how would the Jews live, if there were no Christians for them to live on?' objected a Jew to whom the project was communicated. The objection was unanswerable.

† 'All schemes for making settlements by private individuals or companies in the unlocated districts of Australia have of late years been discouraged by His Majesty's Government, as leading to fresh establishments, involving the mother country in an indefinite expense, and exposing both the natives and the new settlers to many dangers and calamities.' Despatch of British Colonial Secretary, Glenelg, 23rd January 1836.

of that day was what humanity is to a Prussian to-day—a thing so repellent that it must at all costs be avoided.

Yet experience has discovered the inevitable flaws in the Wakefield system, and shown us not merely what may be worth imitating but what must certainly be avoided. As to one inherent defect, a contemporary criticism may be exhumed from the dust of provincial journalism. 'The means 'of the settlers,' said a writer in the New Zealand 'Nelson 'Examiner' in 1844, 'have been crippled by paying large 'sums of money for land, and everything at present seems to 'point to the same consummation as in South Australia—'total exhaustion.' The criticism is fair both of the Australian and New Zealand settlements. By imposing no limit to the amount of land a settler could buy, the system led (*a*) to men exhausting their capital by taking up more land than they could cultivate, (*b*) to the consequent separation of settler from settler by large blocks of uncultivated land, (*c*) to land speculation, and (*d*) in some cases to absentee proprietorship.

Time and changing circumstance have knocked a more serious hole in the Wakefield scheme. The people he planted carried their government with them; there was neither Commonwealth nor Dominion in 1840. To-day we have Colonial Governments with active branches and publicity agents in London, fully conscious of their local desires and limitations, and with the power and decision to order their own destinies. No Colonial Office can dictate to them; no new Wakefield ignore them.

It is with these Governments that we must work. They have full control over immigration; constitutionally they can discourage and even forbid it entirely, or encourage it as a set national policy to the limit of their powers of absorption —and no colony can safely immigrate more people than it can absorb. New Zealand under Vogel and Seddon, and Canada of recent years, are examples of the latter policy; Australia, with certain recent exceptions, of the former.

Now New Zealand, which was founded on the principle of systematic colonisation by selected immigration, for many years continued as a State what Wakefield had done as a private individual, and carefully selected her immigrants in order that she might, in the words of Sir George Grey,

'lay here the foundations of a race which shall be in every 'respect a monument to those who have striven to build it.'

That noble principle of systematic and selected colonisation as the basis of conscious nation-building we must hope to see applied again; we can ask no better example than present-day New Zealand.

But in New Zealand and the older and more thickly-populated parts of Australia and Canada, such immigration as there is will be mainly that of new individuals entering an already established community. Such immigrants will in time influence the community in which they settle, according to strength of character or religious belief or material success; but they must necessarily be relatively few in number, they will not therefore in any sense solve or materially palliate the social problem in Great Britain, and consequently they will not be examples of that systematic colonisation on a large scale for which this paper pleads.

For this latter we must look to the founding of new communities in lands that are already indeed under British rule, but are yet empty of population. There we can plant, not an individual but a society, a body of men who will stamp the virgin soil with their tradition, and whose children will reverence the memory of their origin as the United Empire settlers in Ontario or the Puritans of Massachusetts have reverenced theirs, from generation to generation. That is at once the strongest and the most enduring society which derives from a common bond; and the common bond in this case would be the memory of having fought together in the war of liberty. Those who have defended the liberties of Old England will be fit founders of the New Englands.

The first essential is land, and of land there is happily no lack in the British Empire. After a successful war our territories may be even larger than they now are—for the conquered German colonies will generally be retained by the British Dominions which have fought for them—but it by no means follows that the natural instinct to plant our new settlements in these ex-German possessions should be gratified. Most of these countries are tropical, and tropical colonisation by white men is still in its infancy. It is true that the long records of the West Indies, Mauritius, and more recently of Nigeria seem to contradict this statement; but the men who

settled in those countries were individual planters or traders, men with capital who developed their estates and in time returned to England, leaving a son or an agent to carry on their affairs. In prosperous years they made large fortunes, in lean years they have sunk into relative poverty; in the future, so far as we can judge, the increasing demand for raw materials and the high prices which tropical produce fetches on the European and American markets will make their path a pleasant one. But these men are not colonists of the type we now need, just as Jamaica is not British in the sense that Australia is. The tropical planter cannot root himself in the soil in the sense that the man who settles in a temperate country will do; he is an exotic, often an exile, his children are educated in England, his sons frequently marry in England, his womenfolk return to England, and always there is the homeward pull of the mother country. It was a sound instinct which made the English Puritan refugees in Holland reject the glittering bribe of Guiana and establish themselves on the more sober shores of Massachusetts, an unsound instinct which led the great Scots scheme of colonisation to send its people to death at Panama. We have no room to repeat the disaster of Darien.

The same reason will bar Northern Australia. The dismal annals of the Northern Territory have seen many failures, but not one success *; and although this great problem is one that must soon be tackled, it will not be by sending communities of men who will be necessarily small proprietors with limited capital to a country which requires great squatters and large capital; a country, moreover, which requires drainage before it can be occupied by Europeans, and better communications than a single cable, a short length of railway, and an occasional coast steamer before it can be occupied by a colony of any size. The settlement of North Australia will become a pressing matter in the next twenty years, but it is a country in which the engineer and the specialist in tropical medicine must precede the regular settler. The extraordinarily variegated history of Englishmen in the tropics demonstrates that we do not yet understand the building

* The successive attempts to colonise the Northern Territory are set out in 'The English People Overseas,' vol. v. bk. xx.

of a stable white civilisation on permanent lines in countries where we cannot rear our children.

We come then to the temperate countries of the Empire as zones for systematic colonisation; and here, if the site be wisely chosen and the people properly selected, is every prospect of success. There are three continents where settlements can be made—Australia, Canada, and South Africa. As to the first of these, Sir Rider Haggard, than whom there is no better authority, has gone recently to Queensland under the auspices of the Royal Colonial Institute to confer with the Government of that State as to the arrangements that can be made to plant soldiers and sailors on the land after the war.

It is to be hoped that Sir Rider Haggard will also give consideration to West Australia, a State which has considerable areas of land available in its more temperate regions, and which devoted much attention to the increase of its population a few years before the war under its energetic Premier and present Agent-General, Sir Newton Moore.*

In Canada, particularly in the North-West and in Northern Ontario, large areas are available for settlement along the new railway lines; and both the Dominion and Provincial Governments have always been advocates of a generous immigration policy.

In Rhodesia, where are also very large tracts of unoccupied land, the position has been to some extent defined by a statement of policy issued by the British South Africa Company a few months before the war.† This statement declares that:

'In order to deal effectively with the present situation it is proposed that a Land Settlement Board be constituted in Rhodesia by Ordinance of the Legislative Council. The statutory powers of such a Board would include the right to acquire land, to improve it, to alienate it by way of sale or lease, and to raise capital for

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* Sir Newton Moore also tackled boldly the difficult question of the immigration of women. The proper consideration of this delicate but vital problem would require more space than the scope of the present paper allows.

† See Report and Accounts of B.S.A. Company for year ending 31st March 1914, Annexure 5, Proposals for the encouragement of Land Settlement and Immigration.

this purpose under powers defined by the Ordinance. It would also have power to purchase undeveloped land compulsorily under defined conditions.'

At the same time it is remarked that :

'At the present stage it is premature to introduce into Rhodesia immigrants without the experience, the moderate capital, and the physique required to render them successful cultivating land-owners.

'Again, it would be unwise to stimulate land settlement without regard to such factors as the adequacy of the supply of labour or of live stock in particular districts, and the markets available for an increased agricultural output.

'A considerable time must yet elapse before Southern Rhodesia will be able, like older and larger colonies, to stimulate immigration and development by the use of loans charged against taxes levied on the public. Until that stage is reached the funds required for such purposes can only be obtained as heretofore from the share-holders.

. . . . . .

'Nevertheless, having given full consideration to the resolution of the Legislative Council, the Board believes that the time is now ripe for a larger policy. Finally, if a system of smaller farms under more intensive and scientific cultivation be adopted with the assistance which the Agricultural Department can now offer, local supplies should displace imported food stuffs with more advantage to the community, and if an adequate output of high and consistent quality can be established the Company can organise an export trade for certain classes of Rhodesian produce.'

As to the limitations which this programme implies in colonisation much might be said. But at least it is evident that in each of these cases, in Australia, in Canada, and more especially in Rhodesia, a complete new colony that would be a community in itself could be planted with every prospect of success.

Let us sketch out the conditions surrounding such a colony in the making. Experience has shown that five thousand men is as large a number as can be conveniently dealt with as a single unit, and I am inclined to think that these should be sent out in two or three parties of about equal numbers at quite short intervals, care being taken, however, that the right season is chosen in each case, and that preparations are made in advance to avoid confusion on arrival.

A community of five thousand men, the majority of whom are married (and married men should have the preference),

presupposes a settlement that will total some twenty thousand souls within a few years, a settlement that will begin to build its own schools and concern itself about education, as well as crops and stocks, within five or six years, and will in the end take firm root in a country in which the pioneers are always immigrants, but the children are native to the soil. It contains its own vital element within it; it will renew itself from itself; and such a community will in time become 'a Little England in the Wilderness,' with a growing local patriotism of its own, and a robust faith in itself derived from its origin and early records. It is on that model that the British Empire has been built.

It is essential, I think, that such a community should have almost complete local self-government for a period of years. The Englishman is essentially an individualist; the English colony is essentially an individual community likely to be jealous of its neighbour and to seek its own way of dealing with its own problems (which it will probably imagine peculiar to itself); local circumstances of soil and climate will influence its growth almost from the start and give it a specialised character; there will be local leaders, village Hampdens or even Lloyd Georges of the veldt, who will be famous in their own country and nonentities across the provincial border: these influences must have full play or there will be trouble.

For a time there will assuredly be a certain jealousy of the greater Dominion or Commonwealth; this is but the striving of the smaller community to assert and maintain its own individuality against the greater. From inside we may hear complaints of persecution, from outside complaints that a State within a State is growing up; these will be merely symptomatic of growth towards maturity, and may be disregarded. Practically every British colony has gone the same road to the same end: the first generation born on its soil thinks it the only colony in the world, superior to the mother country and vastly superior to the minor surrounding colonies whose defects are so easily apparent to neighbours; the second generation asserts its parents' views more loudly, but begins to feel the pull of larger issues; the third quietly accepts the greater destiny and federates.

Local self-government, then, there must be, because for

a time the new colony will value this far more than it will the two or three members who are the most its small population will have the right to elect in the Dominion Parliament. Moreover, a small community has to work, and its people have little time for the idle luxuries of politics at a distance. The few outstanding men can run the local Council or Assembly without neglecting their private affairs in the next street, or at most a few miles off; but constant attendance during a session at a Dominion Parliament a couple of thousand miles away is an entirely different matter. That colony prospers best which has most to say in its own affairs and least to say in the affairs of its neighbours (until it can speak with them on equal terms).

There remains lastly the question whether this systematic colonisation which is to have permanent results in founding a new British community, or, rather, several new British communities, is to be undertaken by the State or by the private enterprise of a limited company formed for that specific purpose.

But before one answers that question let us define a little more closely the meaning 'undertaken by the State.' By what State? There is an alleged Imperial Government, an occasional Imperial Conference, a whole series of Colonial States, but there is no Imperial State. It is true that there has been State colonisation in the past: that is to say, colonisation carried on at the expense of one or other of the States of the Empire; the British Parliament has voted sums to assist emigration, and various colonial States have voted sums to assist immigration and land settlement. But these are by no means the same thing. The people we readily pay to be rid of are not necessarily the people the colonies will pay to get. Any system of joint action between the various States will take time to devise, and will be open to the objection that the parties are at cross purposes.

Moreover, both the British and Dominion Governments will find their hands pretty full after the war with other and not less urgent matters; nor is it easy to credit the attractive theory that the new and better world which we are promised when peace returns will include a new and better Government that foresees all things, including even the need for courage and action. What will more probably happen will

be that the British Government will appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the whole matter, whose invaluable conclusions—issued some years subsequently—will indeed become a classic authority, but will be immediately shelved on the very proper ground that in the meantime the Dominions and private enterprise have done all that was necessary. There is good precedent for such a course : the motor-omnibus killed the report of the Royal Commission on London Traffic as ruthlessly as it kills mere pedestrians.

State emigration, then, by the British Government probably means nothing at all ; State immigration by the Colonial Governments, whose resources are not unlimited, who have old loans maturing, and whose new capital issues will necessarily be raised at a higher rate of interest, means perhaps a steady but certainly not a very large policy of immigration. That, I believe, is not sufficient. We are driven back then mainly on private enterprise, which has, among other things, largely built up the British Empire in the teeth of Government opposition in the past.

There have been hundreds of private companies formed, mostly with a charter from the Crown, to develop the British Empire. Some, like the East India Company, succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of their founders, entirely changed their original purpose, and lost their original object, trade, in the reluctantly assumed necessity of territorial control and administration. Others, like the Hudson's Bay Company, survive to this day. A few failed commercially, like the New England Companies, but succeeded politically ; a few only, like the Darien Company, failed disastrously in everything.

From the nature of the case, there have been two distinct types of these companies from the very beginning of oversea joint-stock enterprise—the trading company and the colonising company, and, again from the nature of the case, the trading company has usually paid its shareholders better than the colonising company. (The East India Company was formed in 1600, its first dividend was 95 per cent., and for many years its commercial success was enormous ; the Virginia Company was formed in 1606, it survived only until 1624, and never paid a dividend at all.) But the trading company goes to thickly populated countries where it can begin business at once ; the colonising company usually goes to thinly

populated countries where it has to plant its settlement and wait for results while the settlement grows. The one deals with bales and hogsheads, the other with men ; and—a further difficulty for the colonising company—men, especially Englishmen, are more difficult to deal with than bales and hogsheads. The East India Company had a century and a half of trade before it was seriously disturbed by politics ; the Virginia Company found that the first thing its settlers did was to fall sick of various diseases, and the second (*post hoc* or *propter hoc* ?) to set up a Parliament.

A colonising company of the kind desired would not look for a permanent corporate life. Its very reason for existence is that it shall plant a stable settlement, and that work done and its stability assured, the reason for the company's existence vanishes. It would stand in the position of a trustee at the start, but there comes a time in the life of communities, as of individuals, when, if they are of any use in the world, they decide to manage their affairs themselves without trustees. The typical British community learns to manage its affairs rather quickly.

The company, therefore, will recognise that its business in the world is to get certain definite work done and then to die ; otherwise the child it has brought into being will kill it for being in the way. (There are many melancholy precedents.) But meantime its career will be neither dishonourable nor unprofitable. The company, being formed, should establish two separate Boards, if possible with one head—a Board of Settlement and a Board of Selection. It is the business of the former to decide the site of the settlement, of the latter to select the people. Both are absolutely vital to the success of the enterprise.

On the site depend at once the health and the material success of the colony. And here may well be quoted the wise words of Hakluyt, who had seen so many brave schemes of his day fail through ignorance and greed :

> ' The first seat is to be chosen in a temperate climate, in sweet air, where you may possess always sweet water, wood, seacoals or turf, with fish, flesh, grains, roots and herbs. And for mines of gold, silver, copper, quicksilver, or any such precious thing, the wants may be supplied from some other place.'

On the fulfilment of these conditions still depends the success of any colony. The Board of Settlement would in

addition survey the land for occupation; form a tentative opinion, subject to subsequent revision, of the best method of parcelling it out into lots; estimate roughly the price at which it should be sold; make certain preliminary improvements—on the lines of the Canadian Pacific Railway's Ready-for-Settlement farming scheme a few years back—and calculate the additional cost of these per farm.

To the Board of Selection, which meanwhile would be working at home, would fall the not less important business of winnowing and sifting the applications of prospective settlers. Its difficulty lies in the fact that the one final test of fitness is character, and for judging character neither rules nor testimonials are of any use. There is, unhappily, no known test to discover whether a man has grit in him.

The Board of Selection, if it be wise, will in this matter rely on its own common sense, and not on the discretion of its clerks. The attitude of the clerk to the applicant all the world over is very much that of Bumble to the beggar; and it is not condescension that intending colonists want, but information. For that reason the Board will glance through the applications themselves, one or other of them will see most of the applicants, and the final approval would in each case rest with the Board. Preference should be given to married men; the man with a little capital, who was ready to buy his land outright, would also be welcome, since he would help to relieve the finances of the company in its first and heaviest years. (The man with considerable capital would probably not apply, and in any event there must be a limitation to the size of any one individual's original holding.) But the Board of Selection would not reject the unmoneyed man for that reason alone; only in so far as lack of means is clear evidence of thriftlessness will they refuse the poor man. After all, the poor man often succeeds better than the rich in a new country, and many a penniless immigrant has become a Prime Minister.

Concurrently with the choosing of emigrants, the Board of Selection would concern itself with the price and conditions on which the land should be sold. This matter would clearly depend largely on the preliminary survey of the Board of Settlement, but certain conditions can be postulated as essential.

1. The land must in the end become the freehold of the

farmer. Politicians may dispute in England as to the reform of our land system, which is handicapped by inherited traditions, but it is one of the advantages of founding a new community that the goddess of truth can be worshipped there in all her primitive indecency. The only sound rule for creative settlement in a new country is ownership.

2. Ownership being granted, the company must get a fair price for its land. This was the financial basis of the Wakefield scheme, and its soundness can hardly be challenged (although the details in Wakefield's various enterprises were frequently badly arranged).

3. The fair price being granted, it remains the fact that few of the settlers will be able, and not all of the few that are able will desire, to purchase their land outright. A system of tenant-purchase, to be completed in not more than twenty-one years, is an obvious solution.

On these broad principles a fair agreement could be arrived at between proprietary company and prospective proprietors. Time would, it is true, bring various changes in the government of the company. The settlement being founded, the Board of Selection in London would practically have no further reason for existence, and would resolve itself gradually into a Court of Directors of the company's home and financial affairs, charging itself also with the duty of selling that portion of the colony's produce which was placed on the European market.

The Board of Settlement, on the other hand, would necessarily tend to resolve itself into a local government, and to this end provision should be made in the original articles of association for a gradually increasing infusion of the settlers' representatives on the Board. For the lack of this many a promising scheme has come to grief; a proprietary company is naturally jealous of its settlers' demand for a share of the government, the settlers are naturally jealous of the proprietors' power, and friction that has led at times to disastrous consequences has been the result. It is improbable that this can be altogether avoided, but it can at least be minimised by a little political forethought.

A succession of reasonably good harvests, and a fair average price for the crops, should not only assure a living for the settlers, but ensure that they would be able to pay off the

price of their land year by year. (There would, of course, have to be regulations protecting the settler who had paid part of the purchase-price over a series of years against the company should he on one occasion be late with his rent; equally the company would need to safeguard itself against unsatisfactory occupiers—a few are bound to slip through the most careful Board of Selection—not merely to protect itself against loss, but to protect the community against the evil example of the idler or the absentee.) Given reasonable terms, there should be no difficulty in every settler owning his own freehold before the end of the twenty-one years which may be given as a rough estimate of the life of the company.

These postulates being granted, good settlers being selected, and reasonable wisdom being shown by the heads of the enterprise, there is no reason whatever why the company should not be a financial success, in the sense that it would obtain the return of its money and something over from the sale of its land, and the transport of men and produce over its railways. In the end it would have what is even more important—the knowledge that, by carrying out some part at least of the work of systematic colonisation for which this paper pleads, it had done something towards reducing the difficulties with which the mother country will be faced after the present war.

A. Wyatt Tilby.

THE DANGER FOR HOLLAND

SOME political prophecies are merely gratuitous errors; others resemble the working out of problems in kinetics. If the forces in operation are known and can be approximately measured, their approximate result, unless other forces are set in motion to counteract them, can be deduced. The prediction that the situation created by the present war will be found to entail a special danger for Holland is really an inference of that kind; and the danger is such that the defeat of Germany, while altering the character of the danger, will not remove it.

If the Dutch do not know how a triumphant Germany would treat them, it certainly is not for want of a fair warning. The programme was elaborated long ago, and has been advertised, at frequent intervals, by professors, publicists, and politicians. Just as Napoleon once claimed Holland on the ground that the soil was composed of mud deposited by French rivers, so the Germans have latterly claimed it on the ground that it consists of the sediment of German rivers; and they also claim it on the grounds that the Dutch are their cousins, and that they want it, and would know what to do with it. In the German manuals of geography used in schools, Holland is included in 'Germany in the proper sense of the word'; and the annexation or absorption of Holland has been recommended, not merely by sensational journalists, but by responsible writers who may be presumed to weigh their words. This is what Clausewitz, for instance, said on the subject:

'Let us not forget the civilising task imposed upon us by the decrees of Providence. Just as Prussia was inevitably the kernel of Germany, so a regenerated Germany will be the kernel of the future Western Empire. In order, therefore, that there may be no mistake about it, we proclaim here and now that our continental nation is entitled to have access to the sea,—not only to the North Sea, but also to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Consequently we shall absorb, one after the other, all the territories adjoining Prussia, and shall annex successively, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, &c., &c.'

The works of Clausewitz are, as it were, the Holy Scriptures

of the Prussian Militarists. The founder of the modern school of German political philosophy is Treitschke ; and Treitschke, in this matter, says ditto to Clausewitz :

'The Rhine is the king of rivers. It is an infinitely precious natural resource to Germany, and, through our own fault, the very part of the Rhine which is materially most valuable to us has fallen into the hands of foreigners. It is an indispensable duty of German policy to regain the mouths of that river. A purely political connexion with Holland is perhaps not necessary ; but an economic union of Holland and Germany is absolutely required ; and we are far too modest if we are afraid to say that Holland's entrance into the German Customs Union is as necessary to us as our daily bread.'

Similar, and perhaps even more significant, is an utterance of the 'Grenzboten'—an organ through which it has sometimes been the custom of Imperial Chancellors to say things which it did not suit them to say in the Reichstag. In an issue published at the time of the opening of the Dortmund-Ems canal, it is pointed out that this new canal might easily be used, by means of a system of subsidies, to ruin, by its competition, the entrepôt trade of Rotterdam. It was further hinted that the canal probably would be so used unless Holland consented to join the Zollverein. The article went on to discuss the political relations of the two countries, and to exploit the hostility to England which the Boer War, then just concluded, had temporarily provoked in the Netherlands :

'Politically, Holland is threatened by other nations. Her guaranteed neutrality is no more than a scrap of paper which would prove worthless in war. Spain has been brutally crushed by the United States ; Portugal hangs like a fly in the spider's net of England, a prey to her monopolistic mercantile system. The Dutch will not share the fate of the Boers, but, if they are not careful, they may be caught in British snares. From all these dangers incorporation with Germany is the only salvation. The movement of naval expansion in Germany will not end until a German Navy floats on the sea that can compete with the fleet of Great Britain. Equally strong on sea and on land, the world may choose our friendship or our enmity. The strong may make their choice ; but Holland will do well to stand by us in friendship, not so much for our sake as for her own existence.'

For years, and even for generations, the German press had, in this way, alternately cajoled and threatened the Dutch, offering them, as it were, sometimes unofficially, and sometimes

semi-officially, the alternative of voluntary or compulsory incorporation in the German Empire. The Dutch, who live in much more intimate contact with German life and thought than we do, had read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested both the blandishments and the menaces. They probably understood that, whereas a German statesman or emperor who makes a promise or gives a guarantee can never be trusted to keep it, a German who utters a threat is generally a man of his word ; and they certainly behaved at the beginning of this war—I speak of the behaviour of the people as well as of the Government—as if that were their considered estimate of the character of their neighbours.

It is not merely that, like the Belgians and the Swiss, they made haste to mobilise and guard their frontiers—that might have been only a matter of form or routine. But the country was also swept by a wave of panic, as fierce, and sudden, and far-reaching as the recent inundation of the polders. The military precautions taken clearly indicated a real apprehension that the guns would begin to shoot, and that even cities as remote as Amsterdam from the route of an army invading France would have to defend themselves. The preparations at Naarden—the Amsterdam fortress—included not only the construction of extensive wire entanglements, but the felling of avenues of trees and the demolition ot a number of cottages and villa residences which obstructed the line of fire ; and there was even talk of razing the beautiful wood of Bussum to the ground. As for the citizens, who were mostly spending their summer holidays in the country or at the seaside, they jumped into the first conveyances they could find, and scurried back to the towns, like rabbits bolting for their burrows.

Nor was the panic ended when they reached their homes ; on the contrary, it assumed fresh shapes, and took a new lease of life. People drew their money out of the banks, hoarded gold, and refused to give change for notes ; and then, with one accord, they proceeded to stock their larders with provisions, as if for a siege. Immense mobs were massed outside the doors of the various establishments of the great Eigen Hulp Co-operative Stores, which would have been emptied in the course of a few hours if the order had not been given that no single purchaser should be supplied with more than a small allowance of any one commodity. The minor shops, all over the

city, were similarly assailed; and pertinacious housewives spent the whole of several days in a circular tour of the shops, buying a tin of sardines here, and a pound of maccaroni there, until they deemed their provision adequate. Even in the month of last September, when I stayed in Amsterdam on my way home from the Ruhleben Internment Camp, I found some housewives still living on the stocks accumulated in that thrilling period. The Government had to issue new notes of as low value as one gulden, and insist that they were legal tender; while the belief prevalent among tenants of the poorer classes that the war relieved them of the obligation to pay their rent had to be extinguished by strenuous proclamations.

These incidents sufficiently indicate the *état d'âme* of the Dutch in August 1914. They evidently believed that their hour had come, and that their doom was imminent: that they and the Belgians together would form but a single mouthful for their powerful and gluttonous neighbour. 'As for 'Belgium and Holland,' Daniel Frymann had written, in a popular work entitled 'If I were Emperor,' published, only two years before, at Leipzig, 'these petty States have, by their 'very pettiness, lost their right to exist, for the titles of a 'State to independence can only be recognised if it is in a 'position to defend them, sword in hand.' The Dutch believed that those sentiments, rather than the smooth words of diplomatists, represented the idea behind German policy; and even the pro-Germans among them were frightened. They knew that the Kaiser himself had ordered that, when the Germans went forth to war, the Huns of Attila should be their model; and they did not expect that Huns, let loose to rob and ravish, would hold a preliminary inquiry into the political inclinations of their victims.

The days passed, however, and nothing in particular happened; so the Dutch came by degrees to the conclusion that nothing in particular was going to happen. Their army was kept on a war footing; weapons and munitions of war were accumulated. The country found its sphere of usefulness as a haven of refuge for Belgian fugitives, of whom 50,000 crossed the frontier on a single night at Bergen-op-Zoom, and as an Internment Camp for defeated sections of all the combatants. Life once more became tranquil, if not normal.

The emergency notes were withdrawn from circulation ; shops were restocked and prices fell. The general feeling, at the time of my own stay, was that, after all, the rôle of Holland in the war would continue to the end to be that of a spectator who did a little smuggling when the opportunity occurred : that Holland was safe because Germany's hands were full, and that the German peril had definitely passed.

But that was a mistake. The immediate military peril had no doubt been averted, or at least postponed ; but, for those who look ahead, there are still grounds for grave anxiety remaining. The leopard does not change his spots ; and the resilience and recuperative power of Prussia are great. Even Jena was not 'a battle without a morrow,' though it looked like one at the time ; and preparations to resume the interrupted work of Frederick the Great were set in hand immediately after it, pretty much as if it had been a natural process, bound to renew itself as soon as artificial restrictions were removed. It is a similar natural process—or perhaps one should say a continuation of the same natural process—which Holland will have to fear after the war is over.

The first key fact is that, whatever the issue of the war may be, the Germans who come out of it, however hammered and humbled, will have pretty much the same temperament, tendencies, and instincts as the Germans who went into it. That means that, after the war as before it, they will still want to overflow from Germany into neighbouring countries, if not as armed hordes—a thing which is likely to be made impossible for them for some time to come—at least in the way of peaceful commercial penetration. Moreover, the conditions prevalent in Germany after the war are likely to be such as to accentuate that desire rather than to diminish it. Germany will then no longer be a rich country, but a very poor country, handicapped, in the way of commerce, by a world-wide prejudice against goods of German origin, and, in all likelihood, by hostile tariff barriers, and condemned at the same time to bear a crushing burden of taxation,—probably at least £200,000,000 a year merely for interest on the War Loans. If I am not mistaken in my reading of the fiscal signs of the times in the German Press, that taxation is likely to take the shape, among others, of the establishment of a large number of Government monopolies in many fields of industry at present occupied by

private enterprise. The inducement to Germans to invest the wrecks of their fortunes somewhere beyond the reach of the German tax-collector's net will then be very strong ; and there are not wanting indications that a good many of them, foreseeing the evil day, are already transferring their money to neutral countries as a measure of protection. Hence, among other causes, the rapid decline in the value of the mark.

The second key fact is that, while Germans are likely soon to have stronger reasons for emigrating, or investing their money abroad, than they have ever yet had in the whole course of their history, the number of countries in which their presence is likely to be tolerated is smaller than it has ever been. All the countries with which they are now at war have seen something of their peaceful penetration, and none of them wishes to see any more of it. We ourselves, most certainly, are not driving enemy firms into liquidation with the view of permitting their reconstruction as soon as a Treaty of Peace has been signed ; and the Dominions beyond the seas are quite at one with us in this attitude. The abhorrence of Germans felt in France and Belgium is, for good reasons, still more intense than ours, and likely to be still more enduring.

Anecdotes and incidents pointing to that conclusion abound. A French officer prisoner of war, to whom some eminent German spoke, very possibly with the best intentions, of the useful commercial relations which might ensue after the two countries had tested each other's qualities by fighting, replied that, so far as he could judge, if any German ventured to cross the French frontier after the war, he would be shot on sight, and no French jury would be found to convict the executioner. The Belgians in their exile have drafted a Bill—I read the text of it in the German papers at Ruhleben—whereby access to Belgian territory will be forbidden, absolutely and for ever, to any German of either sex who took any part in the military occupation or civil administration of Belgium, while other Germans, not so disqualified, will only be admitted under restrictions similar to those which, in England, limit the movements of ticket-of-leave-men. The Serbians are hardly likely to be any less bitter than the Belgians in their resentment. The Russians, even if they find it difficult to avoid trading with Germany, will certainly regard German immigrants as undesirable aliens ; while the same estimate of them,

in spite of Von Bülow's adroit convention, is obviously, and rapidly, gaining ground in Italy.

It is only, therefore, in the countries at present neutral that it will be possible for Germans to take refuge in any considerable numbers ; and there are many neutral countries in which their presence will be unacceptable. The Americans, with all their tolerance, will hardly welcome the compatriots of the military attaché who systematically hired assassins to commit outrages in their factories, and may be relied upon at least to stiffen their immigration laws as a barrier against them—more particularly if the next presidential election results in a victory for Mr. Roosevelt. Brazil and the other South American States, having discovered evidence of German designs upon their independence, will be equally reluctant to receive them. Portugal has already been added to the list of their enemies, and Rumania probably will be. Denmark and Norway are at present frigid towards Germany and are likely to remain so ; while the conditions of the eventual peace will certainly preclude Germans from seeking their fortunes in the Balkans, in Turkey, or in the East.

What outlets, then, will be left ? There will be a possible outlet in Spain ; but Spain, even if willing, will be unable to absorb enough Germans to ease the situation to any perceptible extent. The obvious outlets will be into those countries among Germany's immediate neighbours in which Germans have been accustomed to settle in the past, and with which Germany has been able to maintain a certain measure of commercial intercourse throughout the war. The only countries which fulfil those conditions are Sweden, Switzerland, and Holland. All future German efforts at commercial expansion and peaceful penetration—intensified by the pressure of German needs which one foresees—will, in the new circumstances which one can also predict, be concentrated in these directions. For each of the countries concerned it will create an urgent and difficult problem.

The case of Switzerland is chiefly interesting as an object lesson ; for there the problem had already reached the stage of urgency before the war broke out. For years the slow and steady process of Germanisation had been at work, with results of which a good many of the Swiss themselves did not

fully realise the significance, until it was pointed out in an article in this review, subsequently reprinted in Bâle and Geneva and discussed in almost every newspaper published in the Confederation. Nearly half the population of the frontier towns, it was there pointed out, was already German. The proportion of German residents in Zurich was only a little less, and was continually increasing, more particularly among the industrial and mercantile classes ; and Switzerland was, in consequence, rapidly ceasing to be Swiss.

This is a danger which will not disappear with the defeat of Germany ; but it is, at least, a danger which the Swiss recognise and may be expected to provide against. One proof of their recognition of it may be found in the revolt of the Federal Council and the independent newspapers against the alleged pro-Germanism of the Swiss General Staff ; another in the reply of a Swiss house of business at Bienne to a German firm from which it had received an order,—an answer printed in the 'Berliner Tageblatt' : 'Messieurs, Notre maison ne travaille 'qu'avec les pays civilisés. Agréez, messieurs,' &c.' In spite of their perception of the menace, it was difficult for the Swiss, before the war, to know what measures to take to counteract it ; but the war itself is introducing changes into the spirit of international relationship which will simplify their task, if they are prepared to face it boldly.

Appreciating their peril, the Swiss may reasonably be expected to take adequate precautions ; but by the mere act of doing so, they will enhance the peril for those other countries which the Germans are likely to regard as a legitimate field for their activities, and over which they have been in the habit of spreading themselves with an arrogance which forbade them to conceal their contempt for the inhabitants. The chief of those countries is Holland, where, in the course of a couple of decades, the Germans have almost succeeded in transforming Rotterdam into a German port, and have established innumerable industries.

How far the process has gone no statistics enable us to measure with exactitude ; but it is impossible to stay in Holland without realising that it has gone far and is meant to go further. The principal general store in Amsterdam, for instance, is a branch of the great German House of Tietz,—

the firm whose branches at Brussels and Antwerp were wrecked by the Belgian mob at the beginning of the invasion. Other German houses hardly less prominent in Amsterdam are those of Gerson of Berlin, and Palthe (the Amsterdam Eastman), which has lately distinguished itself by the issue of advertisements in the French language making a special appeal for the custom of Belgian refugees. Countless smaller shops all over the country are in German hands; while it is almost impossible to enter any shop whatsoever without meeting a German clerk or a German counter-jumper. The wholesale textile houses and the Leipzig fur houses are extensively represented. There is also more than a sprinkling of Germans on the Bourse and in the professorial chairs; and the latter make no secret of their contempt for Dutch intelligence, erudition, and professional capacity. 'You Dutch are so 'stupid,—one can't expect you to understand,' is almost a formula with them; while the German merchants proclaim aloud that the Dutch want hustling,—and hustle them. The way, in short, has been well paved; the work has been well begun; and the Swiss precedent shows with what rapidity the Germanisation of a small country can be effected when the seeds falls on a receptive soil, and how easily it may happen that outcry and resistance will be delayed until after the mischief has been done. Hence the importance of determining how far Dutch conditions and inclinations are responsive to Germanising influences.

This is a matter in respect to which there has been a good deal of change even within the lifetime of middle-aged men; and one may attempt to outline the history of the transformation.

Historically, Holland is not without her grievances against Germany,—or, at all events, against Prussia. As a reminder, if only a mild one, that it is wise to lock up the spoons when Prussians are in the neighbourhood, a certain, though only a small, portion of Dutch territory disappeared into Prussia in the settlement of Europe which succeeded the Napoleonic wars. Clèves and the neighbourhood, now German, was once Dutch; and the sentiments engendered by this chapter in the history of the expansion of Germany governed the situation for a substantial period. William III. hated the Prussians and all their works; and Bismarck fed his hatred by threatening to violate the neutrality of his Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in

1870,—just three years after that neutrality had been guaranteed by the Powers at his own suggestion. Bismarck's veto on the Dutch king's proposal, at a time when he was vexed by the lack of pence, to sell his Grand Duchy to France—a proposal encouraged by his French mistress, Mme. Musard—had already kindled the resentment which was fanned by the menace of that breach of faith.

Those circumstances defined the attitude of the King and the Court, if not of the country, during the Franco-German War. William III. then took, in Holland, practically the line which M. Venizelos is now taking in Greece ; and he was supported and encouraged in it by his first consort, Princess Sophie of Würtemberg, who had inherited, and never lost, the South Germans' jealousy, distrust, and dislike of the Prussians. The king and queen were at variance, to the point of quarrelling, about most things ; but their common detestation of the Prussians united them, for a season, in bonds of unaccustomed amity ; and they appeared in public together, during the war, for the first time for a long term of years. The king desired to throw the Dutch army into the struggle, and march to the rescue of the French ; and he was only prevented from doing so by the emphatic representations of prudent ministers, who played the part now sustained in Greece by King Constantine. His character being violent, the scenes in the Council Chamber were of a violence corresponding with it ; and though the manuals of history say nothing about them, they still provide the Dutch with a rich store of anecdotal reminiscences.

The change began—or, at all events, the foundations of the change were laid—when, Queen Sophie having died, William III. contracted his second marriage with Princess Emma of Waldeck Pyrmont. Queen Sophie's interests had been intellectual and cosmopolitan, with a strong inclination towards France. She was one of the cleverest women in Europe, an eminent *salonière*, and a close friend of the Empress Eugénie. Queen Emma was a German, *pur sang*, among whose good qualities intellectual distinction does not appear to have been included, but whose spiritual home, in so far as she had any, was identical with Lord Haldane's. The second marriage was necessary for dynastic reasons—the Prince of Orange being dead, and the illness of Prince Alexander threatening to leave

the king childless. It opened the door, however, to German influences; and the further opening of that door after the king's death was practically inevitable.

Inevitable or not, it happened; and Queen Emma's daughter, the present Queen Wilhelmina, was brought up very differently, and under very different influences, from Queen Sophie's sons. Queen Emma is, of course, like any other German princess, entitled to her German predilections; but the fact that she is the aunt of a young man who has betrayed England, and is now bearing arms against the country which supports his mother at Claremont, cannot be left out of sight by anyone who is trying to estimate her as an educational force. Born in Germany, she was not clever enough to look beyond the barriers of German Kultur, and the spiritual home influence which she exercised was necessarily German. After her marriage, as before it, the Kaiser seems to have been a tremendous figure in her eyes. She was flattered by the notice which he presently began to take of her; she was always ready to accept the invitations which he showered on her after her husband's death; and it is hardly too much to say that she allowed him to choose her a son-in-law.

At all events, the Dutch said so at the time; and they, on their part, were not flattered. The marriage was very unpopular, and was carried through in the face of many remonstrances; for Prince Henry was not only a German but a scion of one of the most reactionary Houses in Germany,—that of Mecklenburg, where even the pretence of constitutional government is still unknown. The objections to the marriage did not cease when it was an accomplished fact, but persisted, based upon fresh grounds. Stories of matrimonial dissensions were spread, and filled the press. Prince Henry's personality was declared to be rather worse than unsympathetic. Again and again it was reported that he had threatened, and even struck, the Queen, and that the interference of Dutch courtiers had been required to protect her from a violence which was said to be a matter of course in Prussian households.

It may be that these things did not happen exactly as they were reported; it may be that the reports were mainly, if not entirely, the reflection of a pre-existing prejudice. It is impossible to ascertain, and it would therefore be unprofitable to inquire. In any case, however, the floating of the stories is a

proof that the prejudice prevailed ; and it was a prejudice against Prussia as well as against an individual Prussian. Various influences, however, have conspired gradually to weaken it. The Dutch are not by nature a very critical people where royal personages are concerned, but are prone to accept whatever official view of their virtuous characters is set before them ; and the occurrences of the Boer War temporarily united the Dutch and German peoples in a common animus against ourselves.

The inspiration of the animus in the two cases was not identical. The indignation of the Dutch was genuine, racial, and respectable ; it even found an echo on our own platforms and in our own Parliament. The German anger was purely envious and artificial. What was happening in Africa thwarted certain German ambitions ; and the Kaiser and his Ministers tried to exploit the situation to their advantage. Whether the Dutch now realise that that was so or not, they certainly did not realise it at the time, or until after a considerable period had elapsed. It was while the Boer War was fresh in their memory that the ' Grenzboten ' declared, in a passage quoted on an earlier page of this article, that incorporation with Germany was their only safeguard against British snares ; and though that announcement went a good deal further than Dutch opinion was likely to follow it, there is no doubt that a certain *rapprochement* between Holland and Germany was then inaugurated and has since made appreciable progress. In a great many directions, Germany became the model to be regarded with continually increasing reverence ; and Kultur, not yet exposed in its hideous nakedness, was esteemed more highly in Holland than elsewhere.

That was the situation when the present war broke out. I was in Luxemburg at the time ; and it surprised me to hear from Luxemburgers that pro-Germanism was lamentably prevalent in Holland. My incredulity seemed to be justified by a series of articles which I subsequently read in the ' Berliner ' Tageblatt,'—the letters of a special correspondent who had been sent to Holland to look for pro-Germans, and had had the greatest difficulty in finding any ; but, at the same time, the views of my Luxemburg friends appeared to find substantial support in the violent protests of French journalists—notably of M. Clemenceau—against the lax manner in which

the Dutch were, according to them, interpreting their neutrality. Later, on my way back to England, I spent some time in Holland, and was able to pursue my own investigations. What I then saw and heard convinced me that there was no word of truth in the allegation, current among Belgian refugees, that a portion of the German Army had, with the connivance of the Dutch Government, though without its formal permission, crossed Dutch territory in order to get into Belgium. Everyone classed that story with the myth of the Russian Legion, said to have been fetched to Scotland from Archangel. Yet Dutch sentiment, viewed as a whole, was by no means as unanimous as one would be disposed to infer from Mr. Raemaekers' cartoons.

Among the masses, indeed, the unanimity was complete. Workmen, waiters, barbers, taxi-drivers, newspaper-vendors, and the like were anti-German to a man and a woman. They never spoke of the Germans except as *de Moffen*—a word as mysterious in its origin as *Boches*, but equally opprobrious in its intention * ; and they demonstrated with uproarious delight when they read the first bulletins of the Battle of Loos. Observing their attitude, I quite understood the complaint of the German soldier who had been brought from the Dutch frontier to Ruhleben. He had expected that the guards of the two armies would exchange civilities and cigarettes across the barbed wire palisading ; but nothing of the kind had happened : ' On the contrary. The Dutch always treated us as if we were ' pig-dogs,'—an instructive, if a disagreeable, anticipation of the treatment which the civilised world will mete out to them in the years to come. Decidedly the hearts of the Dutch masses were, and still are, in the right place ; so conspicuously so that, when Dutch railway guards bring exchanged prisoners from Germany into Holland, it is their pleasant practice to stop the train as soon as the frontier is crossed and invite the said prisoners to pull long noses at their enemies.

Among the intellectual and artistic classes, again, the feeling in favour of the Allies is, if not universal, at all events, overwhelmingly preponderant. There are pro-Germans among them, like the notorious Professor Steinmetz, who have

* Perhaps the word has some etymological connexion with the French ' mufle.'

attempted pro-German propagandism; but they constitute a small minority, and their colleagues have snubbed them into quiescence. Many of these have felt that it was the moral duty of Holland to fly to the rescue of Belgium, and do not hesitate to say so in private conversation, though they do not imperil their country's neutrality by saying so in print. Mr. Raemaekers is the best known, in England, of those who have proclaimed their sympathies on the house-tops; but the case of Professor Treub—the brother of the Finance Minister who resigned office the other day—is, in Holland, no less significantly conspicuous. The timidity of his country, as it seemed to him, in the face of a clear moral obligation, moved him to propose, with bitter sarcasm, that the lion should be removed from the Arms of the Netherlands, and a hare substituted for it.

The timidity, indeed, which Professor Treub thus satirised strikes one as the salient characteristic of the *petite bourgeoisie* and the newspaper press which ministers to it. There are, in the country, courageous and frankly pro-Ally papers like the 'Telegraaf,' which published Mr. Raemaekers' cartoons until the Dutch Government remonstrated in deference to the Kaiser's cry of pain. The 'Telegraaf' then launched an effective campaign against the smuggling industry. There are also papers, like the 'Niewe Rotterdamsche Courant' and the 'Toekomst,' which play the tunes called by the Germans who pay the piper, though the torpedoing of the 'Tubantia' has now set the former organ playing tunes of its own. But the mass of the journals, like the 'Handelsblad' and 'Het 'Niews van den Dag' adopt as non-committal an attitude as the difficult circumstances allow, refusing to be more than moderately indignant even when Zeppelins take short cuts over their soil; and their *clientèle* appears to approve of their restraint, and to identify neutrality with national honour. 'We must not imperil our neutrality—we must leave that sort 'of thing to the gentlemen at the Hague': that is the kind of footnote with which the indignant correspondents of these newspapers are put in their place; and the footnotes often find their echoes in mixed society. Not pro-Germanism, but the instinct of self-preservation, seems to be the inspiring motive.

In the *haut commerce*, the conditions are a little different.

That is the class which has always had the most extensive relations with Germany. Those who belong to it have not only done a great deal of business with Germans ; they have also frequently intermarried with them. A marriage of the kind seems as natural to them as an Anglo-American marriage seems to us. They have been accustomed to regard Germans hardly as foreigners ; and the German trade has been very profitable to a great many of them. Consequently one does find a good deal of fairly definite, though not very outspoken, pro-Germanism among them. It is not enthusiastic or sentimental ; it has nothing to do with ideals ; but it seems to be, as it were, broad-based upon the scriptural text which tells us that ' where the treasure is there shall the heart be also.'

Undoubtedly there are many men among the Dutch merchants who are superior to such considerations. The point of view of such was pleasantly illustrated in a letter recently received by a London Trading Company from a Dutch firm with which it had been compelled to decline, on patriotic grounds, to do certain business. It was printed, with all its peculiarities of orthography and syntax, in the ' Westminster ' Gazette ' ; and it will be instructive to reproduce it here :

January 29, 1916.

' Dear Sirs,—We possess your esteemed letter dated 14th inst., and although we regret to loose this time your esteemed order, we cannot do otherwise as appreciate the desition taken by your manager which in this difficult time is a duty to your own country.

' Taking advantage of this opportunity to express the wish of the greater part of our nation, which is that old England with its allies will soon crush the military beests.

' We remain,
' Yours truly,
' ——— '

Such tokens of sympathy are very welcome ; but we must not cradle ourselves in the illusion that all Dutch firms are adopting the same attitude. A great many of them have accustomed themselves to the idea that closer union with Germany means increased prosperity for their own businesses ; and a certain passive pro-Germanism has indubitably resulted from that limited conception of the universe. It is not a sentiment which is likely, in any way, to affect our own relations with the Dutch Government ; but it is a sentiment which

has to be reckoned with in any estimate of the particular danger to Holland now under investigation. And we must also, of course, consider, in the same connexion, the sentiments, in so far as any concrete proof has been given of them, of the Dutch government, the Dutch army, and the Dutch court.

In engaging upon that branch of the inquiry, we are, no doubt, treading upon somewhat delicate ground; but it is a subject from the discussion of which the Dutch themselves do not shrink, and nothing shall be set down here upon which I have not found practical unanimity of opinion among my Dutch acquaintances.

Outwardly, the official attitude has been one of detachment and correctitude. Any apparent departures from that attitude have been ascribable to nervousness, and the knowledge that Germany is very near and very powerful, and hampered by no scruples perceptible to the naked eye. Queen Wilhelmina, one is assured, has been impenetrably neutral. The Ministry has included friends of the Allies like Mr. Treub, and friends of the Central Powers like Dr. Kuyper, whose readiness to do anything in reason to oblige the Germans has received the satirical attention of Mr. Raemaekers. It seems to be an open question, however, whether Dr. Kuyper and his school are really in sympathy with the Germans or only afraid of them; whereas, in the case of the Army, there are sharp differences of opinion which have found expression in overt acts.

The attitude of the rank and file has already been indicated; and evidence of it faces one at every turn. Dutch soldiers openly declare that, if they were called upon to fight as the allies of the *Moffen*, they would mutiny. A Dutch friend of mine who took a foreigner into one of the Dutch forts warned him that he would be in danger of personal violence if he were heard to speak German. Irresponsible privates even cherish the dream of joining the Allies when the hour comes for the expulsion of the Germans from Belgium. But this is not, so far as one can judge, the point of view of the General Staff, the High Command, and the military aristocracy generally. These are freely charged by their own countrymen with a pro-Germanism which they are not even at pains to conceal; and evidence is called in support of the indictment. The German prisoners of war interned in Holland have, it is commonly said,

been better treated than the British and Belgian prisoners, of whose treatment indeed there has lately been some complaint in the House of Commons. A Dutch colonel has been reported —I do not know with what result—for marching at the head of his regiment singing *Die Wacht am Rhein*. The names have been published in Dutch papers of a number of young Dutch noblemen who have accepted commissions in the German Army and are now campaigning against the Allies. And these proceedings are said to reflect the sentiments, if not of the Dutch Court as a whole, at least of that section of the Court of which Prince Henry of the Netherlands is the head corner-stone.

There is a point of view from which one may reasonably say that none of these things matters very much. The differential treatment of prisoners can be, and presumably has been, terminated by diplomatic remonstrances. The tide of war is not going to be turned by the songs of a Dutch Tyrtaeus or the swords of a handful of Dutch Jonkheers. The facts enumerated, in short, are far less important to any of the belligerents than to the Dutch themselves; and their importance to the Dutch themselves will not appear until the war is over. Until that day arrives, the smugglers will go on trying to smuggle, and the Customs House officers will go on trying to prevent the smuggling. Not their political sympathies, but quite other considerations, will determine the issue of the trial of wits between them. But that contest, whether the optimists or the pessimists turn out to be the true prophets, cannot, in any case, be a long one. Possibly in a few months' time—and certainly within a year or two—the blockade will be raised and commercial intercourse will flow back, as far as may be, into the old channels; and it is then that the German sympathies of a comparatively small number of Dutchmen will constitute a grave danger for the whole country.

It is, unfortunately, precisely in the quarters in which they can do most mischief that the existence of those sympathies is suspected. Encouragement in Court circles and in high commercial circles is precisely the encouragement which the Germans are likely to need, and of which they are certain to be quick to take advantage. If the Hague is the alternative to Coventry for disgraced German sovereigns and aristocrats, their sense of personal dignity will require them to resort to it

as much as possible and make themselves as important there as they can. It will be for them what Petrograd was for Peter the Great—the window through which they will try to look out on civilised Europe. Encouragement in high commercial circles will be equally valuable to their merchants and manufacturers, for even more obvious reasons. High taxes at home and high hostile tariffs abroad will give them a double motive for establishing branches of some of their businesses and the headquarters of others on Dutch soil; and a concentrated flood of immigration will follow the concentrated course of German trade. Seeing that the population of Holland is only a little over 5,000,000, whereas the population of the German Empire is about 70,000,000, the influx may easily be more than Holland can absorb without losing her national characteristics in the process.

The danger is, of course, one which can be stayed if it is recognised and resisted in time. If the Dutch fail to perceive the danger and to take the necessary measures to avoid it, they will find their country becoming, by evolution instead of conquest, an appanage of whatever the war leaves of Germany. To the vast majority of Dutchmen that prospect will assuredly be detestable. They are not likely to be reconciled to it by the torpedoing of their liners: an outrage which seems likely to modify the views even of pro-Germans, and bring about the opportune introduction of precautionary measures.

FRANCIS GRIBBLE.

A FREE TRADE SYMPOSIUM

I

A Dialogue, by Janus Bifrons

FOR many months our British policies had been going into the crucible of war. It was clear that on the return of peace the main instruments of civil order and industrial life would have to be forged afresh. There had been foolish crowing and perhaps some sinister calculations, but I always noticed notwithstanding a strong tendency among sober and sensible men of all ways of thinking to import an element of candour and fairness into their discussions of the future which was rarely apparent before the war.

When the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee to the Board of Trade appeared, I was moved to put into execution a little plan I had long had in mind. I have two friends, both able men and both outside politics. As disputants they are both singularly open-minded and sincere. When they talk they seek, not victory, but truth. Above all they can and do apply the touchstone of national interest to the matter in dispute. To all these excellent predicates they stand joint subject. But they differ in one respect. F. T. is a Free Trader, while T. R. has long been a believer in Tariffs for national and Imperial ends. I took them for a country walk on a fine Sunday. This is the record of their conversation.

F. T. If I let you tip out the bath-water, will you help me to save the child ?

T. R. There *is* some dirty water then ?

F. T. Better that than a dirty child. But I drop metaphor. In our old disputes I never claimed more for Free Trade, and I admit it was a good deal, than that it secures the greatest total economic return for the national output of industrial effort. Of course I also used to say that it was the only possible means of preserving complete theoretic equality of

treatment by the State as between individuals, classes, and interests. I never claimed more, as for instance that——

T. R. Just a minute to deal with your second point and get it out of the way in a parenthesis. I know why you say 'theoretic' equality. You Free Traders have to justify interference with individual freedom of contract by factory laws and labour combinations. Some of you used to do it by saying that, if Free Trade is to yield its full advantage, buyer and seller must both be really free to accept or refuse the bargain, and that where such equality does not exist it must be called into existence. Otherwise, you argued, you have in effect a forced sale, and that is not Free Trade. I always thought it rather thin myself. Why not say straight out that, in this case only, the cost of economic *laissez-faire* is too high, expressed in terms of flesh and blood?

F. T. Many Free Traders did. But you still have the crude fact that any State interference (including your exception if you insist) means, and always must mean, actual transfer by Government of cash from pocket of citizen X to pocket of citizen Y. In old days Free Traders were unwilling to entrust any Government with that power. Since then we have had the case of Old Age Pensions, which is clearly such a transfer and one of the right sort. But that used to be their case, and not a bad one in the old days, when Governments were neither very wise nor fairly representative of all interests.

But to get back: I never claimed for Free Trade that it could secure quasi-military tactical advantages on German lines of trade manipulation.

T. R. But Free Traders have certainly defended it as good international peace *strategy*.

F. T. They did. It seems rather out-of-date now, but if you want their line of justification you shall have it. If the Kaiser had been only a little wiser, not better, wiser—the event proves it—he would have averted the war. If so, it might have been postponed *sine die*. But could that be said with any confidence if we had previously embarked on an openly 'precautionary' and 'defensive' trade policy? Rather a feeble attitude, you think. Perhaps; but the Free Trader was so set on not giving anyone the slightest pretext or excuse for making war—and it was really a very

respectable position—that he simply put his shirt on peace being maintained. Well, it wasn't; so he hasn't got a shirt, not a rag of one, on the strategical point. But the belligerent enemy hasn't got a rag of an excuse either, and that is worth something. And, mind you, there's a great deal more than that to be said for what Free Trade actually did to strengthen our position for the war. I won't make a long story of it, but consider the really topping financial form we have shown from the start, the strength of the City and a free gold market. Is the despised Free Trade system to get no credit for that? What I rate even more highly is the elastic resource and versatility which our industry has shown in putting its machine on a war footing. Not much fly-blown fetichism there, I think. That is one side of the story. The confessions and admissions I made just now are another.

T. R. The last are extorted from you by the facts. The facts don't force me to make mine; but they enable me to, without any great sacrifice, because they afford enough support for all that is real in my case. I always wanted Tariffs, because in no other way can you get the balance, organisation, and co-ordination of national industry and Imperial trade which this war has proved to be absolutely necessary. I therefore cheerfully throw overboard all the old arguments, heard, I am afraid, much too often at street-corners, that you can make *everybody* richer by import duties. When the less thoughtful among my friends tried to prove that, so far from having to pay for the advantages of organising trade on a national footing, there would actually be a larger national dividend expressed in cash, here and now, than under Free Trade, they only did themselves harm, because sensible men couldn't stick it.

But the real point is put better now. You will find it summed up daily in my Press—misdirection of spending power, the subordination of national security to the immediate cash profit of the private consumer, the fruits of *laissez-faire* and buying in the cheapest market. Many of our present woes are traceable to it. It has got to stop. For instance, in future we *must* be independent of all possibly hostile sources of supply.

F. T. All right. I accept all that.

T. R. You recognise, in fact, the distinction drawn by

your too-neglected master Adam Smith between greatest profit and greatest national advantage.

F. T. Yes, but when you speak of national advantage be on your guard against continuing to think only of production, because I shall not allow it. There are two ways of getting richer, producing more and consuming less or to better advantage. If you throw national advantage at me I shall say consider first how much of your national consumption is reproductive and enriching in terms of life and energy for further production, and how much is wasteful, or worse, enervating. Let me, for example, press the case against *laissez-faire* in another quarter where I notice that people who make things to sell never seem inclined to pursue the attack. So much for buying in the cheapest market. But what about selling in the dearest? Can we afford that either? Or does the war show it to be too costly to national efficiency? Bring it to the test of efficiency in war.

T. R. Instance.

F. T. Well, offer any you can think of.

T. R. One would be export of food on private account, when the world price threatens to reach a point which the home consumer cannot pay. The Indian Government regulated that for India last year in the case of wheat.

F. T. Certainly; they stopped private export. That divorced the high world price ruling from the price to the Indian consumer. Then they bought up the exportable surplus at a lower price than the private exporter would have paid, exported it themselves and put it on the market here. Any more instances? Come, the really crucial one.

T. R. Well?

F. T. What do you consider to be our most embarrassing shortage at the moment?

T. R. Merchant shipping, I suppose; fearful freights, coal-diamonds in Italy, less paper, less sugar, less tobacco!

F. T. *Why* have we got too few merchant ships for an island power at war? Because enough have not been built. Why weren't more built in the ten years preceding the war?

T. R. Because the investor isn't a philanthropist. He would merely have presented the world at large with cheaper freights and gone without the market rate of return on his capital.

F. T. Ah! Now we have it. The root cause of this trouble was *laissez-faire* for the investor, selling his commodity, the use of his capital, in the dearest market. In your own phrase, the misdirection of investing power, the subordination of national security to the immediate cash profit of the private investor.

T. R. Well, what do you propose? Bounties, subsidies, or what? I thought they were anathema to you.

F. T. Before I lost my shirt, perhaps. But I'm not sure even of that. Municipal progressives used to defend rate-subsidised trams. The community gets a cheaper service. Nobody really minds except the gentleman who wants to invest his money in a competing show on strictly *laissez-faire* principles. At any rate, in our *post bellum* world subsidies may pass, provided you subsidise the right thing. Before the war I admit, of course, that the row would have been deafening if you had proposed to subsidise all production of the real necessities of national existence (because my argument does not stop at ships) and thereby penalise all production of superfluities and luxuries. But I think I see a way in which this is very likely to come about under the simple pressure of events, without our having to resort to subsidies at all.

T. R. You really begin to be extremely interesting. Go on.

F. T. After the war, industry must be put back on a peace footing as quickly as possible. What will the process be?

T. R. Plant must be reconverted and fresh plant must be laid down.

F. T. And rather quickly too, mustn't it? Remember you will have a large army of returned warriors as well as all their present female and elderly *remplaçants*, who have in the interval all learned only too well how to live on £3 a week. All these will be waiting breathlessly to operate your new plant and draw wages. Time will be an essential matter. When the stomach of a whole nation is kept waiting only a week you get grumbling. Make it wait a month, you will have riots; a year, perhaps revolution.

T. R. What is this dismal tirade leading to?

F. T. Only this. Will private agency unsupported provide the required credit quickly enough? Give it time and perhaps

it would. It always has. But perhaps it *won't* have time.

T. R. And the result?

F. T. Very large advances secured by Government guarantee on the national credit with all imaginable speed. Before you brain me, reflect on this. The war has taught Governments and their subjects that *anything* is preferable to a complete smash. If five years ago anybody had stated in advance all the steps that this Government has already actually taken, in making the national credit available and in other ways, he would have been written down a fool and a madman.

T. R. How does all this fit on to your scheme of controlling the private investor?

F. T. Before anybody gets an advance on the national credit to set his business going he will have to answer one simple question—'What are you going to make?' The Government is already, under pressure of present necessity, exploring for itself the questions 'What is useful to the nation?' 'What ought people to have and what ought they to do 'without in time of trouble?' They are writing the answers down in lists. These lists will be available, and if there is a time of trouble after the war, a relative order of the urgency of national claims will have been already roughly settled.

T. R. What about people who want to manufacture for export? It doesn't matter what you supply to the foreigner so long as you get what you want out of him in return.

F. T. A good point. I have heard it asserted that there is a large export from some European countries to South American States of semi-pornographic novels, 'Milesian tales.' The foodstuffs and raw material they get in return are as good as any other. 'Non olet,' as Vespasian said of the tax-revenue under an unsavoury head.

T. R. Carry it further. Your German tactician would of set purpose unload the really wasteful, enervating, and detrimental exports on the foreign buyer to the utmost extent that the foreign Government would open its ports.

F. T. Well, what your British tactician has got to do is to use your Tariff Reform to defeat him. *But it won't be much use your caulking the seams on the foreign side of the*

hull, if you let the side of home production go on leaking like a sieve.

T. R. In fact the imports you will kill will be, in part, things that you will discourage people from making, selling, and consuming at home, except perhaps sparingly and after more urgent claims for capital, to be invested in the essentials of national life, have been fully met.

F. T. Yes, and all the other imports to be controlled by the tariff, a goodly lot no doubt, will be of the 'key industry' variety, dyes, lenses, and so forth. If these industries are started on the national credit, as they may have to be, they must be worked with an exclusive eye to the national interest.

T. R. You mean efficient steps must be taken to pool the profits of the tariff among the unprotected as well as the protected industries.

F. T. Put it that way if you like. I should prefer to turn it round, and say that means must be devised to distribute fairly the total financial loss to the community involved in protecting some industries.

T. R. Well, put it either way. Personally I am not quite prepared to admit that there *would* be any ultimate financial loss, that is to say as long as the planet is divided among nationally organised trade units. Of course, if the whole human race gave itself over to the severest logic of the division of labour, I concede your point. But it won't. The immediate question is how do you propose to manage these pooling or distributing arrangements?

F. T. For answer, study the contracts of the principal Indian Railway Companies with the Secretary of State for India in Council.

T. R. I know. The company subscribes, say, a tenth or a twentieth of the capital, the Government finding the rest. The company gets a guaranteed rate of interest, and the Government cannot terminate the contract except by repaying the company's share of capital at fixed dates. The shareholder is therefore completely secured.

F. T. So far as the guaranteed interest and repayment of capital go he is to all intents in the position of a debentureholder or better. But under most of the contracts the company receives as well a share of surplus profits roughly in proportion to capital. To that small extent the share-

holder may also be regarded as a holder of ordinary or deferred stock. As the management is in the hands of the company, this is a useful and necessary device to encourage good husbandry. But generally speaking you are right. The shareholder's money is secured from loss and his profits are limited, the bulk going to the public purse. Now that is a hopeful working model.

T. R. It has another advantage in my eyes, and one of great importance.

F. T. What ?

T. R. As far as it goes it seems to dodge the fatal objection to State-managed undertakings of any size ; I mean of course the demoralisation of the voting State employé, the dockyard and Post Office voter for example.

F. T. I'm glad you get a shred of comfort out of that. Now do the same for me. There's a point I haven't mentioned which bothers me badly. Oblige me with a little solace if you can.

T. R. Well ?

F. T. I have had some experience—we all have—of monopoly products in foreign countries ; matches, ten a penny, that won't strike, and so on.

T. R. Yes, I know your story. Quality runs down under shelter from competition. Effort, enterprise, and push fall off when the market is secured and the consumer is helpless.

F. T. Exactly. What have you got to say ?

T. R. Are you satisfied with the 'Queen Elizabeth,' the 'Lion' and the 'Tiger' ? Because, if so, you will perhaps allow that under our old system some products, including certainly armaments and ships of war, were produced under conditions of absolute protection from foreign competition. His Majesty's Government didn't invite tenders from Krupps and Kiel.

F. T. Not bad as far as it goes. But remember that your instances are products turned out to be used communally, not to be sold to members of the public and used individually. That is a horrid gap. Besides, it is absurd to pretend that the principle of competition is not at work in designing and building a battleship. It is, and in its most stringent form, as you see when the guns begin to shoot. The brains of the Admiralty and the armament firms are all the time pitted

against the utmost ascertained scientific and technical effort of the potential enemy, and are trying to go one better.

T. R. I take your point. A Government is strung up by every known inducement to get the best out of armament firms. You are afraid that there will be no screw leverage of any power in the case of protected manufacture for individual consumption.

F. T. Quite so. The Standing Orders of the House of Commons allot only forty-five minutes daily to Questions. The Order Paper will have to be as capacious as the drinking horn of Giant Skrymir of Utgard, Ocean itself, if it is to contain the copious griefs which the exasperated private consumer will distil into the ear of his Member.

T. R. Well, take the case of magnetos. We shall have to make them here ourselves in the future, if only for the War Office, Admiralty, and Air Service. I suppose you think that when the Government indents are delivered the manufacturer will begin producing, for the public, magnetos made, not to spark, but to sell.

F. T. Have you a specific to combat that tendency?

T. R. I see one thing which will help to keep up the standard of production. I will mention it in a minute. But before I do I want to put a general point. You used a medical metaphor. Are you sure that the malady will be as bad as it was, or will you have in the patient, after the war, an altogether robuster fellow than you had before?

F. T. Go on. But don't be too much of a magician or conjurer.

T. R. I put it to you. Are the people who survive the war going to benefit in mind or character or are they not? I am perfectly clear that they are. Take first the survivors among the actual combatants. It is frivolous, and much worse, grossly ungrateful, not to see that such men, acting as they have from such motives and with such experience behind them, will be in all fundamental respects a different and much grander breed.

F. T. I certainly won't dispute it.

T. R. Yes, but what about the men and women in the lump at home feeding the army and the guns, and bearing agonies of separation, anxiety, and bereavement? If we win, as we shall, it can only mean one thing. I don't deny

that even now you could find a sickening lot of swindling and sugaring, such as you fear in the future. But if we win the war it will be because the shells fit the guns and the fuses go off. That is the moral basis of victory, and you can't have it without. I am no expert, but I believe the improvement on the merely technical side of manufacture, improved methods, processes, economy, direction, etc., is already amazing. Is all that to go for nothing, or has Great Britain found herself after blundering so long in the dark of nineteenth-century industrial revolution ?

F. T. I hope I may live to bank on it, but one can't be sure. What about your safeguard ?

T. R. I should think that nearly all your protected war essentials and key industries will enter at some stage into manufacture for export. We shall only hold our own against the Germans if the goods come up to specification. Remember you said the controlled management would have some, though a limited, interest as a deferred shareholder. The home consumer stands to gain a collateral advantage in the quality.

There. That is all I can do for you. And now what do you say the final effect would be if you succeeded in your scheme of putting everybody's savings into the production of national necessities first, and desirable amenities and frippery later, strictly in that order ?

F. T. Intensive national economy. I commend the phrase to people who talk about squandering tax-raised money on nonage and dotage : in other words, on education and old-age pensions. Either they think that these are best left to charity or that they are not necessary. In either case they seem willing to accept the risk that the money saved on them may after all only be spent on different forms of riotous living in all classes. But you asked what the result would be. Real wages would rise, the rate of interest on capital would fall, and existing securities would appreciate. People would have to live simpler and saner lives, and they would be happier, because they would have to learn the value of the pleasures that no money can buy, and that much of our present expenditure actually serves to reduce the exercise of the full powers of the human body, mind and spirit. Add to this that you would all the time be accumulating an immense reserve against the recurrence of the present crisis. No doubt

freights would rule dirt cheap, but if war came again you would find that you have enough merchant shipping to serve all purposes against the enemy !

T. R. Don't you wish we may get it ?

F. T. I believe events will get it for us. Otherwise—but I said before that the war has taught Governments and their subjects that anything is better than a complete smash !

T. R. This is the mystical marriage of Tariff Reform and Free Trade, and the fruit will be——

F. T. Intensive National Economy.

Summary of the Argument

The effect of the Dialogue may be summed up as follows :—

I. The Free Trader had in times past two objections to Tariffs :

(*a*) That the advantage to be purchased would be too costly. The reduction of the economic return on the total national output of industrial effort would outweigh any conceivable advantages.

This objection he has to surrender, since the war has proved that 'no price can be too high' to secure the essentials of national security.

(*b*) That Tariffs would be unfair and endow private interests at the public expense unless scientific means could be devised (the abortive Australian Federal legislation is an example) which would distribute the financial effects fairly among the whole people.

The substance of this objection he saves.

II. (*a*) The Tariff Reformer gains his whole case for State organisation of industry.

(*b*) But he does so at the price of agreeing that the war has revealed where the true path of national economy lies—viz., in a scientific regulation of *internal* consumption and production (and therefore of the direction of home investments) as well as in the regulation of imports.

III. The war has shown conclusively, if anybody doubted it, where the elements of national strength and national weakness lie. A people which consumes few superfluities, and thereby concentrates on making necessities as cheap and abundant as possible, has such an immense advantage in competition with rivals that every belligerent Power has

found it imperative to employ unheard-of measures to make its population conform to this type—e.g. stoppage of vodka, bread tickets, etc.

IV. There is not the slightest reason to doubt that the above is equally true in peace-time and always. The same economic laws operate all the time. *Vide* Mr. Hartley Withers' 'Poverty and Waste.'

V. Prediction is hazardous, but the conditions which will prevail immediately and for some time after peace is declared may possibly not be so different from those prevailing now and to the end of the war as many people think. In any case they will differ widely from the conditions prevailing before the war.

VI. If, therefore, the declaration of peace is simply taken as a signal for the beer to flow and the London season to be revived with greater splendour than ever (in the hope of 'giving 'employment') things will drift back into their old course, with every evil, class hatred, labour troubles, etc. immensely aggravated by the financial drain of the war.

VII. This can only be avoided if the Government, Parliament, and the nation take a tight hold of the courses of private consumption and production for consumption at home (as they are doing), and *retain it after the war* by means of the Tariff and ancillary legislation by consent between sometime Tariff Reformers and Free Traders.

VIII. In so doing they can base themselves securely on unalterable economic facts on which it is believed Free Traders and Tariff Reformers can make common cause, and which are now being driven into the least instructed heads among the population by the hammer of Thor.

JANUS BIFRONS.

II

A CRITICISM, BY A PRE-WAR FREE TRADER

The author of the foregoing dialogue submitted it in draft to an old friend, a Free Trader of the elder generation, who returned it with the following criticisms :—

Your genial and racy dialogue, my dear Janus Bifrons, recalls the remark of the late Lord Northbrook when he was appealed to in his own house by two friendly disputants to

pronounce on the fiscal controversy that was then beginning to shatter the old political parties. 'It is a very proper 'subject,' he drily said, 'for English gentlemen to differ on.'

I confess that I am more afraid of the potential elements of mischief in your weak-kneed imaginative Free Trader than in the professed Tariff Reformer, and I cannot help dreading that the coalition of the two would bring about in the speediest way that 'complete smash' which is rightly deprecated in the closing sentences of the dialogue.

As to Tariff Reform I am still among the unconverted, in the sense that I believe that on the whole and up to the present time the policy of free imports has better suited the peculiar conditions of this country than any system of protective or preferential tariffs. Our people have prospered greatly under it, and this prosperity has been shared by all classes. It has been accompanied by a notable growth of our export trade, and in my view—though this is of course open to argument—it has been a potent cause of this growth by allowing us to manufacture cheaply. Through the wealth thus realised it has enabled us to increase our foreign investments, and it has contributed to make London the money centre of the world, the place to and from which money flows in discharge of trading debts from every quarter. Others, whose knowledge and judgment I respect, affirm that the country might have equally prospered under a scientific tariff, but I thought the evidence ten years ago inconclusive, and the growth of our trade and commerce and wealth during the decade has confirmed my doubts. I admit that the policy of free imports has its defects and weaknesses even in this country, and that these defects and weaknesses have prevented its adoption by countries that have not had the same start as our country or are less favourably situated. But given the special circumstances of England, I think that we hitherto have fared better under free imports than we should have done under the opposite policy of regulated imports, as the latter is found in the United States or in continental Europe.

As regards unpreparedness for war, our free-trade policy may be partly responsible for leaving us without coal-tar dyes and magnetos, but is not the cause in large measure to be found in our educational shortcomings and in the attitude of our manufacturers to science? And *per contra* should

not the free import policy receive credit for the financial strength with which we faced the war, for the magnitude and efficiency of our mercantile marine and for our naval strength? Has not the free imports policy built up our mercantile marine in the past and made us the ship-builders of the world? If there is one great national industry that has benefited beyond others from free imports it is the ship-building industry. The Germans have recognised this in their own fashion. They have allowed most, if not all, the materials required by their great ship-building yards to be imported duty-free.

According to M. Millioud, an eminent Genevan professor, the unsound state of German finance and German trade—State-organised, bounty-fed, scientifically framed for peace and war—and the imminence of their collapse were the determining cause of the war. ('The Ruling Caste and Frenzied 'Trade in Germany.') Our trade, despite its prodigious growth, was, as events have shown, on an eminently sound and safe basis; while our banks and our commercial finance have been the admiration of hard-headed American investigators. The fruits of *laissez-faire* in this instance are not to be overlooked or despised.

I recognise, like many other Free Traders, that after the war the forces against the continuance of free imports will be irresistible. The public will demand a tariff for revenue purposes, for preferential treatment of colonies, dependencies, and Allies, for penalising the enemy. I am not therefore arguing the case for maintaining our present fiscal system, but am trying to set out the grounds of the faith of the moderate-minded Free Trader, and the feelings with which he would see the old order give place to the new.

I now turn to your dialogue. My first grievance is that your disputant F. T. is a very sorry specimen of a Free Trader. He might have made a better fight, or at least shown himself appreciative of what his free-trade brethren hold to be the strong points of the free imports system. He makes a valiant start by claiming for it that it gives 'the greatest total economic 'return for the national output of industrial effort.' But he shows no conception of what that high and just claim imports. In my *apologia* I have endeavoured to set out its variety and extent. But your Free Trader, having stated the claim,

straightway drops it as a thing of no importance. Why, he does not say. But we are led to infer that he agrees with T. R. that free imports have resulted in 'misdirection of 'spending power, and the subordination of national security to 'the immediate cash profit of the private consumer.' Surely, from a Free Trader we might look for some statement of the evidence which has led him to apostatise. For the evidence does not lie on the surface. Free imports may have left us bare of magnetos and dyes, but Free Traders claim that free imports have given us the naval and maritime supremacy of the world, an enormous reserve of accumulated wealth, and an unequalled capacity for manufacturing every conceivable article that is required for war. The genuine Free Trader, one who was not ashamed of the faith within him, would have said to T. R. that in so far as the principle of *laissez-faire* in fiscal matters is in this discussion at stake, the war has signally vindicated it. If the war has displayed the unpreparedness of the State and its ignorance of business methods, it has at any rate revealed the organising capacity, the well-equipped intelligence, and the resources of citizens trained to rely on individual effort.

Having drawn his indictment against the existing system, and expressed his horror at the defenceless state to which free imports have reduced his country, your Free Trader proceeds to state his remedy. He is prepared to 'subsidise all 'production of the real necessities of national existence, and 'penalise all production of superfluities and luxuries.' This he would accomplish by positive and negative expedients. In the first place the State is to prepare a list of these necessities in order of urgency, and make advances to producers on such conditions as will constitute the Government the major shareholder in their undertakings. Simultaneously it is to penalise by import duties the import of articles which 'people should be discouraged from making, selling, or con-'suming, except sparingly and after capital has been provided 'for the essentials of national life.'

I have objections to both expedients. In the first place I cannot imagine that any Government at the end of a ruinously costly war, faced with enormous additions to the permanent and floating debt, with crushing taxation and depreciated national credit, would have the hardihood to add to that debt

and mortgage still further the national credit, in pursuance of a policy of financing a series of commercial undertakings, which are selected not because they will pay, but as being judged 'essential to national existence' in the event of a future war. I regard it as out of the question that such support would be needed by or extended to well-established industries, such as ship-building, iron and steel works, agriculture, essential as they are to national existence. The persons interested in them are making money out of the war; they have, or can obtain locally, all the capital they require, or if not, they will be able to get it on easy terms from our pacific brother Jonathan over the water. After the war they may find trade bad at home and their goods undersold abroad, as high taxation and inflated wages will prevent cheap production for export and restrict the home demand. The Tariff Reformer has his remedy for these evils, but the establishment of *ateliers nationaux* would but aggravate them.

If there are any 'key' or 'basic' industries which do not exist in this country, which cannot be established here without direct support, and which the Government consider should be established for political reasons in order to free important national industries from the control of another country, their case would be one for exceptional treatment. But I believe that close investigation would show that they could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Even in these few and exceptional cases it is not clear that a partnership between the State and a group of shareholders, under which the former should find the bulk of the capital, would be the best way of proceeding. A comfortable board of septuagenarian directors, such as is compatible with the Indian system of company-managed and State-financed railways, would not meet the requirements of a manufacturing and trading venture which would depend for success on trained business capacity of the highest order, on individual initiative and quick decision, on readiness to take risks and cut losses, and on an intuitive knowledge of how to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market.

The subsidising of 'all production of the real necessities' of national existence' is not, therefore, a promising way of escape from the financial difficulties which will inevitably

attend this country at the end of the war. It remains to examine the second expedient of a tariff so framed as to discourage the making, selling, or consuming of articles which are not essential to national life.

I have nothing to say against the policy of penalising articles of luxury imported into or produced in the country for final use or consumption. It is right that the well-to-do should pay heavily on such outlay, both because presumably they can well afford to contribute in this way to the national needs and because it is desirable to discourage immoderate expenditure of this kind. By all means tax luxurious motor-cars, whether imported or made at home, vessels of gold and silver, pearls and ivories, Tyrian raiment, and the whole apparatus of sumptuous living. But I doubt whether penalisation of luxury by import and excise duties ever fulfils the hopes entertained of it. Articles of luxury which are imported or produced for the rich alone are relatively few, and merge imperceptibly in a much larger group of commodities which represent at once the careless luxuries and profusion of the wealthier classes and the hard-earned comforts and prized enjoyments of the poor. It is almost impossible in practice to tax these articles so heavily as to penalise and discourage effectively consumption by the rich. For before this point is reached the effect of the taxation on the food and clothing and small comforts of the poorer classes would be felt by the democracy to be almost intolerable. Again, many articles in this comprehensive group of luxuries and comforts are indifferently imported from abroad and produced at home. Heavy duties on the import of such articles would inevitably increase their production at home, and this would work against the design of conserving our own supply of capital for the making of goods essential to national existence. The conclusion seems to emerge that tariffs as a sumptuary weapon are not of much value, and can be pushed to a point where they do more harm than good. I would rather rely on heavy direct taxation to check expenditure on luxurious living.

But the second object which your interlocutor F. T. would endeavour to compass by a tariff is to my mind far more reprehensible. He has got in his mind a classification of all our industries in an assumed order of their relative im-

portance to national existence, and he proposes by means of duties on imports, and possibly on exports, to impede and discourage industries at the bottom of his scale. Thus presumably he would discourage by his tariff the making and export of gold and silver plate, jewellery, pianos, lace, velvet or silk goods, furniture, London tailor-made goods, and many other miscellaneous products in which this country at present does a large and profitable business abroad. Than this nothing could be conceived more likely to retard the industrial recovery which we wish to see after the war. The problem which we shall then have to face is correctly enough envisaged in the dialogue, but the friends in converse seem to have missed the solution. They see that we shall then have parted with our accumulations of capital abroad, that our national dividend will be reduced by many millions on this account alone, and that it will be further reduced by the millions of interest due on war-debts contracted abroad. From being a creditor country we may even find ourselves in the unhappy position of a debtor. We shall have to discharge our international indebtedness from our annual earnings and from this fund we shall also have to satisfy the bondholder within our gates. The only hope of salvation lies in increasing production. It does not seem a promising way of promoting this to discourage and handicap trades in which we have at present a natural or acquired superiority. Disputant T. R., from his premisses, would find no difficulty in a rejoinder. He would say that a suitable tariff would so increase home production for the indispensable needs of the population as to provide work for persons displaced from discouraged industries and lessen our yearly bill for imported goods. This is merely to re-state the commonplace argument for protection. What surprises me is that F.T. should find himself coerced by our approaching national poverty and indebtedness, and by the urgent necessity for increasing our annual production, to abandon a system which, as he asserts, ' secures the greatest total economic return for the ' national output of industrial effort.' I should have thought that on his premisses he would see that the system thus described would be more than ever essential if we are to pay our debts and begin afresh to accumulate capital.

III

A Comment, by a pre-war Tariff Reformer

In order that Janus Bifrons may receive the boxing-glove on *both* his foreheads, and so, though battered, maintain his equilibrium, a short note of comment upon the foregoing criticism by a pre-war Tariff Reformer is appended.

1. I agree with you in distrusting Janus's solution. I believe it to be a task beyond the competence of Government. I do not think that on these lines the State can go further than taking care that certain indispensable industries are established here. But,

2. I should assert that it is wise for a State to encourage *production* in all forms. Assume for a moment that the choice lay between production on the one hand and the distribution and financing of the productions of others on the other hand. It is conceivable that a nation might attain to an equal aggregate of wealth by either of these courses, but national wealth and national welfare are not interchangeable terms. The producing nation would support the larger population, and *ceteris paribus* would be in all other respects the stronger.

Happily there is no necessity to choose between the two. Historically the position of London as the money market and exchange centre of the world followed upon and was the creation of our industrial primacy, and nothing must be done to endanger its position in this respect. I only suggest that it would be a mistake to attribute its greatness solely to the free trade of the last seventy years, and not less a mistake to suppose that that greatness would indefinitely continue if the industrial supremacy out of which it grew passed from us.

3. I therefore think that our fiscal policy should as far as is practicable encourage imports of raw or little-worked goods, and discourage the import of the fully-manufactured article.

Our trade with America and Germany has shown the opposite tendency, for the last generation, and *this has been largely due* to the fact that we have left these things to chance whilst they have had an organised policy directed to this result.

4. I agree that from the 'forties to the 'eighties free trade served as well as, perhaps better than, any other policy would have done *for that period*; but I think that this is no longer the case, because (*a*) of the subsequent development of *competitive* industry (not complementary, as Cobden anticipated) in Germany and America, (*b*) because their policy does not leave natural forces free play and trade is not really free at all; (*c*) because of the scale on which modern industry is organised and the fighting methods—cartels, trade agreements, dumping, etc.—which it adopts.

5. Free trade within the Empire is the ideal, but at present it is not attainable. Even a convinced Free Trader may admit the *political* advantages of a common trade policy.

6. On a point of detail, I do not think the argument sustainable that our mercantile marine and our naval strength are due to our free-trade policy.

Both were firmly established before free trade and under the old mercantile system. When the change came from wooden to iron and steel ships, our iron and steel industry, and ours only, was sufficiently developed to take advantage of this. Meanwhile, our most dangerous possible competitor, the United States, was knocked out by the Civil War, before she could develop hers.

It was under the German protective system (including bounties, etc.), that Germany had become so formidable a competitor.

Historically, therefore, it is not true that our strength in these respects was due to free trade, because our supremacy was pre-existent, and the example of Germany shows at least that a modern fleet for war or commerce can be created under, if not by, protection.

Further it is to be observed that ship-building and engineering have always enjoyed a large measure of practical protection in this country because, for reasons of national defence, the immense Admiralty orders are all always placed at home irrespective of price. This has been a factor of great importance in the development of these industries.

THE DECLINE OF PARLIAMENTS

WHEN the war is over and the nations are able to draw breath and take stock of their internal affairs, the vast import of the terrible upheaval through which the world has passed will by degrees reveal itself to all. In political, social, economic, and industrial matters, many of the old landmarks and standards will have disappeared or been discarded, and in all these matters reconstruction will have to be undertaken. In none of these spheres of national life will the gulf between past and present be more strongly marked than in the political. The political change—Revolution or Evolution, whichever it may be termed—will not be confined to the nations which have been actually at war; it will influence the neutrals also. But it will be more especially felt in those nations belligerent or neutral, called Progressive—Great Britain, France, and the United States—and it may be that one of the most far-reaching consequences will be the downfall of the parliamentary system of representative government, as it exists at present.

This statement, so far as it concerns Great Britain, will perhaps appear surprising, possibly absurd, to the great majority, though it is believed that there are not a few to whom the discrediting of the system will come rather as an inevitable than an astounding event. Institutions originally established with the honest intention of benefiting a community, and which have, on the whole, carried out this intention for many generations, are apt to gather around them an atmosphere of reverence, even of sanctity, that forbids men to contemplate their abolition as within the sphere of the possible, and prevents them perceiving that time and changed conditions have insensibly but surely undermined their usefulness and therefore their value. But one of the effects of a world-wide upheaval is to test institutions, and to remove from the minds of men the trammels of custom, prejudice, and traditional points of view, forcing them to investigate, with vision thus cleared, in what manner their long-cherished institutions

have borne the strain. This investigation, though it may begin with, will not long be confined to the war period. The weaknesses and failures, which at first may have appeared due to the sudden, tremendous catastrophe of a universal war, will be found to have been in existence long before.

Parliamentary representative government is not a law of nature but a means to an end. That end may be stated broadly to be the freedom and prosperity of a people. At a period when the mass of the nation was ignorant and inarticulate, and when communications were slow and difficult, it was convenient to give to each section of the community the right to choose representatives in whom it had confidence to state its grievances and advance its interests, and it was a fair assumption, that if these representatives were assembled together they would, after debate, determine what was for the general good. It is, however, beginning to be perceived by some that the advance of a nation in well-being is brought about by Evolution and not by Election, and that an Act of Parliament crystallising the state of feeling at the moment, at the best smoothes the path of Evolution, and at the worst temporarily obstructs it. As this conviction becomes more widely extended, it will lead to the conclusion that a nation sufficiently advanced in intelligence and knowledge does not need legislators. All it requires is government; it will legislate for itself. By which is meant that the general needs of the country as a whole (not one particular class or section of it) will be perceived and determined by the people collectively, by the formation and organisation of public opinion through public meetings and the press. All that would be needful would be a governing body, whose function it would be to put into final shape the nation's will and carry it into execution.

This idea may seem at first sight wild and impracticable. But is it? Let us clear our minds of prejudice and look at one great fact. That fact is that public opinion is the most potent force in the country to-day. In matters of moment, would Parliament dare to set itself against any unmistakable expression of public opinion? Is it not the most telling indictment that can be laid against Parliament that it ceases to reflect the feeling of the country? But at the present time the parliamentary system is in itself an obstacle to the due expression of public opinion. Never perhaps has that been

more strongly shown than during the long and bitter struggle over Home Rule. How often and how truly was it answered, when a general election was advocated as a means of finding out the real wish of the people, that it would be impossible to fight the election on that sole issue ! Class interests, local conditions, even the personal element, would lead to the return of many members whose election had turned much more on one of these factors than on the question on which the country was asked to speak authoritatively.

But perhaps the greatest evil of the parliamentary system in its relation to current affairs is the party system. No one having the well-being of the Empire and of the world at heart can contemplate without sorrow the baneful influence of the party system on our preparations for war. To satisfy the exigencies of a powerful section of their party, the late Liberal Government, though knowing the secret aspirations of Germany and the danger of unpreparedness, devoted their time and energy to the development of huge schemes of social reform, on which such enormous sums were spent that it was necessary to retrench as much as possible on the defensive forces of the nation. In stating this no charge of bad faith against the Government is intended. When men, who have devoted the previous years of their public life to the advocacy of changes in the beneficial effect of which they are absolute believers, find themselves in a position to carry out their ideals, it is not unnatural that the realisation of these ideals should engross their minds to the detriment of other things. The continuance of the late Liberal Government in power depended upon the support of men so steeped in schemes of social reform that they were blind to what was going on abroad and deaf to the warnings of those who did see. It was therefore not perhaps surprising that the maintenance of this majority intact by exclusive devotion to the matters in which it took most interest should have appeared to the late Liberal Government to be its most imperative duty.

In addition to being mischievous, party feeling is, in our day, illogical. However natural it might have been in earlier times, when issues were fewer and so much less complex that men could take sides unhesitatingly, to-day the wide range of governmental activities must necessarily lead to the inclusion in the Ministerial programme of measures which are disliked

by many of its supporters. The larger the majority the more opportunity there is for differences of opinion, until we have the spectacle of a Government, after several years of power, sustained by a majority that has but one common bond, that of keeping the Cabinet in office. This common purpose, though possibly not conducive to the highest good of the nation, does not merit all the indignation that is poured out upon it. For it has its origin in that spirit of compromise which is the sanest and most wholesome element of English public life, and also perhaps the most potent factor in furthering the silent march of evolution, which permits the old to be sloughed by natural process, instead of being uprooted by revolutionary fury, and prepares the way for the new to fit itself into place with scarcely perceptible disturbance. A supporter of a Government is not too much to blame if he sacrifice his convictions in one direction on a matter on which there may be much to be said on both sides, because he believes that by so doing he may assist in the attainment of other measures in the utility of which he has faith.

Among the causes which are contributing to the rapid decline of British parliamentary life is the recent innovation of payment of members. The present writer may claim to speak on this point with some little knowledge, for he has passed many years in France and the United States, and has been able to observe from the outside something of the working of paid Parliaments. The result of his observations is that the payment of members contains in itself, irrespective of any other causes, the germ of the decay of parliamentary representative government. It changes and debases the whole idea on which the system, if it is to retain the respect of the people, rests. Why should a man be paid for the voluntary performance of the most honourable duty to which a citizen can aspire? The argument that good men may be prevented by lack of means from seeking this honour is not worth notice, for there is nothing objectionable in a constituency voluntarily subscribing to the support of one whom it desires to have as its representative. Men so chosen would be likely to be worthy of the choice. A great deal of the passion and indignation roused by the parliamentary proceedings of the last few years is due, at bottom, to the feeling that, to put it coarsely, 'many members are hanging on to their four hundred a year.'

(Some time ago, when it was proposed that the House of Commons should rise for six weeks, it was openly remarked that the members ' were getting their eight pounds a week for ' nothing.') What a change for the worse in public estimation ! Many accusations have been brought against Parliament, but never one so degrading as this !

In the United States, whose enormous resources are as yet undeveloped, the incentive to material success and prosperity is afforded in such countless directions by the employment of personal energy in private enterprises, that it is not to be wondered at that the best men in the country devote themselves to such objects rather than to the public service. Anyone who has been brought into close contact with the youth of America must be struck by the optimism they feel as to their future. Born in an atmosphere of boundless opportunity, the certain but very limited field offered by a Civil Service career is wholly without attraction to them, and indeed such a career is generally regarded as a refuge for the lazy, the timid, or the incompetent. With such ideas, it is clear that a political life does not enter into the calculations of the majority of Americans, and their disregard of it is strengthened, probably unconsciously, by the conviction rooted in every American heart that the country is working out its own path to salvation by the natural evolution of time and circumstance, and that its progress will not be interfered with by any political or parliamentary system. In short, the Americans, though perhaps they do not fully recognise it, are penetrated with the belief in the doctrine above laid down, that a nation progresses to better conditions, irrespective of its political systems.

The people of the United States, however, though much less averse from change than the people of Great Britain, still retain enough of their inherited English instincts in political and legal matters to adhere to tradition, and therefore the shell of the parliamentary system remains with them in apparent vigour. But though the machinery is still in existence, its working interests the people very little. The members of the Legislatures are largely professional politicians, and are known as such. Politics is a game played by the rival political parties. The local organisers of this great game are men whose knowledge of the weaknesses of human nature, and whose natural coarseness of fibre fit them for the life of intrigue and subterranean

manœuvre by which their ends are attained. Many instances might be given of the small esteem in which the Legislatures are held, and of the paucity of interest taken in their proceedings. Two may be sufficient: the meagreness of the press reports of their transactions, and the limitations placed on the sessions of the State Legislatures. In some States the Legislatures meet only every other year, and in others the number of sittings is limited, the members being paid by the working day. Congress, or the Federal Parliament, enjoys more attention and consideration. Its functions are defined and limited by the Constitution of the United States, and its members are paid a sum—a thousand or twelve hundred a year—which in Europe would be considered high, but which in America is small.

The Americans are developing a dislike for legislation, and are more disposed to trust to their constitutions, Federal and State, and to the power of the courts of law to decide on the legality of the measures passed by the Legislatures. It is perhaps for this reason that the constitutions of the newer States are more comprehensive in matter and detail than the National Constitution, which is conceived in the most general terms compatible with clearness and precision. Legislation is too frequently only another word for lobbying, and a Bill passes less on its merits than through the manœuvres employed to carry it. The power of the courts of law to declare Acts of the Legislature unconstitutional is of the highest importance. The far-reaching consequences of this power are not generally realised on this side of the Atlantic. Each State is sovereign within its own borders, but this sovereignty is limited by the provisions of the Federal Constitution to which every State must give its adherence on its admission to the Union. In the amendments to the Federal Constitution that were adopted after the Civil War one short sentence was included, the meaning of which in a free country seemed so natural and obvious that it scarcely needed expression. The words occur in the 14th Amendment, adopted in 1868, and are as follows: 'nor shall any State deprive any person 'of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' When those words were inserted the importance they would subsequently assume was far from being foreseen. If any State, by its legislation or otherwise, infringes the laws or

Constitution of the United States, the matter may be brought before the Federal Supreme Court, it being, however, a preliminary requisite that the highest Court of the State in question should first pass on the point. Of course if the State Supreme Court finds the Act unconstitutional the matter ends, but if it supports the Act, an appeal lies to the Federal Court.

The consequence of the insertion of the above-quoted words in the Federal Constitution has been that cases involving not merely legal questions but matters of political and social economy are brought into court, and during the last forty years the Federal Court has been largely occupied in dealing with these very grave and perplexing issues. In effect the Supreme Court of the United States, while acting as a court of law, often determines the direction that the social and economic life of the country shall take.

A celebrated case may here be cited as an example. The State of Illinois, considering that the grain elevator business was a monopoly, and as such must submit to the regulation of its charges by the government of the State, legislated to that effect, and the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The owner of an elevator, built and operated before the passage of the law, refused to submit, and carried his complaint to the Federal Supreme Court, claiming that he was being deprived of his property by the State without due process of law. Thus the important question of monopolies and the right of the State to control them came squarely before the Court. It is not necessary to follow the case further, as it is referred to only to show the wide extent of the issues that may be raised under a seemingly simple clause.

The nine Justices of the Federal Supreme Court have naturally differed on many important questions thus brought before them, for it is their office to interpret the Constitution and apply its general terms to the concrete case under consideration, and where there is occasion for interpretation there is always opportunity for difference of opinion. It is obvious that the responsibility resting on the Court is heavy, but it sustains it well.

The foregoing has been inserted for the purpose of showing that in this power granted by the Constitution to the Supreme Court of the United States of declaring unconstitutional any Act either of a State Legislature or of the United States

Legislature there exists so potent a check on legislative vagaries that the American people are less interested in watching the doings of their elected legislators than are the people of Great Britain and Ireland. A State passes a law which, as in the grain elevator case, raises in an unexpected way grave social or economic questions. The Act may give rise to long and angry discussion, but if passed it does not cause the uneasy feeling that the floodgates are opened that it would give rise to in Great Britain. The people know that the matter must be subjected to the calm, weighty, impartial consideration of the Supreme Court of the United States, and they trust to that to guard them against disaster. In the United States the Legislatures are powerless both in theory and practice to make a matter constitutional that is against the Constitution, whereas in Great Britain, in theory, Parliament can do anything, and in practice recognises no limit to its powers except the fear of offending public opinion.

It is hoped that enough has been said to indicate broadly that in the United States the legislative bodies, though still retaining externally their forms and powers, are, in reality, held to be much less important than the British Parliament is still considered to be in the British Isles. The vast extent of the American territory, and the jealousy of the States regarding their local sovereignty, have made the multiplication of legislative bodies seem hitherto a necessity. But the silent advance of opinion continues, and appears to be leading towards the establishment of really democratic, as distinct from representative government. Under that system the people of each State would, collectively and directly, indicate the policy they wish to see carried out, and would appoint a governing body, elected by the whole State, to execute their wishes. In the same way a central governing committee, elected by the whole nation, would sit at Washington to conduct national affairs. Already indeed, in several of the American States, there now exists a system termed the 'Initiative,' by which the voters of the State are practically enabled to call for the legislation they desire. This Initiative is of two kinds, the direct and the indirect. The former gives the power to the voters immediately, while the latter requires the preliminary submission to the State Legislature of the measures proposed. In either case the system is a long way removed from the representative theory of government.

When we turn to France, we find ourselves in a very different atmosphere. The political instincts and traditions of Great Britain and the United States are fundamentally identical; those of France are widely different. In the two former countries parliamentary institutions are so woven into the very existence of each people, so essential a part of the national life, that it seems almost impossible to contemplate either country without such institutions. But real parliamentary government as it is understood in Great Britain and the United States is of very modern growth in France. It may be said to date back less than half a century, i.e. since the Franco-German war of 1870.

It is treading on delicate ground to try to estimate the force and extent of the silent change that that great trial has wrought in the French people. The present writer vividly remembers the contemporary accounts of the excited, noisy crowds marching along the Boulevards of Paris shouting 'à ' Berlin!' and the light, almost contemptuous confidence shown in an easy victory over the Germans; six months later he was present at the triumphal entry of the newly-made German Emperor into Paris and saw the beginning of the Commune. The outbreak of the present war found him again in France, and the contrast was deeply striking. In an important provincial city the news of the declaration of war was received with grave concern and silent anxiety. But of outward manifestation of excitement there was absolutely none. On the next day a small crowd of youths attempted a march through a principal street, carrying flags and shouting 'à Berlin!' It did not get far. A superior officer of police dashed up in a motor, plunged alone into the middle of the mob, seized the flags, threw them down and trampled them under foot, dispersing the astonished lads before they had progressed a hundred yards. That trivial incident and the pathetic queue of people waiting patiently for hours outside the savings and other banks to withdraw their money were the only outward signs of anything unusual. The city was placed under military law, and the necessary measures of safety and protection were promptly, efficiently, and silently carried out. From that day to this daily life has pursued its usual course. The men have gone to the colours willingly and with an entire absence of self-consciousness in the discharge of their duty to their country. The steadfast heroism of the women has equalled that of the men.

The present writer has had many opportunities of observing the humblest ranks, and cannot recall a word of complaint. Wearing anxiety, deep sorrow, grinding toil to keep the little home or business together—all this has been witnessed with saddening frequency. But of complaint against the hardships that have befallen them, not a breath. As the men have taken up their military duties seriously, modestly, and bravely, so have the women in like manner applied themselves to the civil tasks their country requires them to perform.

Of the military conduct of the French the writer is not competent to speak. Still it may be permissible to emphasise the steadfast endurance and patient tenacity of the French soldiers in the trying conditions of trench warfare, and to recognise in this endurance and patience an indication of a radical change in the national character. If the iron entered the soul of the French in 1870, it has, with all its bitterness, had the happy result of strengthening and stiffening the national fibre. While retaining their gaiety, they have thrown off the giddiness they were formerly supposed to possess, and the French now present to the world a nation of sober, resolute people, determined, without fanfaronnades, to see to a victorious conclusion the life and death struggle in which they are engaged.

How will this deepening of the national character affect their internal political future? That is a question that time alone can solve. But it may not be over-bold to venture on some speculation in the light afforded by the past.

It is safe to say that while the shadows of Bourbon days—not yet entirely dissipated—and the disasters brought upon France by the personal government of the Napoleonic dynasty have rallied the French people to the present régime, it does not fit them well. The French, whether from temperamental causes, or lack of sufficient experience, are wanting in one great essential of parliamentary government—the spirit of compromise. Compromise means to them simply the backing down of the party in power, or a cowardly abandonment of principle by its opponents. To this is probably due the number of groups (they can scarcely be called parties) which exist in the French Parliament. Each group, ready to fight *à outrance* for its particular nostrum, has to be separately reckoned with, and they have to be balanced one against another in order to obtain, in normal times, that amazing

climax of all parliamentary institutions, the acquisition of the half plus one that decides the fate of the country. That such a system has on the whole not been productive of calamity is another proof that the development of a nation is independent of the doings of its Parliament.

The potency of the ' candidature officielle ' in France is still very strong, and is one reason why so many Frenchmen hold Parliament in small esteem. Then again, the increase in the pay of members a few years ago has further diminished the respect in which Parliament is held. In a land of small incomes, fifteen thousand francs a year is something more than a competency, and men who now stand for election are, as a body, regarded in the light of ' quinze milles ' rather than members. Though elections cause some excitement and arouse some interest, the foreigner who witnesses a general election in France must be conscious of a feeling that there is something going on that is outside the habits and ideas of the people, that is not a part of their lives or very much affects them. They cast their votes, those that trouble to do so, with a joke or a sneer, and pass on to their personal affairs.

Still, while recognising the slight esteem in which parliament is held in France, it would be hazardous to forecast its abolition. If the war result in a victory for the Allies, and the restoration to France of her lost provinces under a treaty of peace which shall ensure her tranquillity and security, with freedom from the nightmare that has oppressed her for nearly fifty years, the gratitude of the people to the régime under which these blessings have been achieved may be strong enough to rehabilitate it in public opinion for a time at least. And then, too, unless this crisis shall have had effects on the French character more extended even than is now anticipated, it can hardly be said that the French are sufficiently advanced on the path of real self-government to be in a position to abolish the representative system. They scarcely appreciate that it is the business of a nation to direct its own affairs, and to that end to interest itself in matters of world-wide or national moment.

The French are among the most self-centred people in the world. This self-concentration is not only national but local, and manifests itself in an almost heartbreaking indifference to anything not local.

It is difficult to believe, but it is nevertheless a fact, that in a country village near to which the writer lived for some time, he had to explain more than once that a sea voyage to the United States required a longer time than the passage across the Channel to England. He always remained in doubt whether it was generally understood that the Americans and English were different peoples. Universal service has had some effect on the younger generation in widening their mental horizon a little, but in the district of which the writer is now speaking it is responsible also for the removal of the more ambitious and energetic of its sons, who, after being in contact with the varied and stirring life of the barracks and the large towns, are reluctant to resume the dull monotony of rural existence.

Notwithstanding their deep and pure patriotism, the French have not yet sufficiently evolved that sense of personal, individual participation in the conduct of the country's business that breeds a spirit of initiative with the wholesome impatience of deficiencies and defects that usually accompanies it. The paralysing presence of officialdom is still too much to the fore ; the *préfet*, even the *maire*, fills too large a space in the French mind. It is to be feared that at the bottom of his heart the average Frenchman feels that it is the duty and the business of Government, through some official or another, to discover the existence of defects, and then to originate and carry out the necessary remedies. A Frenchman is ready and willing to fight and die for France, but, so far, he cannot be made to see that it is his individual duty to try to bring about, by his own and his neighbour's personal exertions, ameliorations and reforms in the general conditions of their life. And so long as the French are content to shift on to the shoulders of officials the initiative and execution of many things that they ought to shoulder themselves, they will not be far enough advanced on the path of that education in true democracy which will enable them to perform efficiently the great task of governing themselves directly. And, therefore, parliamentary government, with all its failures and shortcomings, is probably, for the immediate future, best suited to French needs.

In England, the mother of Parliaments, the respect for an institution that is both old and English is giving place to a feeling that the House of Commons no longer satisfactorily

fulfils the purpose of its existence. In accordance with the English temperament, abolition is not even dreamed of, but from time to time suggestions for reform, such as proportional representation, are timidly brought forward with a view to securing a more just reflection of the wishes and opinions of the people. But strong though the British dislike to sudden and violent change may be, the political instincts of the nation have throughout its history been sound if slow, and it cannot be very long before this guide leads it to perceive that under present conditions, with the mass of the people practically sovereign, the centre of gravity has changed, and that the time is at hand when the responsibility of power must be thrown openly and directly upon those who possess it. In other words, the eyes of the people must be opened to the great fact of which they are at present not conscious, that they are themselves the dominant power, and that for what is done and its consequences, whether for good or evil, they have no one to thank or blame but themselves.

One of the worst of the drawbacks of the present system is that it blurs this great fact, by apparently leaving to the members of the House of Commons, whose election largely depends upon local intrigues, the determination of great matters affecting the whole body politic. What sense of responsibility can the ordinary elector feel for his share in deciding the general policy of his country? He casts his vote in his own constituency for one or other of the two great parties, or, if he be a crank, for that picturesque but generally useless individual, the independent candidate. He has voted for the election of one six-hundred-and-seventieth of the assembly, which, though composed of members elected on almost as many different issues as there are constituencies, will have the power to settle, after interminable debate and party intrigue, the general policy of the entire country. Can the voter charge his conscience with any responsibility for any decisions that may be taken? In short, Parliament, by assuming all power, has blinded the people to their own duties, and, while claiming to be the voice of the nation, is but a distracted chorus of varied and dissimilar cries, each of which tries to make itself heard most loudly above the prevailing hubbub. Notwithstanding the various general elections and the prolonged discussions in the House of Commons, would anyone venture to state what is the opinion of the nation

as a whole on Home Rule or Welsh Disestablishment? A Referendum on either of these important questions would have put the matter beyond doubt years ago.

Surely the time has come when a sharp distinction should be made between the management of purely local concerns and those affecting the whole community. Subject to the common welfare, purely local concerns should be left to the management of those whom they immediately affect. But it is essentially foolish to confide the conduct of national affairs to a body which is merely an agglomeration of representatives of local subdivisions, whose election has frequently been decided by some trumpery local issue. Where the nation as a whole is concerned, it should be entitled and called upon to express its decision *as a whole*. This is, of course, impossible under the present system of local constituencies, and therefore the collective voice of the people, when it is most deeply important to hear it, is distracted, divided, feeble, and uncertain.

Since the outbreak of the war, there has been much heated discussion about 'keeping the people in the dark,' 'taking 'the nation into the confidence of the Government,' and so on. This talk, to be of any value, should have gone on several years ago, when the mass of the people, naturally eager for an improvement in their social condition, and kept entirely ignorant of the imminent danger threatening from without, were absorbed in the parliamentary development of schemes of social reform. Parliament wrangled and fought endlessly over these domestic questions, without devoting more than occasional and perfunctory attention to the defence of the realm. The Government gambled on the chance of peace being maintained during its tenure of office. That the Government recognised that the European situation was critical is clear from their efforts to come to an understanding with Germany, and it is hard to comprehend their supineness after their conciliatory attempts proved abortive. Truly, the fear of Parliament is the beginning of evil. The attachment of a powerful political party to the watchword (or, more properly, catch-word) of Peace, regardless of circumstance, has much to answer for.

When the cessation of hostilities shall afford the people of Great Britain the opportunity to weigh and consider what took place before the war, they will see that their House of Commons, convulsed and torn by prolonged and bitter strife

over domestic questions, and overborne by a majority whose blind devotion to these questions rendered them deaf to all warnings from without, received with indifference, even hostility, any suggestions looking to the increase of the military and naval strength of the nation. Will they not also see that this clumsy, inefficient organisation, which wrangled for weeks and months in ignoble efforts to gain a party triumph while the very existence of the nation was trembling in the balance, is no longer fit for its duties, and that, notwithstanding the respect due to it for good work in former generations, it has now reached the limit of its usefulness ? Nay more, that it has become a source of positive danger ? Even its own members were so conscious of the feebleness and triviality of their disputes, that once war was actually declared their pitiful outpouring of talk ceased as if by magic.

Occasionally we read of suggestions, tentatively and timorously put forth, that it is necessary in this crisis to have business men at the head of affairs, and, still more surprising, there has even been expressed a wish for a dictator to see the war through. A dictator in England ! Is this proposed successor to Oliver Cromwell to be found in Mr. Lloyd George ? To clamour for a dictator now is as foolish as it was before the war to fight over questions of subordinate importance while ignoring the danger that theatened the nation. Had the Government then been in the hands of a comparatively small body of men, elected by the whole nation for national purposes and therefore free from the exigencies of the party system, matters would have been on a very different footing in August 1914, when the light broke in upon an almost unconscious people with blinding force.

When the veil of tradition and prejudice has fallen from the eyes of the British people they will see where the weakness lies. It lies not in the fault of one man or one set of men, but in the incapacity of a system that no longer responds to the circumstances of the national life. The dangerous incapacity of our present parliamentary system has been demonstrated by the events of the past few years. The country was kept in a state of political turmoil from 1909 onwards ; in 1914 it was brought to the verge of civil war, with the result that our enemies were stimulated to strike. Meanwhile the primary duty of watching over the safety of the realm was neglected, so that when the

storm burst we were in such a condition of unpreparedness that almost superhuman efforts were needed to remedy the criminal carelessness of the past.

When France comes to her national stocktaking, it seems likely, for the reasons above given, that the parliamentary régime will not incur so grave a condemnation as in Great Britain. Nevertheless Frenchmen will hardly forget the severe parliamentary struggle their Government had to face in order to obtain the passage of the Bill changing the period of military service from two to three years. The French Chamber suffered the same kind of blindness to outside events that obsessed the House of Commons. The climax was reached in the nonsense poured out about the advisability of a comparatively small regular army, and the *levée en masse*—the arming of every Frenchman with a rifle, and sending him thus equipped into the field if invasion should ever occur. It is to the everlasting credit of the French Ministry of the day and its supporters that they stood firm. They *knew* what the real state of affairs was, and were not afraid to risk their parliamentary existence in doing their best to be prepared when the hour of trial arrived. What a melancholy contrast is afforded by the action of the British Cabinet! But France will not forget that there was stubborn opposition to the Government's proposals, and she will probably show her stern disapproval of the miserable, petty intrigues and party combinations that discredit her present parliamentary régime. The tremendous national crisis that has welded France into one solid whole cannot fail to have its effect on her political life. The French people will demand from their deputies single-minded work for the welfare of the country, and the application of all their energies to the business of remaking the nation instead of unmaking ministries. Further than that one cannot now see. It has yet to be made clear how much this war has done towards arousing a greater sense of personal responsibility and developing a wider field of vision in the French people.

On the last of the three States selected as progressive, the United States, the effects of the struggle must be indirect only. There is, however, in the American character a somewhat unusual combination of qualities, viz. an entire satisfaction with their own national conditions, and an alert, watchful

attention to conditions prevailing elsewhere. It has been stated that a prominent American, the late Mr. Pierpont Morgan, once said that he took special heed to what was being done socially and politically in England, because, sooner or later, the United States was apt to follow on the same lines. However much truth there may be in this statement, it seems likely that if Great Britain were to broaden her political system in the manner herein suggested, the United States, having largely identical political ideas and instincts, would not remain insensible to the change, more especially as that change would lie in directions in which she is obviously tending. On her the parliamentary system sits loosest, and therefore she would feel the wrench of its loss the least.

In a word, the parliamentary system is looked upon in the United States with indifference, in France with distrust, and in Great Britain with disgust. Why? Because in principle it is obsolete, and in practice mischievous. It is obsolete in principle because changed conditions, the advance of the masses in intelligence, and the lowering of the franchise have centred the power in the people themselves, and they ought to exercise it directly. It is mischievous in practice because it blinds the people to the perception of their own responsibility.

Each widening of the franchise has increased the weakness of Parliament. The proceedings of the present House of Commons have made that weakness patent to all. Under the normal working of the party system the House of Commons is a mere machine for registering the decisions of a Cabinet responsible not to the country but to the party that placed it in power. If the Cabinet can keep on good terms with its party followers it can afford to treat the House of Commons as a body with contempt.

The destruction of the individuality and independence of the private member, which are essential to the vitality of any true representative system, and the hollowness and artificiality of debates, which are merely a waste of time, since the conclusion is foregone, alone suffice to prove that the existing parliamentary system has outgrown its capacity for good, and is dangerous to the future welfare of the nation.

W. Foster.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

ALL doubt as to what will be the dominating issue in the presidential election of November 1916 was swept away at the unofficial convention of the Republican party of the State of New York which was held in New York City on the 15th and 16th of February. At this State Convention a platform was adopted pledging the Republican party to the defence of America and Americans against attack from any quarter whatever, and Mr. Elihu Root made what was accepted as the key-note speech of the Republican campaign for the defeat of President Wilson. Mr. Root attacked the tariff and the Mexican policies of the Democratic Administration ; but the key-note of the approaching electoral campaign was sounded when he vigorously condemned President Wilson's failure to protest against Germany's outrage on Belgium, and also the President's handling of the 'Lusitania' outrage and the other submarine outrages which resulted in the loss of American lives. Without question Mr. Root is the ablest man in the ranks of the Republican party. He has held two of the highest offices in the gift of the party—those of Secretary of State and Senator for the State of New York. He is the foremost statesman of the Republican party ; and in spite of his age—he is seventy-one—he may be nominated at Chicago as the presidential candidate of the Republicans.

Popularity such as was enjoyed by President Roosevelt, and to some degree by President Taft, has never been Mr. Root's. His career before he went actively and continuouslyinto federal politics—his career as a corporation lawyer—militated against his popularity. But his influence in the inner councils of the Republican party has long been considerable. Certainly no man in the party speaks with more caution or with more authority ; and when he declared in his speech in New York that President Wilson's policy on the war must be the dominating issue of the campaign, both parties promptly realised that the low tariff which was enacted by the Democrats

in 1913 and the policy of the President in regard to Mexican affairs must fall into subordinate places among the issues of the presidential campaign. One of the strongest journalistic supporters of President Wilson, the 'New York Times,' wrote on the 16th of February 1916:

'The Republicans will never win the campaign on the issues of protection and Huerta. But when Mr. Root took up the things the Administration has done or left undone, or has not succeeded in doing, in respect to the grave and urgent questions forced upon us by the European war, he placed himself boldly upon the battle-ground where the fighting of the campaign is to be done. In this choice of the party position he displayed the highest skill of statesmanship and of politics—he did not seek to make an issue for the Republicans, he chose an issue that is already made in the hearts of the people.'

At an earlier stage there had been a development of much significance in regard to the outlook for the Republicans at the election in November, which makes it probable—indeed almost certain—that there will be an end to the division in the Republican party.

As the elections of 1912 made plain, the Republicans can have no hope of success so long as there is in existence a well-organised and persistent third party, led by Mr. Roosevelt, that can poll over four million votes at a presidential election. The action of the Progressives—whether they nominate their own presidential candidate or throw in their lot with the fortunes of the candidate of the Republican party—must be of the utmost importance in the electoral campaign. Their decision will come in June, when they will hold their national convention in Chicago during the same week as the Republican Convention is held in the same city. It was on the 11th of January of the present year that the Committee of the Progressive party made this very significant arrangement for synchronising the national convention with that of the Republicans. At the same meeting the Committee, after drawing up a declaration of Progressive principles in which were re-endorsed most of the principles of Mr. Roosevelt's platform of 1912, turned to President Wilson's policy on the war and condemned it, not indeed with quite so much detail but in terms quite as strong as those subsequently used by Mr. Root at the New York convention of the Republican party. The pronounce-

ment of the Progressive National Committee on the war reads as follows :

' President Wilson's Administration has repudiated the faith of our forefathers, which made the American flag the sufficient protection of an American citizen around the world. It has suffered American men, women, and children to be slaughtered in Mexico and on the high seas, American property to be destroyed, and American liberty to travel and trade to be subject to the arbitrary and lawless coercion of foreign belligerents. It has stood by while the law of nations disappeared from the earth without adequate protest or effective resistance. It, first among American Administrations, has shown the supine spirit, whose sure consequence is the contempt of the world.

' Our people are becoming impatient of leaders who hold that comfort, prosperity, and material welfare are above honour, self-sacrifice, and patriotism. We need a re-awakening of older Americanism, of our belief in those things that our country and our flag stand for. Our people are seeking leadership—leadership of the highest order and most courageous character : leadership that will draft to itself, for the country's benefit, the unselfish and patriotic services of its ablest citizens. They are demanding that principles and policies shall be proclaimed and carried out by a man who has the wisdom to formulate them and the manhood to fight for them.'

With this declaration there went the statement that the national convention of the Progressive party had been called to meet in the same city and at the same time as the national convention of the Republican party.

' We take this action,' the Committee continued, ' believing that the surest way to secure for our country the required leadership will be by having, if possible, both the Progressive and the Republican parties choose the same standard-bearer and the same principles. We are confident that the rank and file of the Republican party and the very large independent vote of the country will support such an effort.

' We pledge ourselves to approach the consideration of the issues involved in such an effort without any desire to revive partisan bitterness. If the Republican Convention is responsive to the patriotic spirit that brought the Republican party into existence, and that made it dominant for half a century—if it meets this crisis in the spirit of broad patriotism that rises above partisanship—the effort for a common leadership will be successful.'

The Progressives and the Republicans are now in general agreement on the tariff. Each demands a permanent Tariff Commission to make possible the scientific revision of the tariff

on protective lines. The Progressives in January last pledged themselves to an immediate revision of such schedules of the tariff ' as the conditions of the world war have made unjust, or ' are necessary for the preservation after the war of industries ' newly established here, whose necessity the war has demon- ' strated.' The Republicans of New York, in their State platform, condemn the Democratic tariff of 1913 because of its failure to protect American industries. ' Before the outbreak ' of the European war,' reads the tariff resolution in the New York State platform, ' the disastrous effects of this tariff were ' already felt throughout the land. The war has obscured these ' effects. But immediately upon the restoration of peace they ' will be felt again with redoubled force.'

Tariff protection was not an issue between the Republicans and the Progressives when the division developed at the Chicago Convention in 1912 ; and in the early days of the presidential campaign of 1916 the Progressives and the Republicans are practically on common ground as regards the tariff. Both parties are demanding provision by Congress for an adequate mercantile marine. So far the Progressives have expressed this demand only in general terms ; while the Republican party, if it follows the lead of the New York State convention on this question, will advocate the ' quick up- ' building of an American merchant marine by the methods ' which have given us industrial independence and without ' the economic waste and the international embarrassments of ' government ownership, direct or indirect.'

Both parties also demand preparedness. The Progressives, insisting that ' international law is humanity's final safeguard ' and civilisation's last bulwark,' urge ' complete preparedness, ' not merely in military armament, but preparedness that will ' mobilise our economic resources—agricultural, industrial, and ' financial.' The Republican resolution on this question passed by the New York State Convention is identical with that of the Progressives. ' We advocate,' it reads, ' complete prepared- ' ness for the common defence—economic, industrial, and finan- ' cial as well as military.' Both parties are agreed too in condemnation of President Wilson's policy in Mexico and his policy as regards the great war. Since 1912 the Republican National Committee has eliminated from the national convention the long-existing scandal of the gross over-representation

of the southern States, which never by any chance help to swell the total of Republican votes in the electoral college—a scandal of which the Progressives bitterly complained when they broke away from the Republican National Convention four years ago. There remains to-day little to keep the Progressives and the Republicans longer apart, and much in conditions arising out of the war to bring about a re-union for the campaign that will precede the presidential election in November.

To observers of contemporary American politics and in particular to those who have followed the history of the Progressive party since it brought about the defeat of Mr. Taft in 1912, there is not much ambiguity in the declaration of the Committee of that party that the American people are seeking leadership—that they are demanding that 'principles' and policies shall be proclaimed and carried out by a man who 'has the wisdom to formulate them and the manhood to fight 'for them.' Mr. Roosevelt, who called the Progressive party into existence and whose personality largely accounted for the four million votes polled by the Progressives in 1912, was not at the meeting on the 11th of January from which the new declaration of Progressive principles was made. Unlike President Wilson, Mr. Roosevelt is not as yet formally and officially a presidential candidate, although under the primary laws of several of the States—laws which govern the election of delegates to the national conventions—Mr. Roosevelt has had an equal opportunity for announcing his candidature and making it official. But he is just as much the leader of the Progressive party to-day, and just as much its one commanding personality, as he was in 1912. Nobody thinks of the Progressive party, or of its policies and fortunes, without thinking of Mr. Roosevelt and the amazing rally to his call of four years ago. No one conceives that the onslaught on President Wilson's policy in regard to Belgium, and on the action of the President as regards Germany's methods of submarine warfare, made by the Committee of the Progressive party, was other than the view of Mr. Roosevelt. The declaration of the Progressive National Committee against President Wilson's conciliatory attitude towards Germany is, in fact, an epitome of Mr. Roosevelt's speeches on questions arising out of the war.

It is unnecessary to recall the fact that Mr. Roosevelt was the first American statesman to condemn President Wilson's failure

to protest against the invasion of Belgium. His equally vigorous condemnation of the President's handling of the 'Lusitania' outrage he has often repeated—sometimes in one form, sometimes in another, but always to the same effect. Mr. Roosevelt sailed for a six weeks' vacation in the West Indies the week before Mr. Root formulated his attack on President Wilson's policy—an attack quite as strong as any that had been made up to that time by Mr. Roosevelt. His last speech before he sailed from New York was made in Philadelphia on the 30th of January—a speech in which he returned again both to the invasion of Belgium and the sinking of the 'Lusitania.'

'For the last eighteen months, I have borne testimony with all my strength against Germany, because of its cynical disregard of the obligations of international humanity, alike in its dealings with Belgium, in the outrages committed on non-combatants of other nationalities, and in its assaults on our own people. It has been to our deep discredit as a nation that we have not actively and effectively interfered against this callous brutality.'

It was in this speech that Mr. Roosevelt compared President Wilson's diplomacy over the 'Lusitania' outrage to Mr. Micawber's method of finance.

'Mr. Micawber's speciality was to issue notes. He never honoured these notes when they came due. His mind was so constituted that he felt that when a note became due he met it adequately by writing another. His creditors, however, did not take so charitable a view of the performance. They did not have single-track minds. To those acquainted with diplomatic history during the last year or two there will be no necessity of pursuing the analogy further.'

The Progressive party, as judged from the utterance of its National Committee, has closely followed Mr. Roosevelt's lead on the American issues raised by the war; and when the Committee declared that the people of the United States were seeking leadership of the highest order and most courageous character, and that the surest way to secure this leadership was for the Progressives and Republicans to choose the same standard-bearer, it was in effect expressing the hope that the division of the last four years would be ended by the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt both by the Progressive and the Republican parties.

The Progressives desire a union on the same platform—on

the same body of political principles—as well as on the same presidential candidate. It has been shown that much ground is now held in common by the Progressives and the Republicans. They agree in the main on the tariff. Each is committed to a revision of the tariff enacted by the Democrats in 1913, a revision which will ensure more protection to American industries. They agree on the urgency of an American merchant marine. They agree in condemnation of President Wilson's policy in Mexico. If Mr. Root's speech at the New York State Convention can be accepted as indicating the attitude of the Republican party as a whole towards Belgium and the submarine outrages, they are agreed on the dominating issue of the campaign. In the second week of June, when the national conventions of the Republican and Progressive parties are assembled in Chicago, it is not probable that the platforms adopted will prevent a reunion. Everything will turn on the nomination for President made by the Republican party. Among the regular Republicans there are only two men of national prominence available as presidential candidates—Mr. Root and Justice Hughes, now of the Supreme Court at Washington, and formerly governor of New York. Among the lesser possible candidates are Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, leader of the Republican minority in the House of Representatives ; Senator Burton, of Ohio ; Mr. Myron T. Herrick, also of Ohio, who was United States Ambassador at Paris during the Taft Administration ; Mr. Charles W. Fairbanks, of Indiana, who was Vice-President from 1905 to 1909 ; Senator John W. Weeks, of Massachusetts ; Senator A. B. Cummins, of Iowa ; Senator W. E. Borah, of Illinois ; and Mr. H. S. Hadley, Governor of Missouri.

Justice Hughes has repeatedly refused to allow himself to be considered as a candidate, and on the 9th of February he emphatically re-asserted his position. ' I am,' he wrote, ' entirely ' out of politics. I am totally opposed to the use of my name ' in connexion with the nomination and selection or instruction ' of any delegates in my interest, either directly or indirectly.' Justice Hughes was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Taft in 1910. He has, of course, been out of politics since that time, and nothing is known of his opinions on any of the questions that are at issue in the presidential election. But he achieved national reputation during the four years that he

was governor of the State of New York—the four years immediately preceding his appointment to the Supreme Court bench—and he was much discussed as a presidential possibility while he held office as governor. If he were willing to become a candidate, there is no man in the Republican party who would be so acceptable; and with Justice Hughes as the candidate the support of the Progressives would be assured, for while the Progressives are undoubtedly hoping for the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt, it is not a condition with them that only this nomination will bring them again into line with the Republicans. Mr. Roosevelt himself, according to statements made by his associates of the Progressives, has declared that he will support any candidate who can defeat President Wilson. Republicans who hesitate to accept Mr. Roosevelt—who keep in mind that he caused the defeat of the Republican party in 1912—desire Justice Hughes as the candidate of their party. They did not abandon hope even after the letter of the 9th of February. They were willing to admit that Justice Hughes was not a candidate, but insisted that while a man might not be a candidate he still might accept a nomination tendered with unanimity by the national convention. Unless Justice Hughes should assert that under no circumstances will he accept the nomination, his name will be canvassed as a presidential possibility until the convention assembles at Chicago in June. It will also appear in the ballotings in the convention. But a seat in the United States Supreme Court is usually the highest ambition of great American lawyers intent on public service, and no judge of this court ever left that bench to accept a presidential nomination. It is therefore difficult to believe that Justice Hughes will create a precedent.

Mr. Root has never enjoyed wide popularity such as attached to Justice Hughes during his four years as governor of New York State. He ranks high among Secretaries of State since the Civil War—nearly as high as the late Mr. Hay; and he was of much importance and weight as Senator from New York. He is to-day very influential in the Republican party, as witness the opportunity that was afforded him in the New York State Convention of determining the lines on which the Republican party is going into the presidential campaign.

Despite his age, Mr. Root's name will be submitted to the convention. Three of the four delegates-at-large presented for

election at the primaries by the New York Republican State Convention are supporters of Mr. Root. The fourth—Governor Whitman—at the time of the convention professed to support the nomination of Justice Hughes. Mr. William Barnes, long prominent as a boss of the Republican party in New York State, is the most active and influential partisan of Mr. Root, and he will be able to bring about the election of a considerable number of delegates from the State of New York who will vote for Mr. Root's nomination at the Chicago Convention.

There is a political feud of nearly four years' standing between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Barnes—a feud that came into court in 1915, when Mr. Barnes was unsuccessful in an action for libel that he had brought against Mr. Roosevelt. At the Chicago Convention in 1912 the Progressives were also sharply at issue with Mr. Root ; and there is consequently little likelihood that the nomination of Mr. Root would be acceptable to the Progressives, or would result in the Progressives and Republicans going into the election with the same candidate and the same platform. At Chicago the Republicans will have to face not only the fact that the Progressives will be in convention there, and ready to nominate a presidential candidate if the Republican nomination is not acceptable to them. They will also have to face a strong conviction within their own party that the presidential election this year should see an end to the division that gave rise to the Progressive party, and also a strong feeling in favour of the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt by the Republicans. This feeling is particularly pronounced with those Republicans who are in sympathy with Mr. Roosevelt's outspoken utterances in condemnation of President Wilson's failure to protest against the invasion of Belgium, and his diplomacy in connexion with the submarine outrages.

There will be 998 delegates to the Republican National Convention. Sixty per cent. of them will be chosen by the new method of election at primaries—namely, the elections in the States at which the members of each party vote by ballot for their own delegates. The remaining forty per cent. will be elected according to the older method at Congressional district and state conventions. When the New York State Convention was held the election of delegates had scarcely begun. Some of the elections do not come until within a few weeks of the

national convention. Until most of them are over it is not possible to gauge the strength of the movement within the Republican party for the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt. One of the first manifestations of the movement in the preliminaries of the campaign was in Michigan in the early days of January. Had Mr. Roosevelt been willing his name would have been submitted at Republican primary elections in that State. He withheld his consent on the ground that he was not a candidate ; but on the day that he left New York for his vacation in the West Indies—the 11th of February—there was a significant demonstration in favour of his nomination by four prominent Massachusetts politicians who were then candidates for election as delegates to the Republican National Convention. One of these candidates is an ex-lieutenant governor of the State ; the second was a candidate for governor last year, as the nominee of the Progressive party ; the third is a Republican member of Congress ; and the fourth a member of the State Senate. In announcing their candidature as delegates—in appealing to the Republicans of the State for support—these advocates of Mr. Roosevelt's nomination published a joint manifesto announcing their desire to be elected as delegates pledged to Mr. Roosevelt :

'We are tired of vague statements and beating about the bush. We propose to go straight to the point, and give everyone a chance to know for what he is voting in the primaries. We do not want to go unpledged. We do not want a convention for dark horses. We want Roosevelt for President.'

One of these candidates was formerly a leading member of the Progressive party in Massachusetts—Progressive candidate for governor in 1913 ; and in a supplementary statement jointly made by the four candidates this fact was emphasised, and it was added that 'this coalition of former divergent 'elements of the party is expected by its Massachusetts 'representatives on the Roosevelt ticket to become general 'throughout the country.'

On the same day that this declaration in favour of Mr. Roosevelt was published in Boston, three candidates for election as delegates from Illinois, in filing their petition with the Secretary of State at Springfield, intimated that if elected to the Republican National Convention Mr. Roosevelt would be their choice. These instances are quoted as indications in

the early stages of the presidential campaign of the feeling of large sections of the Republican party in regard to Mr. Roosevelt's nomination.

Mr. Roosevelt is the most commanding personality in American political life to-day. He is the foremost American and the most outspoken exponent of Americanism. In the early months of the campaign he was not, as has been stated, a candidate ; but Republicans and Progressives alike well know that he is available if both parties agree to nominate him. So do the Democrats ; for when Democrats warn each other, as Senator Newlands did on the floor of the Senate, that they are about to face a united Republican party ' chastened ' by adversity and eager to persuade,' they have in mind a united party in which Mr. Roosevelt would again be a power. Everyone realises, moreover, that Mr. Roosevelt intends to take an active part in the election campaign. The persistence of the Progressive party at the Congressional elections of 1914, when the Republicans lost thirty-nine seats as a result of the opposition of the Progressives ; the recent activity of the leaders, and the declaration of the committee of the party all point to the intention of Mr. Roosevelt to be in the campaign with the Progressives behind him. He will be the outstanding figure in the convention week at Chicago as he was at the convention in 1912 ; and the demand first voiced from Massachusetts—' We want Roosevelt for President '—will become the demand of many of the delegates to the Republican Convention.

Not one of the men of second rank whose names have been mentioned above as possible Republican candidates is likely to be able to command a majority in the convention. Times are too critical both for the Republican party and for the country to permit of the bringing out of a dark horse after the convention has assembled ; and if Justice Hughes persists in refusing to allow his name to be considered, the convention will shoulder a great risk for the Republican party if by nominating Mr. Root it forces the Progressives to go into the election with a candidate of their own.

There have been presidential elections since the Civil War the results of which were awaited with intense interest, even with anxiety. One such was that of 1884, when, owing to a division in the Republican party over the nomination of

Mr. Blaine, the hold of the Republicans on the national government was lost. Another was the election of 1896—the year of the free silver campaign. But in the years since Lincoln's second election in 1864 there has never been a Republican National convention which was awaited with more wide-spread and intense interest than the convention this year at Chicago.

The Democratic National convention that will assemble at St. Louis on the 14th of June—the week immediately following the conventions of the Republicans and the Progressives—will, as regards the nomination, arouse no such intense interest as the two Chicago conventions. It is an almost invariable rule with both political parties that a President can have a second nomination from his party if he so desires. Mr. Wilson desires re-nomination. He permitted his name to go on the primary ballots for the election of delegates to the St. Louis convention early in February—just as soon as the preliminaries to these elections began—thereby confirming officially an intimation given in a speech at Indianapolis in January 1915 that he was a candidate for re-election. This first intimation was soon followed by a significant pronouncement by Mr. Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives, who was President Wilson's strongest competitor for the nomination at the Baltimore convention in 1912. 'If the President makes good,' said Mr. Clark, 'he will 'be re-nominated and elected. If he does not, then the Demo-'cratic nomination for the Presidency will not be worth the 'paper it is written on.' No other candidate has ever been mentioned; and it is a foregone conclusion that at the Democratic National Convention President Wilson will be unanimously re-nominated.

Interest in personalities at St. Louis will centre on Mr. Bryan, who was Secretary of State in President Wilson's Cabinet until he resigned, in June last year, rather than be a party to President Wilson's second note to Berlin over the sinking of the 'Lusitania.' He was afraid that the note might impel Germany to break off diplomatic relations with the United States, and thereby 'create a situation out of which 'war might come without the intention of either side.' In March 1913, when President Wilson formed his Cabinet, he was practically compelled to include Mr. Bryan and to assign to him the highest position, not because any man in or out of

the Democratic party had ever thought Mr. Bryan capable of filling the great office that had been held by statesmen like Bayard, Olney, Hay, and Root, but because Mr. Bryan had used his influence in the Baltimore convention to bring about Mr. Wilson's nomination. It was Mr. Wilson's misfortune that he was under this obligation to Mr. Bryan. No Secretary of State in the last thirty years commanded less confidence than Mr. Bryan ; and there was satisfaction among Democrats as well as among Republicans when, as one Democratic newspaper phrased it, Mr. Bryan ' turned tail in the face of a crisis, ' and sought refuge by counselling dishonour.'

Mr. Bryan has been an outstanding figure at every Democratic National Convention since 1896. At three of these conventions he was nominated as the presidential candidate ; and at the other two—1904 and 1912—he was able greatly to influence both the drawing up of the platform and the nomination of the candidates. Mr. Bryan will be at the St. Louis convention in June. It is not conceivable that he can create any serious opposition to President Wilson's re-nomination, but it will then be discovered how much of a following he retains, after his failure as Secretary of State.

At the Democratic National Convention, with President Wilson's renomination assured, the platform will be all-important ; for in the platform there must be an unhesitating endorsement of the Administration. There must be an endorsement of President Wilson's Mexican policy and of all the diplomacy arising out of the war—policies for which the President and his Cabinet are responsible ; as well as an endorsement of the measures for defence that Congress will have passed before the present session comes to an end, and also of the tariff and currency legislation enacted in 1913–1915. In a normal presidential year tariff legislation would be uppermost in the issues of the campaign. This year, unless the war is over before the election in November, the tariff will fall into a secondary place. The election will turn on the war and the issues it has raised in American politics ; and in the platform adopted at St. Louis, as well as in the speech of the temporary chairman of the convention, there must be some answer to attacks on President Wilson's policy in regard to the war, such as those made by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root. Mr. Root's speech is one of the documents of the campaign. No arraign-

ment of the President's policy that may come from any leader of the Republican party can exceed it in authority or in the attention it has commanded. There has already been one answer to it in Congress—a speech made by Senator Lewis on the 19th of February. Other answers will be made in Congress ; but the Democratic party as a whole must make answer to it at St. Louis, and embody this answer in the national platform.

President Wilson has several times defended his policy as regards Mexico. In his speech at Indianapolis on the 9th of January 1915 he said :

'I hold it as a fundamental principle that every people has the right to determine its own form of government, and until this recent revolution in Mexico, until the end of the Diaz regime, 80 per cent. of the people of Mexico had never had a " look in " in determining who should be their governors, or what their government should be. Now I am for the 80 per cent. It is none of my business, and it is none of your business, how long they may take in determining it. It is none of my business, and it is none of your business, how they go about it. The country is theirs. The government is theirs. The liberty, if they can get it, and God speed them in getting it, is theirs. And so far as my influence goes, while I am President nobody shall interfere with them.'

While President Wilson has frequently taken the country into his confidence as regards his Mexican policy, he has as yet offered no explanation of his failure to protest against the invasion of Belgium and no defence of his diplomatic handling of the 'Lusitania' outrage—no answer to the charge made on the 11th of December by the American Rights Committee, that he had by that time exhausted the resources of diplomatic remonstrance and warning. With negotiations still proceeding it was perhaps impossible for President Wilson to be as outspoken in regard to this diplomacy as he has been in connexion with his policy towards Mexico. But as Mr. Root insisted in his speech in New York, when the President and the Secretary of State have taken a certain line in diplomacy, and when the President seeks a new grant of power, as President Wilson is seeking at this election, the President and the Secretary of State, and the party which is responsible for them, must account for their use of power to the people from whom it came, and the people must pass judgment upon them.

There must be at the St. Louis convention, before President

Wilson is re-nominated, a defence of the policy on the war. The policy has been challenged, and challenged by men who cannot be ignored. There are many indications that the defence of Mr. Wilson's policy will rest on the fact that it has kept the United States out of the war. President Wilson hinted at this line of defence in a speech at Cleveland, on the 29th of January, one of a series of speeches that he made in support of his plea for a larger navy and a larger army, and his plan for a continental army that will give the United States a reserve of half a million men. In an aside in his Cleveland speech he said :

' It is very difficult for us to hold off and look with cool judgment upon such tremendous matters. And yet we have held off. It has not been easy for the Government at Washington to avoid the entanglements which seem to beset it on every side; it has needed a great deal of watchfulness and an unremitting patience to do so; but all the while no American could fail to be aware that America did not wish to become entangled, that she wished to hold apart, not because she did not see the issues of the struggle, but because she thought her duties to be the duties of peace and of separate action.'

Much the same line was taken by Senator Lewis, when in the Senate he answered Mr. Root :

' We are reaching results with Germany. Here and there differences arise, of course, as they do in all pending negotiations ; but we have still maintained peace. There is no war ; our cities are not sacked ; our fields are not withered ; the dead are not heaped up in our streets ; mothers are not shrieking as they see their babes bayoneted. Our land is at peace ; women can still bless God that their homes are secure, their children happy ; mankind can still turn to America, and appeal to it as the only spot in all the world where " peace on earth " prevails under law and under the guidance of God, sustained by the patriotism of man. We will continue this course ; we will hold to our ancient tradition of peace with all nations ; and despite the eminent statesmanship of these eminent men who misrepresent the conditions merely to create falsely a party issue before their country, America will go on her course of peace, justice, and honour.'

Newspapers that support the Administration are confident that President Wilson's policy will carry him through the election ; and if the United States is still not directly involved when the Democratic National Convention meets in June, the likelihood is that the President's policy will be endorsed

and commended to the electors on the ground that it has kept the United States out of the war. It is impossible to know the feeling of the country on this issue. It was not tested at the Congressional elections in November 1914, when the Democrats retained a majority in the House of Representatives and added to their majority in the Senate. Popular support for President Wilson on this ground is not so vocal as is the condemnation of his failure to protest against the invasion of Belgium and his policy in regard to Germany's ruthless methods of submarine warfare. The real test of popular feeling cannot be made until November. Since the Civil War there have been only three Democratic successes at presidential elections. Two of these—1884 and 1912—were due entirely to divisions within the Republican party; and since 1860 there have never been two successive Democratic administrations. It is now improbable that the Democrats will have the advantage of a divided Republican party this year; but it is impossible even to estimate what proportion of the electors, only loosely held to the Republican party, are with Mr. Root and Mr. Roosevelt on the issues of the war. If the tariff and other domestic questions are subordinated—if the election turns solely or mainly on the issues that have developed out of the war—it is impossible to predict the result. Americans who feel strongly that the United States should be in the war are not in a majority even among those whose sympathies are whole-heartedly with Great Britain and the Allies; and it is difficult to make the masses of the people understand that a severance of diplomatic relations with Germany over the 'Lusitania' outrage need not necessarily have involved the United States in the war.

Edward Porritt.

THE SMALL HOLDINGS CRAZE

Report of the Departmental Committee on the Settlement or Employment on the Land of Discharged Sailors and Soldiers. Cd. 8182. 1916.

ON the 15th of July last the President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries appointed a Departmental Committee 'to consider and report what steps can be taken 'to promote the settlement and employment on the land in 'England and Wales of sailors and soldiers, whether disabled 'or otherwise, on discharge from the Navy or Army.'

Sir Harry Verney was chairman of the Committee; the Army was represented on it by the Lieutenant-Governor of Chelsea Hospital, and there were also representatives of the House of Commons, the Development Commission, the Small Holdings Commissioners, and the landed interest. The Committee heard the evidence of twenty-four witnesses. It inspected a number of small holdings in various parts of the country, one large farm, two agricultural colleges, and some land on the coast ripe for reclamation. On the 4th of September last the Committee presented an Interim Report, which was not printed or published, recommending that a free course of training at an agricultural college should be given to fifty disabled soldiers or sailors. On the 21st of January last the Introduction and First Part of the Final Report was presented, and it is this portion which forms the basis of the present article.

In their Introduction the Committee urge that it is to the advantage of the nation to increase the agricultural population and also the supply of home-grown foods; and that each of these objects can be and ought to be promoted by attracting to the land suitable ex-service men at the end of the war, provided that this can be done with reasonable certainty of success—that is to say, that the men will make a good living on the land when they get there. The Committee express the belief that many men not previously engaged in agriculture may find that the taste for it, latent in most

men, has been developed by their open-air life in the services, and they point out that emigration will be the only chance of gratifying this desire unless something is done to give such men access to the land at home.

Proceeding from these premisses, the Committee recommend the creation by the State of colonies of small holders with expert guidance for the tenants, co-operative organisation for the purchase of goods, for the sale of produce, for the provision of certain of the implements and machines, and State-aided co-operative credit facilities. A probationary period is to be served by prospective tenants, during which they will work for wages, with the object of weeding out the unfit. County Councils are urged to develop similar schemes with the powers they possess under the Small Holdings Act, 1907, to which certain amendments are suggested. A great propagandist campaign is recommended to be set on foot, in favour of land settlement, throughout the services prior to demobilisation on the cessation of hostilities.

In considering these recommendations it may be assumed that the Committee in no way intended to concern themselves with the question of rewarding the men who have offered their lives in the defence of the State, and that their proposals must be judged entirely from an economic and social standpoint. Indeed it is difficult to see how the best interests of the men could be served in any other way.

As regards the primary desire expressed by the Committee to see more men on the land and an increase in the production of food, everyone will agree. But it is impossible to accept as proved the subsequent assumption that if the men can get a 'good living' there will necessarily be greater productivity. Indeed one of the explanations of low productivity at the present time is that men now on the land want to get a good living for themselves rather than to secure the maximum output of food for the nation.

The Committee begin their work by drawing a somewhat arbitrary distinction between 'settlement' on the land and 'employment' on it. By the former term is meant the settlement of men in holdings of their own, whether as proprietors or tenants; by the latter, employment at wages on the holding of another. 'Settlement' is dealt with in the Report now under review; the recommendations of the

Committee on the question of 'employment' have not yet been published.

It will be seen that the meaning of settlement is restricted to small holdings. Thus the essential point involved is the economy, or otherwise, of the small holding as a unit of production. On the question of ownership *versus* tenancy the Committee present an admirable analysis of the arguments, which will carry conviction to most people of the undesirability of any attempt to create a peasant-proprietor class in England. For some reason not given the Committee seem to have excluded from their consideration the possibilities of co-operative occupation.

The main recommendation of the Committee is that power should be given to the Board of Agriculture to acquire land for the settlement of soldiers in small holding colonies. In support of this proposal the Committee quote the Report of the Board of Agriculture for 1909 on the Small Holdings Act to the effect that the establishment of small holdings 'involves the application of more capital and more 'labour than is the case with large occupations, and that it 'will result in more intensive cultivation and greater pro-'ductiveness.' The Small Holdings Act came into operation on the 1st of January 1908, so that any conclusions as to the value of holdings established under it by the end of the year 1909 cannot be very weighty. Putting this on one side, however, and accepting the opinion, which has been repeated in subsequent Reports, it seems a very dangerous generalisation that because the conversion of large farms into small holdings has, in certain cases, led to an increase in the population on the land and greater productiveness, it must follow necessarily that small holdings are more economic units of production than large farms. It is of fundamental importance to get away from sentiment and mere assertion and to test the economics of small holdings by the experience of history and by the analogy of other forms of enterprise. The demand for small holdings seems to ignore all the lessons of history. Every kind of productive enterprise has developed from small beginnings and has never returned to them; the village blacksmith's shop has given place to the foundry; the hand-loom has made way for the cotton mill; the spinning wheel has been supplanted by the mills of Yorkshire; the tenant

of thirty acres has been replaced by the man farming several hundreds ; the village community, more or less self-contained, has grown into the British Empire. In every branch of human enterprise cheap production and maximum production have been synonymous with large-scale production, and yet there is still this assertion that, in agriculture, organisation and management count for nothing, that the clock should be put back a hundred and fifty years, and that substantial English farms should revert to the small holdings from which they have developed.

As a sentimental ideal the peaceful, self-contained village community appeals to everyone. But when we come to hard facts it is undeniable that intellectual and social development have gone hand in hand with industrialism, and that without industrialism not a tithe of our population could be maintained. When England embarked upon industrialism in other forms of production she was necessarily committed to organisation on a similar scale in agriculture. That organisation has been a long time in coming, for the industry is ancient and old institutions change slowly ; indeed, the change can hardly yet be said to have begun, for the 200, 300, 400-acre farms which are so common to-day seldom give adequate scope for the application of industrial methods to agriculture. To show how little the Committee have appreciated the wastefulness of small-scale production in agriculture, it is only necessary to refer to their scheme for the creation of a fruit and market-garden colony. The colony is to be 1000 acres in extent, and it is to provide 112 holdings of four acres each, arranged so that they can expand into the land behind them, which is, in the meantime, to be cultivated as a single holding. In the first place the equipment of this colony involves an expenditure of some £5000 on roads and fences, which would not be required if the land were occupied as one holding ; in other words, the enterprise is saddled with an annual charge of 5s. per acre, exclusive of the cost of maintenance, in respect of unproductive capital invested in roads and fences, which will, moreover, withdraw a very considerable acreage of land from productive occupation. Other items such as drainage, water supply, buildings, even the cottages themselves, will entail an expenditure largely in excess of that which would be necessary if this equipment

were centralised instead of being spread round the whole estate.

An equally important disadvantage of small holdings arises in connexion with finance. In financing his business the small producer encounters difficulties which are unknown to the large farmer. The great majority of small agriculturists know nothing whatever about banking—they have no bank accounts ; nor would they have any idea of stating their case for a loan in a form which would be acceptable to the local manager of a joint-stock bank. They therefore apply to men who know them, and whom they know, when they want credit ; they pay the cake merchant for the winter cake supply after the following harvest ; they get the local auctioneer, or cattle dealer, to send them live-stock, which is paid for when it is sold again ; and so they finance themselves in a variety of subterranean and irregular ways with which most people are familiar. They do get credit, but they get it in the wrong way, and pay very dearly for it. The large farmer usually knows nothing of this difficulty. His bank account is an index of the nature and extent of his business, and in his own neighbourhood his character and stability are matters of common knowledge, so that large sums are readily advanced by his bank, by way of over-draft, on personal security. A great variety of plans have been framed to get over the difficulty of financing the small holder, but none of them have appealed either to the banks or to their prospective customers, and co-operative credit is practically non-existent in this country. The Committee propose to solve the difficulty by the creation of co-operative credit banks in connexion with their suggested small-holding colonies, backed with a guarantee of solvency from the State. Doubtless this would meet the difficulty so far as the small holders are concerned, but the demand for a State guarantee is itself an admission of the economic unsoundness of small holdings. It may fairly be asked why the State should guarantee the debts of the small farmer and not those of the small butcher or baker.

Turning to the management of the land, the same limitations in economic development are to be anticipated. The colony is to be a fruit and vegetable colony ; but if, as proposed, it is divided into little holdings, the use of machinery for

cultivating the land, for washing and spraying trees and crops, and for other purposes, would be largely impossible. It is suggested that co-operation will remedy this defect, and certainly it can do a great deal, but co-operation will not enable a power fruit-tree sprayer to pass in and out of a series of 112 plots fenced off from one another, and scattered over a thousand acres, for the same cost at which it would go up and down one large plantation; indeed, it is doubtful whether power sprayers could be employed at all, and there must inevitably be a good deal of difficulty, if not of heart-burning, where 112 men are using this and other instruments of husbandry in common.

Again, when it is a question of marketing the produce of the land, the small growers once more reveal their economic weakness. The Committee suggest that the difficulties which confront isolated small holders in the disposal of small consignments of produce, irregular in quality and put on the market at irregular intervals, can be got over by providing a central depot for the grading, packing, and sale on a co-operative basis of the fruit and vegetables from the whole colony. This would certainly supply the solution as between individual small cultivators and small-holding colonies; but it must be remembered that the same organisation is possible on the large farm, whilst a considerable saving of expense could also be effected. Imagine, for example, the unproductive labour involved in sending round from holding to holding to pick up produce, all of which must be kept separate and distinct for identification at one depot; imagine the additional burden of book-keeping at the depot to keep track of the goods from 112 consignors. Again, the small producer, even assisted by co-operative organisation, is shut off from certain markets. The Committee refer to the evidence put before them as to the occurrence of gluts in the markets for vegetables and fruit. Possibly these gluts are due largely, as stated by the Committee, to faulty organisation, but they are nevertheless facts which must be faced. Now, if the large producer is disappointed in his market for ten acres of sprouting broccoli planted out in the hope of high prices for kitchen greens in the spring, he can eat his crop off with sheep and market it in the form of mutton. Moreover, his ten acres are only an incident in his whole production. To the man

with a four-acre plot a direct sale is vital; his half-acre of broccoli represents one-eighth of his produce, and if there is no market for it, he has to face a total loss. Pigs are useful scavengers on a small holding, but a few pigs would not make much impression on half an acre of sprouting broccoli running to seed under an April sun, and the idea of a co-operative flock of sheep working round the 112 plots would be absurd.

In connexion with this question of marketing the Committee remark that 'the disparity between the retail prices paid for 'market-garden produce in the big towns and the small portion 'of those prices received by the growers is utterly indefensible. 'It demonstrates a degree of economic waste which would 'ruin any other industry.' No figures are available to show what proportion of the cost of production of articles of food is attributable to the cost of distribution. Certainly our methods are wasteful. The street in which the writer lives contains ten houses, and each day four milk-carts, three bakers' carts, three grocers' carts, and two butchers' carts deliver food to them. Twelve men, horses, and carts, not to mention a host of errand-boys on foot and on cycles, to deliver food to ten families! While we are content with such a loose organisation of distribution as this represents we must not wonder if the prices received by producers seem disproportionate to those paid by consumers, particularly when the produce partakes of the nature of market-garden stuff, bulky, perishable, and of low value. But is there any evidence that this weakness is peculiar to agriculture? The processes by which a yard of calico makes its way from a Lancashire mill into the hands of a London suburban housewife may be relatively as costly as those controlling the movement of a Cornish farmer's broccoli to the same destination.

The disabilities under which the small fruit-grower and market gardener labour are felt with equal force in the other types of small production advocated by the Committee. The dairy holding of twenty-five acres may give a fair living to a man, with good luck, but it is not an economic unit of production. To give change of pasturage there must be little fields, cut up by hedges wasteful of ground, wasteful of labour, and harbouring weeds and vermin. The hay-stacks are all tops and sides. Moreover, the difficulty of grading up

the quality of the dairy herd is enormously increased when there are only the half-dozen animals of a small capitalist to deal with, and whilst the losses from death may be partially met by a scheme of co-operative insurance, the small dairyman has no protection from the ravages of disease, such as tuberculosis, and more particularly contagious abortion, which may easily ruin him in the course of a few months.

The occupant of the fifty-acre arable holding is in a like position. His holding is not big enough to keep a pair of horses busy, whilst being too big for any other form of cultivation; he cannot employ machinery; his various corn crops are not sufficient for a full day's threshing, for which nevertheless he will have to pay; and even though he may get a good living in certain districts, such as in a potato-growing district, he is always at a disadvantage compared with his larger neighbour.

There is reason to doubt whether the Committee themselves were able to establish clearly in their minds what is the proper position of the small holder in our rural economy. It might be inferred from the passage already quoted in their Report that they had satisfied themselves that small holdings, properly organised, should be the national ideal. But later they state that:

> 'One of the principal objects of providing small holdings is to supply an agricultural ladder, so that a man who makes a success of a small allotment may, through the intermediate stage of a small holding, gradually rise until he becomes the tenant of a large farm. . . . What is wanted is an elastic system which will suit the needs of each man at different periods of his life, so that he can increase his occupation, if necessary, when his family is growing up, and reduce it again when they are in a position to take separate holdings for themselves.'

This appears to be in direct conflict with the rest of the Report in that it implies that large farms are the economic unit, and not small holdings, so that the whole elaborate machinery recommended by the Committee depends for its justification upon the chance that here and there a small holder may be found capable, by industry and thrift, of becoming one day a large farmer. The suggestion that a man who has climbed the ladder should proceed to scuttle

down it again as his children grow up does not seem to call for serious discussion.

Let us consider for a moment this question of the agricultural ladder, with a view to determining the proper position of the small holder. The Committee's idea is that a start should be made from an allotment. Now history and experience tell us that agricultural labourers do not want allotments, and that they will only cultivate them under the spur of dire necessity. Probably the earliest allotments were the 'Poor Allotments,' parcels of land allotted to agricultural labourers out of work, as a means of finding subsistence for themselves and their families, and a survey of allotments in many parts of England brings out the fact that all subsequent allotments have been successful in proportion as they have contributed to the same necessity. That is to say, allotments are only cultivated by farm labourers in those districts where the rate of agricultural wages does not reach the minimum on which life can be tolerably supported. That allotments exist in other districts is undeniable, but most of them will be found to be in the hands of the small village tradesmen, and where agricultural labourers are amongst the tenants it is usually because they are occupying cottages without gardens. These facts have been clearly established by a survey of small holdings and allotments* conducted by Mr. A. W. Ashby, of the Institute for Research in Agricultural Economics, Oxford. The investigation shows that where a man climbs from the allotment to the small holding, and from the small holding to the large farm, the early stages frequently have been made possible with the assistance of some subsidiary industry or petty business. During this period, which may last for many years, the cultivator becomes accustomed to making small economies and small cautious investments; in fact, thrift and caution are the key-notes of the management. When the passage is made from the holding of thirty acres or so to a hundred acres or more, the tenant is usually past the prime of life as a worker, his mind is stereotyped by

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* Now in the press. See also P. G. Craigie, 'Size and Distribution of Agricultural Holdings' (*Journal of the Statistical Society*, 1887).

his former cautiousness and frugality, and the effect of his life's experience is to make him a very conservative farmer and unprogressive as a business man. The same qualities that make a man a successful small holder may not make him a good organiser on a large farm although he may crop and stock his land well, and pay his way. While it is essential to be able to hold out some hope of economic and social betterment to farm labourers, this must depend on their getting the greatest possible service from the land. With an extensive development of credit facilities the process of rising from the position of labourer to that of big farmer might become much more rapid, but this would do nothing to enlarge the man's horizon, and farming has suffered too long from managers with a confined experience and limited vision.

The training required to make a successful occupant of a large farm can only be acquired on a large farm, and experience proves that it is the man who has spent all his life in farm service, usually moving about from farm to farm until he rises ultimately to the position of farm-foreman, who makes the best use of the large farm. He will have served under many different masters, possibly in several counties, and he will have become familiar with more than one system of management and more than one market. He is used to handling capital and labour on a large scale, and a transaction which may be a great adventure in the mind of the erstwhile small holder is to him an every-day occurrence. This type of man is most commonly met with in the Midlands and Northern counties, and in Scotland, where the system of hiring gives greater opportunities for saving money. These men would not think of exchanging farm service for small holdings as understood in this Report, and provided that they avoid the mistake of setting up for themselves on an inadequate amount of capital, they make better farm tenants than the man who has derived a progressive experience from small holdings. The writer has in his mind a man who had climbed up the small-holdings ladder until he became the occupier of a farm of 800 acres. This position had been achieved by middle-age by means of hard work and frugality practised to an extraordinary degree. Having taken possession of his 800-acre farm, his only idea of scientific organisation and management was to wander up and down the roads

intersecting it behind his cows. By this means he saved the wages of a boy at 5*s.* per week, his cows obtained a part of their living at no expense to himself from the grass by the roadside, whilst he regulated their wanderings in a manner which enabled him always to overlook his men in the fields to see that at no minute of the day should they relax their efforts on his behalf.

There is indeed no point in which the economic position of the small holder is not inferior to that of the large-scale producer, and there can be no justification on economic grounds for the artificial creation of small holdings by the State or by any other agency. There will always be a few angular individuals to whom service of any kind is intolerable and to whom a holding of their own is the only hope. Apart from the fact that these men form a negligible part of the rural community, there are sufficient small holdings already existing in most places to accommodate them. Even were it otherwise, they are of a type which will work out its own salvation, independent of State aid. *De minimis non curat lex.* The law cannot concern itself with small holdings.

The Committee, however, draw a sharp distinction, which many people will not be able to accept, between ' economic ' reasons ' and ' social grounds,' and putting economic reasons on one side they emphasise the social value of small holdings as a means of increasing the rural population. It is probable that in many parts of the country a development of small-holding colonies would increase the rural population. The successful small holder is usually a man with a large family, for his success depends very much upon the amount of forced labour that he can extract from his children. He is frequently a sweater of the worst description, though it must be admitted that the ill effects of excessive child-labour on small holdings are less apparent than in urban industries, owing to the healthier conditions under which it is performed. Yet the incessant toil that life on a small holding involves is seldom attractive to those who have experienced it. In August last a domestic servant was filling up her registration form. The daughter of a small holder, she could milk, rear calves, manage poultry, feed pigs, etc., but after consideration she decided not to register her skill in these directions, as she felt she could not face a return to the conditions of life under

which her proficiency had been reluctantly acquired. It would be an interesting investigation to trace the ultimate occupations of the sons and daughters of small holders.

The Committee do not refer in their Report to the experiences of small cultivators in Denmark, or in Belgium, in support of their advocacy of small holdings in England. A Belgian Government official, resident in England during the war, who was for some twenty years professor of agriculture in a Belgian University, told the writer that in another fifty years there will be, in all probability, but few small holders in Flanders. Existence is only possible for them when all the energies of the whole family are concentrated without intermission on the work of the holding, and he did not believe that this narrow life could persist in the face of the fuller opportunities of modern existence. For England, he thought, the Colonies would always offer an alternative more attractive to the labourer, added to which Englishmen as a whole seemed to him temperamentally unsuited to the standards of life and labour prevalent amongst the Flemish small farmers, with whom even the smallest child must pay his footing, in the form of grass and dandelion leaves collected by the roadside for the sustenance of an Ostend rabbit !

In spite of these considerations it is undeniable that a demand does exist for small holdings ; the applications to the County Councils have proved it. But before proposing that this demand should be satisfied at the expense of the taxpayer with economic loss to the whole community it is surely wiser to determine the causes leading to it and to find the means by which those causes can be removed. We may put on one side the case of the village tradesman who wants a small holding only as an adjunct to his business. That is a perfectly reasonable demand, and can generally be gratified on sound economic lines without any help from the State or County Councils. The real test is the case of the agricultural labourer who wants a small holding in the hope of getting his whole living from it The demand in this case undoubtedly arises from the impatience which an intelligent labourer must feel with long service at low wages under an indifferent farmer. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that farmers must be held responsible in a large degree for the unsatisfactory position of the rural worker.

Wages are fixed mainly by competition between industries or between the employers in an industry. Where agriculture has to compete with other forms of industry, wages are higher than in purely rural districts, in which a kind of freemasonry amongst farmers has always regulated the labourer's remuneration. The consequences have been disadvantageous both for employers and employed. The labourer has been discouraged and has sought other outlets for his labour, whilst the farmer has suffered in his production by the relative inefficiency of the labour left at his disposal. In the winter before the war a farmer was complaining of the action of a certain landlord in his neighbourhood, who farms on a very large scale, in raising the wages of his labourers without first of all consulting with the tenant farmers of the district. On inquiry it proved that the wages on this estate had been raised from 12*s.* to 13*s.* per week. This reluctance to give labour its fair reward may be accounted for in a measure by the experiences of farmers in the days of the depression, when the only lesson they learned was the need for cutting down expenses. But it is bad organisation and false economy not to make the conditions of labour sufficiently attractive to retain the services of the best men for the industry, and the desire for small holdings may fairly be regarded as an expression of a feeling of resentment in the men against unfair conditions of service, coupled with the conviction in many cases that the land on which they work is not being fully employed, and that, given equal opportunity, they could make it more productive.

It ought to be possible to satisfy the demand for fuller opportunities on the land, whether it springs from the farm labourer or from soldiers and sailors on demobilisation, without resorting to schemes which cannot be justified on economic grounds. In their Report the Committee are most emphatic on the need for better organisation in the agricultural industry, and the importance of the point cannot be urged too strongly. It is too commonly assumed that good farming is merely a matter of technical skill combined with a certain amount of scientific knowledge. It is frequently argued, too, that good farming is impossible in conjunction with bad markets, and that the attempt to increase the production of wheat, or of some other commodity, in the face of low prices is not

justified. But the soundness of this argument clearly rests on the assumption that it is impossible to introduce more economical methods of production, using that term in its widest sense to include both the purchase of materials and the sale of products. Much stress is laid by timid farmers and their advisers on the agricultural depression of the 'eighties. That depression was caused by the failure to realise the coming effect of railway development in new countries. No management can be considered efficient, however great the technical skill, which is not also based on a consideration of the probable course of events. Had there been an organisation of landlords or farmers, whose business it was to study world markets and world production, it is not too much to say that a large part of the loss and suffering experienced in the 'eighties and 'nineties of last century might have been avoided, for much could have been done to foresee the course of events and to direct production into the channels most likely to be remunerative in the future. In the absence of any organisation of this kind to assist them in their agricultural development, landlords and farmers drifted along to disaster, and Cobden received posthumous blame for a catastrophe which was the natural outcome of the disregard of economic laws.

Farm management in this sense is still far from having received the recognition to which it is entitled, for it is of fundamental importance. That the Committee recognise this is indicated by the careful consideration which they have evidently given to the subject in connexion with their proposed small-holding colonies. Their scheme provides for a skilled director, of good business capacity, whose duty it will be to organise the whole enterprise for maximum production, having regard to market requirements. Study of the markets is specially mentioned by the Committee, and the importance of scientific book-keeping with a view to the determination of the cost of production is very strongly urged. Then it is suggested that there should be practical instructors in every branch of production developed on the holding. All these men are to receive a good salary or wage. Co-operative buying organisations are to be developed, both for agriculture and for the every-day requirements of the colonists; the sale of produce is to be centralised; in fact co-operation and scientific organisation are to be extended in every direction—

except in that of the occupation of land. For some reason which cannot even be conjectured, the Committee did not consider co-operation in land tenure. The colony is to start as a large co-operative enterprise, the men drawing wages as labourers while gaining proficiency in their task. As soon as they have learnt their work, and are beginning to realise the value and the possibilities of co-operative organisation for production, the whole principle is to be thrown to the winds, co-operation is to go by the board, and each man is to become an individualist, a law unto himself on his own little patch of ground.

The writer has attempted to show the weakness inherent in small holdings. Granted that the scheme of the Committee would enable the men to get a living, the conditions of life can hardly fail to be so hard as to discourage all but the most determined. The Committee appear to realise the probability of this, for they lay great stress on the amount of assistance the small holder must get from his wife if their enterprise is to succeed, but many people will feel that the wife has achieved all that should be desired of her if she can claim to have managed her home efficiently. Agricultural labourers more familiar with the conditions may put up with them for the sake of their independence, but it is to be feared that those amongst the discharged sailors and soldiers whose earlier experiences have been derived from the warehouse or the factory will give up the hard fight for success, in disappointment and disgust.

It is, however, worth considering whether the organisation sketched out by the Committee could not be applied to the establishment of agricultural colonies on a truly co-operative basis. It is absolutely essential that agriculture should be developed on a large scale if it is to give the best return to the worker and the greatest amount of food to the nation. The Committee suggest the purchase of estates up to 2000 acres in extent. To fix any particular acreage for the big farm is unnecessary. But given a sufficiently large area under the control of a competent director, assisted by equally competent departmental managers, and run as a co-operative enterprise right through, paying the men a decent wage, and distributing the surplus profits proportionately between the management and labour, the objects which

the Committee have in view should stand a much better chance of realisation.

Skilled management and efficient organisation would lead to greater production, and the consequent demand for more labour would guarantee the closer settlement of the land. Greater chances would be afforded to the workers, for instead of being jacks-of-all-trades they would have opportunities for specialisation along lines which proved most attractive to them, and with this would go a more liberal scale of pay. In fact, there would be more skilled men and fewer general labourers, and the agricultural ladder would be provided in its best form, for the openings available at the heads of the various departments would be sufficient for the small proportion of the men who showed themselves capable of rising to positions of responsibility. Having gained their experience on a large farm, with all the advantages afforded by abundance of capital, the utilisation of labour-saving appliances, and skilled organisation in every direction, they would be able to turn their opportunities to better account than would be possible in the case of the man who had climbed by means of small holdings to be the tenant of a fair-sized farm. In the fuller life of a great enterprise it is probable that the dissatisfaction felt by so many labourers with their present condition, which finds its expression in the desire for small holdings and independence, would be removed, and we should have a rural community contented and prosperous because based upon the only sure foundation, namely good business.

As a separate branch of their Report the Committee make various proposals for the establishment of small holdings by County Councils. They appear to attach no importance to the want of enthusiasm displayed by most County Councils in administering the existing Small Holdings Act, and only regard this reluctance as an obstacle to be removed. They recognise that it is largely due to the fear that losses may be incurred, and one might have supposed that they would draw the conclusion that such a general feeling of apprehension throughout the country as to the soundness of the small-holding movement was itself an argument against that movement. Instead, the Committee cheerfully accept the possibility of loss, and suggest amendments to the machinery

of the Act so as to facilitate the payment of one-half of the losses by the State, in the expectation that it will cause the County Councils to launch out in speculations upon which they are unwilling to embark on their own responsibility. It is difficult to harmonise this proposal with the firm declaration by the Committee of their belief in the social and economic value of small holdings already established under the Act. If the existing County Council small holdings have been so brilliantly successful, one is puzzled to understand why it should be necessary to set up machinery to protect the Councils against losses which, in the view of the Committee, will never be made.

One other detail which calls for notice is the recommendation that buildings erected under the Small Holdings Act with the approval of the Board of Agriculture should be exempted from local by-laws. There is a strong feeling throughout the country that the local by-laws impose unnecessary restrictions on cheap building. This opinion was constantly expressed a year or two ago, when the question of the provision of more cottages in rural districts was before the public, and it has also been raised in connexion with pigsties in the Reports of the English and Scottish Committees appointed last year to consider how to increase the production of home-grown food. The building by-laws in rural districts are generally based on the model by-laws of the Local Government Board, and it must not be forgotten that their object is to defeat the jerry-builder and to safeguard the public health. But there is little doubt that they are unnecessarily exacting in their requirements, and foolish in many of their details. This, however, is not a matter which concerns small holders only. It may be suggested that a joint committee of representatives of the Board of Agriculture and of the Local Government Board should be appointed to draw up a new set of model by-laws, so that the question may be settled as broadly as possible, instead of being attacked piecemeal.

In considering the difficult case of ex-Service men who have been partially disabled in the service of the State, the Committee make recommendations for training them for employment on the land. This proposal is eminently sound. We owe a special debt to these men, and it is of the utmost importance that they should not be allowed, by their partial disability,

to drift into precarious ways of life. Very many of them should be particularly suited for a life on the land, but once more it must be asserted that employment on a large farm would give them far more scope and opportunity than could be found on any small holding. Unconsciously, perhaps, the Committee themselves seem to conceive this, for in the list of occupations for which partially disabled men should be suitable they give prominence to shepherding, management of live-stock, turnip-hoeing, hay-making, harvest work and threshing, and the use and repair of agricultural machinery, none of which suggest themselves very particularly in connexion with small holdings.

The Committee seem to be of the opinion that a very active propaganda will be required to bring their small-holdings scheme to the notice of a sufficient number of men. They recommend that the Board of Agriculture should arrange with the Admiralty and War Office for a distribution of literature amongst the troops on active service, and that representatives of the Board should visit naval and military hospitals, convalescent camps, etc. Further, that the help of the various associations for the employment of soldiers, and of regimental societies, should be enlisted in the same work. The Committee instance the well-known methods employed by the Colonial Governments for securing colonists, and refer to the attractive pamphlets issued by them, which, they suggest, our Board should imitate. Most of us are familiar with the Arcadian pictures on these pamphlets, in which attractive young men and women stand about in cornfields or orchards, whilst in the distance somebody else appears to be doing the work of the holding; many of us have heard the comments made on these advertisements by the colonists whom they have deluded. It is most desirable that strenuous effort should be made to keep our best men at home, and that nothing should be left undone to this end. But work is work, and the idea of the ' attractive pamphlet ' is a very dangerous one, particularly in connexion with a scheme for the creation of small holdings. Apart from this it may occasion some surprise that the Committee should consider that there would be such a real need for this campaign to ' boom ' their scheme. Under the most favourable conditions it is difficult to see how they can hope to settle more than two or three men from

every battalion, and one would have thought that this limit would be reached without any advertising campaign. The danger is that the proposals of the advertising agents would prove attractive to too many men, and that the difficult and delicate situation which the provision of employment may occasion after the war, would only be aggravated if many thousands of the returning soldiers were to get it into their heads that there was employment waiting for them on Government farms, with the prospect of fully-equipped holdings of their own a few years ahead of them.

In considering the Report of the Committee the big question of whether State action is called for at all has not been treated. It is conceivable that the State might set itself to demonstrate to farmers in various parts of the country what is possible by means of better organisation, better finance, and better management. Such an object lesson would have the greatest educational value. But if the State is to embark upon any such educational work its plans must be based upon a very sure economic foundation.

C. S. Orwin.

THE CONTROL OF VENEREAL DISEASES

Report of the Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases. Cd. 8189. 1916.

THE issue of the final Report of the Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases is an event of national importance, deserving the attention of all well-wishers of humanity, even in the stress and strain of a world-war. It may be doubted whether even this war at its finish will have shortened a larger number of lives, and decreased the physical and mental efficiency of a larger number of persons, than have venereal diseases during a single generation. Nor is there any more promising field of work for rapidly restoring our national efficiency and for healing the ravages of war than is to be found in adopting to the fullest extent the chief administrative measures proposed in the thirty-five recommendations in which the members of the Royal Commission have summarised the practical results of their deliberation.

The Commission was formed in November 1913 under the able chairmanship of Lord Sydenham of Combe. Among its members were Sir Kenelm Digby, G.C.B., Sir Almeric Fitzroy, K.C.B., and Dr. Arthur Newsholme, C.B., representing various Government Departments; Mrs. Burgwin and Mrs. Creighton, with Mrs. Scharlieb, M.D., representing the supreme interest of women in the problem; Canon Horsley and Dr. Scott Lidgett, representing religious communities; Mr. Philip Snowden, M.P.; and Sir Malcolm Morris, K.C.V.O., Sir John Collie, Mr. Lane, and Dr. Mott, F.R.S., representing the medical profession and pathology.

The Report of the Commission is in harmony with the growing feeling of the educated, and particularly of the medical, public, that further efforts are urgently needed to prevent the spread of venereal diseases. Already by preventive measures we have secured the abolition of typhus fever, the rapid decline and impending almost complete abolition of enteric fever, far-reaching control over smallpox, the reduction of tuberculosis and of child mortality. There

is no reason why venereal diseases, and especially syphilis (great pox), should not become as rare in this country as is smallpox.

There are two chief venereal diseases, gonorrhœa and syphilis.

Until recently gonorrhœa has been regarded with some degree of complacency as a relatively mild disease. 'It 'has, in reality, serious and far-reaching consequences,' for an enumeration of which page 26 of the Royal Commission's Report should be studied. In women it is frequently followed by a condition of permanent semi-invalidity, and it is perhaps the commonest cause of sterility. It also has a cruel effect upon new-born infants. Gonorrhœa in the mother, commonly acquired by her innocently from the father, infects the infant's eyelids during the act of birth, and unless active and energetic steps are taken total loss of eyesight may result. Between a fourth and a third of all the cases of blindness in children are due to this one cause. The saving of the present expenditure by the community on the special education of these children and on their support through life would alone go far towards covering the cost involved in organising the control of venereal diseases.

The effects of syphilis are more complex and numerous than those of gonorrhœa, and its remote results extend beyond the patient to the next generation. In this sense it is inherited, though the inheritance consists not in any given habit of body tissues, but in actual transmission of the germs of the disease from parent to child. Some idea of the subtlety of this insidious infection may be gathered from the fact that the innocent child may suffer up to adult life from disease which has been transmitted from husband to wife, and conveyed to the offspring by the latter, while she herself may never have displayed obvious signs of syphilitic disease.

There is no tissue of the body which may not be invaded by the virus of syphilis, transmitted by the blood from the original site of infection. So much is this the case that the clinical medicine of any part of the body may be taught to a medical student in terms of syphilis and its consequential diseases. The primary sore or chancre occurring in syphilis is followed later by skin eruptions, by general anæmia, falling of the hair, and diffused or localised inflammation which

may attack any part of the body, but commonly the heart and arteries, liver, lungs, bones, and the brain and spinal cord. Serious bone disease with nasal deformity often owes its origin to syphilis. ' A man is as old as his arteries,' and syphilis is thus commonly the cause of premature old age, by causing arterial disease between the ages of thirty and fifty.

But perhaps the most startling effects of syphilis are produced on the nervous system. Fatal brain disease in middle life is often due to the syphilitic virus. Locomotor ataxy is a very frequent late result of syphilis, and general paralysis of the insane is always due to syphilis. The Royal Commission reports that in the case of males 14 to 15 per cent. of the admissions to the asylums of London and of other large cities are due to syphilis, and in the case of females 2 to 3 per cent.

In most cases syphilis is acquired, as is also gonorrhœa, during sexual congress. This is not always so. It may be acquired by kissing or by intimate contact with infected materials. There is much more ' innocent syphilis ' (*syphilis insontium*) in addition to inherited syphilis than is commonly supposed. Syphilis has been known to be communicated for instance to a number of workmen from using in glass works a blow-pipe which had previously been used by a workman having a syphilitic lesion in his mouth. Perhaps this consideration will lead the minority of subscribers to voluntary hospitals, who still appear to think that treatment of this disease in these hospitals implies a condonation of sin, to revise their judgment, lest their action should mean the neglect of treatment and the destruction of the health of ' innocent ' and ' guilty ' alike.

This consideration is still further emphasised by the facts as to congenital syphilis. Were not these demonstrated by indubitable evidence, they might be regarded as too strange and too terrible to be true. Congenital syphilis is perhaps best studied in the history of selected syphilitic families, examples of which were supplied to the Commission by Dr. Mott. He found that in the case of 34 syphilitic mothers 175 pregnancies were followed by only 30 ' apparently healthy ' children, leaving 104 premature births, still births, or deaths in infancy, and 41 ' seriously diseased ' offspring. It cannot

be assumed that the 30 apparently healthy children were really so; for, unhappily, syphilis may develop its symptoms some months after birth, and its later manifestations may continue to the fifteenth or twentieth year of life, or even later. One need not fill in the details of the picture of congenital disease. The infant who, as the result of syphilis, has been born dead or dies in early infancy, must be considered fortunate; for the unfortunate survivor may suffer from defective eyesight or blindness, from nerve deafness, from meningitis, hydrocephalus, or various other diseases.

Of 1100 children in metropolitan schools for the blind, it is estimated that about one-third are blind from syphilis; and a large proportion of acquired deafness in children is due to the same cause.

Syphilis cannot be traced with certainty in Europe before the fifteenth century; but from that period it has been well recognised, sometimes spreading—commonly in connexion with great movements of population—to an extent which made it assume an epidemic form. In the earlier days its mode of spreading was scarcely recognised, and the theory that it could spread by distant aerial convection gained support—especially as the disease occurred among a celibate priesthood, whose reputation for sexual morality needed protection. Gradually, however, its usual association with irregular sexual intercourse became recognised.

The first step to the discovery of the specific organism of syphilis was taken about twelve years ago, when Metchnikoff and Roux succeeded in inoculating anthropoid apes with syphilis. Soon afterwards, in 1905, Schaudinn and Hoffmann published a paper in which they claimed that a protozoon, the *spirochaeta pallida*, is the specific organism of syphilis. Their conclusion has been confirmed by workers in many lands. More recently the Japanese worker Noguchi—subsequently confirmed by Dr. Mott in this country—discovered the *spirochaeta pallida* in the brains of persons dying of general paralysis of the insane, thus proving that syphilis is an essential part of this awful disease, and that it is not merely an after-result due to the tissue degeneration produced by the spirochæte. Deaths from general paralysis of the insane commonly occur between the ages of forty-five and fifty-five,

not infrequently twenty or thirty years after the original infection with syphilis—a terrible penalty to follow a youthful indiscretion.

The discovery of the spirochæte was followed by the discovery of the bio-chemical blood test, commonly known as the Wassermann or serum reaction, by means of which the presence or absence of syphilitic infection in the system can easily be determined. This test has opened out possibilities of successful treatment for a large amount of previously obscure disease.

The last stage in scientific discovery bearing on syphilis was the experimental work of Ehrlich, which resulted in the discovery of '606' or salvarsan. This is an arseno-benzol compound, which has a remarkable selective germicidal effect on the spirochæte of syphilis, causing the rapid disappearance of all the symptoms of the disease. Whether actual cure is produced when the drug is given *secundum artem* still remains to be proved; but this is certain, that salvarsan undoubtedly secures more rapid abolition of symptoms than any other treatment known to the medical confraternity. Patients who have been treated by it have no doubt at the time that they are cured. Even though, in some instances, symptoms may recur at a later period, the facts stand out that superficial lesions disappear, that before their disappearance *dead* spirochætes can be demonstrated in them, and that the patient ceases for a time to be infectious. Conceivably he may some time afterwards, perhaps in married life, convey infection; but for the time being he is deprived of that dangerous power. This represents an enormous gain. Moreover, temporary disinfection having been secured, watch can be kept on the patient by means of the Wassermann test, and thus permanent disinfection and cure can be ensured.

The evidence collected by the Royal Commission shows that other compounds closely allied to salvarsan, which have recently been manufactured, are also efficient in the treatment of syphilis.

Gonorrhœa, like syphilis, is due to infection by a micro-organism, but this organism is a bacterium and not a protozoon. Called the gonococcus, it was discovered in 1879 by Neisser; but unfortunately there has not been found, as in syphilis, a drug or drugs which can be re-

garded as specifically curative for gonorrhœa. This is particularly unfortunate in view of the fact that the disease when apparently cured may remain quiescent for long periods, capable of being transmitted at intervals by a person who himself or herself is suffering from little or no physical inconvenience.

An attempt was made by the Royal Commission to obtain precise statistical information of the prevalence of the disease, but for fairly obvious reasons the information obtainable is incomplete. Statistics of the Registrar-General of Births and Deaths are based upon death certificates given by medical practitioners, who cannot reasonably be expected to tell the whole truth until confidential registration of the causes of death is secured. This was advocated by Dr. Stevenson, of the General Register Office, and approved by the Royal Commission. Even this reform would not cover the case of a person dying of arterial or other disease which may or may not owe its origin to syphilitic infection.

The Navy and Army statistics relate only to a limited though most important body of men. They show, from the middle of the 'eighties of last century onwards, an extremely satisfactory decline in the amount of venereal disease. Poor Law medical statistics are notoriously defective, and admittedly grave doubt attaches to the figures giving the number of patients in Poor Law institutions stated to be suffering from venereal diseases.

Prison statistics are more precise. Of 694 prisoners examined in a prison containing able-bodied prisoners, nearly 14 per cent. showed signs of having suffered from syphilis. It is even more striking that, among the 941 occupants of Borstal institutions containing young prisoners between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one, especially selected as likely to become habitual prisoners, over 16 per cent. presented one or more signs of congenital syphilis, while in addition there were five cases of acquired syphilis.

The lunacy statistics, perhaps more clearly than any other, give evidence of the mischief wrought by syphilis. During the five years 1908–12, 5352 males and 1028 females suffering from general paralysis of the insane were admitted as paupers into asylums in England and Wales. Of this number 5805 were aged twenty-five to fifty-four years, giving a rate of

7·12 per 1000 of the general population of the country at these ages for males and of 1·23 for females.

In the hope of securing some more accurate measure of the prevalence of syphilis in the community the Commission initiated two inquiries, the results of which are very interesting as throwing some light on the prevalence of syphilis among apparently healthy sections of the population of London. Sir John Collie arranged for the examination of men who were candidates for various semi-industrial or industrial posts under public bodies. These were divided into three groups. The first two groups comprised 1119 men disabled by accident or illness, and 557 men apparently in good health, who were subjected to examination as a condition of employment. Examination of the 1676 in these two groups revealed sixty cases, or nearly 3·6 per cent., of venereal disease among these men. A third group of 491 men, apparently in perfect health, were subjected to the more rigid Wassermann test, which was performed under the direction of Dr. Mott. Among these 46, or 9·4 per cent., gave a positive Wassermann reaction. It is significant that, of the total 491 men thus examined, 103 who had been in the Army or Navy were shown by the Wassermann test to have been infected to the extent of 18·9 per cent. as compared with 6 per cent. among the civilians. In another inquiry Dr. Fildes summarised the results of 1005 Wassermann tests made on patients attending the London Hospital. These patients were especially selected as having come to the hospital for treatment for reasons wholly unconnected with syphilis. The general results were as follows : of 616 males examined 10·3 per cent., and of 389 females examined 5·1 per cent., gave a positive result.

There is statistical evidence to show that, as might be anticipated, syphilis is essentially a town disease, and that such consequential diseases as general paralysis, locomotor ataxy, and aneurism closely follow syphilis in their relative order of distribution in different communities. County boroughs have a higher mortality under each of these headings than the smaller towns, and these than rural districts

The Commissioners in their Report animadvert severely, but not too severely, on their failure to obtain satisfactory answers to questions sent by them to the voluntary hospitals of the United Kingdom, asking for returns of incidence of

venereal disease in hospital practice. From 285 hospitals only 67 replies to the request for detailed information were received. It was evident that in the majority of these voluntary hospitals adequate records for statistical purposes were not kept ; and public opinion will, we have no doubt, endorse the remark in the Report that it is ' highly unsatisfactory that ' these institutions, which are maintained from funds of a ' semi-public nature, should be unable to furnish precise ' information respecting the diseases with which they deal, ' and we trust this important question will receive the serious ' attention of the managing bodies.'

In summing up the available evidence as to the prevalence of venereal diseases in the general population of this country, the Commission quote the opinion of Sir William Osler that ' of the killing diseases syphilis comes third or fourth ' ; and they state their opinion that ' the number of persons who ' have been infected with syphilis, acquired or congenital, ' cannot fall below 10 per cent. of the whole population in ' the large cities, and the percentage affected with gonorrhœa ' must greatly exceed this proportion.' This statement is admittedly formulated on imperfect data, but it is not likely that it errs on the side of over-statement of the magnitude of the evil under consideration.

Venereal diseases form a scourge which, with the possible exception of tuberculosis and cancer, in time of peace is chief among the Captains of Death and Disease. In war the ravages of venereal diseases form an even more serious calamity. Large numbers of our soldiers are rendered inefficient for considerable periods by these diseases, and this to an extent which seriously handicaps our military position. So far no recent figures as to the amount of these diseases among our troops have been published ; but it is well known that the amount is serious, and that in several parts of the country there are large hospitals which contain no patients except venereal patients.

The statistics of the Army during peace-time give some conception of the serious mischief which almost certainly is now being caused. In the year 1888 in the United Kingdom the sickness due to venereal disease was equivalent to one soldier out of fifty-five constantly ill. In that year venereal diseases caused 41 per cent. of total military sickness. In the

year 1912 the sickness due to venereal disease corresponded to one soldier in 182 constantly ill, venereal disease forming 28 per cent. of the total illness. This shows a gratifying improvement. It is probable that under war conditions there is proportionately less venereal disease than in peace-time, though the following remark in the Report of the Commission does not fully support this view :

'There is no reason to believe that the percentage of infection in the naval and military forces is now greater than in normal times ; but there can be no doubt that the total of infected persons has increased.'

If it be assumed that the sickness from venereal disease is now only 1 per 200 soldiers, and that the total soldiers in the United Kingdom are two millions, there are 10,000 men constantly disabled from a cause which is preventible and which ought to be prevented. If it be assumed that the cost for each of these patients does not exceed £2 weekly, and no allowance be made for the monetary loss apart from hospital treatment, and the still more serious military loss involved in the constant disablement of a steady succession of 10,000 men, it follows that this country is losing a million sterling per annum in the treatment of a disease among its soldiers which need not occur.

What measures are proposed to combat this great cause of national and of military inefficiency ?

All the evidence points to the extreme importance of early recognition of the nature of the disease, especially in the case of syphilis, in order that treatment may be given before the spirochæte has passed into the circulation. There is no doubt, for instance, that if early treatment were given general paralysis of the insane and other forms of insanity caused by syphilis would certainly be avoided. The prevalence of these serious nervous diseases implies unsatisfactory treatment, often due to failure to recognise the nature of the initial disease.

One serious impediment to successful treatment is the resort of patients to unqualified practitioners, such as chemists and druggists and medical herbalists. A well-qualified practitioner, having had experience of venereal disease, can usually recognise it even in its slighter manifestations without

further assistance. To assist doctors who have not had this experience, and for diagnosing obscure cases which occur in the practice of every doctor, it is essential that pathological aids to diagnosis should be available and should be used. Many patients, for obvious reasons, decline to go to their own doctor. Therefore it is imperative to provide treatment centres, and to make these centres of such a character that they will be readily resorted to where the need arises.

As regards resort to unqualified persons and the employment of quack remedies, much detailed evidence is given in a Parliamentary Paper issued in 1910 (Cd. 5422). It is there stated that in many of the great towns the treatment of venereal diseases is largely in the hands of unqualified persons. There can be no doubt as to the resulting mischief. The disease is wrongly diagnosed, there is delay in adequate treatment, and the disease is frequently communicated to others, owing to the absence of advice as to preventive measures. Much of the evidence before the recent Commission was to the effect that syphilis usually did not come under treatment until secondary or tertiary symptoms had developed, and constitutional infection was thoroughly established. Dr. Johnstone, a medical inspector of the Local Government Board, who made a valuable report on venereal diseases to that Board just before the work of the recent Commission began (Cd. 7029, 1913), stated that medical men in various towns informed him that they were rarely consulted until the patient had spent some weeks in the hands of a herbalist or chemist, or in trying some advertised cure.

The Royal Commission do not propose any direct action in regard to unqualified practice. Doubtless they have refrained from doing so because of the thorny character of the problem, and the apparent impracticability of securing, so far in advance of public opinion, the legislation which would be required to secure practical reform. They content themselves with strongly endorsing the recommendations of the Select Committee on Patent Medicines that all advertisements of remedies for venereal diseases should be prohibited.

That by itself will of course effect very little, nor is anything to be gained by suppressing the unqualified practitioner unless provision is made for skilled treatment by qualified

doctors. The Report of the Commission lays stress on the need for further medical training in relation to venereal diseases. Some witnesses, especially those largely engaged in the treatment of syphilis, urged the desirability of making syphilis a subject on which there must be a special compulsory course of instruction, in addition to the general training of a medical man. Whether by this means or otherwise, it is to be hoped that the medical schools will take the necessary steps, as enjoined by the Commission, to secure that each student has adequate instruction in these diseases.

For a large proportion of the cases of venereal disease pathological assistance is necessary to secure early diagnosis, satisfactory treatment, and a subsequent examination to determine whether the infection has ceased or not. The Commission recommend that such a pathological service should be organised, and that in connexion with it the fullest use should be made of the laboratory facilities of universities and hospitals.

In the Civil Service Estimates for 1914–15 a sum of £50,000 was voted to assist in the provision of laboratory facilities 'with a view to the prevention, diagnosis, and 'treatment of disease in general.' This was intended to be a grant-in-aid of the provision of pathological laboratories by county and county borough councils; but the war put a temporary stop to the carrying out of these proposals.

In addition to drawing attention to the insufficient training of many medical practitioners, the Report of the Commission further states that there is evidence that 'medical practitioners 'frequently do not adequately emphasise to their patients 'the importance of continuing systematic treatment, and 'do not explain sufficiently the risk to the patient himself, 'and to his wife and children, involved in neglect of such 'treatment.' For roughly one-third of the population of the United Kingdom, the panel doctor under the National Insurance Act is responsible for the treatment of venereal disease, in so far as this can be properly undertaken by a general practitioner of ordinary professional competence and skill. There is some difference of opinion as to whether the administration of salvarsan can be regarded as coming within the above definition; but there can be little doubt that the treatment of syphilis by the panel doctor will

need to be supplemented by treatment at special treatment centres.

The Poor Law treatment of venereal disease is inadequate and commonly unsatisfactory; and the deterrent influence of Poor Law regulations is for the majority of patients contrary to the first principle of success in the treatment of these diseases.

Much good work has been done in voluntary hospitals in the treatment of venereal diseases; but all the evidence points to the conclusion that this is limited in extent, and at present does not do more than touch the fringe of public needs. These hospitals freely treat the later manifestations of syphilis and the diseases consequential both upon it and upon gonorrhœa; but the prejudice against the treatment of venereal disease in its earlier stages is still widespread; it is even contrary to the statutes of some hospitals to admit venereal disease as such into their wards. Apparently it is feared that the subscribers to these hospitals would drop their subscriptions if they knew that venereal diseases were being treated in them.

Undoubtedly many otherwise kindly people still regard the provision of facilities for treatment of venereal diseases as a condonation of the original sexual offence to which the disease is assumed to be due. This is a question of crucial importance. Even were it true that all venereal disease is due to immoral conduct, that none is inherited, none innocently acquired, it would still be difficult to understand how any thoughtful and humane person could deliberately prefer that mankind should continue to suffer from these terrible diseases rather than that a sinner should be speedily cured. The experience of the world proves conclusively that in no country has the dread of venereal disease ever prevented the existence of irregular sexual relationships. Few people who are able to look facts in the face can hold the belief that the world will ever reach a stage when the rules of monogamy are strictly and universally observed. But if that stage should ever be reached, it is certain that the change will be due to moral causes, not to a materialistic fear of specific diseases. Do the people who refuse to 'condone vice' really think that it is justifiable to allow the race to be saturated with syphilis while waiting for an epoch of universal purity? The moment

we look at the problem squarely it becomes clear that we must take measures to free our country from these hideous but preventible diseases, even though a contingent penalty for vice may thereby disappear.

This is the view taken by the Commission. Their unanimous conclusion is that the State should itself undertake the responsibility for the adequate treatment of these diseases. In such schemes the provision for suitable institutional treatment will form an essential part, and the principle is laid down that this institutional treatment should be available for the whole community, and should be so organised that persons affected by the disease will have no hesitation in taking advantage of the facilities for treatment which are offered. This evidently implies that the patient shall have no awkward questions asked as to his place of residence, or as to his personal ability to pay, though it ought to be practicable to arrange for payment on the part of those patients who can afford to pay.

For the sake of simplicity in administration as well as for the convenience of patients the Commission recommend that treatment at a particular institution should not be confined to persons living within a particular local government area. In order to avoid attaching a stigma to patients suffering from venereal disease the Commission look with disfavour on special hospitals unless other arrangements fail. They urge that voluntary hospitals should be utilised to the fullest practicable extent.

Finally, the Commission recommend that three-fourths of the cost of local schemes for the treatment of venereal diseases should be borne by Imperial funds, leaving only one-fourth to come from local rates.

The plan proposed by the Commission is based on the consideration that for every case of venereal disease treated under satisfactory conditions there is an immediate reduction of spread of infection, and for every case cured this is still more markedly the case. The method of attack is different from what would be required, for instance, for smallpox—a disease which spreads rapidly as the result of momentary direct human association, or indirectly through infected articles. A single case of smallpox, unisolated, may nullify the good produced by isolating a hundred cases of the disease.

Syphilis, on the other hand, spreads only under conditions of close intimacy, and its spread is controlled exactly in proportion to the number of patients who are brought under treatment. Hence the plan of the Commission is both scientifically sound and administratively practicable.

It has been suggested that as a further measure notification of the disease should be made compulsory. As is well known, cases of smallpox, enteric fever, scarlet fever, etc., are required to be notified by the practitioner in attendance to the medical officer of health of the district in which the case occurs. Such notifications have statistical and epidemiological value in the study of disease ; while from the practical point of view they often serve to give timely warning of infected milk or water-supplies. They also enable sanitary officers to enforce measures of isolation and disinfection, to secure removal to a fever hospital, and in other ways to safeguard the public health. They may also enable indirect measures of importance to be taken—such as the reduction of over-crowding, the cleansing and lime-washing of premises, or even the gradual elimination of courts and alleys in crowded centres of population. But how can notification help in preventing the spread of gonorrhœa and syphilis, even if the notification could in practice be obtained? The movements of patients having these diseases cannot be restricted, and need not be ; for infected persons by taking very simple precautions against casual contamination—such as drinking out of the same vessel—can avoid conveying infection to others in the course of social life. Given such simple precautions, these diseases can rarely be communicated, except through sexual congress. Under these circumstances, there is no evident gain from compulsory notification, and there is a tremendous risk that, if notification were compulsory, patients would refrain from consulting a doctor, and would be driven, in still greater numbers than at present, to consult unqualified practitioners, who could not easily be compelled to notify.

Closely connected with the question of notification is that of means for enforcing continuance of treatment until the patient is free from infection. It is suggested that notification would enable patients who neglected treatment to be followed up. Many patients suffering from venereal disease discontinue treatment before the disease is eradicated, often as soon as

the immediate discomfort has been removed. But to compel such patients to resume treatment would have the same effect as compulsory notification, in driving others to resort to unqualified practitioners from the beginning of their illness. Reliance will need to be placed, for the present at least, on educational measures, and especially on the increasing enlightenment of the public as to the calamitous after-effects of neglected disease.

An exception to this general proposition is made in the Report of the Commission in respect of poor-law patients; and some members of the Commission were in favour of making a similar exception for prisoners. The justification of the first exception lies in the special conditions under which poor-law patients are admitted to infirmaries. The patients in question are usually inveterate prostitutes who have become diseased to an extent which disqualifies them from plying their unhappy traffic and who consequently are destitute. Even with the knowledge that they will be detained until well such women must enter the infirmary: and persons of practical experience appear to regard it as certain that the exercise of powers of compulsory detention would not be likely to have a deterrent effect in preventing these women from accepting treatment. Such 'ins and outs' are at present a serious scourge to the community. In maritime towns, for instance, such women when still highly infectious 'take their discharge' when a large ship arrives in port, returning as soon as their horrible business slackens! The amount of mischief thus done is incredible to those who have not come into actual contact with it; and at present there is no effective remedy for it. The police are almost helpless, though there is much harrying of unfortunate women from town to town. The medical officer of the infirmary is helpless; he must permit patients to leave the institution, even though he knows that their departure will be the prelude to much increase of venereal disease in the district. There can be no hesitation, therefore, in agreeing with the exception made in respect of these patients in favour of compulsory continuance of treatment in infirmaries until they are reasonably free from infection. It is unfortunate that in so many poor-law institutions the accommodation provided is unsatisfactory and often most depressing in character. Reform in this direction is urgently needed, and

should accompany any attempt to strengthen the law in favour of compulsory detention of patients.

A similar argument would apply in the case of prisoners found to be suffering from venereal disease; but the proposal to detain prisoners beyond the term of their sentence, if still infectious, is one which involves difficult considerations in jurisprudence; and the Commissioners refrained from committing themselves to this proposal. They urge instead more effective treatment of prisoners during their term of imprisonment, and active voluntary efforts to secure continued treatment afterwards.

An even more important consideration is raised by the question of how far it is possible to deal with the disease by prophylactic measures. In some countries measures of personal prophylaxis for those who are about to expose themselves, or who have exposed themselves, to possible infection, are enjoined in the case of members of the naval and military forces. These prophylactic measures, which have proved highly efficient, come under two headings: the use of germicidal applications before irregular sexual intercourse, and the use of germicidal injections and applications afterwards. It is well known that the use of simple measures within one or two hours after exposure to infection will, in most instances, prevent the occurrence of disease. In an appendix to the Report of the Commission it is stated that by the use of such measures gonorrhœa could be stamped out in a few years. The Commission carefully refrained from expressing any opinion upon either method of guarding against disease.

The importance of the matter cannot, however, be ignored. Both at home and abroad our soldiers are being grievously infected with venereal disease. As shown above, the expenditure during the war for soldiers suffering from these diseases must already have mounted up approximately to a million pounds a year merely for that portion of our forces stationed in the United Kingdom. Even more serious is the incapacitation of large numbers of men from military service. Short of imprisoning every woman who approaches a military camp and absolutely cancelling all military leave, it is impossible to begin to prevent soldiers from running the risk of venereal infection. Nor would even these impossibly drastic measures touch the case of the soldiers living in billets.

The seriousness of the matter is fully recognised by the military authorities, and lectures are given on the horrible character of the risks that a man runs in consorting with immoral women, but the results are disappointing. Therefore, the question arises whether, in the interest of their health, of the health of their wives and of their unborn children, and also in the interest of the military strength of the nation, it is not desirable to give to our soldiers the opportunity of guarding themselves against disease. It is not suggested that the soldiers should be in any way encouraged to indulge in irregular sexual intercourse, or that anything should be done which would give them the idea that the military authorities look with tolerance upon such irregularities. But the evil is so grave that the case is very strong indeed for putting into the hands of the soldier the means which will enable him to protect himself.

A PROGRAMME FOR PEACE

ON the morning of Saturday, March 4, the thirteenth day of the battle of Verdun, I stood, with others, on a low spur to the north-west of the town and heard, rather than watched, the preparation of the second German attack upon the village of Douaumont. A few hundred yards below us French batteries were snapping out defiance at the invisible German guns across the Meuse and beyond the nearest heights. How many guns of all calibres were in action on both sides I cannot tell—many hundreds certainly, perhaps thousands. Quick jets of flame would spurt from unexpected positions, huge shells would drone across the valley and burst with terrific clatter into cloudlets of dirty, black-grey smoke, but even the stray gleams of anæmic sunshine that broke through the curtain of mist and sleet revealed little of the grim work in progress. It was like a severe spring tempest, with peal upon peal of rattling thunder, near and far, in a hilly landscape half hidden by sheets of snow and hail—but a tempest rendered tragic by the consciousness that, at every detonation, the devoted French infantry, some of the finest and most intelligent men in the world, were being dismembered, buried alive, or slain outright. Yet the uppermost feeling at the moment and on the spot was one of impatience at being merely a listening spectator, not a combatant. Only on returning westwards and seeing fresh reserves of sturdy humanity rushing towards the shambles in huge motor lorries, did reflection overcome the lingering thrill of the distant strife, and the question arise insistently, 'Why? Why?'

Little by little, the question transformed itself into a hard resolve, into a determination not consciously formed but elementary, like hunger or thirst,—'Never again! Never 'again shall the fiends in human shape that let loose this orgy 'of wickedness upon the world be permitted to hold mankind 'to ransom, and to measure the liberties of their superiors in 'civilisation by the might of their own scientific savagery and 'organised lust of wealth and power!'

Hard upon the ' Why ? ' with its attendant resolve, followed the ' How ? ' ; and before a clear notion as to ways and means could delineate itself in the mind came an angry wish that every minister and diplomatist, politician and publicist, whose voice may be heard or whose influence be felt in the determination of peace, should see what we had seen, hear what we had heard, feel what we had felt. A period of compulsory presence on or near a battlefield, of salutary exposure to shell-fire, of obligatory visits to ruined towns and villages, ought indeed to be an indispensable qualification for every man who aspires or may chance to be in a position to influence conditions of peace. How many suave soothsayers would find their words die on their lips, how many political pontiffs would doubt their own infallibility, how many leisurely recliners in well-padded chairs would feel their sluggish blood tingle with an unwonted intensity of purpose, could they have direct experience of what war means, and realise the positive criminality of any failure to exact reparation to the uttermost from those who have caused it ! The truth that only by prolonged punishment will it be possible to correct the impulses of those who sought to attain their ends by bringing woe upon others might then burn itself into flaccid minds and tighten lax moral sinews.

The war caught us unprepared. Shall peace, which some of our political wiseacres aver will come as a thief in the night, find us also unprepared ? Our unpreparedness, they say, was the best proof of the purity of our pacific intentions. It was also a proof of the sleepy gullibility of our statesmen. On that point much will presently have to be said, and the brows of those who, being watchmen, failed to watch, or who, watching, saw and gave not the alarm, will have to be suitably branded with the mark of guilt. Even now, after twenty months of war, they show little sign of being animated by the stern spirit, or of regarding the future with the penetrating vision that is indispensable if we and our Allies are to secure ourselves against a recurrence of the present catastrophe. We need to look and think ahead and to mobilise for peace. Whenever the conditions of peace become a question of immediate interest, and the suspension, or even the end, of hostilities is in sight, the blatant voice of crankdom will be heard again and every philanthropic or economic quack will cry his wares

aloud in the market-place. Before this can happen it behoves every serious student of national and international affairs to make up his mind, while still under stress of war, as to the kind of Europe he would wish to see rebuilt upon the ruins of the Europe of 1914; and, having taken counsel of his fellows, to assist in formulating so sound a peace doctrine and in securing for it so large and solid a support of public opinion that no maudlin statesman or cynical diplomatist will dare to betray its fundamental postulates. In these matters the peoples of the British Empire cannot afford to 'trust the 'Government.' After having saved the Empire by their exertions, in conjunction with those of the Allies, they will need to save it again for the welfare of future generations by the soundness of their instinct and the vigour of their pacific purpose.

Let it not be said that peace conditions ought not to be conceived in a war-spirit. The peace we shall need to impose upon the enemy should be no ordinary peace. It cannot be a pact concluded, with honourable give and take, between two parties of belligerents who have learned to respect each other. It should be the kind of peace which a strong chief of frontier police dictates to marauding tribesmen. This war has been as an earthquake laying bare the foundations of European civilisation and revealing the national character of the sharers in the fray. These characters are not likely to change within a calculable future. The nature of the German people, as we have learned to know it during this war, is its real nature. As long as the Germans were weak and divided against themselves, their brutality and greed concerned chiefly themselves. But, with national unification and the direction of the national will by an ambitious dynasty, they became a peril to mankind. It is against the revival of this peril in an active form that the Allied peoples must compel their Governments to guard. A strong peace policy, carefully thought out in the present war atmosphere and adhered to despite the fatigue that may accompany the last phases of the struggle, will be the best, nay, the only safeguard against a recurrence of the German danger.

The British Empire, which will have suffered less than any of the Allies during the struggle, is in duty bound to exert its whole power to make peace permanent. In its navy it wields

a weapon that can ensure the adoption of whatever terms the Allies may formulate. It can decline to raise the blockade of Germany or to recognise the German flag on the high seas until Germany has made full reparation for the wrong she has done. The method of ensuring the adoption of the necessary peace terms is, however, a matter of less immediate importance than the discussion of what those terms shall be ; and, in the drafting of those terms, the chief aim to be pursued is the creation of a Europe so constituted that German attempts to dominate it by force of arms or economically shall henceforth be hopeless.

It is often said that the Allies cannot hope permanently to subjugate or enfeeble a nation of 65,000,000 or, if the German Austrians be included, of 75,000,000 souls. From this premiss it is argued that no attempt should be made, after an Allied victory, to interfere with the internal arrangements of the German Empire or to pursue a ' vindictive ' policy. Smug humanitarians who have neither fired a shot nor seen a shot fired in the war will remind us of the advantages secured to Germany by Bismarck's ' magnanimous ' treatment of Austria in 1866, and will warn us that we cannot impoverish Germany without limiting her future power to trade with us, and, consequently, without impoverishing ourselves. Before the war ends, it may be hoped that a sense of the enormity of the crime committed by Germany in provoking it will have become keen enough in England, as it already is in the British Dominions, to rob this pernicious nonsense of its befuddling power. But, inasmuch as the good-natured foolishness of Englishmen is inexhaustible, it is necessary at once to demolish the mistaken or interested conception upon which these arguments are based.

There is no parallel between the situation of 1866 and that of the Allies in this war. Bismarck's ' generous ' treatment of Austria was intended to facilitate German aggression upon France and to remove a potential obstacle to Prussian hegemony in Europe. It was meant to spare the pride and the material interests of the Hapsburgs and their peoples against the day when they could be cajoled or coerced into alliance with Germany. It was conceived as a first step towards the practical annexation of Austria-Hungary by Germany : that is to say, as a preliminary to the policy of ' peaceful pene-

'tration' which Germany has since developed with such treacherous virtuosity in other countries besides Austria. Far better would it have been for Austria and for Europe had Bismarck failed to prevent his Sovereign from inflicting upon the Hapsburgs a galling wound. They would then have been compelled to set their house in order and seriously to seek reliable allies against the Prussian victors. As it was, Bismarck's 'magnanimity' presently enabled Germany to acquire working control of Austria-Hungary and to use her 50,000,000 inhabitants as retainers of the Hohenzollerns. The advantages which Germany has derived from having at her disposal this mass of *Menschenmaterial* to serve as cannon fodder are immense—scarcely less important than the services rendered her by the Skoda, Wittkowitz, and other Rothschild arsenals in Austria. The advantages which Austria has derived from her association with Germany are, on the contrary, bankruptcy, famine, loss of independence, and, if the Allies do their duty, permanent disruption.

Against Bismarck's magnanimity in 1866 should be set off his treatment of Denmark in 1864 and of France in 1871. How keen was his regret in later years that, through a miscalculation, he had then failed to 'bleed France white'! The present war was intended by Germany to do what the Treaty of Frankfurt had failed to accomplish; and if, by any chance, Germany had been able to land a force in England, our partisans of 'magnanimity' would have been taught a lesson that might have disturbed even their incorrigible faith in German highmindedness.

The task of the Allies is not to seek, in misunderstood history, precedents for the solution of an entirely unprecedented problem, but to deal with the problem itself on its merits.

It is true that an entire people cannot be punished for murderous brigandage as an individual would be punished; but it can be taught, as individuals have to be taught, that brigandage and murder do not pay. This lesson has to be inculcated directly upon the present generation of Germans, and in such manner that its chastening effect may be felt by future generations. After the war the Allies cannot simply resume their former relations with Germany. They must for a long time to come have few dealings with her other than those that may be necessary to secure full reparation to

Belgium, Northern France, Serbia and Poland. Some metaphysicians, posing as economists, have enunciated the doctrine that we cannot impoverish Germany without impoverishing ourselves. If that be true, the answer must be : Let us rather be impoverished and secure than see Germany go unpunished and her victims denied indemnity. But it has yet to be proved that by economic alliance between the various portions of the British Empire and between it and our Allies, by developing our and their resources, we shall not only not be impoverished but shall gain in clean prosperity. Germany, it may be said, will trade with neutrals ; and as we cannot help trading with neutrals, we shall be indirectly trading with Germany. This question of relations with neutrals will require firm and careful treatment. France, for instance, who is setting an example in so many things, is already dealing with it. The French commercial service, which is ably organised, is already ' black-' listing ' neutral firms which are known to have placed themselves at the disposal of Germany during the war. Those firms will do no more business with French firms for many a long day. Should not our commercial service, which has accumulated much valuable information on the subject of the assistance given to the enemy by neutral traders, also begin to prepare its ' black list ' for future use ?

In trade, as in all other matters, there should be preferential treatment between the Allies after the war. Neutrals will fall into several classes. Countries which, like the United States, have shown, on the whole, good will towards the Allied cause and have understood its significance for the future of humanity ; governments which, like that of Spain, have ' played ' the game ' to the best of their power ; and possibly little States like Denmark, that have cowered defenceless under the fist of the German bully, will be entitled to special consideration. But States which have clandestinely sided with and helped the enemy or have deliberately hampered the Allies during the war ; peoples which, while able to defend themselves against eventual German aggression, have yet believed in and wished for the success of German arms, must be regarded as second-class neutrals. The economic and financial arrangements and practices that ceased at the beginning of August 1914 can never return. The old order of things in Europe passed away for ever when the Germans crossed the Belgian

frontier. The leaders of the Allied peoples should therefore cease to stumble backwards into the future with their eyes wistfully fixed on the past and their minds filled with longing to save as much as possible of its effete arrangements. They should resolutely face the new conditions, actual and prospective, in which the wealth of individuals and of the nation, their trade and their industries, will be as truly parts of the national defensive system as are armies and navies.

In other words, a war temper must animate our statesmen, politicians, and the public. Hitherto many of our public men have displayed only a regretful peace temper. They have acted and spoken as though they expected—some of them indeed have never ceased to expect—peace to 'break out' at any moment. Their chief preoccupation has been how, on the 'outbreak' of peace, to return to *ante bellum* conditions with the least loss of time and of money, and with the least dislocation of their views and habits. Have we not heard Sir Edward Grey bewail, again and again, the wickedness of Germany—because she refused to attend a diplomatic conference upon the Sarajevo assassinations? He seems really to have believed that Germany, after having carefully prepared for many years the wherewithal for the assassination of Europe, and having secured a most advantageous pretext for the consummation of her premeditated crime, would meekly take part in a diplomatic conference during which her prospective victims might have had time to divine her purpose. He appears still not to perceive that the Conference of Ambassadors of 1912-1913, over which Germany and Austria allowed him to preside, was designed by Germany to gain time for the completion of her naval, military, and diplomatic preparations, while convincing him of her good faith and thus increasing the likelihood of British neutrality during her onslaught. Men of this temper cannot be trusted to reconstruct Europe in the way in which Europe must be reconstructed if this war is to be final, and not merely a prelude to other wars fought in less advantageous conditions. Unless the British Empire is to betray its trust to its peoples and to its Allies, our Foreign Minister, not less than our Prime Minister and our Generals, need to be men filled with the war temper.

Hitherto only one of our present Ministers has shown, from time to time though not constantly, signs of the true war

temper. It has been reserved for the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Hughes, to display it in its fulness. The response evoked by the speeches in which, in the terms applied by him to Mr. Lloyd George, he 'used words as an instrument to action, 'not as a substitute for it,' showed how strong is the inarticulate war temper among our people. The appearance of Mr. Hughes and the reception given to his speeches have been the most heartening phenomena in the non-military public life of the British Empire since the beginning of the war. We can be grateful to him without needing to acclaim him as 'the man,' or to believe that upon his frail shoulders we can unload the burden of our duty while we slumber yet awhile. No one man can save the Empire or the Allied Cause. This war is essentially a war of peoples, not of kings or dictators. But no people can act efficiently without some crystallisation of its ideas, some canalisation of its political instincts. Those who have given thought to the matter should therefore put forward their conception of the practical objects to be attained by the war, if only in the hope of provoking a discussion that may help to clear up obscure points and to further the acceptance of a general programme. In this hope I venture tentatively to draw up a list of what seem to me the essential postulates of a lasting peace.

(1) That the Allies win the war so thoroughly as to be able to dictate their terms. An inconclusive peace, following upon even a victorious war, would be but a prelude to a fresh period of armaments and of preparation for a struggle still more cruel.

(2) That, as a preliminary step to the winning of the war, the British people entrust its management to a few men filled with the war spirit and determined to conquer literally *at all costs.*

(3) That the co-ordination of Allied effort, and particularly of Franco-British effort, be carried much farther than it has hitherto been. To this end the British forces in France should be regarded as an integral part of the French Army, and should receive orders, not merely suggestions or advice, from the French Commander-in-Chief and his Chief of Staff. Just as the French Navy is, in practice, subordinate to the British Navy, so the British Army, with its reserves and resources, should be effectively subordinate to the French Army, which, in the

conduct of a Continental war, is at least as superior to our Army as the British Navy is superior to the French Navy.

(4) That as soon as a Government for War shall have been formed in Great Britain, a policy of economic alliance between the various parts of the Empire, with the help of statesmen from Oversea Dominions, shall be drafted on broad lines.

(5) That this policy having been formulated and adopted in principle, the British Empire, as a whole, shall concert with its Allies a scheme for economic defence against Germany and her allies both during and after the war. The objects of this scheme would be :—(*a*) To tighten the ' blockade ' of Germany ; (*b*) to convince Germany and her allies that the longer they continue the struggle the more complete will be their economic ruin, and the more protracted the period of economic servitude through which they must pass until they have fully indemnified those of the Allies who have most suffered from Germany's action ; (*c*) to establish, as a settled principle of Allied policy, that, until these indemnities have been fully paid, the British and Allied Navies will not recognise the German or any enemy flag upon the high seas ; and that the Allies will exact such additional guarantees of the payment of these indemnities, by occupation of territory or otherwise, as may be deemed essential.

(6) That, simultaneously with the formulation of an Allied economic policy, there shall be taken in hand the establishment of a definite scheme of European reconstruction, territorial and political, such a scheme to include :—

(*a*) The restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France ;

(*b*) The adjustment of Belgian territory in accordance with Belgian requirements ;

(*c*) The constitution of an ethnically complete Serbia in the form of a United States of Yugoslavia ;

(*d*) The constitution of a unified self-governing Poland under the Russian sceptre ;

(*e*) The constitution of an independent, or at least autonomous, Bohemia, including Moravia and the Slovak country of north-western Hungary ;

(*f*) The allotment to Rumania of the Rumane regions of Hungary and the Bukovina, provided that Rumania shall have helped effectively to liberate those regions from Austro-Hungarian rule ;

(*g*) The establishment of the freedom of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles to shipping, after Russia has secured, or has been given, possession of Constantinople.

(*h*) The completion of Italian unity by the inclusion within the frontiers of the kingdom of Italy of all Italian districts in the Trentino and the Carnic Alps, on the Triestine littoral and the Istrian coast; the establishment of Italian naval control in the Adriatic by the possession of Pola, Lissa, and Valona.

I foresee the objections that, though the pastime of selling the bear's skin may be diverting, no practical object can be served by discussing conditions of peace before the enemy has been beaten, and that the concentration of attention upon 'after the war' problems may distract the public mind from the much more serious business of winning the war. The force of these arguments is undeniable, but there are considerations which make it eminently expedient that a sound scheme of general peace conditions should be framed before hostilities end. The war may still last many months, perhaps years. The longer it lasts the more exhausted will all the belligerents become, and the more eager will be sections of public opinion in the Allied countries to secure a rapid settlement without overmuch haggling as to terms. Fatigue, masquerading as generosity, and unavowed pro-Germanism whispering 'Let bygones be bygones,' might become serious political factors unless the Allied peoples were agreed in advance upon a minimum peace programme. We do not know in what form proposals for peace will be made. The first proposal may be for an armistice, during which conditions would be debated. Such an armistice would oblige the Allies to keep their millions of men mobilised, ready to resume hostilities should negotiations break down. The longer the armistice and the more protracted the negotiations, the more irksome would be the state of armed inactivity to the men in the field, and the keener the desire for a rapid settlement that would restore them to their civil occupations and relieve the burden upon taxpayers. In these circumstances the tendency to compromise upon essential points might become too strong for any Allied government to withstand. Germany, we may be sure, will seek to exploit these possibilities. It behoves us, therefore, to guard against them in advance.

The best means of guarding against them is the formulation of a clear-cut minimum programme which must be accepted by the enemy before any armistice can be conceded. The programme must include the giving of guarantees for its execution pending negotiation upon points of detail. These guarantees must be such as to permit of the demobilisation of the greater part of the Allied armies, even if the fleets have to remain mobilised. The protraction of discussion upon points of detail for a few weeks or months would then matter little.

Another and equally cogent reason for the formulation of a minimum peace programme in advance lies in the manœuvres which Germany has already attempted, and is likely increasingly to attempt when she is forced to admit herself beaten. She may, for instance, suddenly evacuate Belgium in the hope of troubling Allied public opinion and of inducing neutrals to clamour for the cessation of hostilities. Belgium once evacuated, she would doubtless try to use her occupation of north-eastern France and Poland and the Austro-German occupation of Serbia as a lever to extort concessions from the Allies. If these manœuvres were thwarted, there would remain a supreme expedient to which—as careful observers of German affairs have long apprehended—the German Government may have recourse. Allied statesmen have repeatedly declared that 'we are resolved to destroy Prussian militarism.' Some have added that we are not fighting 'the German people'; and others have fatuously disclaimed any wish to 'humiliate' Germany. It is conceivable that when German bankers, shippers, manufacturers and merchants see ruin staring them in the face, they may—not without a secret understanding with the Government—organise a bogus revolution for the benefit of Allied public opinion and seek the moral rehabilitation reserved for repentant prodigal children. This would be perhaps the most effective and, for the Allied cause, the most dangerous manœuvre that the Germans could attempt. The organisation for effecting it lies ready to hand. The Social Democratic party, the working-class organisations, the press and other agencies, are well under control, and are, to a great extent, subject to Jewish influence. Were the Prussian Government, or even the Hohenzollern dynasty, convinced that a well-managed revolution would be the shortest path

to comparative safety, they would scarcely hesitate to sanction it—with the understanding that, when once generous peace terms had been conceded by the Allies to a penitent German people and the Allied armies had been demobilised, an equally well-managed counter-revolution would set things right again.

Against this possibility also the Allies need to be on their guard. It is not impossible, though, in present conditions, it is scarcely probable, that the German people, exasperated by its losses, will attempt a real and serious revolt ; though it is hard to see what chance of success such a revolt could have as long as the able-bodied male population remains under arms in the field. But, in any case, it would be easy to distinguish a true from a false revolution. When we receive authentic information that the German masses are burning, murdering, and pillaging in their own cities with the same natural and innate ferocity as the German soldiers displayed in Belgium and France, we may begin cautiously to inquire whether something has not changed in Germany, and, after having convinced ourselves of the reality of the change, to take the new situation into account. The whole question of the attitude of the Allies towards Germany in future years, as, indeed, the question of the internal constitution of Germany herself, must depend very largely upon the conduct of the German people during the later phases of the war. We shall need very carefully to avoid the danger of mistaking our wish that there may be a change of heart in Germany for the reality of such a change.

There is yet another and final argument in favour of the formulation of a minimum peace programme by the Allies before peace negotiations begin. The reconstruction of Europe will be a hard task. Were the work to be left entirely to a diplomatic congress sitting in secret after the strain of war has passed away, the Allied peoples, to whose determination and self-sacrifice victory will have been due, might find themselves confronted with a series of accomplished facts hardly differing in quality from the grotesque abominations perpetrated by the Congress of Vienna. As a general rule, professional diplomatists have no political conscience. Their whole training tends to exorcise it from them. Frequently, too, they are skilled ignoramuses. Foreign Ministers of parliamentary origin are often as ignorant as diplomatists,

though less skilled. They are apt to be puppets whose gestures are controlled by wires pulled by permanent officials. No lasting or satisfactory European settlement can be attained by such agents unless the general character of the work is marked out for them beforehand by the informed moral sense of their respective peoples. It is necessary, therefore, that the broad conditions of a European settlement should be discussed and agreed upon in advance by groups of competent persons in the Allied countries. It should be the task of these groups to explain to the public the bearings of the various questions awaiting solution, and to create a sound public opinion which may compel governments to 'run straight.' However disheartening it may be that democratic governments should in this war have proved, on the whole, so inferior to their task of leadership and so incapable of rising above personal or party conceptions; however roundabout, slow, and uneconomical may be the method of driving a government, by pressure of public opinion, to do the duty it ought to have done spontaneously, there is at least this compensation, that in future we shall not be saddled with pseudo-dictators who might prove as incompetent for the tasks of peace as are our lawyers and other political hacks for the tasks of war.

A democracy has to work out its own salvation, and cannot abdicate its governing functions without grave peril to itself. But it needs to watch the doings of its agents much more vigilantly than it has done hitherto and to make them feel that they are exercising executive power with halters round their necks. Groups of competent persons are now being formed in the principal Allied countries; these groups will endeavour to keep in close touch with each other, so that their influence upon the public opinion and, through public opinion, their pressure upon the governments of their respective countries, may be concordant and simultaneous. Some of the questions with which they must deal will naturally be national rather than international or inter-Ally. British, Russian, and Italian opinion would have little to do with the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, save in supporting the demands which the French nation might, upon mature reflection, formulate as indispensable. Similarly, the opinion of Allied countries would have little to say to any internal rearrangement of the British Empire, save in so far as it might

affect their economic interests. Upon the demands of Belgium, whenever they are definitely formulated, the European Allies in general will have to pronounce, though it may be confidently expected that they will uphold every proposal that may tend to strengthen the political and economic position of Belgium in Europe and Africa. It is upon questions in regard to which there is no precedent for the guidance of public opinion—such as the Southern Slav, the Bohemian, and, to some extent, the Polish questions—that the work of agreement will be hardest. So many unfamiliar factors will be involved, so many conflicting interests will come into play, that only by seeking solutions on firm and clear principles will it be possible to reach a tolerable settlement in time. Each of these questions—the Southern Slav, the Bohemian, the Polish, and also the Rumanian—affects the existence of Austria-Hungary. Indirectly also they bear upon the future political constitution of the German people. Old follies die hard, and there lurk in many quarters in this country and in France, if not, indeed, in Italy, mouldy convictions that Austria is indispensable to the Balance of Power in Europe, and that 'if she did not exist it would be 'necessary to invent her.' Ideas such as this take no account of the fact that the Hapsburg Monarchy has been since 1866 potentially, and since 1879 actually, an appendage of Germany, and that her 'mosaic of peoples,' which superficial observers expected to break up at the first shock, has been and still is in reality an element of strength to the German Empire. As long as these peoples are controlled by the Hapsburg Crown and are clamped together, as in an iron frame, by the power of the army, the bureaucracy, the police, the Church, and the Jews, so long will they be instruments of Berlin and involuntary foes of the peace of Europe. The Hapsburg Monarchy must be broken into and broken up from outside by detaching from it those elements which, ethnically, 'belong elsewhere.' The fate of the remainder will depend largely upon the policy which the Allies may think expedient to adopt in regard to Germany.

First among the fragments requiring detachment are the Southern Slav provinces—and here we reach an issue which, in its apparent simplicity and real complexity, is characteristic of many of the issues which the reconstruction of Europe will raise. Serbia has deserved so well of the Allies as to be entitled to any and every extension of territory to which she can

legitimately lay claim. But Serbia has been in the past an exclusively Balkan and Orthodox State, over whose policy outside agencies have sometimes acquired undue influence. Should the Allied Governments think it sufficient to reinstate her in the territory she held before her overthrow last autumn, and merely to grant her sundry 'compensations,' they would probably render the Southern Slav question insoluble and seriously impede any satisfactory reconstruction of Europe. The creation of an ethnically complete Serbo-Croatia, or rather Yugoslavia, is an indispensable preliminary to any proper treatment of the Austrian question, upon a sound solution of which the future equilibrium of Europe depends.

It would not be too much to say that, without the creation of a unified Yugoslavia, there can be no lasting tranquillity in Europe. Should any shortsighted attempt be made, or, if made, be persisted in, to keep the Croat or Catholic portions of the Southern Slav world separate from the Orthodox or Serb portions; should any mistaken solicitude for the maritime outlets of Austria or Hungary be allowed to impede the union of the Croats, Slovenes and Serbs of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Slovene country and parts of Istria, with the Serbs of Serbia proper, the door would be left open to endless friction and intrigue from which there would probably be no escape save through another war. The United States of Southern (or Yugo) Slavia would include some 5,000,000 Catholics, some 7,000,000 adherents of the Orthodox Church, and a few hundred thousand Serb Musulmans. The complete fusion of these various elements—which, be it noted, are all of one race and spoken language—might be as long a process as has been the fusion of the various States of Italy into one united Italian people; but, given political union and the cohesive force of a common patriotism under the pressure of a common peril, the fusion would be but a question of time. With a strong Southern Slav State of 12,000,000 inhabitants, stretching from the Upper Save to the Vardar and from the Danube to the Adriatic, Europe would know that the Gate to the East would be securely held. Such a State could not menace Italian naval supremacy in the Adriatic nor impede the development of Italian commercial and linguistic influence in the Balkans. On the contrary, it would offer a wide field to Italian economic enterprise

and give to Italian influence an opening such as it has not had since the fall of the Venetian Republic. With Trieste as a free port in Italian possession and under Italian administration, and with Fiume as a free port under Southern Slav administration, ample provision would be made for the needs of Hungarian and Austrian seaborne commerce. Between Fiume and San Giovanni di Medua there would be harbours in plenty for the maritime trade of Yugoslavia.

The achievement of Southern Slav unity, coupled with the completion of Rumanian unity by the inclusion in the kingdom of Rumania of the Rumane districts of Hungary and the Bukovina, would tend to reduce the kingdom of Hungary to its proper proportions and to leave the Magyars in possession of the central Hungarian plain. The process would require to be completed by the inclusion of the 2,000,000 Slovaks of north-western Hungary in a united Bohemian-Moravian-Slovak State that would stretch from the Saxon border to the Danube at Pressburg. Such a Bohemia would comprise some 12,000,000 souls, inhabiting a country in an advanced stage of industrial development and possessing great mineral wealth. The large Bohemian port of Usti (or Aussig) on the Elbe, of which the commercial importance rivals that of Trieste, and the development of Pressburg as a Danube port, would provide outlets for Bohemian trade; while proper international arrangements as to railway communications would give railway access to Trieste and Fiume, if not, indeed, to northern ports. Like Yugoslavia, Bohemia would be vitally interested in resisting the encroachments of Germanism. The removal of these States from the orbit of Germanic control would weaken the aggressive force of the German people, and would tend to keep its political and military ambitions within bounds.

This consideration applies with almost equal force to the reunion of Poland. The removal of Galicia from Austria, and of the Duchy of Posen and of Silesia from Germany, would deprive the Germans of ill-gotten sources of strength and wealth. The reconstruction of Poland will be no easy matter. A nation cannot be divided for nearly a century and a half and placed under three different systems of government and education without the separate fragments becoming in some measure differentiated. There are noticeable differences to-day between

the Poles of Austria, the Poles of Russia, and the Poles of Prussia, however much these differences may be overshadowed by the intense Polish patriotism that animates them all. Under a unitary *régime* these differences would tend to disappear. But, as moderation has not hitherto been regarded as the distinctive feature of the Polish national character, it is indispensable, both in the interest of the Poles themselves and in the interest of Europe, that a renewed Polish polity should not be left to fend entirely for itself. Poland should be attached to Russia in such manner that the welfare and integrity of the Polish nation cannot become a matter of indifference to the Russian Empire. Poland, however reconstituted—and on this point Polish views differ too widely to permit of any dogmatic scheme of settlement in detail—will need at once the protecting hand of Russia and access to the Russian market. Without the Russian market, Polish industry, when it has recovered from the havoc of the war, would be likely to languish, despite the new openings which would be provided by the reversion to Poland, in one form or another, of the old Polish ports of Dantzig and Königsberg. Divorced from Russia, Poland would, moreover, fall into the position of a mere buffer State, a borderland between Russia and Germany, in whose affairs Petrograd and Berlin would be constantly tempted to interfere, with results deplorable alike to Europe, to Russia, and to Poland. Reunion and self-government under the Russian sceptre should therefore be the watchwords of the Allies and of far-sighted Polish leaders. The pledge given to Poland in the Grand Duke's manifesto of August 1914, a pledge which the Emperor of Russia has repeatedly ratified, is the basis upon which the solution of the Polish question must be sought.

Upon the necessity of completing Italian national unity, and of securing for Italy a position in the Mediterranean and in the Adriatic corresponding to her needs and to her just aspirations, little need be said. For Italy this war is less a war of conquest and territorial acquisition than a war of national safety, both material and moral. It has enabled her, after a period of diplomatic servitude, to take her place once more by the side of the free nations of the West ; and it has afforded her an opportunity to escape from the German control of her intellectual and economic life. But the Allies of Italy should

not forget that she cannot suddenly change her commercial allegiance without serious detriment to her national economy unless they begin, during the war, to substitute their own economic aid and influence for that of Germany. The people of Italy are very devoted to the ideals for which the Allies are fighting. No factors influenced more potently their decision to draw the sword than their indignation at the German treatment of Belgium and their horror at the sinking of the 'Lusitania.' They believe also in the principle of nationality to which their owe their existence, and which they, like the other Allies, are pledged to uphold. But they look for a helping hand during and after the war, and expect the Allies to sustain them, in trade as in arms, while the struggle against militant Germanism endures.

Our duty to Russia is equally plain. It is to aid Russia in securing the possession of Constantinople and to place the economic freedom of the Straits upon unassailable foundations, to further the development of Russian resources, and to establish between the Russian people and ourselves a communion of feeling and interests that shall withstand all efforts to undermine it. In our attitude towards Russia, as towards our other Allies, any hint of egoism, any display of calculating selfishness, would be fatal. The war which Germany sprang upon the world in August 1914 was essentially a war for the destruction of the liberties of Europe. It is a war of common defence against Germany that is being fought by all the Allied Powers. Without complete self-forgetfulness, we none of us can hope either to win the war satisfactorily or to impose upon the enemy conditions that will guarantee a lasting peace.

Indeed, something more than any conditions which the Allies may be able to impose upon the enemy will be needed if peace is to be really permanent. Its foundations are being laid from day to day during the war by the conduct of the Allies towards each other. If, when hostilities cease, the stock of good will between the Allies and of their respect for each other should through any mismanagement prove to have been lessened during the course of the struggle, their reciprocal engagements will have lost virtue and the settlement of delicate questions will become extremely difficult. If, on the contrary, the rough-and-ready give-and-take that accompanies the working of every true alliance has resulted in an increase of

good will and of eagerness to give each other the benefit of any doubt that may arise, it will be possible to find, in a large and trustful spirit, tolerable solutions for many an 'insoluble' problem. Hence the importance of inter-Ally propaganda, in order to make Great Britain better understood among the masses of the people in France, Russia, Italy, Japan, and reciprocally to generate in the minds of the masses of our own people feelings of effective sympathy for our Allies generally and for each Ally severally. Those who do such work are true apostles of peace, for, by striving to create and maintain instinctive cohesion among the Allies, they are not only thwarting in advance the efforts of the enemy to separate us one from another during the war, but are cementing relationships which, by enduring after the war, will convince the sound elements among the German people that only by a complete change of method and aspiration can Germany hope to regain admission to the family of civilised nations.

I have deliberately refrained from touching upon the difficult extra-European issues with which the Allies will have to deal either before or immediately after the conclusion of peace. Such questions are those of Persia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, not to mention the whole problem of the repartition of the former German possessions in Africa and elsewhere. Each and all of these questions might give rise to serious friction unless they were approached in the spirit of reciprocal confidence that makes it possible to speak frankly without giving offence or arousing suspicion of ulterior motives. Whether Persia be maintained as a quasi-independent State or placed directly under Anglo-Russian tutelage; whether Turkish Armenia come under Russian protection or be given an autonomy guaranteed by the Allied Great Powers; whether Mesopotamia become a British and Syria a French possession, or whether some other form of administration be found, the value of the settlements adopted will depend almost entirely upon the spirit in which they are conceived and upon the relations which will thereafter exist between the Allies. Should peace, even a victorious peace, leave any feeling that one or other of the Allied Powers had sought its own profit, or had, while professing to exert its utmost strength, cannily let the main burden rest on the shoulders of others, then that Power will have suffered moral defeat, and, in any future contest,

will have to fight its battles alone. Our business is to take care that no such suspicion should rest upon ourselves. This is why so much importance attaches to questions like the rise of freights, and the consequent prohibitive prices of coal and other necessaries which we help to supply to our Allies. The fact that, mainly through lack of timely and concerted official action, British shipowners have been allowed to make gigantic profits out of the needs and sufferings of others naturally creates comment among our Allies, whose irritation is not assuaged by the reflection that, owing largely to the same lack of timely action, the shipowners belonging to neutral and to Allied countries have also been able to take advantage of the prevailing high freights. Again, any suspicion that we are wilfully backward in recruiting and training our armies, or niggardly in pouring them into the common stock, would naturally diminish the good will of our friends in France, Russia, and Italy. There is indisputable evidence of the effect produced in Russia by the manœuvres of German agents who disseminated the saying 'England will fight to 'the last drop—of Russian blood.' We cannot seek out and refute these calumnies one by one, but we can and happily are now striving to promote a better understanding of our position and purpose in the minds of our Allies. Yet, when all has been done, it remains true that the first requisite of our present position is to demonstrate by our every word and act our loyalty to our Allies and our determination to carry on the war until our enemy is crushed. This is the first postulate of a peace programme, for, without it, the signing of a peace treaty will bring us, not the assured prospect of fruitful tranquillity, but the certainty of future trouble.

Henry Wickham Steed.

INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION

1. **The Principles of Scientific Management.** By F. W. TAYLOR Harper Brothers. 1914.
2. **Scientific Management and Labor.** By R. F. HOXIE. D. Appleton and Co. 1915.
3. **Memoranda of the Health of Munition Workers Committee.** Ministry of Munitions. 1916.

IN January last the present writer attempted to sketch out in an article in this REVIEW some of the conditions necessary for such a reconstruction of our political system as would remove the more obvious political evils from which the country now suffers. Equally important is the reconstruction of our industrial life. Indeed the latter is the more important. For the political organisation of any country must finally depend on the character and the social relationships of the people of that country, and these in turn depend very largely upon the conditions under which men and women have to earn their daily bread. That those conditions are at present satisfactory for the majority of the people of this country even the most complacent optimist would hardly venture to assert. If we look at our large cities we see mile upon mile of mean streets lined with little box-like houses, ugly without, congested within. These are the homes of the people. Except on rare occasions the majority of city dwellers never see a green field, and their picture of the sky is always bounded by the hard lines of the opposite roofs. Where wages are regular and families small there is generally no lack of food and clothing, but for a very considerable part of the population the supply both of food and clothing—especially boots—is insufficient. In the rural districts, where only a minority of our population now live, the conditions are in some respects better, in others worse. There is plenty of fresh air, there is very often insufficient food, practically no amusement ; while very few farm labourers are able themselves to make any adequate provision for sickness or old age. Their

lives from start to finish are lives of dependence : first on an employer, then on the Poor Law or the State.

In these conditions, it is not surprising that discontent should be fairly widespread ; indeed the greatest matter for surprise is that there should be so much apparent acquiescence with conditions which are essentially bad. Of late years in the towns there has been, under the inspiration of the Socialist Party, organised rebellion against existing social conditions, and this movement is undoubtedly spreading to the countryside ; but at present the farm labourer is less vocal than the town artisan. It does not follow that he thinks the less. The contrast between rich and poor is almost as obtrusive in the country as in the towns, and labourers have plenty of opportunities for contrasting their position with that of those above them in the social scale. But it is, as a rule, only to those with whom they are intimately acquainted that they give expression to their feelings. The writer has a vivid recollection of an incident which occurred some thirty years ago. He was working beside a farm labourer in an open field. The labourer was a man of sterling honesty and unceasing industry, who rarely spoke of anyone except in terms of kindness. While we were working together there drove by an elderly lady alone in a pair-horse carriage, with a coachman and footman on the box. My companion looked up and just remarked : ' Strange, ain't ' it, that it takes two men and two horses to cart one old gal ' about the country ? '—and then went on with his work. Contrasts such as these will be felt even more after the war than before, and, what is more important, they will be felt by both sides, not only by one. Of all the good results that have come out of the war—and there are happily some to compensate for the misery and ruin inflicted upon the world—the best is the fact that the rich have realised as never before a community of interest with the poor. This feeling of comradeship, of common humanity, comes straight from the trenches, and it cannot fail to have an influence upon the solution of those social problems which must be solved if the nation is to avoid social revolution.

Already people in all classes are asking themselves anxiou ly what is to happen after the war. It is universally realised that after the war millions of men and women may conceivably be seeking for work and finding none. All that we know for

certain is that our armies will be disbanded and our munition workers discharged, and that the payment of separation allowances will cease. The rest is doubtful. It is often suggested that after the war the work of reconstruction will be so urgent that temporarily at any rate every available worker will find an opportunity of working. This is a plausible estimate, though it ignores a great many economic and financial difficulties. But even on the very optimistic assumption that work can be found for everybody after the war the question will still remain, on what terms will that work be found?

The problem which has to be solved is not merely the provision of work for everybody, but the provision of work on such terms as the mass of the population will consider to be fair. And this is certain, that what was considered fair before the war will not generally be considered fair after the war. The vast majority of manual workers have grown accustomed to a higher standard of wage than they ever knew before. They will not readily consent to sink back to their old position. It may be that economic forces may compel them to do so in spite of trade unions, just as the agricultural depression of the 'eighties compelled farm-labourers to abandon the trade union movement started by Joseph Arch. But whereas in that case the trouble was limited in extent, we are now face to face with a problem which affects practically the whole of the industrial population.

In considering on what lines that problem ought to be approached it is first of all necessary to refer to the only body of opinion which has yet put forward any attempt at a general solution, namely the Socialists. Their scheme is cut-and-dried. They attribute every industrial trouble to the private ownership of capital, and they believe and teach that universal happiness will be secured when the State itself owns and manages every industry in the country.

The main flaw in the Socialist argument arises from the failure to take account of past as well as of present facts. Capitalism at present undoubtedly produces a great, and often a hideous, contrast between the rich and the poor. But as against that evil must be set the fact that to capitalism the world owes practically all the material progress it has made. The rudest tool that a savage makes to assist him in

his work is a piece of capital; a steam hammer or a power-loom is only an expanded tool. Without tools, without engines, without factories, it would be absolutely impossible to produce the comforts and luxuries which have become necessaries of life to the vast mass of our population. All these things are capital, and they have been called into being through private ownership. The man who might have spent the whole of his earnings or winnings of any kind upon immediate enjoyments has preferred to set them aside for future developments. In so doing he may have benefited himself, though this is by no means always the case, but almost invariably he has benefited mankind. Socialists who dream of abolishing private property as a first step to universal happiness have never yet formulated any scheme by which the State, after confiscating the capital now held by private persons, is to make provision for the necessary additions to capital for the use of future generations.

We need not, however, look so far ahead as this. It is certain that after the war the State will not be in a position to acquire by purchase the vast plant now employed for the industries of the country; it is equally certain that any attempt to confiscate that plant would provoke a social revolution.

For these reasons we may rule out of present consideration the Socialist solution. For present purposes, at any rate, we must assume the maintenance of private ownership of capital as the basis of our industrial organisation. The only practical question is whether the capitalistic organisation of industry can be made to yield a better kind of life to the masses of the population, and if so, how. Those who feel despondent with regard to the possibility of any far-reaching improvement may be advised to cast their thoughts back to the condition of the country a hundred years ago. In the past hundred years the whole standard of living has gone up enormously in all classes, and the rise has been due to that very capitalism which the Socialists regard as the root of all evil.

But though there has been immense improvement all round, we are still left with the fact that the masses of the people are badly off in comparison with the standard of living in the well-to-do classes. In other words, the gap between rich and poor still remains too wide. Here again the Socialists, and

the politicians who lean upon the Socialist vote, have their solution ready. They propose to bridge the gap by taxing the rich in order to subsidise the poor. The fatal objection to that policy is that it makes remuneration depend, not upon work, but upon poverty. Carried to its logical conclusion it means that the State would reward its citizens, not for the services they perform, but for the misfortunes they endure. As a form of charity that is sound enough, but as a method of industrial organisation it is fatal. No community can live unless the mass of its members are willing to work, and therefore the primary object of the State ought to be to secure an adequate reward to the worker. On the human side this is equally important. It is clearly far better for the average citizen that he should be able to earn enough, while active, to maintain himself when old, than that he should earn only a bare minimum of subsistence during his active life and in his old age be dependent upon State charity. Therefore, while it may be necessary as a transitional measure to have fairly extensive schemes of State charity, such as the Poor Law and old age pensions, for those who have suffered either through their own fault or through the defects of our industrial system, such schemes ought to be regarded as exceptional, and not as the main basis of our social organisation.

The real problem to be solved is the problem of wages. By some means or another we have to contrive so to reconstruct our social and industrial organisation that the manual worker may obtain a better living. This is essentially the object which trade unions have set before them, and though they have made many blunders, in the main they have probably effected a very considerable improvement. There can be little doubt that without the assistance of trade unions the manual worker would have been unable to improve his position to the extent to which it has been improved. It does not, however, in the least follow that trade union action will suffice to secure the further improvement that is desirable, or even that present trade union methods are leading in that direction. The defect of trade union action, as indeed of most collective action, is that it is generally based upon a short view of the situation. The individual, or at any rate the individual who succeeds, looks further ahead than the crowd. The crowd is affected only by the facts of the moment, and so we find that

much of the action of trade unions conflicts with the permanent interests of the wage-earning classes.

The root of the trouble lies in the popular conception that there is only a certain amount of work to be done, and that if one man does an exceptionally large share of the total there is less remaining for others. It is not surprising that this fallacy should be so widespread. Take, for example, the case of a body of clerks working in a bank. It is probable that if they adopted some device for increasing the rapidity of their own work fewer clerks would be wanted in that particular bank and one or more would be discharged. It does not follow that the employed class as a whole, or even bank clerks as a separate body, would suffer. For example, a simple transaction which will be disposed of in about a minute by a clerk in a London bank must in Buda-Pesth go before three clerks and will take about fifteen minutes. In a lesser degree the same comparison holds true between the banking methods of Paris and London. But the final result is not that more bank clerks are employed in Buda-Pesth or in Paris, but that more are employed in London because, among other reasons, banking work is there so well done that the world asks that it should be done there.

Similar considerations apply to every kind of workshop. It may easily happen that an increased output by an individual workman may diminish the demand for workers in that particular shop, but it must extend the demand for work as a whole. The ultimate exchange between individuals as between nations is an exchange of goods or services against goods or services. Part of the output of Lancashire cotton mills is exchanged against part of the output of Northampton boot factories. The more cheaply the Lancashire operative produces calico the more calico can the Northampton boot operative afford to buy. Reciprocally, the more cheaply the Northampton operative produces boots the better shod will the Lancashire cotton-spinner be. This basic consideration holds good for international as for national exchanges. When the Lancashire operative is earning high wages by increasing his output of yarn or cloth, he is able to buy more Indian tea, and reciprocally the Indian coolie buys more Lancashire cotton.

Looking at the world as a whole, it is clear that the interest

of all of us lies in cheap production: that is to say, in making the most economical use of our own brains and muscles aided by the best implements we can acquire. This truth is palpable enough to the individual workman when he is working for himself in his own garden or small holding. It never occurs to any man in such circumstances that he can improve his position by working in a sluggish manner or by refusing to use any available machine which will lighten his labour. Yet it is the deliberate policy of most trade unions to check the pace of the individual workman and to oppose, more or less overtly, the introduction of improved machinery.

Before blaming the trade unions it is necessary to understand their point of view. They regard an employer as a person who is using the work of wage-earners for his private benefit. Up to a point that is a true view. The employer must make a profit for himself out of the labour he employs, for otherwise his business will come to an end. But if it ends the immediate employment of the persons employed by him will cease. This aspect of the matter seems so obvious that it is somewhat surprising that it is not more universally appreciated by the wage-earning classes. It generally is appreciated in small undertakings where the employer either works with his men or is not far removed from them in social status. But where the employer is a person who lives remote from his workpeople in a great mansion, or where he is not even a person at all, but a company—an abstraction composed of shareholders who are never seen and who only draw dividends which, apparently, they never earn—it is perhaps intelligible that the general body of employees should assume that the firm possesses a bottomless purse out of which unlimited wages can be paid for limited work. Making this assumption they argue to themselves that the firm alone suffers if they do bad work in return for good wages, and that it alone gains if their work is the best they can give. Further, they argue that if each man works at an easy stroke more men must be employed and paid out of the bottomless purse of the firm.

These conceptions are so deeply ingrained in the minds of the mass of wage-earners that mere reasoning will not remove them. It is of course easy enough to demonstrate the fallacies underlying the whole trade union position with regard to the limitation of output, but such a demonstration would leave

the men concerned either indifferent or angry. Indeed, we have lately seen the sovereign State itself solemnly acquiescing in the absurdity of the ca'-canny policy, and undertaking by means of words inserted in an Act of Parliament that, after the war, trade unions shall be free to re-establish the restrictive practices which they have partly abandoned during the war. A stronger proof of the need for industrial reconstruction it would be hard to find. During the war, workmen are enjoined in eloquent speeches from prominent politicians to exert themselves to the uttermost in producing implements of destruction with which to beat down their country's enemies. But though the duty of destroying our country's enemies stands supreme it does not differ in kind, but only in urgency, from the duty of building up our own country and adding to the comfort and happiness of our own people. If it is right that the members of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers should do the best work they can while making shells or battleships during the war, it cannot also be right that after the war they should work at an artificially slow stroke in building railway locomotives or textile machinery, or indeed in building battleships for the peace requirements of the fleet.

The whole conception of an artificial limitation of output is in fact fundamentally immoral. In the case of commodities the immorality meets with immediate popular recognition. A speculator who tries to effect a corner in wheat and to make a fortune for himself by keeping the world short of food is regarded as an enemy of mankind. But in this case the mischief done is only temporary. The wheat is held back, but not wasted; sooner or later it becomes available for consumption. In the case of labour restrictions, on the other hand, there is a real wastage of wealth. The human energy that might have been employed in producing ten articles in a day has been checked and shackled so that only five have been produced. The half-day cannot be recovered out of store like a stock of wheat; it is lost for ever. The world is made definitely poorer when a man who is able and willing to produce much is compelled to produce little.

It may be argued that perhaps the world only wants little. But does it? Are all the people, even in this wealthy country, sufficiently supplied with food and clothing and house accommodation? Take the one question of housing. If

houses could be built at half their present cost per cubic foot the comfort and convenience of millions of people could be enormously enhanced. Yet the bricklayers' union deliberately insists upon a standard of work which is far below the capacity of even the least efficient workman, with the double result that the cost of building is very greatly increased and the possible income of the bricklayer reduced. Other branches of the building industry are subjected to similar restrictions. The nation is badly housed, partly because bricklayers, carpenters, plumbers, painters, and plasterers are all obsessed with the folly that they can earn more money by doing less work.

But merely to condemn this folly carries us a very little way forward. We have to discover how to remove from the mind of the wage-earning classes the delusion that their collective interest lies in reducing the individual output of work.

The belief of the present writer is, as hinted above, that the trouble is finally due to the separation of classes. The mere relationship of employer and employed is not in itself necessarily destructive of mutual good feeling. On the contrary, where employer and employed belong to the same social class the business relationship between them often leads to close personal friendship. A similar friendship is often created even where social distinctions exist and are preserved, provided only that the employer shows that he is conscious of the human as well as of the business side of the relationship.

In itself the wage system is in no way inhuman. Indeed, it is the best device that has yet been discovered for dealing with the human aspects of industry. What every man wants is security for his life. Many—very many—wage-earners are still a long way from enjoying that security to the full extent which they desire and are entitled to demand; but they would be still further from that ideal if they were trying to employ themselves with their own scanty capital. In every direction the path of the small man working 'on his own' is blocked with obstacles. He cannot afford to buy the best machinery; he cannot get credit except on costly terms even when his business is going well, and the moment it begins to go badly he cannot get credit at all—and then he is done for.

On the other hand, a skilled and steady workman rarely finds much difficulty, except in times of severe industrial depression, in obtaining employment. In some industries a skilled man can walk out of one shop and into another within an hour. Such a man, provided his wages leave him sufficient margin to make provision for sickness and old age, has more complete security for his life than any member of the community—except a government servant. His wages are regularly paid whether the firm he works for is making a profit or a loss ; if it breaks altogether he can get employment with another firm. Such a man is on the human side immensely better off than a man of similar means attempting to run an independent business. What the Socialists with their quaint phraseology call wage-slavery is for the skilled and steady artisan the highest attainable form of liberty.

Obviously men who are unskilled and unsteady find less security in the wage system. But it has to be shown that any other economically sound system can be devised which will give them greater security. The wage system has the merit of providing discipline as well as pay, and a man who would be quite helpless if left to himself, and dangerous if entrusted with power over others, will make a very fair workman under the control of a good employer.

These considerations show that the wage system possesses very great human advantages. It also possesses the power of producing very remarkable industrial results. Broadly speaking, every great industrial development of the past hundred or hundred and fifty years has been brought about by the combination of employer working for a profit with employees working for a wage. That the system has grave defects it is the purpose of this article to urge ; but do not let us forget its merits.

Still less should we allow ourselves to be dazzled by the superficial merits of suggested alternatives to this world-embracing combination of profit-making employer and wage-earning employee. One of the most popular alternatives is the extension of State employment. If, for example, the employees of the railway companies in this kingdom were polled, probably a majority would vote in favour of the State taking over the railways, and they would frankly give as their reason the belief that the State would pay them higher wages.

Other persons are eager to obtain State employment because—as incidentally remarked above—it offers greater security. But these facts have very little bearing upon the problem that has to be solved.

That the government servant may be in a better position either as regards wage or as regards security than the employee of a private firm proves nothing. For government service is not self-supporting. The State relies upon the earnings made in private business to furnish it with the means of carrying on public business. The only commercial business undertaken by the State in this country is the Post Office, and the only branch of that business which shows a profit is the conveyance of penny letters. The profit here arises because the State, having a monopoly, is able to charge a penny for a service which costs a halfpenny to perform.* The parcels post, the telegraph service, the telephone service, are all carried on at a loss. It is easy enough for the State to pay good wages and to give absolute security of tenure even to habitual slackers if any losses on working can be made good either by imposing monopoly charges, or by drawing through taxation upon the resources of private individuals earned in face of the competition of the world. On these lines there is no hope of progress, for anything gained by the favoured few who are employed by the government means something lost to those who remain outside. For example, the deficit of over a million a year on State telegraphs means that other wage-earners, less well off than telegraph operators, have to pay by way of taxation an extra penny a pound on their tea, to make good the telegraph loss.

A more hopeful scheme is the introduction of profit-sharing. This is a scheme which in one form or another has been before the public ever since the experiment of Robert Owen in Lanarkshire a century ago. The principle of profit-sharing has never lacked enthusiastic advocates, and often its advocates have generously risked, as Owen did, their own fortunes in order

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* The authorities of the Post Office reckon that there is a small profit on the conveyance of halfpenny postcards and halfpenny packets. But the cost of sorting, carrying, and delivering a post-card or a halfpenny packet is at least as great as the cost of the same operations for a penny letter.

to put their ideas into practice. Yet the most enthusiastic advocate of profit-sharing must confess that up to the present the world has remained unmoved. There are a few successful profit-sharing schemes in this country ; there are, or were, a few in France ; probably there are some in other countries. But the total is absolutely insignificant in comparison with the aggregate of the world's industrial undertakings.

The reason for this failure of an apparently very promising device is to be found in the double fact that on the one hand the wage-earner does not care to exchange the certainty of a fixed wage for the uncertainty of a fluctuating share of profits ; while on the other the employer does not care to share his profits with men who take no share in his risks. The system does not in fact correspond to the realities of industrial life. In a great manufacturing concern the element which mainly determines the difference between profit and loss is business management. The workmen may all be doing their very best, but one blunder made in management may sweep away the whole of a year's profits. The workman naturally asks why his wages should be made to depend upon a factor which he does not control. In the same way the employer who risks thousands of pounds of his capital upon a single deal, and who pays his workpeople regularly week by week whether the business goes well or ill, naturally asks why they should claim an addition to their wages if his deal turns out well.

The ordinary wage system is, in substance and in fact, more equitable than profit-sharing—or at any rate can be made so. The workman is paid for the work he does. If he does it well he gets, or ought to get, a higher rate of pay ; if he does it quickly he earns, or ought to earn, a larger weekly income. The employer meets all charges and takes all risks, and therefore in equity should take all profit. When his profits are large he builds up a reserve to guard against future losses, and thus secures the continuance of the business and the uninterrupted payment of wages to the work-people. When the business is too large for one capitalist to finance it, shareholders are brought in who, again quite equitably, share in the risk of loss as well as in the hope of gain, to the extent of their investment.

The main lines of the system are absolutely sound. The

trouble is that its working is too often controlled by people who forget that in all human relationships the assertion of rights becomes intolerable unless accompanied by a recognition of responsibilities. On the one hand, we have workmen demanding the maximum wage that the state of the labour market puts within their reach, while ignoring the reciprocal duty of doing the best work they can ; on the other hand, we have employers forcing the pace in the workshop so as to get the maximum output of work for the lowest wage that the work-people will consent to take, and spending their profits on the maintenance of a luxurious style of living. However equitable the basis of our industrial system may be, it cannot produce industrial peace if in practice it leads to a flagrant contrast between the luxurious lives of the rich and the narrow lives of the poor. This is indeed the crux of the matter. Until the wage system can be made to yield a better life for the masses of the people it cannot be pronounced a success ; yet if the foregoing argument be admitted its possibilities of success are enormous.

The main obstacle to success is mutual suspicion between classes, and if that is to be broken down the first move must come from the capitalist class. Members of the capitalist or employing class must prove in civil life, as they have proved in war, that they are the friends as well as the commanders of the men who serve as privates in the great industrial army. If they can succeed by this means in establishing a relationship of confidence and understanding, unlimited progress becomes possible.

The essential requisites for progress are all with us. We have a large population which in peace time was only partially employed ; we have a vast mass of machinery capable of giving an immensely increased output. A sample of what can be done with good will is before us now. Under the stimulus of patriotism the majority of workmen have laid aside their old trade union prejudices. They have turned out more work themselves, and they have acquiesced in the introduction of new workers. At the same time the widespread adoption of the shift system of working has doubled the possible output of every factory and workshop affected. As a result the country in an industrial sense has scarcely missed the millions of men who are serving in our armies and in our fleet. Out

of our own industries we have been able to supply the greater part of the multifold needs of our fighting forces; we have been able also to provide a better living for the bulk of our civil population; while at the same time we have maintained an export industry which—apart from prices—is in volume at least as great as our export industry of twelve years ago in time of peace. If we can so expand our production of wealth under the stimulus of war there is no excuse for maintaining the low rate of production with which we were previously content.

In some directions no doubt our present pace is excessive. On this point it is instructive to consult the very admirable series of reports issued by the Committee appointed by the Ministry of Munitions to examine questions 'affecting the 'personal health and physical efficiency of workers in munitions 'factories and workshops.' This committee had for its chairman Sir George Newman, and included among its members Sir Thomas Barlow and other distinguished medical men, besides representatives of the Factory Department of the Home Office and other persons interested in industrial problems. Its reports deal not only with such obvious matters as ventilation and lighting, the provision of canteen accommodation to enable the workpeople to obtain necessary meals under comfortable conditions, the prevention of specific diseases due to different processes of production; but they also deal with a matter of vital importance which has hitherto been largely ignored in this country—namely, the relationship between fatigue and efficiency. In America attempts to study this problem have been in progress for some years past. The standard American work on the subject is F. W. Taylor's 'Principles of Scientific Management.' In it will be found some remarkable illustrations of the way in which the output of work can be increased by a scientific direction of the operations of manual workers so as to obviate fatigue.

Two of these illustrations may be briefly summarised. The first is a case of purely muscular work. A gang of men were employed to load bars of pig iron into railway trucks. Each bar had to be picked up by hand and carried up an inclined plank into the truck. When the experiment described by the author began the men were loading on the average 12½ tons

a day. They were placed under a system of instruction based upon physiological calculations. Just as a military recruit has his every movement directed by the sergeant instructor, so every movement of this gang of unskilled workers was directed by a trained foreman. They were told when to pick up their load and walk, when to sit down and rest, when to get up again, and so on throughout the day. The result was that in a very brief time they were able to load in a day not 12½ but 47½ tons. They accomplished this work with less exertion to themselves and they secured higher pay. The only other illustration from F. W. Taylor's book for which space can here be found is the case of a number of girls employed to inspect the small steel balls used for bicycle bearings. The work consists of running the little balls between the backs of the fingers, and picking out defective balls with a magnet. In spite of the opposition of the girls the scientific manager began by reducing the hours of labour from 10½ through successive stages to 8½ per day. Each reduction led to an increase of output. He then insisted that at the end of every 75 minutes the girls should leave their work for 10 minutes and be free to walk about and chat with one another. That meant a further reduction of the working day by 40 minutes, but the output was immensely increased.

In both these cases, it should be added, steps were simultaneously taken to weed out workers who were unsuited to the particular class of work and to give them other jobs. This in itself is of course a very important part of industrial organisation. It is absurd to employ a man with a weak back to lift pig iron, or a girl with defective eyesight to search for minute defects in rows of tiny steel balls. There are thousands of people in every country who have drifted by chance into occupations for which they are physically unsuited, and seldom does anyone take thought of the possibility of directing them into work which they would do better.

Similar results to those given above are recorded in the memoranda published by Sir George Newman's Munitions Committee. The following examples are taken from Memorandum No. 7, entitled 'Industrial Fatigue and its Causes' (Cd. 8213):

'At another large munitions factory men engaged in the heavy work of moulding are required by the management to rest 15

minutes in every hour of work. The manager was satisfied that this was an arrangement good for the men and for the output. But the men objected to this long spell of rest in each hour because the work was piece-work, and they thought the production would be lessened by it. The manager accordingly found it necessary to set a foreman to watch and to make the hourly rest compulsory. When this was done the output per hour was found to be actually increased.

'At another munitions factory the Committee learnt that the manager had given a break of 15 minutes daily at 11 A.M. to girls engaged in sedentary work of a monotonous repetitive kind. During the break the girls had recreation in the open air. In spite of this deduction from their working hours of the time so spent, the output per day was increased.'

While the above illustrations indicate the possibilities of improved working that may be secured by more scientific management it is important to add that science alone will accomplish little. In handling human beings the first essential is to be human. Some of the imitators of Mr. Taylor in the United States have forgotten this elementary condition of success and in consequence have failed. These failures and their causes are discussed in a book entitled 'Scientific 'Management, and Labor,' by Mr. R. F. Hoxie, who was instructed by the United States Commission on Industrial Relations to investigate the subject of sceintific management and its relations to labour. Mr. Hoxie shows that in many cases Mr. Taylor's methods have been applied 'without 'much understanding of the subtler labour problems involved,' and that often the employer has looked upon scientific management merely as a device for increasing his profits, with the result that instead of securing the sympathy of the work-people he has provoked their hostility. We are brought in fact back to the point that unless the employer is willing to accept and act upon the view that he is concerned not merely with his own profit but with the well-being of all his work-people they will refuse to co-operate in measures intended to secure a common gain. They will not spontaneously shake off the class suspicion which is the result partly of tradition, partly of the continued attitude of aloofness of the well-to-do classes, partly of the direct and deliberate teaching of Socialists.

For this reason the problem of the better organisation of industry must be approached primarily from the point of view of the workman's health and happiness. It is from that point

of view that it is dealt with in the memoranda of Sir George Newman's Committee, though incidentally these memoranda show that increased industrial efficiency follows increased care for the human machine. Among the problems dealt with is the question of Sunday labour, and the emphatic opinion is expressed that a weekly day of rest is essential. With the idea of increasing the weekly output of munitions Sunday working has been introduced into a very large number of factories, and as a double rate of pay is allowed for Sunday work the practice is popular with wage-earners. But experience seems to be universal that no more work is done. In the pithy phrase of one foreman examined by the Committee, Sunday work gives 'six days' output for seven days' work on eight days' pay.'

Similar considerations apply to the length of the working day. When the hours of working are too long the pace of working must be reduced because of the physiological limitations of the human machine. Such reduction of pace has the appearance of deliberate and dishonest 'slacking,' but probably in a good many cases it is the only course open to the workmen. As the Committee remark:

'It is not surprising that where employers, following tradition rather than experiment, have disobeyed physiological law in the supposed interests of gain—and for a century this has been almost universal—the workers have themselves fallen very commonly into a tradition of working below their best during their spells of labour. In so far as hours of work in excess of those suitable for maximal efficiency have been imposed during the last two or three generations of modern industry upon the workers, a tradition of slowed labour must necessarily have arisen, probably in large part automatically, as a kind of physiological self-protection. Without some conscious or unconscious slackening of effort, indeed, during working hours of improper length in the past, the output might have been even more unfavourable than we know it to have been for the hours of work consumed.'

The essential wastefulness of long hours of working, from the human point of view, could not be better illustrated. When we go on to ask why the employer persists in maintaining a system which he ought from his own experience of life to know to be unsound, we find the probable answer in the natural reluctance of the owners of capital to sacrifice a large portion of the possible utility of their plant. Power-

looms and automatic lathes do not tire. With occasional repairs they will go on yielding an output as long as there is anyone to attend to them. To reduce the day's work from ten to eight hours means a *prima facie* reduction of 20 per cent. in the output of the machinery. That in turn means a very heavy increase in the cost of production ; for the fixed charges which would have been distributed over a hundred yards of calico, let us say, have to be borne by eighty yards. Those fixed charges in modern industry represent a very large proportion of the total cost of production. The main item is the charge for interest and depreciation upon the original cost of the factory, and its expensive equipment of machinery. In addition there is a necessarily heavy charge for the administrative and commercial staff on whose efficiency the financial success of the business primarily depends. There are additional items for repairs and general upkeep.

It is unnecessary further to elaborate the proposition that just as long hours of working are wasteful of human energy, so short hours of working involve a hideous waste of fixed capital. The latter point of view must be considered as well as the former. It is folly to design and build expensive machines and to erect factories with every convenience for efficient working and then to use this costly plant for less than half the day. As we have all seen, this folly has broken down under the strain of war, at any rate so far as factories for the production of war munitions are concerned. Almost everywhere in munition factories work goes on day and night. But the mistake has been made of dividing the twenty-four hours into only two shifts, with the result that the working period is too long for the maximum efficiency of the normal human being. That mistake may have been inevitable, in view of the difficulty of obtaining a sufficient number of workers to compose three shifts. But it is a question whether under the conditions now prevailing this difficulty might not be, in part at any rate, overcome. It is at least possible that a very much larger number of women would be willing to undertake factory work, if the period of working in munition factories were reduced to seven hours, which ought to be the maximum on the three-shift system.

The munitions problem is, however, in any case a temporary one. The war will certainly end some day, and when it ends

there will certainly be no shortage of labour. The establishment of the three-shift system would have the immediate advantage of distributing employment over a larger portion of the population, and would thus by itself tend to mitigate the severity of the labour crisis. The more permanent advantage would be that it would enable the wage-earning classes as a body to earn higher wages and also to enjoy greater leisure. The economy in production arising out of the fuller use of fixed capital and out of the greater efficiency of the human machine would create a margin out of which higher wages could be paid. Simultaneously the necessity of finding three persons for each twenty-four hour period instead of one person would increase the demand for labour, and so give the workman the power of demanding a higher wage.

If it be asked how the employer is to dispose of the increased output of his factory, the answer is that the increased earnings of the work-people in themselves constitute a very important —perhaps ultimately the most important—factor in the demand for commodities. That demand, as explained above, need not be expressed directly, but expressed it must be. Goods pay for goods, and if our work-people demand better clothing, larger houses, more expensive holidays and a greater variety of imported luxuries, the goods they make will be exchanged through the mechanism of commerce for the comforts and pleasures which they buy. Provided the wages of the work-people increase step by step with the increased output of work, there is no reason to fear any glut of goods. The increased leisure arising from the three-shift system will itself be a factor of very great importance in raising the general standard of living. At present the working man has little chance of developing middle-class tastes because he has too little time to himself. If his working hours were cut down he would be able to obtain larger conceptions of the possibilities of life.

It was remarked above that seven hours ought to be the maximum working period under the three-shift system. This allows a clear hour's interval in the middle of each shift for food and rest and a change of air. During that interval the workrooms can be cleaned and ventilated more thoroughly than is possible while the workpeople are present. But if the workpeople are to be turned out of the workrooms for an

hour—as in the interest of their health and efficiency they ought to be—provision must be made for those who live too far away to be able to go home. This problem has already been tackled by the more enterprising firms of the kingdom, and in many places excellent canteen accommodation has been provided by the firm as part of its business outlay. Special attention has been devoted to the matter by the Munitions Committee, and the reports show that the provision of canteens has led to 'a marked improvement in the health 'and physical condition of the workers, a reduction in sick-'ness, less absence and broken time, less tendency to alco-'holism, and an increased efficiency and output.' Canteens are of course desirable apart from the shift system of working, but that system by increasing the output of the factory makes it easier for the firm to afford to supply canteen accommodation on an adequate scale.

The general establishment of the three-shift system would have the further advantage of rendering financially possible longer annual holidays for the masses of the population. Some mills in the north of England now close for a week in the summer, but that is too brief a holiday for men and women who have been living nearly all the rest of the year in the murky atmosphere of an industrial town. By working day and night throughout the year so much time will be gained that even if mills shut down for a whole month in the summer the total working period would be longer than at present. Alternatively, in the case of pressure of work, the employees could temporarily work a shift and a half, so as to allow one shift to get away.

Another extremely important matter which has hitherto been too generally ignored is the question of a periodic rest for women workers. For physiological reasons very few women are able to work up to their full efficiency without a break of at least two days every month. Often the health of women workers suffers very severely through lack of provision for this need. The problem has been neglected, partly no doubt through false modesty, but largely because of the financial difficulty of dealing with it. Women earning a low wage cannot afford to take the necessary rest at their own expense; employers working on a narrow margin of profit cannot afford to pay wages to absentees. But if we increase

the output of wealth by lengthening the working period of our fixed capital this financial difficulty will at once become soluble.

These are a few indications of the improvements that might be secured by a more economical use of the vast machinery of production that capital has created. But it is useless to hope for any improvement unless the workpeople are willing to co-operate with their employers in increasing the efficiency of labour. If the trade unions persist in maintaining the misconceptions upon which the ca'-canny policy is based, practically nothing can be done. To dissipate those misconceptions the employers must demonstrate that they are approaching the whole industrial problem from the human rather than from the financial side. Man does not live by bread alone ; the workman asks for respect as well as for pay ; a mere cash nexus is insufficient. The first essential is to get rid at once and for ever of the old tradition, which still lingers among some of the well-to-do classes, that the manual worker belongs to a different order of the animal creation and ought to be content with an inferior standard of life.

EDITOR.

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